Wayne White, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute
Biography provided by participant
Prior to joining the Middle East Institute in 2005, White served as Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia. White also served as principal Iraq analyst and head of INR/NESA's Iraq team from 2003 to 2005. He was Chief of INR's Maghreb, Arabian Penninsula, Iran and Iraq division and State Department representative to NATO Middle East working groups from 1990 to 2002.
White served as Political Officer at the US interest section in Baghdad in 1983.
From 1978-1979, White served as a US Sinai Field Mission peacekeeper. White joined INR/NESA in 1979 as editor of INR's Arab-Israeli Situation Report, and as an analyst for Iraq. He then served as Senior Analyst for Syria and head of NESA's Lebanon Crisis Team.
White has traveled extensively in West Africa, North Africa, the Levant, Iraq and the Gulf. He has received the State Department's Superior Honor Award five times, INR Analyst of the Year Award, National Intelligence Medal for Outstanding Achievement, and the Secretary's Career Achievement Award.
A Philadelphia native, White has a BA and an MA in Middle East history from Pennsylvania State University.
Very briefly, one famous dictum the current Administration must take to heart certainly far more than did the Bush Administration is "First, do no harm." Some lessons that can be applied have, of course, been learned as a result of the heavy-handed blundering of the last Administration, making the Obama White House considerably more cautious. Nonetheless, the formulation and execution of more thoughtful counter-terrorism policy related to the Middle East and South Asia region is hindered by conflicted domestic politcal pressures and considerations, a host of deeply flawed regional allies, long-ingrained policies and supporting interest groups very difficult to alter or trump, ongoing military commitments in Iraq and… Read more
The proverbial 400 pound gorilla in the room often not explored sufficiently in many discussions of how would the US take out militarily enough of Iran's nuclear capability that it could be neutralized for a considerable period of time is that the military action required to do so probably would be so extensive as to, essentially, place the US and Iran in a virtual state of war. One must consider that to do the job as thoroughly as possible, a massive amount of sheer military power would have to be brought to bear against Iran. Aside from the complex target set involved (made more difficult to tackle by… Read more
I share the largely pessimistic line of thinking of those having already left responses. Despite the hopes and efforts of the Obama Administration, this may, in fact, be the most inopportune timeframe during which to hope for a breakthrough since the Israeli-Palestinian peace process first got off the ground in the early 1990's. The first major problem is Bibi Netanyahu. Let us recall that Netanyahu did all he could to put a potentially promising peace process in the deep freeze during his first tenure as prime minister in the late 1990's, perhaps having the most to do with the buildup of frustration, mistrust and… Read more
Other contributors already have described the strategic and tactical neglect during 2003-2007 that has generated a situation now confronting us ranging somewhere from extremely challenging to perhaps insoluble. Those advocating a policy of staying the course considerably more robustly, one way or another, for a span of time that might reach beyond 10 years probably are being unrealistic. It is somewhat questionable to assume that the American body politic would sustain such a prolonged, bloody and costly slog. Public sentiment, unlikely to change markedly for the positive and then hold for such a long stretch, probably would not support such an effort. Rachel Kleinfeld's advocacy of an approach that would be forged around an attempt to address energetically the situation over… Read more
The degree to which the Iraq War turns a final corner will be determined heavily by that country's progression toward genuine, robust ethno-sectarian reconciliation. Prime Minister Maliki's response to Vice President Biden's urgings related to this critical issue suggest the Iraqi government still has a long way to go in that respect. Some might be inclined to dismiss the significance of Maliki's rebuff as a natural reaction to what might well appear to Maliki and other Iraqis as American interference in Iraqi internal political affairs. And, of course, Biden's past advocacy of the notion of partitioning Iraq, highly unpopular among most Iraqis, is another factor that… Read more
Despite brazen denials on the part of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his hard-line conservative allies, the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a 2nd term almost certainly involved fraud on a systematic and massive scale, according to most all reliable indicators and sources. By now, however, meaningful public protests on the part of the opposition largely have been suppressed. Because there remains a sizeable core of Iranians, albeit a minority, willing to stand by the dominant, more militant conservative ruling circle, and since the latter continues to control formidable security forces, the opposition had little chance of challenging seriously those… Read more
Rather than a sweeping review of most all U.S. wars, I will focus on three unfortunate ones relating to the 20th and 21st centuries: the Spanish-American War, World War I, and the Iraq War initiated in 2003. Although the impact on affected populations clearly also is critical in assessing conflicts, in this case I will judge conflicts more narrowly: on the merits of whether they were worth the sacrifice in terms of gains and losses related as exclusively as possible to the interests of the United States itself. The Spanish-American War was a relatively brief and inexpensive conflict, so… Read more
With President Obama's popularity throughout the Muslim and Arab worlds already rather high, it is likely that a skillful speech will provide him (and the U.S.) with a positive response that will lift that popularity even higher, albeit to a limited extent. Nonetheless, that bump upwards is likely to be short-lived. The venue probably will be a problem in the minds of some listeners, but that would have been true of most all regional capitals. Consequently, some consideration should have been given before settling on Cairo to delivering such an address in Washington on the eve of (or following) a visit to the region. Increasingly,… Read more
Regardless of how I feel about Speaker Pelosi's allegations regarding the briefing she received on torture from the CIA, it is unfortunate that in many cases Congress is at considerable disadvantage in playing the important oversight role it should with respect to matters related to national intelligence. This is not limited to the inherent problem concerning the almost instinctive desire to scale back that role when the President's own party is in the driver's seat on Capitol Hill. As with the briefings provided in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Congress does not receive from the Intelligence Community anything approaching… Read more
Professional economists would, of course, be critical to the formulation of a more richly textured picture of the likely impact of the ongoing global financial crisis, but certain fundamentals fall well within the portfolios of various observers of international affairs with more general or primarily political and social expertise. Throwing my proverbial two cents into this discussion, I remain skeptical that in the near-term there will be any real winners in terms of not having to make some rather painful adjustments. In the end, the greatest strategic advantage probably will pass to China, but even Beijing has experienced some notable internal difficulties, both financial and social, since late last year that are likely to persist for some time--even worsen. And… Read more
Twenty-six years in the Intelligence Community (State/INR) left me with the impression that no single organizational fix would ever substantially improve results. And many have placed far too much emphasis on structural changes aimed at improving the overall intelligence product. I personally believe the jury is still out on whether the creation of the DNI architecture has been an overall success--and, if so, to what degree. That said, one key organizational (or structural) impediment to the richest possible dissemination of the all-important data available to analysts across the Intelligence Community is the far too restricted flow of information between agencies--something already noted in this discussion. However, agencies have never… Read more
I am perhaps most inclined toward Paul Pillar's overall contribution. Since the U.S. remains somewhat vulnerable to terrorist intrusion and attack despite the disruption of overseas networks by direct U.S. action (whether cost-efficient, well-advised or hyped as to its effectiveness), greater vigilance on the part of other friendly governments inside and outside the Middle East/South Asia region, and measures taken within the U.S. itself, one cannot simply credit the outgoing Administration for the absence of such attacks. Additionally, although more difficult to carry out than prior to measures taken in the wake of 9/11, I agree that, unfortunately, additional terrorist attacks on U.S. soil may well take place… Read more
President-elect Obama's campaign promises related to a rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq might well be difficult to effect, but serious consideration probably will have to be given to hewing to a schedule of withdrawal considerably more rapid than that contained in the U.S.-Iraqi agreement concluded earlier this month that allows for a U.S. withdrawal through the end of 2011. That agreement is not a done deal: it must be submitted to an Iraqi national referendum this July, and there are good reasons to believe that its passage is by no means assured. Should it fail to pass, experts… Read more
Biography provided by participant
