Paul R. Pillar, Visiting Professor, Georgetown University
Biography provided by participant
Dr. Paul R. Pillar is Visiting Professor and Director of Studies of the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He retired in 2005 from a 28-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Dr. Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He has been Executive Assistant to CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence and Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence William Webster. He has also headed the Assessments and Information Group of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, and from 1997 to 1999 was deputy chief of the center. He was a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution in 1999-2000.
Pillar received an A.B. summa cum laude from Dartmouth College, a B.Phil. from Oxford University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University. He is a retired officer in the U.S. Army Reserve and served on active duty in 1971-1973, including a tour of duty in Vietnam. He is the author of Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (1983) and Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (2001).
The excellent comment by Brian Jenkins says most of what needs to be said about the specter of an upsurge of domestic terrorism emanating from the Muslim American (or any other) community within the United States. The extent to which the public notices, is alarmed by, and reacts to an incident (and isn’t this much of what terrorism is about?) is not directly correlated to the number of perpetrators, the extent of the organization to which they may be affiliated, or the sophistication of their methods. A singleton or small cell can get our attention in a big way. Whether or not… Read more
The notion that engagement with Tehran somehow strengthens, and extends the longevity of, an Iranian regime whose demise we would welcome is mistaken for two reasons. One is that engagement is not an antonym of criticism or pressure. It is instead a diplomatic tool, to be used for whatever purposes we wish to use it. If we attempt to use it while convincing the other regime that we will work to topple it no matter how it changes its behavior, then of course the other side will lack incentive to engage and the diplomacy will fail. If we use it instead as a tool… Read more
The intense partisanship that has infected discourse on the issues James Kitfield mentioned is part of a larger partisan polarization that is readily apparent in almost every other major issue of public policy in the United States. That polarization has been made clear in countless surveys of public opinion and has been commented on by many members of Congress--some of them dismayingly, as they retire from office. Partisanship on foreign policy and national security issues has intensified significantly over the last three decades or so. It has been quite a while since politics stopped at the water's edge. The… Read more
Although grand strategy has its uses, U.S. foreign policy would be well served if thinking and debate about it got away from the perennial infatuation with doctrine and with attempts to explain the challenges of the world in terms of simple concepts characterizing a particular era. The infatuation persists because such explanations reassure us and appeal to our desire to understand the world without taxing our minds with too much complexity. It persists also because the ranks of strategists are filled with George Kennan wannabes hoping to offer the next great concept to catch on, even though Kennan himself never intended his… Read more
The assigned question is quite broad and diffuse, not least because the two countries concerned present much different challenges. Too much bad policy flows from throwing “rogue regimes” into a single, oversimplifying pot. One obvious difference is that North Korea already has nuclear weapons while Iran does not. Another difference is that the North Korean regime is far more mercurial, penurious, risk-acceptant, blatantly criminal, and vulnerable to implosion than the Iranian regime, notwithstanding the most recent uncertainty and excitement in the streets of Tehran. Something akin to a normal relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran can be envisioned, notwithstanding… Read more
As with many other things that have been well-advertised and long-awaited, the president’s speech is likely to have less impact than the anticipation of it and the perceptions and expectations associated with the fact he is giving such a speech at all. Given the anticipation, the president probably has at least as much opportunity to disappoint as to satisfy. President Obama, and the United States, already are benefitting from the widespread perception in most Muslim countries that his election marks a departure from what those same populations regard as the most damaging aspects of the Bush administration’s foreign policies. Much… Read more
Congress plays an essential role as a surrogate for the American people in assessing the acceptability of certain sensitive activities that the executive branch conducts out of public view. The activities include not only covert action but also anything else, such as the interrogation techniques that have become the current focus of controversy, that could raise questions about consistency with American values and objectives. The need to maintain security precludes making these activities the subject of public debate from the beginning. So the American public elects representatives to Congress, who in turn choose leaders and members of select committees with… Read more
Hyperbolic rhetoric on Pakistan—about it supposedly being on the verge of falling completely into the hands of crazed, turban-wearing fundamentalists who will push the country back to the dark ages while using its nuclear weapons for goodness knows what—may serve the purposes of getting Pakistani leaders’ attention and getting support for aid packages in Congress. But understanding what is going on in Pakistan requires a deep breath and some perspective. Headlines that the Taliban is now “60 miles from Islamabad” make conflict in Pakistan sound like a World War II-style battle front, with visions of Taliban tanks rolling triumphantly into… Read more
The broader question the moderators have posed -- “what is the way forward?” -- I will not attempt to tackle. My general view of the needed approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be summarized in two propositions. First, a two-state solution, (despite some commentators having already sounded its death-knell) must remain the goal, because all the alternatives are either infeasible or too destructive of the interests of Israelis, of Palestinians, or of regional peace. Second, vigorous and direct involvement of the United States is essential in achieving that goal, as demonstrated by the lack of results when such involvement… Read more
If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the principles of deterrence would not be repealed. They were not repealed when other regimes at least as revolutionary, anti-American, risk-acceptant, and/or mercurial as the Islamic Republic of Iran acquired such weapons. Think of China, where the decade-long turmoil of the Cultural Revolution occurred after China had tested nuclear weapons. Or think of the USSR during the last, paranoid years of Stalin, or during subsequent decades when the Soviet Union was doing far more to try to stoke revolutions than anything Iran is doing today. If we must, then yes, we can live with an Iran… Read more
Biography provided by participant
