Steven Metz, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
Biography provided by participant
Dr. Steven Metz is Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. He has been with SSI since 1993, previously serving as Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies and SSI's Director of Research. Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He has been an adviser to political campaigns and elements of the intelligence community; served on national security policy task forces; testified in both houses of Congress; and spoken on military and security issues around the world. He is the author of more than 100 publications including articles in journals such as Washington Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, The National Interest, Defence Studies, and Current History. Metz's research has taken him to 30 countries, including Iraq immediately after the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. He currently serves on the RAND Corporation Insurgency Board. He is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy and is working on a book entitled "Strategic Shock: Eight Events That Changed American Security." Metz holds a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University.
By combining dramatically improved intelligence collection, analysis and sharing; the building of effective partnerships; and offensive and defensive actions, the United States has proven adept at counterterrorism. Unfortunately, al Qaeda recognizes our weaknesses: we are much better at counterterrorism than counterinsurgency but because counterinsurgency appears to be an effective method of counterterrorism (albeit a dangerously, perhaps even disastrously inefficient method), we conflate the two. Hence al Qaeda has concentrated more on miring us in counterinsurgency, which bleeds, confuses, and divides us, than on direct strikes at the United States which unify, motivate, and focus us.… Read more
I gave a talk on counterinsurgency at the National Defense University today and it led me to think a bit more about this, so I wanted to weigh back in. What has led us to involvement in Afghanitan is the merging of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Simply put, large scale, direct counterinsurgency might be the more effective means of counterterrorism, but it is far from the most efficient. During the Clinton and George H. Bush administrations America lost sight of the fact that we were not immune from the historic laws of strategy--that we too must weigh the costs of… Read more
After prodding from my friend Doug MacDonald of Colgate, I wanted to add a few more words on my dismissal of moral obligation as a rationale for continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Three points: 1) Obligation flows both ways. An argument can be made that we have an obligation to support Afghanistan if and only if the Afghan elite fulfills its part of the deal--controlling corruption and narcotrafficking and taking all of the other steps necessary to build a stable political system and economy. If they do not, our obligation is void. And the burden of proof is on them. 2)… Read more
Without repeated the excellent explanations for both sides of the argument already made by my colleagues here, I'll cast my lot with the "go home...sort of" school. I've long held that an approach to counterinsurgency that is contingent on re-engineering societies that does not want it is folly. That is, I believe, more true in Afghanistan than anywhere I can think of. If the true strategic objectives are to prevent Afghanistan from providing bases for terrorists who might attack the United States or the West, and to prevent Pakistan nuclear weapons from falling into their hands, there are much more… Read more
I'm working on fellow blogger Michael Vlahos' magesterial Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change. It makes my head hurt, but in a good way--one of the most important things I've read for many years. Doctrine wise, I'm poring through a draft of the new U.S. Army Capstone Concept which is amazingly good. Hammock reading is Steven Pressfield's fantastic Tides of War (having earlier finished his Gates of Fire and The Virtues of War.)… Read more
I'm afraid Jay has constructed and demolished a caricature of an imperial power. An imperial power is the one which dominates the making of and enforces the rules in a given system, be it a regional one or a global one--not a power that exercises sovereignty over everything. Rome, China, England, and so forth dominated the rule making and enforcement even in places where they did not exercise sovereignty. But because the word "imperial" is so emotionally loaded, I am certainly open to any other that captures the idea that the United States dominates the making of the rules of statecraft and… Read more
Describing American strategy from 1945 to 1991 as "containment" was always an over simplification. It was, more accurately, a time of system building as the United States engineered a range of new institutions and rules to replace those destroyed by the world wars. It was also a time of system building competition with the Soviet Union--a competition in which the United States succeeded. After 1991, the United States faced two choices: what might be called the "imperial" option which placed America in the position of sustaining and protecting the global security system which it helped create, or the "national" option which would… Read more
History suggests that Democratic administrations initially are less disciplined than Republican ones in terms of speaking with one voice. But we must remember that staying on message can also mean that dissenting positions are not given serious consideration with adverse consequences--witness the decision to intervene in Iraq. Perhaps the best approach is one with vigorous debate behind closed doors followed by a single message once the president makes a decision. But that requires a president experienced enough to wade through dissention and overrule powerful, articulate, and loyal advisers. At this point, I'm willing to give the Obama administration the benefit of the… Read more
High value targeting or strategic decapitation has been an element of nearly every successful counterinsurgency campaign. The Israelis may rely on it more than other counterinsurgents, but most (if not all) use it. It is not a panacea--it cannot bring victory alone--but can make a contribution to an integrated counterinsurgency campaign. The United States simply cannot take it off the table in its global counterinsurgency campaign against Islamic radicals. That said, we must develop mechanisms to do it correctly. This includes not only have the intelligence and personnel to be successful, but also having a means to assure that every… Read more
This issue seems clear to me: gone are the days when ostracism by the United States could help delegitimize a leader. Shunning leftists may give us a temporary sense of smugness, but has no strategic effect. We should hold our nose and deal with them, knowing that they will soon enough prove failures. That said, we should modulate our relationship with leftists, righists, or any other sort of "ists" who attempt to circumvent democracy and mutate into dictators. Ostracizing Chavez or wanna-be Chavezes will have little effect, but that doesn't mean we should invite them over for dinner.… Read more
The Iraq war is not over but the American phase is. One of the enduring dilemmas the United States faces when involved in counterinsurgency support is what might be called the "partner problem." Insurgency arises when a regime or state is badly flawed in multiple ways. To resolve the conflict, the regime must address these flaws. The problem is that the national elite--the very group which could address the flaws--has a vested personal stake in sustaining the flawed system. Hence the great challenge for the United States is compelling our partner regime to undertake reform that it does not want to. This requires leverage. The regime… Read more
The Iranian regime has several options. One is simply to repress dissent using as much force as it takes in the mode of North Korea or Iraq under Hussein. While this might seem appealing, I doubt it can be done for a nation already linked to the global information network. Hussein and Kim constructed their national prisons before the infiltration of information technology. A second option might be to escalate attempts to diffuse internal dissent by external conflict. This would be the most dangerous option both for Iran and the world since it could lead Teheran to provoke a war with… Read more
I'm a pessimist when it comes to counter-proliferation based on sanctions. Unfortunately, the North Korean and Iranian regimes see their survival at stake, so it is unlikely that the United States and its partner states can raise the costs of proliferation to the point that these regimes will abandon it. I am a believer in the efficacy of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional. To make it work, the United States needs to make very clear to North Korea and Iran that certain actions will result in their destruction. And it needs to have the nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defenses… Read more
Burt Solomon's article poses an interesting and complex question. As he points out, all wars look justified, even necessary, at their inception. Only later, when the passions of the moment fade and the outcomes and costs are clear, can we begin a more realistic assessment. But even then it striking how easily every American war could have had a different outcome, and thus been seen differently today. It is not too hard to imagine the American Revolution taking a very different turn had France not intervened. George Washington and his colleagues might been seen as criminals playing a bit part in American history. Had Robert… Read more
Biography provided by participant
