Daniel Byman, Director of Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings
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Dr. Daniel Byman is the Director of Georgetown's Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies as well as an Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service. He is also a Senior Fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He has served as a Professional Staff Member with the 9/11 Commission and with the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Before joining the Inquiry Staff he was the Research Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation. Byman has also served as an analyst on the Middle East for the U.S. government. He is the author of The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Wiley, 2007); Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge, 2005); Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflict (Johns Hopkins, 2002); and co-author of Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from the Iraqi Civil War (Brookings, 2007) and The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, 2002). He has also written widely on a range of topics related to terrorism, international security, and the Middle East.
Although the verdict on Major Hasan’s motivations and foreign ties is still out, the attack he allegedly conducted appear particularly ominous when paired with the alleged plot of Najibullah Zazi and the reports of Somali-Americans heading back to Somalia to fight for the Shebab there. These attacks suggest three distinct domestic terrorism dangers related to the salafi-jihadist movement, each one difficult to combat. Initial reports seem to indicate that Hasan was a scared and angry individual who snapped – he acted along, not part of a larger group. This sort of individual attack is the most difficult to prevent, but… Read more
Revolutions of any sort are historically rare and difficult things to predict. Even unexpected demonstrations and protests, as happened in Iran after the fraudulent elections, can catch many seasoned observers off guard. For a revolution to have any chance of succeeding, there must not only be a popular movement, but also cracks within the elite. To me, this is the most surprising thing about the recent unrest. We all knew that much of the Iranian population scorned the clerical regime. More intersting is the open defiance of the Supreme Leader by several leading Iranians who are usually viewed as establishment… Read more
Having a discussion where an administration says an option might simply be the least worst of all options, or where it says it is trying something that may not work but that would promise a high payoff, is increasingly difficult even though we all know these are important things for any leaders to do. My biggest concern on the ugliness of national security debates is that it makes it hard for both Democratic and Republican administrations to pull back from a mistaken policy or one that has gone awry. Such a move would be painted as a loss and lead… Read more
“How Rome Fell: Death of a Superpower,” By Adrian Goldsworthy. oldsworthy’s book is a superb account of the last three centuries of the Roman empire. His thesis is that Rome’s fall was due to its internal weakness, particularly the near-constant civil wars that plagued the empire. Over time, this consumed the army and made it difficult for Rome to marshal its resources against invaders. Goldsworthy displays a mastery of the complexity of the time, but he conveys it to the reader in a clear and even exciting manner. He is particularly good at letting the reader know when he… Read more
The U.S. and Israeli situations with regard to counterterrorism are quite different, both with regard to the adversary and the relative situations of both countries. That said, I believe that Israel offers important lessons, for better and for worse, as the United States goes down this road. I've written extensively on this, most recently a long piece for the Wall Street Journal.… Read more
Anticipating what the recent unrest in Iran will foster in the medium and long-term is difficult if not impossible. No one predicted the election results and the chaotic aftermath, and there are simply too many variables in play today to have any confidence in forecasting. The Iranian people went to the streets with a genuine sense of anger and outrage. The fissures among the elite are real, but for now Ahmadinejad's opponents appear defeated. They have no true leader: Moussavi was a rallying point, but he hardly inspired. Rafsanjani offered savvy and resources, but his corruption was widely reviled. The… Read more
The latest contretemps between Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the CIA over the disclosure of interrogation procedures reflects a much deeper problem: the weakness of Congressional oversight with regard to intelligence. There are many sources of this weakness, and unfortunately they reinforce one another. On most issues Congress does less oversight than it has historically. It has become cliché to say that Congress has become more partisan, but it is useful to begin there. In terms of oversight, this has meant that Democratic members are reluctant to criticize a Democratic president, while Republicans are equally supportive of their own leaders. Members… Read more
I worry about the message that would be sent (and has already been sent) to junior and mid-level intelligence community officials. The operators involved checked the legal box before commencing, and now they must worry about being hung out to dry as the country's mood has shifted. Already, those working in covert action have to become their own lawyers, and this problem is likely to worsen and decrease the willingness of those in the community to take risks. … Read more
U.S. and allied pressure have constrained al-Qaeda in several important ways, but the organization remains solid and its strength in Pakistan is particularly alarming, as Pakistan itself an important power (much more so than Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's last major base). This does not diminish the accomplishments of the United States in Iraq in the last three years and of several Muslim governments in weakening the organization in specific countries. But it should give us a certain degree of humility, as having a sanctuary from which to operate is perhaps the most important requirement for al-Qaeda's organizational success. To read into these… Read more
We do talk to the Iranians both directly and indirectly on a variety of issues even though we do not have formal relations. And as the above discussion has made clear, there are many reasons to try to step up discussions. Indeed, even if we try a more coercive approach, talks still have value -- successful coercion, as well as conciliation, requires skilled diplomacy. But for all our sensitivities regarding talks with the Iranians, we should remember that their issues with us are even more profound. The coup that overthrew Mossadeq in 1953 is politically more alive to most Iranians than the 1979… Read more
I am writing this from Jerusalem, and my mood is pessimistic. The two state solution has been dying since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007. The recent fighting in Gaza was a further blow, but only one of many. The fighting further discredited Palestinian moderates associated with the Palestinian Authority, as many Palestinians saw them as complicit in Israel's campaign against Hamas. The Palestinian Authority's endemic corruption and poor governance, as well as the declining appeal of secular nationalism, have steadily weakened the moderates even without the fighting with Israel. Hamas, in contrast, offers more efficient governance. In addition,… Read more
The Bush administration made two key advances that helped prevent additional attacks on U.S. soil. First, the United States worked with allies around the world to arrest and disrupt terrorist groups. This cooperation was often done through local police and intelligence services and was usually quiet. But it made things far harder for al- Qa’ida to do even basic operations. Previous administrations had also worked with allies to fight terrorists, but the scale and scope of this cooperation were stepped up after 9/11. The second advance was the overthrow of the Taliban, removing the base al-Qa’ida enjoyed in Afghanistan… Read more
Assuming the referendum goes through, the United States is not likely to have all its forces out of Iraq (and let's get rid of the term "combat brigades" if we can and just talk about brigades) in the next 16 months. The demand for training will remain high, as will the heavy demand for SOF and high mobility forces as backup. Ideally these forces would largely be in the background and most of the visible roles would be played by Iraqi military and police forces. But effective training takes a long time, and delays and slips are almost inevitable, particularly if… Read more
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