I remember Wayne's visit well. His experience of near death at the hands of the "friendly" Yemen Air force was not unusual. Crashes on take-off were commonplace events, especially in the MIG-21, evidently an unforgiving vehicle. There were many tragi-comical events.that happened during my time there. They included the time I watched a Yemeni pilot fly an MI-8 helicopter into a parked truck on take off. He never really "powered up."The Yemeni commander present berated the Soviet advisor on the scene for the "shoddy equipment."

AQAP is an organization largely made up of non-Yemeni Sunni zealot exiles. As Wayne says there is some resentment among Sunni Yemeni villagers in the south of the coutry towards the dominant Fiver Shia Yemeni tribesmen in the north of the country. Al-Hadi, the present president is a Sunni Southerner. He is leading the fight against the AQAP because they are clearly a disturbing foreign element seeking an Islamic evolution.

This should be a war of intelligence, US drone strikes against personalities and an inevitably crushing ground effort by Shia tribals and Sunni villagers serving in the military.

Let us be wise enough to let that "play out" without pouring money and sophisticated military equipment into the country.

This question is legitimate because of gains on the part of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen at the expense of the central government (or what passes for one), capitalizing on the extreme instability at the core of Yemeni politics in the wake of the "Arab Awakening." Nonetheless, the practicalities of making a difference on the ground could prove too daunting.

Since the Yemeni-based AQAP is the leading al-Qaeda "franchise" with respect to mounting terrorist attacks against the US, its territorial gains in Yemen are difficult to ignore. Should it succeed in carving out a more substantial and secure base of operations, it might eventially develop the capacity to operate more effectively than what has fo far been the admittedly shaky terrorist track record detailed by Michael Brenner.

At the same time, however, Pat Lang makes telling points about the corrupt, inept, and tribally riven (even in its northern power base) performance of the Yemeni central government and its fumbling use of US-provided arms--even in better times. In fact, my first on the ground initiation into this governmental unmade bed took place when I passed through Yemen on a briefing trip when Pat was our defense attache in Sanaa (back in 1981, I believe). I have one vivid memory of the shoddy operations of the F-5's supplied by the US: the airliner in which I landed on another swing through Yemen barely missed being run down while taxying off the main runway by an F-5 landing recklessly.

So, even though doing something to bolster government forces in countering AQAP's southern expansion may have some merit, our ability to make sure any arms delivered to the Yemeni military for that purpose were put to proper use would be extremely dicey. To make matters even more difficult, some of AQAP's support in southern Yemen stems not from enthusiam for any terrorist agenda, but rather knee-jerk southern resentment against the more dominant north prevailing since shortly after the two parts of the country were united 20-odd years ago--even triggering a bloody north-south civil war in the mid-1990's.

Consequently, Washington probably should take a hard look at the various possibilities for having the desired impact on the evolving situation in Yemen relating to AQAP beyond more and more drone strikes. That said, in the end, the USG might well conclude that providing direct military assistance that could have a beneficial impact in containing or rolling back AQAP's gains would most likely prove to be, effectively, a mission impossible.

The devil is in the details - so it is said. In this case, the devil is in the concept of national interest that leads us to presume that the United States has a significant interest in Yemen's interminable internecine conflicts. We don't. Since 9/11 we are in the habit of scanning the globe to see if anyone out there is a candidate to have the al-Qaeda terrorist label pinned on him. It's a replay of the old Cold War days when we assigned black hats and white hats on the most improbable characters. The number of badies in Yemen who have both the interest and the potential means to do us harm probably could be fitted into John Brennan's briefing room.

In ten years, one amateurish attempt at bringing down a plane originated in Yemen, with two other possibilities. Recently, Washington is all aflutter over reports by a Saudi penetration agent (not the CIA's) that some of the bunch may try again using a devilishly new device. Whether this alleged device is indeed harder to detect than its predecessor or is just a switch from Jockey to Fruit of the Loom we do not reliably know. In any event, sending heavy weapons to the Yemenese army to attack its several internal enemies will not affect the threat - such as it is - one iota.

I was the Defense Attache in Sanaa, North Yemen a generation ago and have returned a number of times to survey the country both before and after unification with South Yemen. When I served in Sanaa, the country was embroiled in a guerrilla war against insurgents sponsored from Aden in the south. In that war the forces of the YAR (north) demonstrated a level of ineptitude that often surprised even as they sought to use the vast array of modern equipment "sold" to them on credit by the USSR, the United States, the UK and various other countries ni the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Saudis were more forthright in their donations. They simply bought US made F-5 fighters and gave them to the Yemenis along with Taiwanese Air Force people in Saudi Air Force uniform for the purpose of maintaining the fighters. The Saudies also paid for USAF trainers to teach the Yemenis to fly the aircraft. Among the other "goodies" collected by the Yemenis for use in their war against the wily National Democratic Front were, C-130 "Hercules" four engine transport aircraft, MIG-21 Soviet made fighters, MI-8 Soviet made helicopters (flown by Soviet instructor pilots in combat), Agusta built "Huey" helicopters (Italy) flown by international mercenary "instructor" pilots in combat, Soviet built main battle tanks, US built main battle tanks, an impressice array of lesser Warsaw Pact armored vehicles, artillery from both Cold War "camps," and a great many Soviet, Eas,t German, Chinese, American and UK trainers who came to went from the scene. Watching the YAR's forces try to employ all that equipment was a bit like reading of the advancing victorious "army" in Evelyn Waugh's "Black Mischief."

Where is all that "stuff?" Part of Yemeni culture is a highly developed appreciation of the art of eliciting "donations" from foreign governments on the basis of "threats." Don't give them anything more than the minimum necessary to bring their natural ferocity to bear on AQAP. They are laughing at you even as they look for a hand-out. pl