In the aftermath of the fall of Mubarak, the security situation in the Egyptian Sinai has deteriorated considerably. Coverage of this situation, which could become serious enough to involve not only Egypt and Israel but also the US, has been vastly overshadowed by the continuing political and economic instability in Egypt proper. Yet, the ominous situation in Sinai could rise to crisis levels quite rapidly sould there be a cross-border terrorist "spectacular" in which a large number of Israelis become casualties.

The most serious aspect of the Sinai mess relates to the dramatic rise in Islamic extremism among a number of Sinai bedouin. This has been compounded by the post-Mubarak government's decision to end its portion of the blockade of the Palestinian Gaza Strip, enabling elements of Hamas to gain easier access to eastern Sinai--the portion of the peninsula closest to the Israeli frontier. A number of cross-border attacks have been launched by various means--and groups--from Sinai, some involving Israeli casualties. With little confidence this situation will improve, the Israelis are frantically upgrading fortifcations along the entire border between the Sinai and the Israeli Negev.

Ironically, the ability of the Egyptian military to better address the situation is hampered by the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty which limits the amount of Egyptian military forces stationed in Sinai. This is especially true in Zone C established by the treaty that comprises the closest slice of Sinai to the Israeli border. There Egypt has been permitted to maintain only a relatively small para-military and police presence which is clearly unable to cope with the rising extent of militant activity in this critical area.

Clearly, the Israelis, the Egyptians--and Washington--want to avoid a crisis in which at some point--most likely in response to a major terrorist attack--Israel could feel compelled to conduct a unilateral (and doubtless inflammatory) cross-border operation to suppress the threat from the Egyptian side. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood wishes to review the terms of the peace treaty, something generally overly sensitive and fraught with danger. However, all parties to it (the US is a formal signatory) should give serious consideration to amending the agreement to permit the Egyptian military to deploy more numerous and more capable forces into Zone C in an effort the rein in the bulk of the cross-border violence.

Such a revision should work to the advantage of all sides. Amending this one portion of the treaty would reduce the likelihood of an ugly Israeli-Egyptian crisis along the border. And although in a way seemingly a sop to the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters in Egypt proper who wish to change the treaty, it would be aimed at curbing Muslim extremist activity in Sinai's most sensitive zone. And the Egyptian military could showcase the treaty change as one that enhances Egyptian sovereignty over a substantial slice of the Sinai. And, for Washington, the reduced likelihood of getting caught in the middle of perhaps what could be the first substantial Egyptian-Israeli face-off since the fall of Mubarak would be highly desirable.

Eternal optimism based on ignorance and wishful thinking seems to be the birthright of most Americans. Mursi can be a friend of the US? Mursi will be a friend of women's rights and the Copts? Mursi will not try to install his version of Sharia once he achieves enough real power? An Islamist Egypt will remain in the Israeli treaty permanently? The Obama Administration thinks these things are likely because Mursi was elected in a reasonably honest election?

Cetain political parties are self described as "Islamist" because that is what they want their constituencies to know they intend as their focus. The MB is an Islamist party. It has existed for eighty years for the specific purpose of transforming Egypt (and various other countries) into theocracies constructed according to their belief as to what Islam is.

1959 was the year that Castro came to power in Cuba. His rule was widely welcomed among many Americans as a triumph of the people's will over the dictator Batista. Great things were expected from Castro's rule; democracy, "progress," etc. It was only after castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist, an ally of the Soviet Union and an exporter of Marxist revolution that most Americans saw him differently.

Qathafy's coup in 1969 was aquiesced in by the US government. Far from being a popular rising the coup was conducted in Tripoli with 200 odd men during a temporary absence of King Idriss, a US ally. A battalion of paratroops flown in from Germany to Wheelus, AFB could have broken the coup in a day, but we stayed our hand in the hope of a bright future in US/Libyan relations. And, what a future it was!

The Iranian revolution of 1979 was encouraged and abetted by the US government with the support of the elite media. The shah was urged to give in to the revolutionaries and eventually to give up power to the mullahs. The mullahs maintained a "Potemkin Village" facade of democratic process and intent until they consolidated their power. They are still in power and we may yet fight them. The American foreign policy establishment dreamt of better possibilities.

Turkey under Erdogan? That race has not been run to the goal posts yet. As was mentioned here, there is a provision in the Turkish constitution that permits the Turkish military to intervene if the essence of a Kemalist, secular state is threatened politically. Perhaps that is why the process of purging the officer corps proceedes slowly.

Now, the US government seems to see a new dawn for Egypt in the coming of an Islamist government. At the same time we glower at the military disapprovingly at the thought that they might not submit to the MB.

Remarkable.

I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but cautiously thoughtful on how US-Egyptian relations may change under the President Mohammed Mohammed Morsi Isa Al-Ayyat, which is his full name.

There are many unknowns here. President Morsi’s cabinet and other advisors need to become clearer. His views on Iran were a bit clearer today when he said Egypt should re-establish relations with the Iran. I am not sure what this means just yet. The Muslim Brotherhood, from which he resigned yesterday in accordance with Egyptian law, has always taken a rather militant stance with regard to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum.

Hamas seems quite happy about the election results. We shall see whether that happiness proves to be to their advantage as the very difficult real-life tradeoffs facing President Morsi become clearer.

The Israelis of the very right seem to want to use these election results to their advantage to sow greater fear in Israel. The Israelis of the very left have been silent on this. The moderates will take a moderated position and will continue to lose ground ground politically.

There is considerable diplomatic and other space that President Morsi could work in with the Turks and the AK Party. However, we all need to remember that the AK Party is a very different group than the Muslim Brotherhood. The AK Party also works in the Turkish environment. There is a constitutional amendment in Turkey allowing the military to change the government if secularism and Attaturkism is under threat. No such amendment exists in Egypt, even if some in the military would like to see that happen.

The constitutional convention that will be meeting in Egypt will have many difficult and very emotional issues to work through. These would also include what to do about the amendments the Egyptian military tacked on to the Egyptian Constitution recently.

We can find an English version of these amendments at Al Ahram online, but Al Ahram does not state this is the official English version, but most of it is close enough: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45350/Egypt/Politics-/URGENT-English-text-of-SCAF-amended-Egypt-Constitu.aspx.(Please be forgiving of their English in places):

“The following amendments will apply immediately:

- Article 30: In situation that parliament is dissolved the president will be vowed into office in front of High Constitutional Court's General Assembly.

- Article 53: The incumbent SCAF members are responsible for deciding on all issues related to the armed forces including appointing its leaders and extending the terms in office of the aforesaid leaders. The current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of defense until a new constitution is drafted.

- Article 53/1: The president can only declare war after the approval of the SCAF.

- Article 53/2: If the country faces internal unrest, which requires the intervention of the armed forces, the president can issue a decision to commission the armed forces – with the approval of the SCAF - to maintain security and defend public properties. Current Egyptian law stipulates the powers of the armed forces and its authorities in cases where the military can use force, arrest or detain.

- Article 56 B: The SCAF will assume the authorities set out in sub-article 1 of Article 56 as written in the 30 March 2011 Constitutional Declaration until a new parliament is elected.

- Article 60 B: If the constituent assembly encounters an obstacle that would prevent it from completing its work, the SCAF within a week will form a new constituent assembly- to author a new constitution within three months from the day of the new assembly's formation. The newly drafted constitution will be put forward after 15 days of the day it is completed, for approval by the people through a national referendum. The parliamentary elections will take place one month from the day the new constitution is approved by the national referendum.

- Article 60 B1: If the president, the head of SCAF, the prime minister, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary or a fifth of the constituent assembly find that the new constitution contains an article or more which conflict with the revolution's goals and its main principles or which conflict with any principle agreed upon in all of Egypt's former constitutions, any of the aforementioned bodies may demand that the constituent assembly revises this specific article within 15 days. Should the constituent assembly object to revising the contentious article, the article will be referred to the High Constitutional Court (HCC) which will then be obliged to give its verdict within seven days. The HCC's decision is final and will be published in the official gazette within three days from the date of issuance.

- Article 38 of the 30 March, 2011 Constitutional Declaration will be replaced with: "The parliamentary elections will be conducted in accordance to the law."”

These are strong changes and do not “strip the power of the President”, as many have stated, but surely weakens the Presidency at some levels.

Clearly the SCAF wants all things related to the military kept as much in their court as possible. They seem worried that the Muslim Brotherhood might pack the military with their own. Of course, there is that nagging question about how many in the Egyptian military are with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is seemingly impossible to tell.

The amendment on the declaration of war needing approval by SCAF is an interesting one. It seems to be there in order to counter those, especially in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist, who might want to go to war with Israel or others -- for their own ideological reasons. My sense is the U.S. should be very wary to push for this to be changed. The military, with its close ties to the U.S. military and its reliance on funding that is essentially due to the Camp David Accords, will acts as a check and balance to the more radical forces in Egypt who would want to go to war with Israel. The Egyptian military also understands quite well there abilities and constraints. They understand it a lot better than the more radical and hotheaded elements in Egypt. The Egyptian military can act as a cooling off mechanism with the Egyptian-Israeli politics get too hot.

Egypt is a country that is not used to civilian control of its military. The U.S. is a country that is quite used to the civilian control of the military. In the U.S. this seems like a given. Hence, many here have trouble understanding why there is such tension in Egypt about any new leadership in the civilian sector having power over the military.

The U.S. has a built in system whereby the military has to argue for its budget each year. Military budgets in the U.S. are discretionary budgets. The Congress and the President need to debate on what the military budgets will be. In the U.S., promotions at very high levels in the military also need Congressional approval. The same is the case for SES members in DOD. In the U.S., the Congress and the Presidency can act as checks and balances to the military – and to each other. That is how our Constitution became the supreme law of the land after arduous and emotional debates amongst our founding leaders so long ago.

Making a constitution is a very difficult chore. This may be one of the hardest things facing Egypt in the near future. The need for grand bargains and strategic compromises need to be a part of these developments. I wish them well. This will be far from easy.

The Parliament of Egypt was dissolved by a court decree recently. This complicates matters even further. However, unlike the situation of Algeria in 1991, there will be another election and it might be run even better than the one previously.

In other words, there is still a lot of hope for democratic development in Egypt.

It takes a very long time for a country to figure out where it is going after such political shocks to its system. It took a huge amount of effort, blood, sweat, tears and compromises for the U.S. to get to where it is today. In addition, the U.S. democratic system is far from perfect and likely will have further changes as it goes into its future.

Egypt is a different environment than the U.S. It is a different culture. It had different historical pathways than the U.S. Egyptians need to figure their way toward their democracy within their culture and society. This will be far from easy. It will be a lot harder if all they get is advice saying that they need to be like us. The best advice we could give is to help them, if they ask, look at many different democratic systems in many parts of the world and at different time periods, much like our own James Madison did so long ago. We could act as mentors and advisors to some extent, but the decisions, debates, and the big issues should be handled by the Egyptians themselves.

Taking away the military aid from Egypt may be taking the rug from under us. The U.S. has proven a certain expertise in that, as well as shooting itself in the foot diplomatically now and then. We need not have to do this now. The best relations we have with Egypt right now are military to military. Surely, these are difficult relations at times. Surely the politics of here and there can sometimes bring these relations to question. However, these relations have been a strong and important element of our overall relations with Egypt and our policies in the region. We should be very careful to damage them in the long-run because of difficulties being faced in both places in the short-run.

In addition, that aid to the military of Egypt is via the Camp David Accords. It would be best not to give the hotter heads here and there more fuel to try to damage or even throw out Camp David. That would be a significant loss in many ways.

Camp David is not perfect. No treaty is. Many people in Egypt disagree with it. Many would like to see it tossed out. However, for peace and security in the region this is one of the most important cornerstones.

The region is in ferment. Things may get far more volatile and unstable. The Syrian situation could spread into many other places. The situation with Iran is still uncertain. Libya is still uncertain. Algeria could head into its own Arab Spring. Sudan (the north) looks to be heading into an Arab Spring. Bahrain is still volatile. Jordan is under stress. Saudi Arabia has some question marks. Kuwait is not exactly 100 percent stable. Only Qatar and the UAE seem immune so far from the Arab Spring—so far.

We need to tread very carefully, very thoughtfully with Egypt as this situation begins to develop further. We also need to send the best people, who can talk with the Egyptians with respect and understanding. This is particularly important in these very emotional times between our two countries.

We may also have a lot less leverage within Egypt than we think.

It has become clear to me that some who are advising our senior leadership on the situation in Egypt are doing this via a very narrow ideological lens. Many of them also seem to be entirely, or nearly entirely clueless, on things Egyptian and what Egyptians really are like.

I lived there for 6 years. I have been involved with the country for 20. When I read the works of or hear the talks of such “experts” on Egypt I am baffled that they are in the positions that they are in. However, they have influence.

One of the best things we could to, and I will be very frank, is to change some of advisors to leadership on Egypt. They have gotten a lot wrong. Either they start getting things right or they can find other posts.

For Egypt?

This is their story. Let them write it.

(These are my opinions alone. The usual caveats apply.)

With humility. Don’t just do something – think! Washington has been blinding itself to new realities. One, our ability to shape the political affairs of countries like Egypt has declined markedly. Two, we have limited understanding of the complex internal dynamics there and have no ability to predict outcomes (along with everybody else). Three, as far as regional politics is concerned, the old coalition of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the US, and Israel that had maintenance of the status quo cannot be restored. Each player’s policies increasingly are driven by powerful centripetal forces. Puffing up Shi’ite Iran as the common enemy will not suffice to hold them together.

American leaders are relentlessly holding onto a worldview that is out of synch with reality. We are not now (and, in truth, never have been) masters of the world – and, therefore, of our fate (which is the ulterior objective). Traipsing through remote places like Honduras, the Congo, Mauretania, the Hindu Kush borderlands with M-1 in one hand and the collected wisdom of Ronald Reagan in the other only accelerates the pace of declining status and influence. America will not “be back” – to quote Mr. Obama – until we bring back some prudence and sense of proportion.