To paraphrase Leon Trotsky, you may not be interested in the war on terror, but the war is interested in you. The Obama Administration would be well-advised to remember this as it campaigns for a second term in office. Although severely weakened, Al Qaeda remains a dangerous threat. Moreover its regional franchises and Islamist allies are well-positioned to exploit the power vacuums, chaos and political instability that have been generated by the so-called “Arab Spring.” AQAP is growing stronger in Yemen, AQIM has gained greater freedom of action in Libya and access to Qadhafi’s weapons (including MANPADS that pose a considerable threat to civil aviation) and Syria looks to be a promising new front. Somalia remains a fertile recruiting ground for the Shabaab, an Al Qaeda affiliate that is recruiting Somalis living in America. Pakistani terrorist groups allied with Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e Taiba and Tehreek-e-Taliban, also have been actively recruiting inside America.

The Obama Administration already has dispensed with the phrase “war on terrorism” preferring to speak in politically correct terms about the struggle against “violent extremism” in “overseas contingency operations” to prevent “man-caused disasters.” This bureaucratic language is designed more to obfuscate the nature of the threat and play down its urgency than to inspire a resolute long term American and international effort to defeat the terrorist threat posed by Islamist extremists.

Now an anonymous State Department official has declared that the war on terror is over. That is a woefully premature conclusion. Plato wrote that “Only the dead have seen the end of war.” For Bin Laden, the war is over. Unfortunately he has many followers who remain committed to his terrorist jihad. And they are determined to demonstrate that their war against America, the “distant enemy”, is not over.

As long as there are real or perceived national or religious grievances that cannot be resolved politically (or through conventional armed struggle), extremists aroused by such grievances will resort to various forms of asymmetric warfare, including "terrorism," against more powerful opponents. Since 9/11 the US and many of its allies have tried to combat terrorism through military action, improved intelligence, covert operations, vast defensive measures, and PR aimed at "winning hearts and minds." Yet, military action can make matters worse, intelligence is incomplete or flawed, covert ops are isolated stabs at the problem frequently with negative downsides, defensive measures can never be totally effective, and militants and their most committed supporters brush aside Washington's PR (which is uneven and often clumsy in any case).

Taking out Osame bin Laden (OBL) and many senior al-Qaeda (AQ) operatives has been helpful in not only disrupting AQ, but also in deflating the aura of invicibility surrounding them among their sympathizers. Nonetheless, most all the grievances fueling AQ, its many offshoots, and those inspired by it remain. Indeed, just since the beginning of the year, only a tiny number of US soldiers engaging in offensive behavior or outright atrocities have reinforced the image of the US among many militants and the communities in which they thrive as an abusive, anti-Muslim force in the world. Washington can attempt to argue just how isolated these few incidents are in the greater scheme of things. However, accounts of such behavior regularly go "viral" within large portions of the Middle East/South Asian media as well as the many militant sources of inspiration on the Internet, not to mention the many baseless, but robust, conspiracy theories commonly circulatiing (including disbelief that OBL has been killed).

Meanwhile, the notion of a war in the sense of a relentless, well-targeted national or international effort able to eliminate this threat is inaccurate and even promotes an atmosphere of perpetually intense vulnerability among many Americans who should think in terms of the long haul and be far less worried about their own personal safety. The threat of terrorism (that already existed for over 30 years prior to 9/11, and not always related to the Middle East/South Asia region) will not go away entirely, but, at the same time, will impact directly in terms of violence on precious few individuals. Even the concept of "Homeland Defense" is misleading in the sense that those most at risk inevitably will be Americans--military, diplomatic, and private--scattered around the world, not those back in the US.

The overarching issue of the War in Afghanistan also has been blurred by the notion of a "Global War on Terrorism" that can be won militarily and conclusively. In fact, it is highly debatable as to whether keeping a substantial US military presence there will make matters better or worse with respect to the complex challenge of terrorism. Yet, especially in this intensely partisan year in the US, many leading politicians in both parties--including the President--are reluctant to pull out despite a war-weary public and a debt burdened nation in large measure out of fear of being blamed for "losing Afghanistan" or appearing "weak" on national security and terrorism. As a result, the flow of American blood and treasure is set to continue in that fractured land without clear purpose even at this late stage in the game.

The War on Terror, whatever Washington chooses to call it, is far from over. To be sure, al Qaeda’s operational capabilities have been degraded. Its once easily accessible training camps in Afghanistan have been dispersed. Its terrorist networks have been largely dismantled. Its leadership has been decimated by arrests and drone strikes. Its sinews of command are frayed.

Al Qaeda’s old guard, now holed up on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has been reduced to a few hundred men at most. Unprecedented cooperation among intelligence services and law enforcement worldwide has made al Qaeda’s operating environment more hostile. The group has not been able to carry out a major successful terrorist attack in the West since 2005.

Al Qaeda today is far more dependent on its affiliates, on allied groups that have absorbed its ideology, and on its ability to inspire homegrown terrorists—whose turnout, thus far, has been meager.

Of course the death of Osama bin Laden one year ago had an impact. His life’s story was inspirational. He was a charismatic communicator. By the time of his death, his terrorist plans were largely fantasies, but while he lived, he maintained al Qaeda’s unity and focus. No successor speaks with his authority. And yet, his death did not end al Qaeda’s struggle.

The world has moved on. The Arab uprisings seemed to demonstrate the irrelevance of al Qaeda’s ideology. Protestors sought greater political freedom and economic opportunity, not the restoration of an 8th-century caliphate.

Some analysts see the “strategic defeat” of al Qaeda as something that could be achieved in a year or two. Al Qaeda sees things differently. Its PowerPoints portray a struggle that began centuries ago and will continue until Judgment Day. Al Qaeda can claim to have survived the infidels’ mightiest blows, although it accepts that its armed struggle will transcend the lives of its current cohorts. Al Qaeda’s affiliates remain active in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, North Africa, and Somalia, while its ideology has found resonance in the Sahara and the Sahel.

Its communications capabilities have improved. Its ideology has transcended its organization. True, Muslims have not risen up in response to al Qaeda’s exhortations, but it has created a virtual army of followers on the Internet. Most of these would-be warriors remain vicarious participants, ready to boast and threaten online, where it is safe. But a handful of its dimmer, more determined zealots are motivated to action. Each year, authorities uncover new terrorist plots.

And while it is true that few of the protestors in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli, and Saana were jihadists, al Qaeda applauded their success in overthrowing the hated tyrants who, in al Qaeda’s view, governed these countries as puppets of the infidels. Less plausibly, al Qaeda claimed that 9/11 set in motion the events that ultimately led to the Arab Spring, fulfilling al Qaeda’s hopes for a Muslim uprising that never transpired.

At the same time, al Qaeda has positioned itself to exploit future frustration. The failure of new governments to meet the demand for rapid economic development and jobs, machinations to keep Islamists out of power, or the renewal of political repression could provide al Qaeda with new recruiting posters. Meanwhile, al Qaeda has exploited the tumult to expand its operations, obtain weapons, and open new fronts. Al Qaeda is America’s unwanted ally in Syria.

Al Qaeda has drawn the United States and its allies into a costly military effort in Afghanistan. U.S. and NATO forces are withdrawing soon. Afghan government forces may not be able to prevent the expansion of Taliban control, which in turn could give al Qaeda some breathing space, if not a launching pad for new terrorist attacks. Pakistan’s travails offer al Qaeda and its Taliban allies additional opportunities.

Over time, al Qaeda could just fade away. Always resilient, it may morph to survive. Developments on any of several fronts might even enable it to rise again. In a long contest, surprises must be expected.

If al Qaeda will never acknowledge defeat, should the United States itself declare the war to be over? Apart from the obvious risks of claiming “Mission accomplished,” it is uncertain what a unilateral declaration ending the war would look like, or what it might achieve. It could complicate counterterrorist efforts.

While the United States has been “combating terrorism” for decades, and will continue to do so, current U.S. operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban are sanctioned by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, passed by Congress shortly after 9/11. This legislation is tantamount to a declaration of war. Rescinding it would remove the legal basis for the presence of American forces in Afghanistan, as well as American drone strikes and other special operations directed against al Qaeda targets elsewhere. Repeal would also raise questions about the legal basis for holding detainees and remove the president’s authority to detain others as enemy combatants.

A thorough review of the authority ceded to the Executive Branch, along with other security measures imposed since 9/11 is in order. Temporary emergency measures ought not to become permanent features of the political landscape. And fiscal constraints demand that national defense and homeland security budgets be reviewed. It should be possible to reallocate national resources to other more productive investments. Some risks can be taken. But is the “war on terror” over? Not yet.

Brian Michael Jenkins is senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization, and coeditor of the book, The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism (RAND, 2011).

The problem with the question is that if you ask al Qaeda, its leaders would say “no.” Clausewitz wisely observed “defeat is in the mind of the enemy commander.” Al Qaeda is still waging war on us. Of course we don’t have to wage war on them—it takes two sides to make a war. We can do nothing—or very little—like we did before 9/11. That unfortunately did not work out so well.

The “war on terror’’ began as fraud; now it is farce. Conceived in deceit, warped at birth and raised behind a veil of duplicity – the ‘war’s” mature years are marked by actions of mindless reiteration. The penalty we - and the rest of the world – have paid for this feckless exercise in vengeance and grandiosity has been enormous. The payment has been in lives lost or crippled, in trillions of dollars, in prestige and authority dissipated, and in a latent menace to our well-being that the ‘war” supposedly aimed at eliminating. This endless crusade has achieved a state of perpetual motion generated by a confluence of dogmatic ideology, intellectual obstinacy, cynical political calculation and the self-serving exertions of powerful financial and professional interests. Today, the enterprise – or at least 90% of it – is divorced from reality.

The Threat.

Americans’ collective image of the threat that justifies the “war on terror” project is of hordes of fanatical Muslims scaling the outer walls of the Republic with turbans, scimitars between their teeth and terrifying cries of “Allah Akbar” on their lips. They are legion. Heroic Americans clad in the colors of the CIA, FBI, and Homeland Security man the battlements – targeting the jihadis with arrows, stones and hot pitch. Some join the uniformed military to sally forth in punitive raids to smite the enemy before he can muster his forces for the next, inevitable onslaught.

All this is sheer nonsense inspired more by scary TV shows and films than deliberate thinking. Yes, there once was a serious terrorist organization that had the United States in its sights. Al-Qaeda succeeded a few times; once on American soil with horrific effect that traumatized the country. That success resulted in large part from the incompetence of the CIA and FBI (especially the latter) and a national leadership that was asleep at the switch. The military action to root the leadership out of their Afghan base was necessary (although 9/11 was organized from Hamburg). The follow-up intelligence and police operations to degrade the remnants of al-Qaeda, too, were a logical and appropriate response to the danger. Circa 2002 – 2003, no significant threat to the United States still existed. Over the ensuing decade, the sole attempts at terror in the U.S. have been amateurish forays that were ill planned and on a very small scale. If all we have to worry about is some kid with a Rube Goldberg explosive device concealed in has underpants every ten years or so, we should thank our lucky stars. Instead, our leaders and the terrorism industry work overtime to persuade us that the people who couldn’t get their hands on fire retardant shorts are still out there scheming to plant a nuclear fizzle bomb in Michael Bloomberg’s City Hall.

Al-Qaeda is a franchise name – as Rome was for a thousand years after it fell, like Caesar was for two millennia until the Bulgarian Tsar was ousted by the Red Army. The name means little if anything in concrete terms. Al-Qaeda in North Africa? Its Algerian components are serious but concerned exclusively with Algeria. The rest are nests of bandits, desert buccaneers, and pseudo jihadis whose ability to harm us is limited to kidnapping wayward tourists who wander off the caravan routes. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? Here, too, the Saudi component has its sights on the House of Saud. The Yemeni component is preoccupied with its own local agenda and exploiting the opportunities opened by the post-Saleh chaos. Of course, there was the American Aklawi whom we honored by declaring the indispensible man of AQAP. Whether his assassination was warranted or not, it hardly has changed the threat equation. Al-Sabah in Somalia? An impoverished outfit in every respect with its own local political dynamics and ambitions. A refuge for more serious al-Qaeda types? Who exactly? Anyway, far less useful than any major city in Europe. This has not stopped Washington from mobilizing Ethiopia (again), Kenya, the African Union and our own drone squadrons in a massive effort to crush them. The Taliban? No less a personage than Joe Biden declared a few weeks back that “look, the Taliban per se are not our enemy.” Their fading ties with the enfeebled ghost of al-Qaeda past in the Hindu Kush are insignificant since the focus is on Afghanistan’s political future – as it always has been.

The number of those “out there” who constitute some danger to the United States? If we follow the logic of the Obama administration as manifest in justification for the draconian measures of the Patriot Act II and in our geographically growing deployments in Central Asia, South Asia, Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, West Africa, East Africa, and now even Latin America – then the number of enemies is in the hundreds of millions. That is to say, counting all Muslims who harbor hostile thoughts towards the United States and, therefore, are declared legitimate targets in the “war on terror.” How many people actually would participate in a venture to do physical harm to the United States? They probably number in the three digits. How many might have the capability of acting and the will to try and do so? A handful. Other 9/11s in the works? Not a scintilla of evidence of that?

The tragic irony is that our flailing about may fill with quiet rage and a thirst for revenge a few competent people who indeed could do us serious harm. It may already have. Iraq and Afghanistan, of course, were signal achievements in this regard.

The chances of this less than terrifying reality braking the momentum of the “war on terror” juggernaught? Zero. It has become a fixture of our foreign policy, of our politics, of our national psyche, of our budgetary arithmetic.

The war on terror is over in the sense that Americans have realized that "war" was not the best or most appropriate policy in the first place. War is rational when military victory over an opponent can lead to strategic or political victory. As many commentators noted from the beginning, this was never true of terrorism. Military victory over an operational method made no sense.

That said, the conflict with al Qaeda and, with increasing importance, its emulators is far from over. But the model henceforth should not be war--which has a discrete beginning and end, and which prioritizes military victory--but the process of "managing the barbarians" which nearly every civilization in history has been compelled to undertake. In this process military action will sometimes be necessary but, at other times, covert actions and things as simple as turning the barbarians against each other or supporting proxies will be most important. The objective will not be a clear and decisive victory as it would be for war, but minimizing the extent to which the barbarians can disrupt life in the civilized world.