I read and hear a lot about Syria’s impending descent into civil war. It is already there.

Ethnic fault lines are widening as the bloodshed continues.

However, one of the main complexities is that the opposition is not just one group. It is many groups. Some of these groups the outside has some idea what their interests and objectives are. For other groups we don’t have much of a clue even though we might imagine we do. I answered a New York Times reporter during the Libyan uprising when he asked a similar question about supporting their opposition. I pretty much said that it was pretty much impossible to figure out who all the opposition people and groups were at that time. Libya is still a fractured country. Libya still has many militias vying for power, wealth and more. The new Libyan power centers clearly have their extremist groups. It is still unclear who will run the country and what laws; rules and ideologies may dominate or battle it out in the public sphere of Libya.

Libya could easily become a very conservative to fairly extremist state given what seems to coming out of some quarter in their new leadership. Also, the internal battles for power in Libya are far from over. They may turn into battles of words with sporadic violence, but the direction of Libya is not clear and it may take a long time to clarify it.

Here are some questions for those who want to arm the Syrian “opposition”:

1. Can you define exactly who they are?

2. Do you understand their ideologies, goals and objectives?

3. Do you know what they have in mind to do after Assad goes?

4. How will this new opposition develop new relations with the US and its allies?

5. How will this new opposition look at some of the main problems of the region?

6. How will this new opposition look at Syria’s relations with Lebanon?

7. What is its economic ideology?

8. How do they plan to redevelop the country?

9. How will they deal with the Iranians and the Shia leadership in Iraq?

10. How will they handle the Kurdish issues?

11. What will their new relations with Turkey be?

.12. How will they handle the Russian naval base in Tartus?

Ah, yes. The Russians are a very big issue in Syria. About 10 percent of Russian arms exports go to Syria. The Russians lost massive arms deals when Ghaddafi fell. The only navy base the Russians have outside of the former Soviet Union is in Syria. Russia sees this battle in Syria via a Cold War lens. If we arm the “opposition” will the Russians send more arms to Assad and also aid Assad with intelligence and other support? This is a very important question to consider.

Then we need to look at with the Gulf states can do. It seems to me to be a wiser choice to have the Arabs more involved with this situation that we are, most particularly in the arming side of things. Turkey could also play a major role in this, but that is really up to them. They have their own Russian problem. Egypt, one of the major military powers in the region seems to be set against intervention. Israel seems in rather radio silence on many of the most important issues and seems far more focused on Iran.

Ah, yes, there is that Iranian part of the equation. What would Iran do if we started to arm the “opposition”? How might this drive the region into even greater conflict? It is unclear at this moment.

Am I appalled at the crimes Assad has committed against his own people? Is this one of the worst situations of the Arab Spring? Do I think Assad’s time is pretty much up? Would it be best for Syria and the region for him to go? Would it be best for the Russians to back down on this issue?

By the way, the Russians have lost most of the Arabs due to their stance on Syria. The Gulf leaders have said that very clearly. The longer the Russians try to hold on to their temporary strategic leverage in Syria the more such leverage there are losing in the rest of the Arab world, Turkey, and possibly even in Central Asia. The Russians in the end will be the big losers in this bloody tragedy of far too many acts.

The answer to all of these I give a resounding: Yes.

However, to arm them may not be as effective as trying to defang the Assads by working on detaching their support from other countries, to put it subtly. Sanctions are one way of doing this. Isolating leveraged support is another.

The longer the Russians are their supporting the brute Bashar the longer this nightmare will continue.

We can help in other ways and in quiet ways. And we should.

This is a truly wicked problem with no real optimal solutions. We have a lot of bad choices to make. Now we need to decide which is the best of the bad choices and decide. There are many ways to save 10s of 1000s of people from the grave. And this is exactly what is happening.

Then there are the many difficult questions about what if there are major changes in Syria and how will these changes proceed to the betterment of the Syrian people, the region and more.

Will Syria become another Iraq? Another Lebanon? Another Chechenya? Or will it become a state focused on human and economic development of its people in peace and prosperity in the long run? It is hard to tell at this juncture.

Whatever our leadership decides they need to tread carefully, thoughfully, and with proper information guiding them to visions of the longer term results in this complex situation. But they need to tread quickly. The blood is pouring like rivers in Syria.

Of course, I am speaking on my own, as usual.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2012/02/mccaffery-says-israel-may-attack-iran-with-nucs.html

I don't think Syria can be discussed in isolation from; American policies, Afghanistan, Somalia, Egypt, etc. If no one else expands this discussion, I will.

Washington probably does not have to involve itself in providing arms to the Syrian opposition: others almost certainly will begin doing so at this stage in the bloody standoff between the Assad regime and the opposition.

A number of regional players closer to the action have grown ever more weary waiting vainly for the UN Security Council, the US, NATO, or even the larger foreign support group opposing the Syrian regime's bloodyminded behavior to act decisively and already are hinting that they could begin supplying arms at any time. And since the arms most familiar to Syrians are those widely available from the old Soviet Bloc, others are better positioned to supply arms appropriate to this situation in any case.

Even more important, however, than arms for the opposition is the desperate need for regime opponents to lure quite a few more Syrian soldiers to defect to their side than has been the case so far. The relatively small and scattered groupings of army defectors--supplemented by ill-trained civilians--now battling regime forces cannot hope to stand up to main force elements of the Syrian army. Frankly, what is really needed is the defection of entire units from the Syrian military. This is unlikely with respect to elite regime defense outfits like the Republican Guard and 4th Armored Divisions, but other formations far less closely tied to the regime potentially could be swayed. Until this happens, I fear that regardless of the quantity of arms and ammunition provided to the opposition as it stands now, those in the fight still do not appear in any way capable of repelling or defeating the regular Syrian army units pounding them.

Those who ask "who are the opposition" raise a very important question. In ethno-sectarian terms, the Syrian political landscape is more complex than even those of Egypt or Libya. And one substantial minority--Syria's Alawite community--forms much of the core of the Assad regime, similar to the way Saddam Hussein's brutal regime drew heavily upon Iraq's Sunni Arab minority to fill its key army and police ranks. As a result, considerable unrest and some ugly score settling are likely to follow the fall of the current order in Syria.

The last major uprising against the Assad Family & Co. 30 years ago was led by the extremist Muslim Brotherhood, and some militant Islamic elements doubtless make up a portion of the opposition today, but no-one knows how much. Fear of uncertainty more generally, as well as concern over the possible role of such extremists in Syria's future, is not a valid defense for doing nothing in the face of ongoing and horrific regime atrocities, but such concerns are important cautionary notes regarding what those hoping for more aggressive foreign support for the Syrian opposition should bear in mind with respect to possible post-Assad scenarios.

Americans love to personalize their wars. Hitler, Tojo, Ho Chi Minh, Saddam, Qathafi, Mubarak and now Bashar Assad; they were all the epitome of whatever we were fighting. We love to think in broad generalizatoins and in terms of slogans that belong on the backs of cereal boxes rather. than in policy debates.

We insist on believing that the peoples of the Middle East and Central Asia are "little brown brothers" who are innocently waiting for liberation from oppression, waiting for the day when they will be given the chance to recognize our benevolence, take our development money and emerge from the "shell" of their "primitive" ways into the sunlight of westernization and modernity.

Somehow this view of the world is not working well for us. Egypt is an emerging Islamist state in which power will be shared between the Islamists and the generals who take our money and then put democracy activists on trial. Iraq is a country in which we brokered the creation of a state run by former Shia Islamist activists and in which we were "shown the door." Afghanistan? The "little brown brothers" are enraged by our disrespect for their scriptures. It has been ten years and we do not know better than to do something like this? Perhaps we have not learned because we imagine that their biliefs will soon disappear as a product of "globalization?"

Now we have the phenomenon of the revolt in Syria. Who are the rebels? Every day we are fed numbers concerning casualties on the rebel side in Syria. Who vouches for these numbers? Does the USG vouch for these numbers? I think not, Syria has a long history in which the Alawi minority has ruled over the large Sunni majority. The cities that are in revolt are centers of Sunni Islamist agitiation.

Saudi Arabia has a long standing project for the restoration of Sunni supremacy in Syria and Lebanon. They have worked steadily and patiently for this outcome for a long time. Their money has been useful. This revolt is a great opportunity. Who are the supporters of the rebels? Qatar is the only Wahhabi state outside Saudi Arabia. It is inevitably closely aligned with Saudi Arabia. Al-Qa'ida fights for the rebels. Turkey is overwhelmingly Sunni. Hamas is a Sunni Palestinian religious group. They now back the Syrian rebels.

What sort of government will a Syrian rebel victory produce? Who are the rebels?

Libya was a different case. The country has a small population. It is overwhelmingly Sunni. Unlike Syria, Libya did not have well developed and capable armed forces. Contrary to popular belief Libya was never threatened by Sunni Islamist governmental takeover. It still is not. Libya was "low hanging fruit." Syria is not.

Who ar the rebels?

A year ago as the Libyan insurrection accelerated and threatened to produce significant civilian casualties at the hands of Colonel Qaddafi’s loyal troops, three important voices spoke up: Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power and Susan Rice. One our Secretary of State, one a senior advisor to the President, one our Ambassador to the United Nations. All carrying very clear memories of opportunities missed, like Rwanda, and taken, like Bosnia, with respect to the use of American influence and force of arms to protect innocents. Some referred to their collective stand as the Rise of the Valkyries in support of what has become known as the responsibility to protect (R2P).

We need to hear from them again, to stimulate the planning and execution of the mission to protect the Syrian opposition; identify, engage with and facilitate the developing Syrian National Council; and to then assist the manning, training and equipping of the Free Syrian Army.

David Sanger in his oped in Sunday’s New York Times gives insight about President Obama’s national interests based approach to his prosecution of foreign policy. In the Libyan mission, President Obama supported a NATO interest with combat enablers - missiles, refueling, intelligence systems. Libya was not a vital US national interest; rather, NATO was the primary rationale to become involved. R2P the secondary explanation. For Europe and NATO, a positive outcome in Libya is important and through NATO, we acquired a mission support requirement. The President’s decision to provide a supporting role illustrated a doctrine where the United States will lend support for indirect interests, differing from direct action in support of vital national interests along the lines of the killing of Osama bin Laden.

A similar logic applies to Syria and is very well laid out by Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter in her NYT 23 February oped in support of concerted action in support of the Syrian opposition (she also advocated for our Libyan involvement a year prior).

Most observers are quick to point out that Syria and Libya are vastly different problems militarily and diplomatically. And, there are substantial geographic/demographic, military and political differences - but they don’t spell outsized risk or insurmountable obstacles. Hard is not impossible.

And, then there is a truly huge opportunity along the lines of what Henry Kissinger brilliantly pursued - ‘linkage’. Countries act on interests, and it is in the US interest to see an outcome in Syria that is considered negative to Iran. That interest is not vital, but an interest nonetheless coupled to regional stability and our alliance with Turkey and our responsibility to protect. To the Israelis, the linkage issue IS a vital national interest. To say nothing of Israeli concerns about instability north of the Golan.

As Ms. Slaughter lays out, establishment of safe havens for the Syrian opposition in multiple locations along borders of very interest neighbors would allow for multiple ‘Pusan Perimeters’ that would permit orderly support for at-risk populations. It would further permit a logical evolution of humanitarian relief to introduction of weapons of increasing capability to an increasingly competent and understood opposition. Ultimately, as these perimeters expand, the risk to air assets diminishes and allows for lower risk combined arms action against the Syrian Army. Simultaneously, diplomatic outreach and support of a lead agent like Turkey to answer the ‘Who are these guys?’ question would allow the US to provide a supporting role to NATO member Turkey and Arab League members Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

For sure, establishment of a lead agent for the ‘Syrian Project’ would help the unity of command challenge, but a distributed, geographic focus would not be debilitating to the deployment of US logistic, political and diplomatic support.

I expect to hear an increasingly energetic advocacy for clear US engagement in support of an outcome in Syria that is probably inevitable, positive for regional stability in the long run and negative to Iranian regional aspirations.

Professor Slaughter has fired the first shot. Let’s hear her allies in support of important US regional interests and our responsibility to protect.

This is a part of the world languishing in a sea of arms and plenty of places to get them.

Assad’s regime, which has made war on its own citizens, has lost whatever legitimacy it once had. Tehran has dispatched members of the Quds Force, an elite element of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, to help crush dissent within the country. He is the one drawing “outside” powers.

The U.S. can play a constructive role in the conflict by supporting efforts to deliver humanitarian aid. The U.S. should also be working closely with regional partners, especially Turkey, both to help speed the transition to a new, legitimate government and to continue diplomatic pressure and international sanctions against the Assad regime.

Syria is all about uncertainty – of interpretation, of policy choices, of expectations, of outcomes.

Almost all persons and societies are made uneasy by uncertainty. We depend on fixed reference points to orient ourselves; we depend on fixed ideas on how the world works to interpret what’s happening and what it means; we need fixed expectations so as plan ahead; we need fixed standards to assay and to assess individuals, events and actions. Much of the time, we filter our perceptions of reality so as to avoid the challenge posed by the new, the different, the strange.

American’s tolerance for uncertainty is especially low. After all, we are cocksure we know what’s right and wrong, what is normal and abnormal, how things are supposed to operate, what is godly and what is ungodly. Moreover, we are programmed to try and set matters straight when they deviate from the right/normal. By nature, we’re a pro-active and can-do people. ‘Don’t just stand there, do something!” neatly sums up that attitude. Little if anything is seen as being beyond our reach or our capacity. The very notion that some things are irritates us. The emotions cut much deeper when we try to solve a problem but can’t manage to make the supposed solution work. Anger, frustration, scapegoating set in. Or, we engage in the avoidance behavior of denying the failure – Iraq and the legendary miracle working of David Petraeus. Now we are on the brink of failing again in Afghanistan and desperate for another mythmaker to come along whose magical alchemic powers can transform tragedy into triumph victory with one touch of his virtuosic finger on the PR button.

Yet the American instinct to find the answer, to solve the puzzle, to resolve matters persists. In the case of the revolutions in the Middle East, we already have rewritten history to bring it into line with American mythology. Thus, we have convinced ourselves that we played the crucial role in toppling dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya - even when leading from behind or hedging our bets. We fulfilled our Providential destiny.

If the outcome is not a clear cut success for freedom, democracy and decency, then it’s “their” fault. Just as it’s the fault of the Iraqi rag heads and Afghan homicidal maniacs. Syria, in principle, should be susceptible to the same treatment. Identify the good guys, anathemize the bad guys, and then figure out how to turn the former into winners. The basic identifications, in truth, are not that difficult. Victims and victimizers are pretty clear. However, there are other players on the scene: the Muslim Brotherhood, various violence prone Sunni groups, fearful Christians, Alawite innocents, the Druze and other “bystanders.” Too, there are players in the neighborhood – some well intentioned (for the most part), some not at all well intentioned = as pl enumerates. These considerations make figuring out what to do damn hard. Then there is the uncomfortable reality that politically feasible means may not work while the methods that likely would topple Assad at least are not feasible. Then there are the time-frames: what happens the day after tomorrow? the following day?

All of this is uncertain. So press for humanitarian assistance, of course. So try to establish contact with the key opposition factions, yes to get a feel for who’s who and what’s what. So push for targeted sanctions – the easy thing. Put off what to do next when they predictably fail. Do a lot of wing flapping, cackling and scurrying around the barnyard to show everyone at home and abroad that America is still the indispensable power. Never ever admit that we may not have the answer, may just have to live with uncertainty. That violates the American creed.

So if anyone is really desperate for surety, immerse yourself in the Republican primary contest where only certainties are allowed to enter. One convenient certainty is that if anything unwelcome happens it’s all Satan’s fault – Satan who has been working overtime to sap the nation’s vital fluids and corrupt its soul.