Whoa, slow down. We're "preparing for a post-Assad Syria"? Contingency planning is a good idea - look what a mess we made of Iraq when we didn't plan - but Assad's exit probably won't come soon, if it comes at all. Whether, how, and when he falls, furthermore, has very little to do with what any outside power says or does, and arguably least of all what the U.S. might do, because we have few commercial ties with Syria and therefore few carrots or sticks we can apply to pressure the regime. But short of military intervention, which no one has the stomach for, no outside power will play a decisive role in Assad's ouster. In fact, even the domestic opposition within Syria can't force a decision, not as long as Assad's security forces remain loyal enough to commit mass murder in his defense. So far, I see no signs that fingers are coming off the trigger. Worse, with the regime run by an often-persecuted minority, it's hard to imagine them voluntarily relinquishing power and leaving their community to the mercy of majority rule. I'd personally bet on a post-Assad regime going out of its way to prove itself a friend of the Alawites, if only to international audiences, but if the Assad clique were that optimistic about how other Syrians would treat them, they wouldn't have established their dictatorship in the first place.

I'll caveat my guesstimate by admitting that I'm not a Syria expert, and even the experts aren't sure what's happening. Political earthquakes, just like literal ones, can build and build with few visible signs until the pressure reaches some critical threshold and the whole system snaps. Certainly outside observers were shocked when the Libyan regime collapsed after months of stalemate. But I don't see that happening in Syria as long as the regime has all the guns.

So instead of planning for a Syria without Assad, we need to plan for Assad's survival for months or years to come. I'd opt for a plan of steady pressure, especially economic, with quiet aid to the opposition - of all stripes, including the Muslim Brotherhood, not just the ones that make us comfortable. Of course we've tried the same basic course with Iran for three decades without success, so don't hold your breath. One difference from post-1979 Iran is that we do have an embassy in place, and that's a major asset. Ambassador Ford should stay in place (until the regime expels him): U.S. diplomats meeting regularly with regime opponents is at least as powerful symbolically as withdrawing our embassy and of far more practical use to the protestors. If the regime does fall, then a functioning embassy with ties to the opposition puts us much further ahead in being helpful in whatever comes next. But what comes next may not come for a long time.