I supported US/NATO intervention in Libya, not to "protect civilians, but to get rid of Qathafi. He was and is a lunatic scamp. His women guards, costumes and bravado are amusing but not enough to think that he should be left in peace to strut and oppress the Libyans. A further irritant was the farcical "triumph" of non-proliferation still gloated over by Cheney in which the Libyans "gave up" their nuclear weapons program to justify Bush Administration actions elsewhere. All those who know better, know that Libya had several warehouses full of crates of bits and pieces that they had no idea what to do with. Think of the last scene in Raiders of the Lost Ark." It was a good trade by the Libyans. They gave up a lot of "sunk cost" junk and then George W. Bush embraced them. I am not in favor of letting an oriental despot appear to have duped us that thoroughly. In the event my expectation was that a generous application of air power and local guerrilla forces would suffice, and they did.

Now, the Libyan rebels have largely won their war. The hand wringing "carping" that continues is just silly. Libya in spite of Qathafi sent a lot of people abroad to study. They have human resources of quality in numbers sufficient to their needs. They do not need an army of "experts" to tell them how to deal with each other, fix the utilities and write a constutution. The American foreign policy clique yearns for yet another "field of dreams" in which to pursue its own ambitions. That group of people imagines that we Americans, and they in particular, are possessed of some special wisdom, perhaps derived from our "exceptionalism" and genius for governing foreign societies, that will lead the Libyans into the "sunlight" of "progress." Our "successes" in Iraq and Afghanistan must confirm that belief. Sad.

Rob Malley said tonight on TV that foreigners should not imagine that they can succesfully re-structure Libya. "Only Libyans can do that." This IS wisdom. On the same program Dov Zakheim explained that according to a government commission, 20 billion dollars have been "stolen" by embezzlement and fraud in our two "crusades" for progress. Do we want more of that?

Boy, is it easy to sound hard-nosed when it’s not your life at stake. Let’s look at the facts: a hated dictator who held his country hostage for 42 years is on his last legs. The Libyan rebels own this success – but it would not have happened without NATO. On the eve of their intervention, Gaddafi claimed that he would hunt down protesters, “inch by inch, room by room, home by home, alleyway by alleyway.” To avert this slaughter, President Obama rallied allies so America could uphold our values but would not have to own this intervention alone.

That decision – however imperfect, however critiqued for coming too late, or conversely for doing too much – has paid off. Potentially hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved. Celebrating Libyans hold signs thanking America – even conservative columnist Nick Kristoff has noted what this intervention has done for improving America’s (very sullied) image in this part of the Arab world.

Moreover, the strategy worked not only in the execution of the war, but in the aftermath. Yes, if America had thrown itself 100% into the fray, we could potentially have helped the rebels get into power earlier. But then, they would not have owned their victory. They would be looking to us for help – or resenting us for our help – rather than running their own country. Wars are no longer going to be like WWII, where the fighting ends and everyone goes home – in the messy wars of today, much of the expense and much of the success is created after the fighting is finished. It is winning the aftermath of the fighting that wins the “war” today – and working through allies is the only way to do it.

This is so important that it bears repeating: thanks to Obama’s strategy of working with allies, and letting locals lead, America does not “own” the problem of Libya’s future, as we did after the Iraq War. The conservative strategy of going it alone in Iraq (with a fig leaf of international help) created a situation in which Iraqis did not feel they had responsibility for their country. Instead, America was blamed for every misstep, and had to put our own money on the ground – and our own servicemembers’ lives on the line – for almost a decade.

In Libya, rebels set up their own government. They looked to Europe for economic help – which makes sense, since Tripoli is a hop and a skip from the coasts of Italy and Greece. America upheld core values – and created real pro-American feeling in what we hope will be a democracy with oil. That’s smart values, and smart exercise of our national interest. And we did it for less than one tenth of one percent of what we have spent in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is what is known in the foreign policy world as: success.

The latest worrisome news out of Libya is that different rebel militias are carving up Tripoli and bickering over who's in charge, with the Benghazi-based Transitional National Council nominating and then retracting an overall commander and generally slow to get its people into the capital.

That's not great, though it's not a spiral into violent chaos, either. But the situation only argues MORE for moving the money, because (as I've argued before) money with proper strings attached can be used to bride different factions to work peacefully together under a unified leadership that serves as a conduit for cash. The message to the local militias needs to be, "Respect the TNC and don't shoot each other, or no dough," while the message to the TNC needs to be, "Listen to the locals, or no dough."

Military cooperation largely between NATO and the anti-Qadhafi opposition has not been without its problems, US participation pressed the envelope on bypassing robust domestic consensus building, the rebel effort against this tyrant was slow-going for quite some time, the end game also will likely be messy, and establishing sound governance in a country long so ill-managed and still multi-factional after Qadhafi's fall will be a tough slog. Nonetheless, the US kept its participation to a minimum, key NATO allies demonstration a capablity to lead and persist in a substantial military endeavor, and one of the only two full-blown bloody-minded tyrants & international pariahs challenged by the so-called "Arab Spring" (the other being Assad & Co.) is much closer to exiting the world stage. All in all, I believe it was worth the effort despite the inevitable questions and challenges.

Because of the political blowback in Washington amidst two other major military commitments abroad and a serious fiscal crisis, the Obama Administration approached involvement in Libya cautiously--not so much flushed with "hubris." If a hubris award in this case must be assigned, it would best fit French President Nicolas Sarkozy, not Barak Obama. So if there is criticism to be directed at the administration's decision to back primarily France and the UK in their desire to intervene, much of that perhaps should be related more to the somewhat belated timing of US action.

Overall, the choice to support the opposition in taking on Qadhafi was a prudent one. Unlike the situations in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen & Bahrain (despite highly disturbing aspects of the regimes challenged in these venues), only Libya and Syria fall into the category of utterly ruthless large scale human rights violators and, at times, supporters of international terrorism and other loathesome regimes (e.g. Qadhafi's extensive support for Zimbabwe's despicable Robert Mugabe). The taking down of a regime in the same category of the Assads in Syria signalled that where feasible, NATO might not simply stand by and watch the brutal massacre of potentially tens of thousands of oppositionists, and, in this instance, quite possibly the resultant flight of possibly hundreds of thousands of refuges--mainly into Egypt which currently has plenty of its own problems.

I also recognize that at this stage of the game, finishing off Qadhafi & Co. will not prove to be the most substantial remaining challenge, although doing so is not to be dismissed lightly. Libya's political, tribal, regional, and even generational divisions pose daunting problems for the formulation of an effective and balanced post-Qadhafi order. Yet, for the US, NATO, the West more generally, the UN, and moderate Arab states, the risk of the emergence of a potentially hostile militant Islamic regime probably is not as high as some have feared. The myriad divisions cited above alone may well militate against the emergence of such a negatively monlithic order.

Also, concerned external powers do hold a number of advantages in nudging a successor government toward more responsible behavior. Among oil-producing Middle East and North African states, Libya needs perhaps greater international assistance than any other in reviving (and maintaining) its hydrocarbon sector in all respects. The same goes for various aspects of basic national infrastructure. For some time, Libya also will be in need of considerable outside humanitarian aid. And the release of the bulk of Libya's substantial financial assets abroad to a new government could well be made contingent on certain aspects of behavior. So whereas some issues involved in the formation, behavior and external relations of a successor government doubtless will prove dicey, the picture painted by some observers in that respect probably has been overly dire.

The situation in Libya is far from over. Ghaddafi is still not found. Some of his family is still not found. Others are in Algeria. There are many people who still support him, especially those from his tribe, the Ghaddafa, and allied tribes. He likely still has a lot of mercenaries working for him. There are many supporters in the south near Sabha and on to the borders of Algeria and Chad. There are many supporters in Sirte.

His supporters and hangers on are quiet unlikely to drop their weapons and join the rebels, even if some of them may simply drop their weapons as a tactical move.

The rebels have had many tactical victories. However, the most important victories will be the strategic ones. They need to get the economy going, jobs produced, the water and electricity running and so forth. The TNC needs to get the country to act together as one nation without squabbles that could easily turn into inter-tribal warfare.

There are chances that Libya could fall into warlordism.

All of this talk in Washington, Paris, London and Tripoli about the “victory” in Libya is this president’s “Mission Accomplished” moment.

And it will likely turn out to be as embarrassing, if not more embarrassing to this president as the last one. His advisers are letting him down. The claims of victories by the TNC and the rebels are exaggerated. The claims of unity amongst the rebels are exaggerated. The claims of peace on the ground in 95% of Libya are massively exaggerated.

The claims that extremists have been let out of prison in the thousands in Libya are correct. The claims that lots of dangerous weapons are still on the ground in Libya are correct. The claims that many weapons, and pretty serious ones, could get loose and into the hands of some rather bad extremist types could be possibly correct.

Al Qaeada in the Islamic Maghreb is likely much more active and searching in Libya. The various “islamic” fighting groups in Libya that Ghaddafi jailed and tortured are likely looking for some revenge. Vendetta is in the air all over. The last few months and the last 42 years of his criminal rule have developed some very bad blood feuds and other angers and hatreds between and within some tribes and other groups.

Overall, it is hard to say where Libya is going, but it is highly unlikely that this conflict will be fully resolved any time soon. Ghaddafi is still out there and my guess is that he would like to go out with a bang if he sees his end near. He has a long history of incredible violence and viciousness. He trained some of the worst of the worst at the World Revolutionary Center. He supported the RUF in Sierra Leone, known for chopping hands and feet off to make a political point – or simply to do it. He supported and trained the IRA, the Abu Nidal Group and some of the nastiest and most brutish dictators and terrorists around. He has lakes of blood on his hands. Qaddafi is also a devious, malignantly untruthful person. He even kept a huge lie going that his daughter was killed during the bombing raids in Libya during the Reagan administration. She was not. The proof was found in his compound at Bab Al Aziza. She has been alive all of this time and she was, of all things, a doctor. She also traveled worldwide for medical and other purposes. If such a lie can hold for so long in such a terrorized and terrified society like Libya what credibility does anything that he or, for that manner, anyone else says have?

We need to remember that Libya was an intensely fearful country. It was a country under the thumb of an animalistic, brutal dictator who could challenge even Idi Amin for his bloodthirstiness. He could challenge Bokasa for megalomaniacal and selfish behavior. And he got away with it. This was a society fearful of just about anything that would challenge the “Great Leader”.

He ruined Libyan society. He ruined the Libyan economy with his often bizarre economic policies and his massive waste of Libya’s oil and gas wealth for his personal causes and projects. He gutted the government of Libya. He vaporized civil society. He did not allow a rule of law to even develop. He crushed all opposition.

So who expects Libya to recover quickly from this worldwide allowed devastation of a people? I do not.

It will take a long time to develop better education, legal, political, cultural, social, and administrative systems. Above all it will take a long time to heal the rifts that were played upon by Ghaddafi who split the military, the security services, and the country in order to keep them all weak, excepting the groups that were there to protect and enrich his power and his ego.

Rebuilding Libya is a lot more than getting the tribes in the south to allow the water from the Great Man Made River Project to send water up north and it is a lot more than having simple elections with the blue ink or green ink of first time voters.

This is a damaged place.

It needs peace and prosperity. Crowing loudly that victory is here and handing out the high tea crackers to celebrate will do nothing. For Libya to really move forward the world community its neighbors and many others will need to do a lot of work over the long run. I doubt that sort of effort for that sort of time will be forthcoming.

So as a warning into the headwinds of Washington spin on Libya: this is far from a full victory for anyone involved. The real victory could take decades or plain sweat, hard work, smart work, and real planning and creativity. Otherwise, expect more bullet holes than factory bricks.

First of all: Wow, you guys are gloomy. The Libyan rebels have accomplished something extraordinary, NATO airpower played a critical role in helping them do it, and the US played a critical role enabling NATO. This is what success looks like.

Certainly it's a mess. Certainly, everyone involved screwed up in ways that cost human lives - but war is like that even when you win. Certainly, Libya is just beginning a long and dangerous journey that could lead to chaos or renewed tyranny - but revolutions are like that, including ours in 1775. And frankly even a new authoritarian regime would be an improvement on Qaddafi as long as the new strongman met the minimum standards of (1) not sponsoring terrorism, (2) not gunning down crowds of protestors, and (3) not being batshit insane. But I think Libya can do a lot better than that.

So how can we help them? I'd agree with Dr. Adams that the US and Europe should not be thinking in terms of ground troops now any more than they did before Qaddafi fell. A few military advisors would help the rebels regularize their militias into a force capable of stabilizing their own precarious country, but the Libyans haven't asked for peacekeepers and they don't need them. They probably don't need a deluge of aid workers either, given the tendency of even the most well-intentioned Western government agencies and non-government organizations to devour funding for little effect.

What the Libyans need is their money back - the billions in Qaddafi assets frozen by governments around the world. We should release that money carefully, with all the oversight appropriate to a nascent government and with any technical assistance the Transitional National Council may require, but "careful" should not mean "slow." If funds do get held up, the US could lend the new government money with the frozen assets as collateral.

Let's give the Libyans their own money so they can start solving their own problems. They've already shown that they'll do it better for themselves than we could for them.

-- Sydney Freedberg, www.LearningFromVeterans.com

Okay, give the home team its due: NATO took out el-Qaddafi on humanitarian grounds, and they did get the Europeans to sort of lead in supporting the fractious rebels. This is, however, a very small success on an initial task. The crisis is not over. It is not yet the beginning of the end, or even the end of the beginning. Most of the hard work lies ahead. Call it reconstruction and stabilization, stability operations, or nation-building. Someone will have to do it. Somebody's boots will have to be on the ground.

Like Afghanistan in December 1979 and Iraq in April 2003, we can afford a moment of being dizzy with success. Then, quickly, someone has to be the adult and start to talk about the way ahead. It would be wonderful if Arabs could take the lead, but I am not holding my breath. The UN would say to NATO: after you, sir, you started it. Uncle Sam "led from the rear" on phase one, an easy task, but he will find that the Euros will only do a small percentage of the expensive stability operations that need to be done NOW. Wait a few months, and NATO may be cleaning up after a bloodbath. The preliminary bout is over, but NATO's diplomats and soldiers are not ready for the main event. If you are serious about a "responsibility to protect," then you better be thinking about boots and wing-tips on the ground.

Let's call the Libyan intervention a "success." If you supported the policy of protecting the civilian population and removing Kadafi, providing air power and a minimal amount of assistance on the ground (largely by the Europeans) was enough to let a rebel force, on a steep learning curve, hive off an unpopular dictator.

The art of minimalism and the importance of the indigenous commitment are both key to this success. As in Afghanistan, the NATO powers did not send ground forces, beyond US special forces in a spotter and advisor role. And a local military capability was absolutely essential to carry it off.

Let that lesson be learned in the aftermath, though I fear it will not be. Already, the stalwart advocates of "nation-building" are afoot, from Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations to Max Boot of we-are-an-empire-let's-act like-one fame. The cottage industry of American nation-building, with support from some Europeans, is all too eager to thrust NATO ground forces into Libya in order to "stabilise" the situation, "secure" the residual chemical stockples, and provide oodles of advice on economics, oil, governance, rule of law and all those wonderful things we so generously brought to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan.

I sounded off on this enterprise at Time Inc's blog site, Battleland, last week - http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/08/25/here-we-go-again-telling-the-libyans-what-to-do/ - To continue the thought, we have learned some very negative lessons thanks to our ill-fated invasion of Iraq, our willful neglect of Afghanistan (until 2009), and the decision to "double down" for the last two years.

1. We stink (so as not to use a stronger word) at governance, economic advice, and program implementation in such countries, and may have caused more harm than good in both places, as a result. Don't believe me; read the SIGIR and SIGAR reports for the last several years. All the cheerleading in the world from the embassy and the military will not change this.

2. Major deployments of non-indigenous military forces help stimulate the very insurgency they are supposedly intended to confront. Nobody, especially in this region of the world, likes a foreign occupation, however well-intended.

3. Ginning up a major capacity to tell countries in this region how to do their business is counter-productive. It smacks of the old days of the Colonial Offices and overseas administrators. Pace, Tom Barnett, the US is not and cannot be the "system administrator" of the world. Nobody asked us to do it; we don't do it well, we can't afford it, and the "system" treats our effort to do so as an unfriendly act. The blow-back is fatal for our national interest.

4. If the new Libyan regime wants help, it can ask for it. They will have ample resources and a capable population, including returning members of the Libyan disapora. It would be an act of respect and self-interest for the NATO countries to wait until the Libyans have defined what they want and need, rather than crowd Tripoli with advisors, many of whom may well be private sector parasites just waiting to make more money with minimal impact, as they have already done in Iraq and Afghanistan. Caveat Libya!

5. Whatever is provided, on Libyan request, should be minimal, non-intrusive, respectful and, above all, humble. Humble because, by now, with Iraq and Afghanistan (and before them, Vietnam) in mind, we have a great deal to be humble about.

6. Don't expect Switzerland on the Mediterranean out of whatever advice and assistance is provided. The Libyan people, for better or for worse, are the masters of their fate, not the US or its NATO allies. No nation's affairs are so picture perfect that they can withstand critical scrutiny by others.

Western intervention in Libya represents the first military enterprise after the 9-11 War, and thus shows us a bit of the emerging framework of how it will be done in future. Libya is primarily a European (and Italian) colonial legacy. France, Spain, and Italy have strong residual interests in North Africa, and intervention was probably inevitable. The compelling interest can be compared to (the former) Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Libya is as close to Italy as Yugoslavia is to Germany, and hence clearly within the European economic and strategic orbit. Successful intervention permits Europe, and Mediterranean Europe especially, to show how it still has the strength and determination to defend its economic and strategic integrity. The effort was probably not sufficient to impress an aggressive Russia — and here Germany's absence is telling — but it is nonetheless a better representation of European will than inaction.

The neo-colonial dimension — however sotto voce — should not be elided. Ghaddafi was a colonial successor king, and so represents a form of continuity to Italian rule, if not administration. This has been true of Algeria and Tunisia, for France. In this sense it was prudent for the United States to stay resolutely in the atmospheric background, and with the colonial successor king's fall, we should retreat even more into the shadows. The lingering consequences and efflorescences of Europe's colonial venture in the Arab World are not gone, and for too long, and to our strategic detriment, the US has picked up the European baton. If we are ever to have a useful relationship with the Arab World, we must be sure to put that baton down now and forever.

Finally, the Western military enterprise in Libya may prefigure the rough framework, if not the actual template, of what Washington now loosely calls "offshore balancing." It is intervention whose aspect is highly attuned to the limits of action. It is "from the sea," without any visible footprint touching the tar pits that so relentlessly enmired us these past decades. It quietly operates according to the new spirit of the age — which the Arab Spring has revealed as being a globally emerging zeitgeist collectively opposed to imperial policing. The lessons of Libya are in their own way History's judgment on the 9-11 War.

At this point, it is increasingly difficult to see how Libya serves as a model for anything.

For sure, you cannot argue that Libya justifies the “right to protect” doctrine or UN Security Council authorizations as providing exceptional legitimacy for military operations. The NATO operations so grossly exceeded the UN mandate it made the whole Security Council mandate exercise laughable. Nobody complained—but if operations had gone poorly folks would have drowned out the wolves howling at the moon complaining over NATO’s overstretch.

For sure, the operations can’t be seen as validation of “leading from behind.” NATO operations simply could not have happened without US support. If NATO tried to do something the US opposed and the US pulled out the whole thing would have fallen apart. So just because a US general was not doing press briefings each night—doesn’t mean the US wasn’t carrying this thing from beginning to end. There is not much difference here between Libya, Bosnia, and Kosovo. If all leading from behind means is that the US pulls the string—but then can have plausible deniability to walk away if things go south or pop-up and take the credit if things go well—that will surely undermine US leadership faster than a New York minute.

And, of course, there is the problem of it is not over. There are still a lot of bad things that can happen. The final outcome will determine the final grade.

Finally, most of what the administration did or did not do was done mostly behind close doors. It told Congress as little as possible. It never—and still has not articulated a clear strategy. The US policy was about as opaque as public policy gets. So it is pretty hard to judge how the White House “handled” things from the outside looking in.

Right now the most important thing is not who learns what lessons or takes credit for whatever, but making sure US interests are looked after and that US commitments are consistent with those interests.

The uprising of Libyans against their long time dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has succeeded in toppling him and his regime. Now the post mortems begin. What lessons are to be drawn from the affair?

It is important to address this question sooner rather than later, for predicting the past has become chancy. History is no longer written mainly by historians. The dominant understanding of past events for the public at large, and for the ‘informed’ political class as well, increasingly is crystallized by interpretations made during and immediately after their occurrence. Pictorial images reinforce them. The purveyors of these stories rarely are qualified by knowledge, acuity of analysis and/or good intentions to shape our view of reality. Exhibit 1: the fictional legend of the ‘surge’ in Iraq.

Here are the main points that I believe we should bear in mind as we ponder the last six months in Libya.

1. Foreign intervention in support of a popular movement can work to achieve desirable ends. The how, where, why and by whom issues are critical to making a reasoned judgment in each case. There are no absolutes. Because the United States and/or NATO is involved does not mean that the action ipso facto is misguided, illegitimate and flawed. A converse judgment is no more sound.

2. The United States was not the lead player. The diplomatic initiative was taken by France and then by the Anglo-French couple. The large majority of the airstrikes were launched by the European members of NATO. Advisors and a few special force units on the ground, especially in the last phase, were again European with France in the lead. The U.S. military role was significant in the first phase when cruise missiles were employed to knock out air defense and related infrastructure and a later intelligence contribution was made via aerial surveillance.

3. At the diplomatic level, Washington’s jumped in after other had made the running. Barack Obama’s public declaration that ‘Gaddafi must go” was little more than an opportunistic attempt to reap some glory from what seemed his imminent demise. Five months later he appeared before the cameras again to reap what he had not earned. In between, Washington contributed little of value. . The post-hoc justification that the White House was perfecting the art of “leading from behind” was a feeble rationalization for Washington’s irresponsibly sudden exit from the scene of action.

4. Libya has been a classic exercise in coercive diplomacy – more exactly, a classic case of how not to conduct it. The first lesson to draw is that in a game of intimidation the psychological factor is key. Actual use of military force is designed to undermine the morale and break the will of the targeted leadership. To succeed, it should be swift, concentrated and carry a credible threat of more to come unless they comply with the ultimatum. The United States and NATO failed completely to meet those requirements. Implementation of a vague, incoherent strategy was disjointed in the extreme. Military and diplomatic actions both were irresolute and fitful.

5. The West and their Arab partners sent the diktat that they wanted Colonel Gaddafi to yield power to the opposition. To this end, they sought to peel away his closest associates, military commanders and army units still arrayed at his side. Successes on this latter score were registered early in the confrontation but few further defections occurred until the denouement. Various elements enter into an explanation; one is that they visualized Gaddafi’s surviving an onslaught that appeared fitful and irresolute.

6. Almost no battlefield support was given the insurgents at critical moments early in the campaign when Gaddafi and his loyalists were barely holding on. For more than a month, the thousands of claimed NATO air sorties had so little practical effect that opposition leaders voiced concerns that they had been misled if not betrayed. The incoherence and ineptitude of the air campaign undercut the political strategy of putting intolerable pressure on Gaddafi and his associates. The hand-off from the United States was abrupt and uncoordinated. President Obama was anxious to limit American exposure at a time of mounting domestic criticism about American overextension and the fierce opposition of the Pentagon led by Robert Gates.

7. As for NATO and the Europeans, their weak political will – individual and collective – is notorious. Once again they have demonstrated an inability collectively to manage difficult, complex missions when the United States is not there to lead them. This judgment holds despite the initiatives of French President Sarkozy who has been too erratic and lacking in the authority to orchestrate the behavior of other governments.

8. The talk – now rife – of what the United States and the West should do to help in the reconstitution of the Libyan state and the fostering of a democratic polity is misplaced. The revolution was made by Libyans. They have the human and financial resources to arrange their own affairs without outside interference. A prominent Western presence in the form of government agencies, international organizations and a slew of NGs will raise the odds against success. We still harbor the conceit of our superior wisdom and our practical altruistic virtue despite abject failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. That does not auger well for playing a constructive future role in a world fed up with being pushed around by ‘superior’ Westerners – above all, know-it-all Americans.

9. The issue is unlikely to arise. Libyans, who threw off the yoke of autocracy with bravery and perseverance, are not about to allow foreigners to take charge of their fate. They are fully aware of what the not so gentle ministrations of the United States led to elsewhere among those peoples who were denied the chance to make their own choices as to whether they wanted outside help. The exceptions are the owners of luxury rental properties and rug merchants.