August 2011 Archives

Obama's strategy in Libya amounted to staying resolutely behind the scenes throughout the five-month NATO air operation. To wit: Don't say the United States is openly engaged in ousting Muammar el-Qaddafi. Don't even concede the United States is going to war. Take cover behind a political imprimatur for action from the Arab League and United Nations, and let Europe lead the strike forces. Then modestly take credit--albeit only with a restrained statement from Martha's Vineyard, where Obama has been vacationing.

Obama has maintained that the U.S. was not at war in Libya because the American role was confined to a defensive posture of "suppressing" enemy air defenses, to intelligence-gathering, and to surveillance and reconnaissance capability--but NATO says U.S. involvement in recent weeks has verged into clearly offensive attacks using armed Predator drones on selected targets, especially as a desperate Qaddafi sought to quietly shift his troops to civilian hideouts in the final stages.

If and when Qaddafi falls, does Obama's strategy of a low-profile, stealthy U.S. role of "leading from behind" deserve any credit? Will he get it? Should this provide a model for future military operations? Or, do you agree with critics who say Qaddafi might have been toppled faster and fewer people would have been killed if America had led the mission militarily from the start?

Once Qaddafi goes, do you believe the U.S. should participate in a peacekeeping mission if the rebels--or the U.N.--deem it necessary? What about American military boots on the ground?

11 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, Rachel Kleinfeld, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Wayne White, Paul Sullivan, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Joseph J. Collins, Gordon Adams, Michael Vlahos, James Jay Carafano, Michael Brenner

By calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down and imposing a raft of tough new sanctions, the Obama administration ramped up the diplomatic and economic pressure on Damascus. Still, it's unclear what leverage the U.S. and its allies have to actually force the strongman out of power.

With more and more countries calling for Assad to step down, rather than making reforms, what will a post-Assad Syria look like? Syria's opposition has been repressed for decades, and amid the bloodshed, its leaders are struggling to coalesce. What are the chances that a country like Syria--whose opposition now includes some Alawites, Druze, Christians, the Muslim Brotherhood, secular leaders, local leaders and youth activists--will come together and present a cohesive plan for transition? What are the regional security risks if Syria is made even more unstable by political confusion? What lessons can be learned from turbulent transitions in Tunisia and Egypt?

While several countries withdrew their ambassadors from Syria, U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford remains in Damascus to continue discussions with opposition figures and press the government to heed the U.S. message. Should Ford stay in the country? What can be done to prepare for a post-Assad Syria? How should the U.S. deal with the hodgepodge of opposition figures? The U.S. is very cautious not to appear as if it is interfering in another country's struggle. What can the U.S. do to tread the diplomatic line between supporting protesters and helping a transition to democracy, and being seen as controlling a revolution?

1 response: Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

House Armed Services Chairman Buck McKeon, R-Calif., did not get his wish to have a hawkish GOP member of his panel on the joint committee charged with coming up with a plan by Thanksgiving to cut the nation's deficit by $1.2 trillion. House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, instead picked lawmakers with decidedly different interests and priorities. Rep. Jeb Hensarling of Texas, chairman of the House Republican Conference, will co-chair the super committee, while the House GOP will also be represented by Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp and Energy and Commerce Chairman Fred Upton, both of Michigan.

But the Defense Department, whose budget will almost certainly be on the table for cuts during the months-long negotiations, does have some strong boosters on the panel. They include co-chairwoman Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., who chairs the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, sits on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and is a strong Boeing backer. Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., a well-known proponent of missile defense programs, is also on the panel, as is Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

What does the lineup mean for how the Defense Department will fare during the committee's negotiations? A senior Pentagon official recently told reporters that he hopes the committee will not look to the Defense Department, which the White House already plans to cut by $350 billion over the next decade, for more savings. Considering who will sit on the super committee, is that realistic? Or will the Pentagon's budget, which makes up more than half of all discretionary spending, be a prime target?

2 responses: Michael Brenner, Gordon Adams

Since President Reagan's defense buildup in the early 1980s reversed the "hollow force" legacy of President Carter, the Republican Party has generally owned the brand "strong on defense." The recently reached debt-ceiling deal suggests, however, that a tea party-inspired Republican caucus is far more anti-tax than pro-defense. If a bipartisan congressional panel created by that deal cannot reach a compromise agreement on additional deficit-reduction measures by November, an automatic "trigger" could slash defense spending by as much as $1 trillion over the next decade. New Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said such deep cuts would severely damage U.S. national security.

So is the GOP in danger of having its "strong on defense" brand downgraded? If so, how will that change in the political dynamic likely impact a military that is trying to wind down and recoup from a decade of war? Is the deficit issue a serious enough crisis that cutting defense to reduce the shortfall would be, substantively, a good trade?

11 responses: Paul Sullivan, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Gordon Adams, Larry Korb, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Joseph J. Collins, Michael Brenner, Wayne White, Michael Brenner, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Richard Aboulafia

Last week's arrest of Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo thwarted an attempted terrorist attack at Fort Hood, the military base that was the site of a 2009 rampage that left 12 soldiers dead. Abdo is at least the third Muslim-American soldier suspected of trying to kill his fellow troops since the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2003, then-Sgt. Hasan Akbar threw a grenade into a tent in Kuwait, killing a pair of American soldiers. Six years later, Maj. Nidal Hasan was charged with opening fire on a crowd of troops at Fort Hood, killing 13 people--including 12 soldiers--in the worst act of military-on-military violence in U.S. history.

Is this a growing trend within the military, or a handful of troubling incidents? How much of the radicalization has to do with the Muslim-American troops' own changing feelings toward the United States after serving in Iraq or Afghanistan--as opposed to adopting the views of extremist Islamist clerics? What can be done to prevent troops from adopting--and acting on--violent Islamist beliefs? How can this be done without alienating Muslim-American troops, or suggesting all such personnel are somehow suspect?

2 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, Gordon Adams