It’s now clear that the Transitional National Council’s senior military commander, General Abdul Fattah Younis, was assassinated by fellow rebels. That’s deeply disturbing. Younis was arguably the highest-ranking defector from the Qaddafi government, having been interior minister, and was one of the rebels’ most experienced officers. But he was also suspected of retaining ties to the regime and was on his way to be cross-examined by his civilian superiors – and it’s to the rebels’ credit that they have put civilians in charge – when he was killed.

When a revolution turns on its own, the result can be a feeding frenzy of self-destruction, like the Terror in revolutionary France. But the Libyan rebels aren’t there, at least not yet, and Younis’s murder does not discredit the Transitional National Council.

In fact, I’d argue that this assassination makes it only more important that the U.S. and other Western powers unfreeze Qaddafi’s assets for the Council to use. Right now, the Council survives on consensus and moral suasion. It has moral authority but not practical power over the array of semi-independent rebel forces, including the one accused of the Younis murder. What it needs, bluntly, is funding. Only if the Council becomes a provider of arms and paychecks can it solidify control over the rebel fighters and have a real chance of bringing renegade groups back in line. It’s time to show them the money.

The recent unclear situation with regard to the murder of the military head of the Libyan opposition, General Abdel Fattah Younes, should give pause. General Younes was Ghadaffi’s Minister of Interior before he “defected” or defected in February. He was very close to Ghaddafi for decades and was pretty much a main part of Ghaddafi’s to help keep the country in line. Some in the opposition seem to think he continued to be in touch with Ghaddafi’s people, hence a traitor to their cause. Others believe he was a true believer and a great help to the rebel cause. Some think a rebel group killed him. Others think one of Ghaddafi’s notorious hit squads got him. This may also have been a revenge killing from an event years ago.

Whatever the case may be this is yet another example of how shadowy and complex Libya is and how complex and pretty much unknown much of the opposition are. Do we really know who the opposition is and what their real plans are? Do we know whether the group that we recognize is actually the power in the opposition? How many on The Hill and in other leadership quarters could name the top rebel fighters in the field and have known of them for more than just since February, March or even later? How much do we really know about some of the rebel leaders? Could the many disparate tribes and other groupings within the opposition turn on each other as the going gets tougher? How much of a team will they be once Ghaddafi is gone? (I don’t buy the French idea that Ghaddafi can stay on. It is naïve in the extreme. There will be blood for blood vendettas, in Arabic it is Al-Thar. Al-Thar is well known and widely practiced in Libya and is part of some of the tribal codes. There will be a lot of score settling well before the dust settles on this one. There will be blame game all around if the rebel battles go badly.)

Well, we recognized Ghadaffi and Company and reestablished diplomatic relations recently. Did that turn out to be a well-researched decision? Did that work out well? He continued his brutish treatment of his people and never really changed his stripes. So many oil companies and leaders trotted out to shake his hand and do deals. Many now regret these deals. Others seem to be way too stuck to the bottom line to see the human costs of their decisions.

When I give my presentation on Libya in some of my classes I show photos of well over a dozen world leaders in Ghaddafi’s tent shaking his hand with smiles. Then I mention to my students to be careful who you shake hands with. It may come back to haunt you some day, especially if you become a prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and the like. When Ghaddafi said he would kill of the rats and cockroaches, what he called his own people who happened to disagree with him, I knew he was back to his old self, or maybe his same self that he hid away after one of those PR makeovers from an expensive lobbying firm?

Whatever the case he has slaughtered many people in his own country. He was supported training of some of the most notorious terror groups, including the IRA, Abu Nidal, and was a supporter of many of the worst of the worst groups in the African wars, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, who used to recruit child soldiers, drug them, and tell them to shoot family members. The RUF also used decapitation and maiming as a policy tool. Ghaddafi supported many vicious rebel groups in Africa and elsewhere with great determination and a lot of money. He has Olympic sized pools of blood on his hands. Yet we recognized him.

The opposition is the only game in town trying to rid Libya of the scourge of Ghaddafi. In international relations sometimes decisions are far from perfect. Sometimes you have to hold your nose. Sometimes you have to push aside some doubts and uncertainties to at least make some decisions to go ahead. This seems to be one of those instances. I am glad I did not have to make this decision. There may be surprises and embarrassments down the road. That is sometimes the nature of things. Most of the “faces” of the opposition are diplomats, professors, lawyers and the like. Some have distinguished themselves in their fields and worldwide. Some surely are good people wanting the best for their country. But the opposition in the trenches may be a very different crowd and they may be a problem to the “faces” in the future when they ask for their peace of the Libyan pie after their sacrifices have been made.

The future of Libya and the future of the Libyan opposition are far from certain.

I cannot say whether The President made the right decision on this. The future will tell. Libya has never been an information rich country. There are lots of holes in the information on the opposition.

I feel this odd uncomfortable feeling in my gut about the entire situation. It is nasty, bloody, crude, and brutish. It could go on for a long time. The tribal and other tensions will not be resolved by a few meetings in 5 star locations in the EU and elsewhere. The situation will not be resolved by just Ghaddafi leaving. Remember there will still be a large number of his supporters left in the country. They can’t all leave. Where would they go? His tribe and associated and allied tribes will likely exact some revenge even after he goes – or even if he stays as the French have mentioned.

$34 billion in funds that could be available to the opposition could bolster their forces, improve training, get some medicines out there and, after some of the dust settles help develop the country. And the country is in dire need of development. If the country does not develop and few jobs are produced after the battles are done then the battles will likely start up again. The opposition, especially it’s smarter and more strategic thinkers should begin to focus on what to do after the battles are done. Winning the battles may turn out to be the easiest part. Winning the peace and bringing the people back together will be much more difficult.

I would like to see a prosperous, peaceful and developing Libya. (Ghaddafi failed on all of these counts and that is one of the many reasons why so many in Libya want him to go.) This is for the best for the Libyans and for just about everyone else. But getting there is the hard part.

Regardless of how various observers feel about the decision to intervene in Libya on behalf of the opposition against Qadhafi, there is simply too much now at stake given what already has been done (and not done elsewhere) to falter in supporting the opposition. This is particularly the case when so many important governments already have crossed the proverbial Rubicon in recognizing en masse the opposition council as the recognized government of Libya (regardless of Muammar Qadhafi's eventual status--once again in play it would seem).

First off, given that even the Arab League also called for military intervention in Libya, this is the only instance in which the West has come to the aid of a beleaguered Arab opposition facing a brutal crackdown on the part of a notorious tyrant. Naturally, there is plenty of room to criticize relative inaction in the face of such parallel cases of ruthlessness in Syria & Bahrain (with Yemen perhaps too chaotic to lend itself to any effective political or military intervention), but the standing of the US and NATO would be that much worse if it had done nothing whatsoever with respect to these various crises.

That said, I am not unaffected by those asking why the US should have taken aboard yet another overseas military and financial obligation. But, again, compared to the comparative hemorrhage of US money (and, in those cases, blood), the American role in the NATO Libyan effort is relative bargain. In fact it is deeply saddening to reflect on just how glibly (and brashly) many of those objecting now so vigorously to any US role in Libya readily supported, for example, plunging into a huge, costly, and questionable war effort--and occupation--in a more heavily populated and more distant Iraq not so long ago.

It is clear that, although halting in some cases, the opposition will be receiving additional aid based on Libya's extensive foreign currency holdings and investments. Nonetheless, it is now time, as a UN fact-finding mission reported on the 25th, to attend also to the humanitarian needs of the large population remaining under Qadhafi's control. Such assistance is dicey, as was the notorious Iraqi "Oil for Food" program, but this cannot be neglected lest an ugly legacy begin building in Tripoli and surrounding areas of deliberate international deprivation. Naturally, such an operation must be overseen quite carefully to avoid, hopefully, much of the regime abuse involved in the comparable Iraqi effort.

I concede readily some of the criticism of my colleague Micheal Brenner--notably the actual drivers behind the US "lead from behind" pull back (if that characterization can apply given the limited and reluctant US involvement even early on). Yet, if Iraq or Afghanistan--even Iraq during the era of No-Fly Zones and "Oil for Food" are points of comparison--I am not as convinced of the supposed enhanced effectiveness of robust US leadership with respect to foreign military endeavors.

Moreover, a good part of the uneveness that has characterized both US and European operations relates to the limitations contained in the empowering UNSC resolution. Needless to say, those bounds have been stretched to the limit (especially the call for a ceasefire), but so have European response capabilities as a result, in part, of the refusal of one of European NATO's three largest militaries (Germany) to participate as well as the continuing criticism emanating from an unhappy Moscow with respect to the maintenance of the original boundaries that cannot be ignored entirely. Such countervailing pressures are bound to produce further deficiencies.

My answers, in brief: Yes, very, yes, yes, yes, no. (That was easy).

To go into a bit more detail:

Regular readers of this blog (or my own site) know that I’ve been cheerleading for the Libyan rebels since the beginning. I agree with Dr. Brenner’s post below that the U.S. and European intervention has been neither decisive or impressive, and I think we should do more – in terms of airstrikes and advisors, not ground troops – but the decisive force on the ground has to be the Libyan rebels.

Considering that the vast majority of them have no military training, no armored vehicles, and grossly inadequate weaponry, the rebels have done remarkably well. They’ve not only kept Qaddafi’s forces out of the eastern half of the country – which is traditionally ambivalent about being ruled from Tripoli, in the west – they’ve also expelled the regime from several cities in the western half, preventing them uprising from becoming (or even being portrayed as) a mere regional movement.

Qaddafi’s main advantage over the rebels, at this point, is money. If we level that playing field, the odds increase that they’ll break the stalemate and finally overthrow the regime. They need better weapons and, just as important, the ability to pay their fighters to fight and train full-time. I’ll be frank, it’s almost certain that millions of dollars will go astray and end up wasted or simply stolen: This is a brand-new, highly provisional government in the middle of a revolution in a country with no tradition of transparency, after all, and international oversight, while a good idea, can only do so much. But the money that does make it through and is spent wisely will have a high return on investment. Just a little training and a few heavy weapons will have a huge impact on a force as bare-bones as the Libyan rebels are now.

Besides, it’s their money. It’s not as if freeing up Libyan assets will cost the United States a dime. It’s not as if Qaddafi was going to spend the money for any good purpose. We ought to start distributing money now, for whatever purpose the rebels’ provisional government requires, with serious oversight but ultimately respecting their decisions.

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

www.LearningFromVeterans.com

The impasse in the attempt to unseat Muammar Gaddafi after four months of NATO bombing in support of the insurgents is forcing an anguished reappraisal of method as well as objective. It has been a classic exercise in coercive diplomacy – more exactly, a classic case of how not to conduct it. The first lesson to draw is that in a game of intimidation the psychological factor is key. Actual use of military force is designed to undermine the morale and break the will of the targeted leadership. To succeed, it should be swift, concentrated and carry a credible threat of more to come unless they comply with the ultimatum. The West and their Arab partners have sent the diktat that they want Colonel Gaddafi to yield power to the opposition. To this end, they have sought to peel away his closest associates, military commanders and army units still arrayed at his side. Successes on this latter score were registered early in the confrontation but few defections have occurred more recently. Various elements enter into an explanation; one is that they visualized Gaddafi’s surviving an onslaught that appeared fitful and irresolute.

Certainly, the strategy has been implemented in a disjointed manner. There was little coordination between the initial American airstrikes and the follow-on air campaign under NATO command conducted by its European allies. Almost no battlefield support was given the insurgents at critical moments early in the campaign when Gaddafi and his loyalists were barely holding on. For more than a month, the thousands of claimed NATO air sorties had so little practical effect that opposition leaders voiced concerns that they had been misled if not betrayed. The incoherence and ineptitude of the air campaign undercut the political strategy of putting intolerable pressure on Gaddafi and his associates. The hand-off from the United States was abrupt and uncoordinated. President Obama was anxious to limit American exposure at a time of mounting domestic criticism about American overextension. The post-hoc justification that the White House was perfecting the art of “leading from behind” was a feeble post-hoc justification for Washington’s quick exit from the scene of action. As for the Europeans, their weak political will – individual and collective – is notorious. Once again they have demonstrated an inability to manage difficult, complex missions when the United States is not there to lead them. This judgment holds despite the initiatives of French President Sarkozy who has been too erratic and lacking in the authority to orchestrate the behavior of other governments.