Most of those arguing that the US military should leave as many as 10,000 troops in Iraq after the December 31, 2011 deadline were also responsible for getting us involved in this mindless, needless, senseless invasion and occupation in the first place. And just as they refused to do a thoughtful cost-benefit analysis of the invasion and occupation in 2003, they are not doing one now. An unbiased analysis would show that it is not in the best interests of either Iraq or the United States for American troops to remain after the deadline, which was agreed to by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Maliki in the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement.

First, the Iraqis never wanted us to invade their country, and most believe that the deaths of several hundred thousand of their fellow citizens and the widespread destruction of the country in order to remove Saddam Hussein was not worth it. Maliki, who was our choice to become the head of the Iraqi government in 2005 and again in 2009, summed up the Iraqi attitude in June 2009 when, under the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement, US troops had to withdraw from the cities and towns to their bases. Maliki announced to a jubilant populace that “we have repelled the invaders.’’

Moreover, it was Maliki who forced Bush and his generals to accept the timeline. The former president had envisioned a prolonged military presence with hundreds of bases and with American forces free to conduct military operations against what he perceived as Iraq’s internal and external enemies. If Maliki changes his mind, it will appear that he has caved to American pressure, and it will weaken his ability to govern.

Second, if US troops remain, violence against Americans will continue to increase and Maliki’s government will likely collapse. Muqtada Al-Sadr, whose support was critical to Maliki’s success in forming a government even though he finished second in the elections, will likely withdraw his support from Maliki if he renegotiates the agreement, thus creating political chaos. In addition, he has promised to reconstitute his Mahdi Army militia, which could be joined by other Shi’ite extremist groups in attacking Americans. In fact there is evidence that the recent increase in violence against Americans is a result of our asking the Iraqis to change their mind on allowing us to stay.

Third, the Iraqi security forces do not need us. They already outnumber the remaining insurgents, and their counterterrorism units are first-rate. Although they are not yet ready to repel an invasion by a foreign government, there is little likelihood of that happening. Even Iran does not have to invade Iraq to have influence there nor given its own internal problems is it capable of doing so at this time. It was the Iranians who got Al-Sadr, one of their clients, to support Maliki. And Maliki has already repaid them by supporting their positions on Bahrain, Lebanon, and Hamas.

Fourth, just as the invasion of 2003 undermined the overall strategic interests of the United States, so too will keeping forces in Iraq beyond the agreed-upon date. It will enhance the Al Qaeda narrative about American intentions in the region and also make it almost impossible to get a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Remember Al Qaeda was not in Iraq until after our invasion and occupation and will likely come back in large numbers if we stay. Moreover, the Taliban will never accept a negotiated settlement with the Karzai government in Afghanistan if they do not trust us to leave that country at a date certain. Giving priority to Iraq over Afghanistan in 2003 undermined our interests by creating a quagmire in that country. Having troops in Iraq would do that again.

Removing our military from Iraq does not mean the United States will disengage. Even after the troops leave we will still have a strong diplomatic contingence that we can still provide aid and assistance and develop non-military exchanges and programs that can deepen the ties between our countries and ensure continuing U.S. influence. But the future of Iraq is in the hands of its government and people. After eight years of military operations, including the surge and the expenditure of a trillion dollars and loss of 30,000 killed and wounded, we have not been able to remove the root causes of conflict in that country. Only the Iraqis can. By leaving at the end of this year, our troops can leave with the dignity they deserve. And if the Congress provides adequate funding for the State Department efforts after the withdrawal, we can mitigate the chances that their efforts will have been in vain.

I'm clearly a voice in the wilderness on this issue, but shutting up has never been my strong suit. So:

I understand that people are profoundly weary of both our current wars. I understand that our war in Iraq in particular began with deceit, descended into disaster, and has still only barely clawed its way back up to a situation that's tolerable, if unstable. And I understand that the "sunk costs" argument – that we've spent so much blood and treasure on Iraq that we can't dishonor the dead by just walking away – is an emotional justification, not a logical one.

But what I see a lot of here is another kind of sunk costs thinking, and it's equally emotion-driven and illogical: Our presence in Iraq has already cost us too much blood and treasure, therefore we should not invest a penny more. But what matters is our marginal cost going forward and our rate of return on investment.

World War II and Korea were even more appalling nightmares than Iraq has been. Korea in particular began with an even worse strategic mistake – specifically MacArthur moving so far north he scared the Chinese into intervening – and ended with an even more unsatisfactory government in place – a military-dominated dictatorship that did not give way to democracy until the 1980s. None of that stopped us from keeping troops in Germany and South Korea for generations – to the present day! – when we saw a strategic need. There’s a strategic need to have a military presence in Iraq.

If the U.S. had the chance to establish a significant advisor presence, maybe even an airbase, in a strategically located country that’s crucial to the global economy, we’d seriously consider it. So why would we reject out of hand the idea of keeping an advisor presence, and possibly an airbase, in a country where we already have one?

What matters above all is our relationship with the emerging, unstable, strategically critical new Iraq. It would certainly be a mistake to try to stay if the Iraqi government didn’t want us to. But it would equally be a mistake to walk away if they asked us to stay. Ultimately, this is not just our decision. It is ours and theirs.

-- Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

www.LearningFromVeterans.com

History sometimes has embedded messages that should be heeded. In 1944 an Iraqi political cabal among nationalist army officers attacked British interests, facilities and persons all over Iraq. The RAF air base at Habbaniyah west of Baghdad was literally besieged for a long time. It was defended by the locally recruited "Assyrian" Christian guards.

It is a long way from central Iraq to the sea. Both the Mediterranean and Gulf are several hundred miles away from the places where most residual American forces would be left. Muqtada al-Sadr has declared that if the US leaves forces in the country after the first of the year, he will tell his men to resume attacking us. And then, there are the Iranians themselves and their special operations forces so deeply burrowed into Iraqi Shia society.

For a residual American garrison to be reasonably secure it would have to be so large as to make a mockery of the idea that we have withdrawn from this sovereign state.

I do not write here of the diplomatic and development aid civilians. They will be scattered across the country, to include the big cities. Their security will be dependent on their hired guards and whatever help the remaining US forces could give them.

The assumption that such residual presences would be "safe" is deeply flawed.

A few additional words on Iranian influence in Iraq. We do have something of a recent, post-2003, experience to rely on. Who was it who brokered the understanding between Maliki and Sadr in March-April 2008 that led to the latter’s standing down (after his militia had gotten the upper hand in Basra and neutralized the government forces in Baghdad before we jumped into the fray)? Who presided at the shotgun wedding of those two that permitted the formation of a government that sidelined our man Alawi (who represented a few secularists and many faute de meilleur Sunnis)? It wasn’t David Petraeus or Dick Holbrooke. There exists a considerable historical record available for anyone who has the inclination and honesty to consult it which validates this assessment.. Clearly, our masters in Washington are not among them – nor are 95% of the D.C. cognoscenti. Instead they trail the red herring (now three years old) of Iranian arms supplies being the cause of that tragic country’s continuing trials. And as an excuse for overstaying our leave. How sad; how irresponsible.

It's impossible to know what's going to happen in Iraq after we leave. But I'd imagine that's precisely what worries the Administration. Or put it this way : Obama doesn't want to go into the 2012 election with the fresh memory he's the president who lost Iraq. And, even if Iraq ultimately asks us to leave, he's slightly better off having been thrown out of the party - the Iraqi's forcing our departure - than he is running for the door.

Last week I was on the phone with a Los Angeles radio station, and made the blunder of mentioning Iran and Israel inside the same sentence. Essentially what I said was that it was a bad sign that senior Israel security officials are retiring from the government and going public that they don't trust Netanyahu on Iran, i.e. Netanyahu very well could launch a preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. I went on to speculate that if that were to happen, it very well could draw the United States into the conflict. ( I also speculated that it's a conflict that would quickly escalate. Who doesn't fear the same thing?) And here's where my blunder turned into an idiotic blunder. In answer to the interviewer's question when this could occur, I offered that Israel isn't going to be happy about a U.N. vote on Palestinian statehood this September ... so maybe that would be a possibility. Netanyahu would derail the vote, and at the same time set back Iran's nuclear program. He'd kill two birds with one stone. Anyhow, for the record, I certainly didn't pretend to know what's going through Netanyahu's mind. But it didn't stope my musings from setting of a froth on the Internet. I should have known Iran's not a subject for polite conversation.

Apparently not having learned a lesson, I'll wade right back into it. Not only does the administration not know what's going to happen in Iraq after we leave, it also doesn't know what Iran will do. The Iran-Iraq border is porous, and Iran's ability to cause mischief in Iraq is considerable. Senior U.S. officials recently made that allusion when they claimed that Iran's been supplying weapons to Iraqi Shia insurgents now attacking our troops. So, if in fact Iran were to take a more visible role in Baghdad after out departure, the administration would be served with a double dish of misery - they not only lost Iraq, but they also lost it to the Iranians.

For the last thirty years we've more than once walked up to the abyss with Iran - but always managed to walk back. There's no reason to think we'll go over the edge this time. But if you're sitting in the White House speculation like this is worthless. The Obama administration fully understands that a symbolic troop presence in Iraq isn't going to turn that country into a Western democracy or measurably improve the the fighting capacity of the Iraqi army. Instead, I speculate, it looks at as troops there as a deterrent - against Iran and against the president's domestic critics. I don't find any of this comforting, but it does explain why the president would continue on with the Iraqi war blunder.

My response to this question was posted on my blog "Sic Semper Tyrannis" this AM.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2011/07/diehl-wants-a-forever-presence-in-iraq.html

The Obama White House and the Pentagon are moving heaven and earth to keep a substantial military presence in Iraq. That includes four giant air bases, 20,000 or multi-capable troops, and a host of CIA operatives complemented by the usual assortment of hirelings. What is the strategic purpose? The administration has not leveled with us about their aims. Nonetheless, they are easily inferred.

1.To serve as part of the cordon encircling Iran able to support coercive diplomacy and possibly coercive force itself. They are not there to defend Iraq from Iran (the cover story) since the Iraqi leadership itself has no fear of an attack.

2. To serve as a component of the base network extending from the Gulf well into Central Asia. That conforms to the 'full spectrum dominance' concept that seeks to dominate militarily every global region. Mission? Anything and everything. Cost concerns? Austerity doesn't play when national security is at stake.

3. To serve as leverage to influence domestic Iraqi politics and policy. The Pentagon has been relentless is currying favor with the new Iraqi army which is seen as their card in the political game. Some factions in the Iraqi army want the U.S. to stick around so as to guarantee a smooth flow of aid. A few even see this as a national need as opposed to a strictly private one since currently they are outgunned by the Kurdish Peshmega. The Kurds of course want us around to serve as a check on the Arab government in Baghdad. How to reconcile these last two? Well, Washington has a genius for inventive methods to square circles - even if their record to date is one of perfect failure.

There is an old blues tune made famous by Mississippi John Hurt;

"I'm just a poor boy far from home,

and I don't got no friends.

So please.....please let me stay the night."

(I'm afraid of those Persians lurking in the dark)

Much of the reluctance to comply with the existing 2011 deadline to pull out US troops is based on the fear--especially in senior American political and military circles in the field and in Washington--that all Hell could break loose in Iraq following a more definitive US withdrawal and what US leaders have managed to characterize as a "success" for several years could turn quite sour. Although the situation in Iraq after a more complete American withdrawal could be dicer in some respects, I tend to believe there is less chance of a truly serious breakdown at this point than do some other observers.

While governance in Iraq remains in an unsettled state and in many ways wanting, in the wake of the terrible bloodletting of 2006-2007 in particular there is considerable popular reluctance to take steps in the direction of significant violence to resolve--or dramatize--remaining grievances. The situation in disputed areas around the perimeter of the KRG certainly remains a leading concern, but an outbreak there of widespread violence also seems a bit less likely than the warnings coming from some quarters would suggest. Will Iranian influence spike after another steep reduction in the US presence? It almost certainly will increase, but aside from a few of the most dire scenarios involving Iraqi infighting, even Tehran might well be cautious about wearing out its welcome by overplaying its hand.

We also must recognize that an extended limited US troop presence is no magic bullet that would guarantee that the overall situation in Iraq would not deteriorate noticeably in some fashion. With the many tendencies at work and still in political conflict within Iraq, there could be trouble that the continued presence of US ground forces would not be in a position to address. Indeed, in a few such problematic scenarios, it probably would be better for the US presence to be more limited in order to have less of our military personnel exposed to related dangers.

Then there is, of course, the problem of Iraqi political approval. The desire for an end to "occupation" is very real, and for Maliki & Co. to embrace an extension of the US combat presence on the ground is not without its political costs. So, as Sydney Freeberg indicates, it would be unwise for Washington to apply too much pressure in an effort to nudge Baghdad into agreement.

And, finally, there is considerable (and understandable) war-weariness on the part of the American public. Additionally, the US military itself very much needs to disengage more of its troops from overseas duty both for purposes of rest and greater normalization at home as well as an improvement in overall multi-mission global readiness.

So while there are some legitimate concerns about the fate of Iraq in the coming years, all told they do not appear sufficient for the US to place untoward pressure on the Iraqi government to allow US combat troops to remain beyond the existing deadline. Indeed, there are some advantages to be derived from further scaling down that presence. One of my principal fears in this situation is that as the 2012 US national political campaign continues to heat up, the Obama Administration might feel particularly compelled to lean excessively hard on Baghdad for a positive decision on extending the US presence because of the potential domestic political danger of being blamed for anything that "goes wrong" in Iraq by its political opponents if US troops leave on schedule.

If the Iraqi government can get its act together to ask us to stay, we should stay. If they don’t, we shouldn’t strong-arm them. (Nudge them, maybe, but no sharp elbows). The benefit of keeping a small American contingent in Iraq after December outweigh the costs unless those costs include Iraqi resentment.

What do I mean by a “small” U.S. force? According to official data, the Army alone still has over 41,000 soldiers in Iraq, so there’s plenty of room to come down. But we have to remember that Iraqi democracy is still inchoate, the relationship between the Arabs and Kurds is still tense, and the Iraqi air force has no ability to defend the nation’s airspace. America is going to have to guarantee Iraq against both civil war and foreign aggression for years to come, and it’d be a lot easier to do that with some forces on the ground.

At a minimum we want to keep, say, a hundred liaison officers in place to maintain our close relationship with the Iraqi security forces, share intelligence on terrorists, coordinate air defense with U.S. fighters based elsewhere in the region, and, inshallah, keep nudging Iraq generals in the direction of democracy and away from staging coups or abusing human rights. We’d have a stronger connection, and more influence, with thousands of advisors spread through the Iraqi Army and federal police. We also want advisors embedded in the Kurdish regional forces, if only to ensure that (a) if troops on either side start doing something stupid, there is an American nearby to try dissuading them and (b) before anyone pulls a trigger, they have to think about whether they’ll hit an American advisor by mistake.

Combat units? It would be nice to retain an airbase in Iraq until their own air force can actually function. (If only so we can intercept the Israelis if they launch an airstrike towards Iran and set the whole Middle East on fire). There was a time when I thought it would be a good idea to have an American “coup prevention brigade” out in the desert, ostensibly to stop Iranian penetration but ready to roll into Baghdad if someone tries to seize power; but on sober reflection I think the politics are impossible: Americans trying to stop a coup d'état would probably give it a popularity boost. Likewise, I wondered if the Kurds might want an American brigade based in their territory, again nominally to guard against Iran but in practice to warn the Arab-dominated federal government not to use force, but that’s more in the middle of the Arab-Kurdish problem than we really want to get.

Overall, I’m talking about perhaps 10,000 military personnel. Even in this apparently endless recession, the United States can afford that. It’s a small price to pay to preserve the relationship with Iraq. I’m not making a “sunk costs” argument: That we’ve spent trillions of dollars and thousands of lives on Iraq already does not, by itself, justify one penny more. No amount of propping up the Iraqi government will bring a single U.S. soldier back to life. But it is worth investing in a strong relationship with one of the largest Arab states, one which is not only a major oil producer in its own right but which stands at the strategic crossroads of the Gulf. And if our influence can help Iraq develop a stable, enduring democracy, so much the better.

--

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

www.LearningFromVeterans.com

After the end of the Vietnam War, Frank Snepp wrote a controversial book called "A Decent Interval." Snepp put forward some disputed proof that our withdraw from Vietnam was premised on getting out and allowing the North Vietnamese to conquer the South -- at a decent interval from our withdrawal.

The facts were the Untied States got out totally by the end of 1973. Congress hamstringed a return. And, by April 1975, Hanoi entered Saigon and the war was over.

I think the American people are sick to death of our commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. With Bin Laden's death, a lot of the support has faded and we want to get our troops home.

Extending the commitment in Iraq will not be tolerated and is especially not going to work in an election year. We will get out of Iraq when we said we would -- and hope they will give us a decent interval before all hell breaks loose there.

As John Kennedy said regarding South Vietnam, in the final analysis, it is ultimately their war. Ultimately, it is the Iraqis peace to win or lose. The Iraqi need to balance their internal struggles.

I have no doubt after we leave, a lot of scores will be settled. But, we have now done all we can. Meddling with arms sales, financial assistance and the like will do little.