I'm terribly afraid that Libya itself is going to be mired in conflict for a long time. (See my New Republic essay "Libya's Coming Insurgency"). But I believe this will generally have a positive effect on the region rather than a negative one. There are two reasons for this.

First, I think Libya will remind the citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, and other Arab states what happens when democratization fails, thus making them more amenable to the sort of compromise that democracy build requires.

Second, I think that a protracted conflict in Libya will force the Arab League and other regional states to assume greater responsibility for the security of their region rather than relying on Europe or the United States.

While both of these would be good things, it is tragic and heartbreaking that it may require the suffering of the Libyan people to inspire them.

Sitting around the table in college library seminar rooms, it is always easy to hold forth on weighty isues with a freedom that is not reflective of the real world. Purity of ideals are easily insisted on when lunch is only an hour or so away. Reality is different. Some wise person said that an intellectual is someone who can hold two opposing positions in his mind simultaneousy. We need to be able to do that now.

Libya is a country ruled by a fool with an entertaining penchant for "dressing up." Some of his "Kodak Moment" versions of "traditional" Libyan dress are captivating. Nevertheless, he is a mad, bad man, one of many bad actors with too much power in the world. Fortunately for the Libyan people, his armed forces are a joke in everything except posession of a large collection of obsolete equipment that has been ill maintained for many years and which his poorly trained and badly divided forces have little real ability to use. On the other hand the rebels are a poorly armed mob.who, nevertheless, seem willing to fight for their own freedom. It will cost us little to help them do that by training, advising and arming these people. A little air support would also be a big help for them. Helping them would be an homage to our ideals and I think we should help them. Without that help Qathafi will ultimately prevail. He should not be allowed to prevail.

Egypt wasa different matter. Mubarak was nothing like the monster that hysteria in the media portrayed him to be. His final decision to resign under heavy American pressure was quite different from that taken in Yemen by Salih. Mubarak's choice speaks well for him. American pressure on Mubarak to go was seen by all the other Arab governments as betrayal and the lesson was quickly absorbed easily as it reinforced the deeply held belief that the Arab World and Arabs in general are seen as children in Washington, creatures to be toyed with.

Having absorbed that vision of betrayal, the governments are now committed to finding their own way to survival. They believe that the the United States is not to be listened to because the United States counsels compromise with forces within their countries that are dedicated to their destruction as ruling elites. In the Gulf they are convinced that Iran plays a major hidden role in seeking revolution through manilulation of 12er Shia populations. In this they are not altogether incorrect.

As a result, thse governments have determined to shoot or bribe their way to survival much as the monarchies of Europe did in 1848. They have also made some basic decisions about international alignments. China, acting through and with its long standing alliance with Pakistani will play a much bigger role in the Gulf from now on. In the last decade there has been a growing group of Saudi officers who have advanced the idea of a stronger relationship with China. Their hand has been strengthened by recent events.

There is a lot of self-assured talk now of right sides and arong sides in history as though there is some purpose in human events. This is a charming idea but altogether incorrect. Histoy has no purpose or inevitablility. It just happens.

Before we imagine that the existing Arab goverments are doomed by being on "the wrong side of history," we should remember that the European governments of 1848 survived for another seventy years until they destroyed themselves and each other in the First World War.

When the President is in Latin America over the next several days there is a strong likelihood that he will raise the idea that Latin America has much to contribute to the rapid changes ongoing in the Middle East.

Don't laugh, it's not as ludicrous as some might think.

In the first instance, both Colombia and Brazil are current members of the UN Security Council and Colombia just voted in favor of the no-fly resolution while Brazil abstained (putting Brasilia in the company of the other BRICs and also Germany).

More to the point, Chileans have already had a delegation in the Middle East discussing the transition process from authoritarianism to democracy, and Mexico initiated the effort to suspend Libya from the human rights commission.

What gives these or other Latin American countries any authority on the issues, and why would President Obama discuss these issues on this trip? Quite simply this: it was barely a generation ago when Latin America was seen as a region more receptive to "strong" leaders, be they from the left or the right, where democracy was seen as a foreign concept and the idea that democracy could be encouraged by the United States was dismissed as either interventionist or naive or both. It was also a region where the United States had long relationships with some fairly unsavory characters in support of what were then defined as national security interests, but was able to pivot over time to support a broader, pro-democracy agenda.

Not every nation turned out the same--we had and continue to have more difficulties with, say, Nicaragua, than we do with El Salvador. The same will be true in the Middle East. But in answer to Sydney's question, there are definitely broader regional impacts that would have to be considered in any actions with Libya, and aligning ourselves on the right side of history, as we did in Latin America, will tend to have this important, salutory effect.

In the meantime Latin America can lead by example, particularly nations like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and others that have developed and strengthened their respective democracies based on institutions such as separation of powers and the peacefull and regular transfer of power by elected officials, freedom of the press, respect for human rights, and all the other things that are relevant in the current Middle East.

Obviously, the two regions are not the same nor is the example of Latin America completely perfect for the Middle East. But there are nonetheless some similarities, and this is one way that the United States might be able to use so-called "soft power" to encourage peaceful change in the region, even if the soft power employed is not entirely our own.

I tend to line up with Michael Brenner, but it will be interesting to see where things stand with respect to what the US actually intends to do after the President speaks this afternoon.

In part because of over a week of prior US footdragging, collective international military support for the opposition comes very late in what has become a less advantageous game. Through unremitting military, para-military and police brutality, rushed in part to get ahead of intervention much like this, Qadhafi largely has crushed open opposition resisitance in the west: Zawiya, Zintan and other locales retaken with much violence, and now a rush to finish off opposition resistance in Libya's 3rd largest city Misrata amidst the declaration of a ceasefire. In the east, enthusiastic but poorly trained and armed opposition fighters have been driven out of Ras Lanouf and Marsa al-Brega, and the city of Ajdabiya has been practically surrounded. All must be done to assist the opposition to preserve their current holdings as a baseline. That should include Misrata since, ceasefire aside, much of Qadhafi's gains there came since UNSC 1973 was passed. Doing so from the air in the east should not be too difficult, but Misrata will be an interesting case because hammering Qadhafi's numerous tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, etc. there not only means hitting them inside the confines of the city into which he thrust them this morning, but doing so in close proximity to the main cluster of Libyan surface-to-surface missiles in the greater Tripoli area.

Regarding the ceasefire mentioned in UNSC 1973 (language inserted by the Russians), the prior UNSC resolution on this Libyan crisis might well provide justification for demanding as a condition of such a ceasefire the surrender soon to the ICC of a number of Libyan leaders, including at least 3 of the Qadhafis, for trial. That, of course, would likely make such a ceasefire unattainable, but it would provide ample justification for considering much of anything connected with the regime and its warfighting capablility (already having been used to assault and "threaten" the population) a target in the meantime. After all, it would appear that the clear objective of all this in the eyes of at least Washington, London & Paris is the demise of this regime.

Nonetheless, Washington must insist that there be a hefty dose of non-US participation in all this, hopefully even a majority share. After all, the UK and the French especially drove this train and should remain in the forefront. Overtures should be made to Italy to get involved directly (and significantly) as well, given its commanding interest in Libya. Rome has been cautious up till now, fearing Qadhafi might prevail, but it should be made clear to the Italians that such is not an acceptable outcome. Arab participation would be extremely desirable. However, one potentially formidable doner in that respect with a major grudge against Qadhafi--Saudi Arabia--is somewhat compromised by its simultaneous intervention in Bahrain.

Hopefully, the picture related to US action, its guidelines and scale should be considerably clearer after the President has addressed how Washington views UNSC 1973 this afternoon.

It should be obvious that acceptance of Gadhaffi's ceasefire in place is out of the question. Sadly, nothing is impossible as the United States (and others) stagger from crisis to crisis, day by day, in the absence of a coherent interpretaion of what has been ocurring in the Middle East. Our credibility - or, more accurately, what is left of it - hangs by a fragile thread through the Middle East and the wider world. That is underscored by the green light that we have given to the violent crackdowns on democracy demonstrators that we have given in Bahrain and Yemen. Indeed, the clumsy volte-face in the Oval Office obviously was due to a belated. 11th hour realization that we had to compensate for our bad publicity in those other places. This is classic Obama: petty, self-centered political games even at times of major crisis. What is to be feared is that those instincts will lead to a readiness for 'dialogue' with Gadhaffi. After all, this is a President who still touts 'bipartisanship' as his compelling interest.

We should deliver some decisive blows to Gadhaffi's forces and set strict terms for him to remove himself to Tripoli as the precondition for political talks whose parameters we set. His spokesman's hands are already shaking. There are no excuses for acting otherwise. No Iranian obsession, no ally "in the war on terrorism' all purpose excuse (although the CIA in its wisdom seems to think otherwise). Time for the President to stop playing at being President and to be one.

Yesterday, the United Nations Security Council approved an Arab League request to authorize “all necessary measures" in Libya. (After I’d given up on both international bodies; I’ve rarely been happier to be wrong). On the ground, the rebels in Ajdabiya are still holding out in the city center, barely, and even with the city surrounded Qaddafi can’t easily or securely bypass it to attack Benghazi. With swift action by the U.S., the British, and especially the French -- who've been most vocal in favor of intervention -- the rebellion in Libya might still stand a chance. I repeat, might.

The tide can only turn if we go beyond a no-fly zone and accompanying attacks on Libyan air defenses to airstrikes against Qaddafi's ground forces outside Ajdabiya and against his increasingly strained supply lines from Tripoli. (I would not advocate airstrikes against regime forces already inside Ajdabiya, because even with most civilians reportedly gone, we just don't have any reliable spotters on the ground and can't easily distinguish rebels from loyalists from 50,000 feet in the air). It would be nice to think that the loyalists' morale will collapse as soon as Western fighters show up to enforce a no-fly zone and knock Libyan airplanes from the sky, but betting the enemy will fold is not a strategy.

Then we may buy time to insert Special Operations advisors to guide the rebels with intelligence and planning advice on how to retake the initiative on the ground. But what's critical is airstrikes before Ajdabiya falls – which probably means Monday at the latest, and preferably this weekend.

The clock is ticking and people are dying. Let’s go.

Qaddafi’s forces are in the critical crossroads town of Ajdabiya. Reports are confused, which is typical of an ongoing battle. Reading between the lines, the news articles saying that the town has fallen are based on interviewing the refugees and rebel troops who are fleeing east, who are naturally going to say the situation’s already hopeless. (There’s a military commander’s maxim that the man who shows up at headquarters claiming to be only survivor of something is usually just the fastest runner). So I’d trust the reports that the battle is still ongoing.

If Ajdabiya falls, the loyalists have two roads open that will allow them both to attack Benghazi directly and to circle round and cut it off. Depending on what remains of the rebels’ morale, that means anything from a swift rebel collapse followed by mass arrests and executions to prolonged city fighting with civilian casualties and starvation. Either way, the cost of a Western intervention will escalate beyond what any government is willing to bear.

So it’s now or never. And it’s already too late for a no-fly zone to make a difference: Qaddafi’s ground troops have too much momentum for the loss of their air support to stop them. Only airstrikes against their supplies and reinforcements coming up the coastal highway from Tripoli can give the rebels a chance.

If the U.S. had acted last week, we would have had better odds of success at a lower cost to us. If we wait until next week, there’ll be no one left to help. I know that America can’t police the world or come to the rescue of everyone being massacred. But Libya is a case where morality, national interest, and military possibility all come together to urge action – now, or never.

It would appear that the time has passed for action that could prevent a Qadhafi triumph over the Libyan opposition, so perhaps it is appropriate that we move on to inquire as to the impact of events in Libya for its neighbors. I believe, however, that the consequences of US, NATO and EU inaction in the face of the exceptionally brutal suppression of the most promising challenge to Qadhafi's ugly, erratic and wasteful 40-plus years of rule will extend far beyond Libya's immediate neighborhood.

First off, there will be consequences related to the overall popular image of the US and the West throughout the region. Despite the presumption that Russia and China would have stood in the way of a UN Security Council blessing for a Libyan no-fly zone (NFZ), their reputational standing is unlikely to change all that much because so little has been expected of them for so long. Likewise, since so little is expected of the establishment Arab League, the lack of direct assistance on the part of its members most likely will not be a major source of grievance either. By contrast, the US and EU have long urged reform, a number of those countries made clear Qadhafi had to go, and their singular lack of concrete action in the face of the butchery and destruction in Libya--as well as the desperate pleas of the Libyan opposition--will further erode their credibility. In fact, the noticeably more pro-active stance on the part of the UK--and France especially--will cast the inaction on the part of the others in an even more inexplicable and disturbing light with respect to those on the proverbial Arab "street."

As for the US, the failure to assist the Libyan opposition, as well as the ineffectivenss of repeated US calls for governmental restraint in so many regional face-offs between established regimes and various forces pressing hard for change, doubtless will generate a widespread impression of US weakness. Worse still will be the inevitable conspiracy theories. US calls for the ouster of Saddam Hussien following the first Gulf War but then doing nothing to assist Kurdish and Shi'a rebels to stand up to Saddam's elite military units charged with regime defense spawned a widespread conspiracy theory to the effect that the US in fact wanted to keep Saddam in power. Similarly, now there will arise a persistent and damaging perception that the US also wished to preserve Qadhafi's rule, with the 2003 US-Libyan rapprochement giving added weight to this viewpoint among embittered oppositionists. Repeated US statements that it does not know enough about the Libyan opposition to act (implication: they might be too militantly Islamic) makes matters still worse because it implies that, yes, Washington considers the awful Qadhafi regime a better option than the oppostion or the unknown--somewhat of an extreme in status quo thinking.

For Mr. Obama more personally, the once rather popular vision of a youthful, sympathetic figure in the White House (an impression already long in decline) now probably will fade away more completely. Instead, there will likely be a return to a more cynical--even scornful--view of the president as little better than his unpopular predecessor when push comes to shove on issues of real consequence in the region.

Perhaps most importantly, there also will be widespread relief in the most hard-edged authoritarian capitals such as Damascus and Tehran that they would be accorded a similarly wide latitude for ruthlessness if faced with a robust internal challenge. Coupled with that view will likely be the belief among oppositionists who might contemplate such challenges even in countries with less brutal regimes that any efforts to effect change in their societies could well involve an extremely bloody uphill climb with practically no hope of securing outside assistance.

Equally troubling will be the assumption among domestically beleaguered governments close to the US that they to can employ still harsher methods to suppress dissent without encountering any truly damaging consequences (as with the deployment yesterday of Saudi and other GCC forces across the causeway into Bahrain to help shore up the al-Khalifa, the latter adopting a tough stance on concessions). And then there could, of course, be a parallel shift within the various opposition movements themselves to a perception of Washington as more of an obstacle rather than an enabler of the change they seek and not a particularly attractive ally should they succeed.

Finally, the US and many of its Western allies will be held widely responsible for the invevitable bloodshed and suffering resulting from their inaction. This will include especially brutal crackdowns in Libya as Qadhafi & Co. go about ruthlessly "cleansing" reclaimed opposition-held areas of not only rebel fighters and those who were outspoken in their opposition to the regime, but also in many cases their relatives. Unless the Egyptians succeed in closing the border or Qadhafi blocks access to it by quickly circling behind Tobruk, there also could well be a rather sizeable exodus of Libyans from Cyrenaica who would then become a burden on the West which, at least in the eyes of the displaced, so cynically let them down. And at the center of it all will be an intensely hostile Qadhafi more like the dictator of the pre-2003 era perhaps looking for opportunities to cause mischief for the US and other Western governments that led the calls for his ouster as well as sanctionsl against his relatives and many within his regime.

Washington's tergiversations these past several days over the Arab popular revolutions have unveiled the core American attitudes toward the Middle East. Unwittingly, we have let the veils drop one by one as we perform an artless improvised dance around the serial crises. Here is how I sum it up.

1. The United States has been a patron power of the status quo - as Wayne White has explained. In the current setting, we are transformed into a reactionary power. All and sundry from the Arab 'street' to the Arab divan see that. The American political class doesn't. They still believe that the ramshackle structure of local despots, Israeli ultras, and anyone who avows fear or terrorists and/or a Shi'ite surge is seismic resistant.

2. The underlying reason is our three obsessions: Terrorism, Iran and Israel - as alluded to in an earlier post. Nothing that is happening has forced the slightest qualification in that mindset. Hence, we quietly bless Mr. Saleh and the Bahraini royal family as we did Mr. Suleiman and the fading memory of the dying Mr. Mubarak. Mr. Gates did not fly to Bahrain to join the join the royal family in a chorus of Auld Lang Syne but rather to be in on the establishment of a GCC protectorate to keep those Iran inspired Shi'ites in their deferential place. From now, all our rhetoric about democracy & freedom in the region will cause acute digestive distress in any true reformer.

3. The Obama fear of the unknown is palpable in our abandonment of the Libyans to the tender mercies of Ghadaffi. He said that “Ghaddafi must go” without realizing that a great power doesn’t have the privilege of declaring something unacceptable and then doing nothing when it clearly has the power to produce the desired effect. In typical fashion, Obama sought to associate himself with what he thought was an imminent success rather than make a pledge to act. So we could not be moved by the surprising Anglo-French prod; we could not be moved by the shocking display of unwelcome Arab League unity in calling for what we do not want to do.

4. Most distressing to me is that we have settled on this course not through a process of deliberation but through inertia. That inertia is conceptual and temperamental. I doubt that Obama personally has the courage, imagination or personality to embark on something new and untried and risky. He just wants it all to go away - as with the BP oil spill, the financial thievery, and anything else that distracts him from the preoccupation of playing President as long as he possibly can. And there are no creative strategists within hailing distance to suggest otherwise.

5. For a decade, we have looked like players of a bizarre arcade video game where the goal is to shoot yourself in the foot as many times as possible. Extra points for a disabling injury. At this pastime, we are nonpareils.

As the Libyan rebellion collapses, we meanwhile have the Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation Council states sending forces to support the regime in Bahrain. The Bahraini monarchy is hardly as bad as Qaddafi, nor are the largely non-violent protests there anything comparable to the civil war in Libya. Nevertheless the precedent is disturbing: It's apparently okay for Arab states to intervene in support of an authoritarian regime, but not in support of a pro-democratic rebellion.

But there's a silver lining here, albeit very thin: Can we argue now that what's good for the Bahraini goose is good for the Libyan gander? If brotherly Arab neighbors can intervene on behalf of stability in Bahrain, where there isn't even rioting, couldn't they also intervene on behalf of stability in Libya? Perhaps Bahrain might make it just a bit easier for the Egyptian military and democratizers to coalesce around limited intervention in Libya.

The U.S. has significant interests in the outcome of the current conflict. Qadhafi has committed crimes against Americans, and it is in the national interest to bring him to justice. Moreover, a protracted civil war in Libya risks spreading instability throughout the region, exacerbating a humanitarian crisis that could spill over to NATO’s front door, and creating a failed state that could become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.

It is time for American leadership. The White House must craft a long-term strategy rather than being consumed by the short-term decision over whether to establish a no-fly zone. While short-term actions may be warranted, they should not be taken simply for the short-term need to “do something.” Rather, military action must be designed to advance long-term strategic goals, and it should be recognized as a first step that might require protracted engagement in the region. Even if the West acted with alacrity now, the best that could likely be achieved is a stalemate in the Civil War…and even that would likely require air strikes as well as logistical support and training for the insurgents.

More and more every day this is looking like the aftermath of Gulf War I.

The Libyan revolution has reached its do-or-die moment – and I mean “or die” entirely literally. The ugly fact is that the rebels are losing. We can no longer cross our fingers and hope the Libyans will overthrow their dictator on their own. Now the U.S., Europe, and the Arab world have to choose which is the least-bad option: We intervene militarily on behalf of the rebellion or we let Qaddafi win.

Military intervention means potentially American casualties, possibly a regional backlash (though I’m increasingly confident there won’t be much of one), and definitely a messy entanglement that will last for years. I’m not happy about it. But letting Qaddafi win doesn’t mean return to the ugly-but-tolerable status quo ante as of January. It would mean something much worse. It means escalating urban warfare. It means a humanitarian crisis in Benghazi when the city is besieged and starts running out of food. It means the massacre of anyone linked to the rebellion – dictators find ways around their promises of amnesty – and a stronger, harsher regime ruling a prostrated people.

Beyond Libya, this outcome would obviously demoralize reformers, hearten reactionaries, and terrify the undecided around the region. But far worse than any merely symbolic or psychological effect, Qaddafi’s victory would firmly establish a bloody-handed dictatorship right between the two leading nations of the Arab revolution, namely Tunisia and Egypt. The delicate dance of transition now underway in both countries between pro-democratic forces, Islamists, the army, and the holdouts from the old regime would be further complicated because everyone would have to look constantly over their shoulders at the monster next door – and at the refugees coming across the borders.

For all these reasons, I consider intervention far the lesser of two evils.

So I say we go in. “Go in” here means advisors and airpower, not ground forces. “We” means the U.S. and whoever is willing to follow. Someone has to lead, and once again by default it’s up to us. The only prerequisite I consider essential is a clear invitation from the Libyan rebels, and whoever’s in charge, every voice I’m hearing is asking for help now. As for the region, the Arab League endorsed a “no-fly zone” this weekend (incidentally validating Steven Metz’s faith in the League when I’d preemptively and, it turns out, prematurely given up on them). If they’ve come so far so soon, there’s a good chance they can be convinced to approve limited airstrikes, even if only after the fact, and a very slim chance they’ll condemn them. So in the old triad of “lead, follow, or get out of the way,” the Arab world has at least gotten out of the way.

Now, I’d love the Egyptian army to roll across the border and at least secure a supply line to Benghazi so the rebels can’t be cut off and starved. It would be a huge help to the Libyans and a psychologically critical commitment to democracy for the Egyptians. But I doubt there’s anything approaching a consensus for intervention in Cairo, either among the general officer corps, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the nascent pro-democratic forces. In any case, if things keep getting worse, once Qaddafi’s loyalists are back in control of the border, which looks likely there’s no way the Egyptians are coming across. Now, if the civil war at least stabilizes – if the rebels at least survive, let alone win – Egyptian peacekeepers and humanitarian support might be possible. But even a stalemate would require someone to intervene. So if we don’t act, the conditions for the Egyptians to act won’t materialize; our action is a prerequisite for theirs. That’s what leadership is about, unfortunately.

On the upside, while the wider Arab world may be distinctly queasy at the prospect of another U.S. intervention to conduct “regime change,” the Libyan rebels will definitely be grateful – and it’s the people whose country it is whose feelings about intervention will be strongest and last longest. Turning Libya from a semi-manageable rogue nation to a friend would be a great gain for the U.S. Turning Libya from an increasingly brutal dictatorship to an even tenuously democratizing state would be a great gain for the U.S. and for the region. Not only do the dangers of inaction outweigh the dangers of action, but the potential benefits of action are immense.

It’s time to act.

It is obvious that over the weekend, the dictator Quadaffi is beginning to gain the upper hand over the opposition forces. That is not good. When you shoot at the king, you better not miss. The shot was fired and its appears the shooter missed.

So what, if anything, can the West (namely NATO and the U.S.) do. Well, short of a "no-fly"zone and a commitment of troops not much. I also don't expect much more from the Arab League. I suspect condemnation exhausted their limited efforts. After all, a number of them are also in the gunsights of the freedom movements.

Where does this all leave us? Well, the situation is hopeless (for now), but not impossible. Whatever happens in Libya, the fuse of overturning these dictatorships has been lit. The greatest hurdle, that it can be done, has already passed with the fall of the governments of Tunisia and Egypt.

This is not going to be an easy road. The rest of the countries in the Middle East are going to crack down hard or give limited concessions to buy off their people. I don't think the people are going to accept this. It may take years, but the face of the Middle East is and will continue to change.

We need to support that change. President Obama's speech in Cairo early in his adminstration tied the West to that change. We not seem to be equivocating on backing change. At the very least, with little options for now, we need to strengthen our rhetoric supporting democracy.

In the midst of the epochal changes reshaping the Middle East, an assessment of their meanings for the United States should keep in mind a few truths about who we are as a country, where we are as a world power, and where we may reasonably wish to be down the road.

1. American idealism always has been central to our self esteem, and to our standing in the minds of other peoples, even as we have acted pragmatically (wisely or otherwise) in pursuit of our national interests. That idealist side of our split national personality has been badly eroded at both home and abroad with the deleterious consequences strikingly evident in both spheres. We may sublimate awareness of what we have become; most others don’t.

2. In an evolving world where our relative power is destined to diminish markedly, the intangibles of status and image grow in importance as assets to be used constructively to help shape a responsible multilateral management of world affairs. That also conforms to what we need to restore self-confidence and self-respect domestically.

3. Our crass conduct in the Greater Middle East during the 9/11 decade has been far more costly in every respect than the Washington punditocracy (or certainly the media) know or admit. The revolutionary wave in the Arab world is a stroke of good fortune - a gift from the gods. It creates circumstances of historic dimensions wherein we can restore our credibility and our standing as the 'good guys.' Obama and his minions seem to have no awareness of this whatsoever. Sadly, they are blind to the big picture as they scurry about on their damage control errands.

4. The challenge is to seize that opportunity while not disregarding our valid, tangible interests that do not fully coincide with our longer term interests in being the godfather and underwriter of democracy in the region. The pivots of our strategic position have been four preoccupations: Terrorism, Iran, Israel and oil. The first three have become obsessions that defy reason and logic. A saner, more reasonable estimation of authentic interests and threats in regard to all three would markedly alter how we balance our divergent concerns and make tradeoffs between short-term and longer-term perspectives. By devaluing the multiform 'war against terrorism,' we lower our stake in Bahrain naval bases, in potentates like Yemen's Saleh, and in keeping Shi'ites at bay wherever they raise their heads. e.g. Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, even Iraq where we are suspicious of our own ‘certified’ Shi’ites. As a result of the Iran fixation, the Obama administration views Shi’ites worldwide the way Peter King views the American Muslim community.

5. The stickiest issues are raised by Saudi Arabia - because of its key role in the global oil market and because there the fall of the House of Saud could bring to power truly disagreeable people.

6. The Bahrain/Saudi link is there although I lack the expertise to estimate possible spillover effects. I can see no compelling reason, though, to send Mr. Gates personally to hold the hands of the Bahrainian royal family, Nor is there reason for us to embrace whatever is left of Mr. Saleh's unsavory and fragile regime in Yemen. The Obama belief that America’s future interests are served by tying them to Mr. Saleh is a commentary on how warped is Washington’s perception of what counts in the region.

7. Two passive acts could vastly improve our position in the region and the world: leaving Bahrain and Yemeni rulers to their own devices; cooling the passions of our campaign against the Mullahs' regime in Iran. Two active acts complement them: calling out the Israeli government; and intervening in Libya. This is the critical moment to fight free of the suicidal Israeli mesalliance. The latter is of far greater importance than the place's nominal value. Nearly everyone in the world knows on which side decency lies. They also are looking at the United States to redeem itself. It is not mainly a matter of means but of ends. Very few would mistake a focused, multilateral intervention to turn the military tide there (with no follow-on occupation) for our ravaging of Iraq and Afghanistan. Peoples’ instincts usually are truer than we give them credit for. This is especially so when the lines are so sharply drawn and everyone's consciousness is heightened. Even the Arab league has given formal expression to this sentiment. Washington, take note. Don’t I recall someone talking about “bending the arc of history?” Or was that another movie?

Doha, Qatar, 13 March-- It has been my privilege these past few days to attend Al-Jazeera's conference on the future of the Middle East. What follows is a summary of what I have heard and learned from Arabs, which might serve as a useful context for considering how the U.S. engages Libya and the Arab world, now and in the future. That said, the only thing I know for sure is this: it is the beginning of the beginning, and anything is possible.

Like the peoples of Africa, the sovereignty of Arabs has twice been usurped in the last 100 years: first from the outside by European colonialists, then from the inside by their own dictators. The result has been a pervasive humiliation and low self-esteem, too aware that their first attempts at self-governance after independence-whether through sacred, secular, or socialist governance structures-have failed. The establishment of democracy in Iraq added both injury and insult to this humiliation, as America did what they could not do for themselves.

This period is now over. To be sure, at least at this gathering, the heavy-hand of victimology dictates a mentality that blames everyone but the Arabs.

Nevertheless, stronger still is the clarion call, especially among those Arabs under forty, that this is their time. As Asma Mahfouz, the young woman who helped organize and sustain the Egyptian revolution via internet, said today with strength, and a smile: "Hold your heads high, you are Arabs!" It is impossible to overstate the importance of this self-esteem, and desire for self-determination.

Indeed, the two words that suffuse every conversation here-and every movement across the Arab world, from Mauritania and Morocco to Bahrain and Baghdad-are identity and dignity.

Just as critically, the discussion and implications of these words are taking place in a pragmatic and non-ideological manner. Said another Egyptian blogger today, Muhammed al-Kassas: "We don't want ideology, we want a common Arab market."

And, seemingly, there is, at least for now, an emerging space for principled pluralism to grow. For example, a young Egyptian woman who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) told me that just as Christians protected Muslims as they prayed in Tahrir Square, Muslims protected Christians as they prayed. "We were simply Egyptians."

I also learned that some believe real reform to be going on in the MB. Younger members believe that the previous elections of MB officials were secretive according to the oppressive environment, and that now there needed to be transparent and accountable elections...or the younger folks would leave the MB. Time will tell.

Al-Jazeera is leading the way in reporting on and sustaining the space needed for these kinds of discussions across the Arab world. It has been a long-time coming. As I wrote in April of 2003: "Although it is going through its own period of "yellow journalism," the good news is that Al-Jazeera can grow into a force for freedom that by-passes the authoritarian regimes of the region, reporting directly to ordinary people on the street." (Please see:http://www.globalengage.org/issues/articles/security/554-the-grand-strategy-sustainment.html.)

We have reached that point. As the first Gulf War made CNN, so the Arab revolutions have made Al-Jazeera: both as an organization of journalistic integrity and as the practical symbol of the freedom of expression that the Arabs gathered here want most. Consider the frank comments of Al-Jazeera's Director General, Wadah Khanfar, which I paraphrase here according to my memory and notes:

We elites have been trained to accept the status quo, but now a popular uprising-not led by an ideology or from the outside but by our own youth-has brought about the collapse of the past, of regimes, and most importantly the collapse of mindsets. Now we must reset as well. We cannot judge according to old categories, nor can we be defined against the other...our new understanding must be based on respect and understanding...there is a chance for American policy to be welcomed, encouraging the values of freedom and respect without being trapped in the old paradigm of [telling us] who should rule.

These words were spoken just hours before one of Al-Jazeera's journalists was assassinated in Libya. Al-Jazeera is not shying away from its coverage of-nor serving as a catalyst to-the three types of revolution that have now emerged in the Arab world: 1) a largely peaceful revolution because the army, paradoxically, is an independent institution capable of non-violent structure and process (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt); 2) a violent revolution (e.g., Libya); and, 3) a mostly evolutional revolution through constitutional reform (e.g., Jordan, Morocco).

What has not yet emerged in these conversations, however, is the intentional process through which the spiritual and institutional infrastructure is built to sustain a new identity so strong that it is comfortable with the dignity of the other.

For example, here in Qatar, as progressive a government as there is in the Arab world, the government has granted the Christian community a large block of land on which to build different churches. Besides the immediate concern of ghetto-ization-and the possibility of a community concentrated and therefore easily targeted-is the simple fact that these churches have not been allowed to place the cross anywhere on these new buildings. The cross cannot even be demonstrated in the stain glass windows for fear of offending that puritanical element of Islam still resident in Arab countries.

If Arab societies are to truly "reset," their identity must be strong enough to not merely tolerate but celebrate the minority in their midst. This is the sign of a strong identity based on self-esteem, and of a stable society that will flourish as a result. Creating a culture and a constitution that enables this kind of mutually-rooted identity takes time, and can easily be lost if not intentionally pursued.

Besides providing anecdotal hope from young leaders that identity and dignity can be protected and promoted for all, the conference has also, if sporadically, presented some ideas about how the Arab world might build this spiritual and institutional capacity for respecting the other.

President Luiz Inacio Lula De Silva, former two-term president of Brazil, gave a powerful address advocating democracy. While his policies are open to debate, his example is not. He held 73 conferences across Brazil-at the national, provincial, and local level-to discern the needs of the people and the resulting policies that might serve them. He also stressed again and again that true democracy demands the peaceful transfer of power. This transfer, he told the conference, is when a society achieves self-esteem.

There are also lessons to be learned from other parts of the world. As my friend, Dr. Amina Rassoul-Bennardo reminded me, this year marks the 25th anniversary of "people power" in the Philippines. What lessons have been learned about the development of state institutions (top-down) and civil society organizations (bottom-up)?

Indonesia, in particular, has gone through its own revolution, with faith-based communities and networks playing a significant role in the maintenance of a relatively stable society. It is a curious thing that the example of the largest Muslim country in the world, a democracy, has not been referenced here.

Absent the development of this kind of spiritual and institutional infrastructure, however, two types of dictatorship become possible: the return of the old, or the establishment of the new. Arab leaders capable of building this infrastructure-the young and young of heart-know that they have removed dictators but not the dictatorship, as Dr. Moncef Marzouki suggested yesterday. The leaders and structures of repression and corruption need to be transformed, otherwise they will simply resume power in the vacuum that can result from well-intentioned hopes and discussions.

And there is the obvious possibility of Islamist groups taking power amidst the period of uncertainty that follows every regime change. There are plenty of well-funded groups who are all too ready to be elected once. (For example, Hassan al-Turabi, Sudan's former Islamist leader, funded groups and networks across North Africa while he was in power, waiting for the opportunity to "Sunnify" governments and governed alike-Arab & African, Sufi and non-Muslim-with his puritanical strain of Islam.) These groups are still there. They will be defeated preemptively if the new Arab leaders can create and sustain a public square that build an Arab identity and dignity that encourages the identity and dignity of the other.

So what does this emerging and rapidly evolving context mean for U.S. policy in the Arab world, and especially Libya?

First, despite the widespread view of many Arabs that the U.S. has been a part of the problem-due to its perceived focus on oil, Israel, and authoritarian regimes that maintain stability-there is a unique and strategic opportunity to reset relations by how we engage the issue of Libya.

A few nights ago I met some Libyan leaders from Benghazi, the rebel stronghold in eastern Libya. All they want is a fair fight, so they can claim their freedom for themselves. What they requested from America was simple: "a no-fly, no-drive" zone under a formal United Nations resolution. ("No-fly" includes helicopters and "no-drive" means no re-supply, movement of tanks, etc.) With the Arab League's official request of a no-fly zone, we are one step closer to a U.N. resolution.

Ideally, a no-fly/no-drive zone would be conducted by NATO forces, including Turkey, in partnership with Arab air forces from the region.

Implemented and sustained in such a fashion, America would be viewed as acting in a manner that was consistent with the values of the Arab revolutions-justice and freedom-and its own. In turn, this would allow American policy to pivot from being perceived as part of the problem to becoming a part of the solution. This kind of action, I believe, would give us a more welcomed seat at the various Arab tables across the region as they emerge and wrestle with how identity and dignity-for all-are not only protected but promoted.

Second, we can help convene the kinds of conversations that bring democratization lessons from Latin America, South Africa, and Southeast Asia into the Arab context. People here are rightly focused on themselves and events unfolding by the hour. Eventually, however, getting leaders outside of their regional context will help bring perspective while providing practical lessons and relationships that nurture transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and respect for the other.

Finally, if this combination of international hard and soft power can persist-always at Arab request and under the auspices of the U.N.-there might be opportunity to not only enable other revolutions, but also to create a new context for the Israel-Palestine peace process in the aftermath of next year's presidential election.

Perhaps these possibilities seem unlikely. But perhaps they are as unlikely as a Muslim majority country, Morocco, being the first to recognize the independence of America in 1777, or a French fleet that enabled a fair fight at Yorktown in 1781. Or more unlikely still, perhaps these possibilities have as much chance as a young Egyptian woman catalyzing a revolution via the internet. While America must engage these complexities with clear-eyed vision, I believe that standing on our values now will enable our mutual interests in the Arab world later.