There has been much controversy since the bombing of Libya began: Why Libya and nowhere else in the Arab world? What is America’s national interest? Why is the U.S. acting multilaterally? What is the end-game? And, the unfortunately unasked question: how might America act more intentionally with its soft power such that we are not reduced to hard power responses in this region?

These necessary questions should be asked in the context of U.S. goals for the Middle East/North Africa region. So far, the response to Libya is a case study in what not to do, while coming alongside the emerging model in Morocco is a critical opportunity to act at the intersection of American values and interests.

Much of this controversy could have been avoided if there had been leadership by the president, who also happens to be the constitutionally-appointed commander-in-chief of American armed forces (see article II, Section II of the Constitution).

War—and it is a war, Mr. President—is the continuation of politics by other means. Politics is the art of compromise, (not) saying what the people (don’t) want to hear. Leadership, however, anticipates issues, saying what the people need to hear, and then doing the right thing, the right way.

It was inexcusable that America was not ready for the Arab League’s 12 March 2011 request for intervention in Libya, the essential ingredient to winning the 17 March 2011 United Nations resolution to conduct a no-fly zone. The U.S. began military operations against Qaddafi on 19 March. A week was lost.

More inexcusable, this evening, was the delegation of the responsibilities of commander-in-chief to the Secretary of State, leaving Secretary Clinton to explain that NATO did not have a concept of operations for protecting civilians on-the-ground in Libya; but that the U.S. was ceding command and control of the no-fly zone over Libya to NATO to prevent a non-existent Libyan air force from flying.

Nevertheless, at the 11th hour, the U.S. did the right thing by preventing the imminent massacre of innocent civilians in the eastern city of Benghazi by Qaddafi’s forces. There is little doubt across most of the political and international spectrum that the people of that city were on the verge of what the United Nations (and the United States) watched in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995. The war against Qaddafi is in accordance with international values, and especially its own, as the U.S. helped to defend those who could not defend themselves.

America’s actions were also exactly consistent with its interests. First, the Arab League asked for the intervention. Almost lost now is this simple fact: for the first time in its history, Arab leaders asked for the use of force against one of its fellow non-democratic leaders.

More importantly, by acting at the request of the Arab League and under the auspices of the United Nations, the U.S. gave permission for ordinary Arabs across the region to understand America anew (if not welcome the affiliation).

Put differently: Libya is about more than Libya, it is the opportunity to “reset” relations with the Arab world, especially its next generation. After 60+ years of being too close to Arab authoritarianism, America now has the imperative opportunity to establish a new pattern of relationship with a new generation of Arab leaders.

Now imagine if action had not been taken in Libya. Instead, we would likely have witnessed the following: a massacre of much greater scale than Srebrenica; a regional Arab leadership convinced that NATO does not have the will to act; Muslims worldwide that looked to Qaddafi as the “Islamic” leader capable of standing up to the “West”; and, most of all, as a combined result, a democratically-inclined movement across the region—defined by its youth and the young of heart—left to its own limited means, morally crushed.

If the above is clearly and consistently articulated—as an American president should—then it is much easier to be patient with the president’s other responsibility to maintain a coalition: 1) capable of decisive action; while ensuring that, 2) internal indecisiveness does not aid and abet the enemy by publicly widening the gaps among allies, and between the U.S. and those grassroots Arab leaders willing to defy their dictators.

(I should also note that by failing to articulate what’s happening in this war, and why, to the Congress and especially the American people, President Obama unnecessarily widens the gap between the U.S. military and American society.)

Meanwhile, “multilateral” is not the opposite of leadership. Indeed, in a world where no single state can do everything—especially debt-ridden states—being multilateral is the essence of leadership (while always preserving the right of unilateral action in defense of the nation).

Look no further than the 1991 Gulf War when the United Nations authorized all means possible to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait after 15 January 1991. The U.S. led a multilateral coalition that freed Kuwait. But it required constant maintenance through consistent phone calls to European and Arab leaders. Even Syria sent troops. That’s leadership.

One cannot help but wonder how many phone calls have been made worldwide by President Obama, especially to Arab League leaders, and what arguments were presented for a constant and cohesive coalition that acts with one voice.

Unfortunately, it appears that the White House approaches national security the same way it does legislation: throw something out there and expect various constituencies to appreciate and support it without input…which eventually results in a plea-bargain approach that splits the difference, lacking both coherence and moral imperative.

In the 1992 movie A Few Good Men, the confident and charismatic Daniel Kaffee is such a good lawyer for the Navy that he has never been in the court room. At a young age, Kaffee is already legendary for his forty-three straight plea-bargains—where the prosecutor, instead of risking his reputation on a not-guilty verdict for a greater offense, offers the defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Ironically, however, Kaffee is unsure of himself because he does not know what he stands for. When Kaffee decides to take the risk and go to trial, however, he finds out about himself, and that people will follow him…even if the chances of a negative result are greater.

The Kaffee approach to national security reduces Libya to a local liability instead of a regional opportunity. This approach prevents America from stating what its policy should be:

"The U.S. is leading a multilateral approach in Libya—convincing, cajoling, and coercing its allies—in order to protect Libyans from massacre, permanently remove the threat to them (Qaddafi), and enable the Libyans to decide for themselves the future they want (which might include partition per tribe). Such action—at the request of the Arab league and under U.N. sanction—will give significant pause to other Arab leaders who might consider Qaddafi-like violence against their citizens even as this action also gives support to democratically-minded Arabs across the region. The fluidity of the situation requires flexibility but the U.S. will stay the course, working to shape events in support of the citizen leadership that continues to coalesce against Qaddafi."

This case-study in reaction and non-leadership does not offer much hope for the possibility of acting in a strategically pro-active fashion, utilizing an integrated soft power approach to support leaders in the region that are intentionally moving toward a constitution and culture that protects and promotes representative government, as well as ethno-religious minorities and gender equality. Yet there is hope.

In Morocco—the first country to recognize the independence of the United States in 1777, a country whose own 1956 independence was inspired, in part, by the “Atlantic Charter”—there is an emerging example of how best to conduct a stable transition toward a flourishing democracy.

Morocco sits at the crossroads of the Atlantic, the meeting place of four continents and the gateway to a fifth, it is critical to the safe passage of the world’s trade. It is led by King Mohammed VI, who, since assuming the throne in 1999, has advanced incremental but steady change that has increasingly empowered his citizens (especially women and children).

On 9 March 2011, the king promised a significant reduction to his own power through: the appointment of the prime minister by parliament, freely-elected provincial assemblies, an independent judiciary, and a Constitutional Commission to recommend a way forward on these and similar initiatives. Prior to that, on 3 March 2011, the king announced the creation of a national human rights council, whose purpose is to “monitor and assess the human rights situation, blow the whistle and enrich rights related-debate,” as well as monitor elections.

Seemingly, here is a partner with whom the U.S. can work. As Secretary Clinton said yesterday at the State Department:

"Morocco is well-positioned to lead in this area because it is on the road to achieving democratic change. His Majesty King Mohammed VI’s government has consistently allowed its citizens to express themselves openly and peacefully, and it has been frank and forthcoming about the challenges ahead.

The King has long demonstrated his commitment to reform. And earlier this month, in an important address that captured widespread attention, he promised comprehensive reforms that would guarantee free parliamentary elections, including the election of a prime minister, create an independent judiciary, and assure human rights for all of Morocco’s stakeholders, including the Amazigh community.

These ideas build on the King’s earlier reforms that included increased rights for women and children, and universal access to a free education. We recognize the critical importance of the aspirations that His Majesty has described and we urge a continuing and rapid implementation of his vision."

To be sure, there are still significant challenges in Morocco. Corruption is rife. Despite tremendous progress, there is still much work to be done regarding gender inequality. Although the press is relatively free, there are taboo topics and self-censorship. While there is a strong tradition of religious freedom, there is a prohibition on changing faith. And there are human rights concerns in the Western Sahara—a territory claimed since 1975 by Morocco and the Polisario Front (an ethnic rebel group based in Algeria) that has required a U.N. presence since the early 1990s. (Morocco has an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara that the U.S. has supported since the Clinton administration).

In fact, next month, the U.N. will consider a resolution to add human rights monitoring to the U.N. mission in the Western Sahara. Understood in isolation, this resolution makes sense: after all, who could be against human rights monitoring? Understood in context, however, this resolution is not the best means for assuring human rights in the Western Sahara, and it is certainly not the best way to encourage the development of democracy in Morocco.

First, the U.N. does not have the best track record on human rights: its human rights council was once chaired by Libya, and we have seen the consequences of its inaction in places like Rwanda and Srebrenica. Second, a global public forum like the United Nations is not the place to tell Morocco how to handle its internal affairs as it takes these incredible strides toward democracy.

Why publicly slap Morocco on the wrist in front of its global peers when there is an opportunity to encourage and come alongside the reforms Morocco is already doing?

Of course human rights monitoring! But let’s give Morocco a chance to demonstrate its own integrated approach to, and empowerment of, all its citizens through the national council on human rights, the constitutional commission, the elections of local officials, and, above all, the leadership of Mohammed VI.

If Morocco can develop and sustain this integrated approach, it will demonstrate to the region a model of mutual respect between an ethno-religious majority and various ethnic and religious minorities. This model of civility, in turn, is the foundation for a flourishing society that values all of its citizens and, as such, provides the ultimate deterrent against the rise of Islamist extremists. And by the way, it’s also a heck-of-a-lot-cheaper than sending in hundreds of tomahawk missiles and flying a thousand sorties over Libya.

Instead of urging a “continuing and rapid implementation” of the king’s vision, the U.S. should instead ask Mohammed VI where and how the America can help implement these urgent reforms with balanced alacrity.

If the U.S. is to remain relevant to this region, it has a choice. It can continue to react to situations like Libya through hard power and non-leadership as events shape U.S. policy. Or the U.S. can help shape events through a coherent regional vision rooted in the long-view of soft power, as America comes alongside leaders who are strategically and intentionally moving their countries through a stable transition to democracy.

Indeed, this Moroccan Moment can be the cornerstone of a cohesive U.S. vision and resulting strategy for the region characterized by mutual respect among people groups and faiths, gender equality, economic integration, better jobs, and the resulting stable prosperity that denies al-Qaeda and drug-traffickers a point of entry.

In Libya there is still time to redeem our non-leadership. In Morocco, there is time to lead by supporting a leader and country defined by what they are for, not what they are against. May America choose wisely, while it still has time to choose.

Napoleon Bonaparte famously said he’d rather fight against a coalition than as part of one. On the other hand, it was a coalition that ultimately defeated him, so let’s take the Corsican’s wisdom with a grain of salt. A lone authoritarian ruler can act faster and more decisively than any group of governments, but isolation takes its toll in the end. I would rather have the current messy coalition of France, Britain, and the United States, backed half-heartedly by various Arab states, than any one Western power going it alone.

Clarity about your objectives is, likewise, a traditional maxim of war. But in practice clarity and coalitions don’t go well together, because every partner goes in with different international objectives and domestic political constraints. The official, public rationale often needs to be the least common denominator to keep weak partners aboard – which, in turn, can enable the real, more radical agenda of the most committed and aggressive partners. The best you can usually hope for is that those committed partners do know what they’re trying to accomplish.

With Libya today, that decisive partner is pretty clearly the French. I wish the Obama Administration were less desperately trying to unload any share of the burden, but given our over-commitment in Afghanistan and (still) Iraq, it’s an understandable mistake. Likewise, I wish the Arab states were more active participants rather than passive enablers, but given their historical reluctance to intervene in each others’ affairs – especially intervening alongside the West – I’ll take what I can get.

In any case, don’t underestimate the Arabs: It’s worth noting that Egypt is reportedly arming the Libyan rebels. That support from a powerful neighbor is probably more important than any aircraft the Qataris eventually provide.

What makes me highlight both the Egyptians and the French is that what matters here is to support the Libyan rebels against the Qaddafi regime. Neutrality is at best a legal fiction and at worst a trap. It sounds high-minded to say our goal is to “prevent civilian casualties” in the abstract. But this is a war, specifically a war against a murderously repressive regime, and the best way to prevent further civilian casualties is for the right side to win.

So far, the international effort has been enough to keep the rebels from losing, but not enough to help them to win. Qaddafi’s offensive momentum has stalled, but the rebels’ ill-coordinated counterattack on Ajdabiya shows they can’t yet seize the initiative themselves. What the rebels need is not only aggressive air support in the form of strikes on Qaddafi’s ground forces, but also advisors – French advisors are just fine! – to improve their military intelligence, planning, communications, and coordination. (What the Pentagon calls “C4ISR”).

Just enforcing a no-fly zone is a recipe for a prolonged, stalemated conflict. At worst that will kill more civilians in the long run. At best it will lead to ceasefire and the de facto partition of Libya into two less-than-viable halves, the western one without adequate oil reserves for economic self-sufficiency and still under Qaddafi’s brutal rule.

Screw ceasefires: We want victory.

Richard Sinnreich is right that in any list of things to worry about regarding the intervention in Libya, the command arrangements are secondary to fundamental uncertainties about what the mission is and how this will all end. As for precedents for allied military efforts in which the United States was not the top dog, World War I comes to mind. When the United States joined the effort in 1917 after France and Britain had already been slogging through three costly years of war, there was considerable disagreement over command relationships and how independently the American expeditionary force would operate. There never was a full meeting of the minds on this, but that did not prevent the allies from beating the Germans.

Both the United States and the Europeans need to avoid what has sometimes crept into discussions of Afghanistan, which is to think of the alliance as an end rather than a means. We have NATO to help accomplish certain security-related missions. We do not tackle security-related missions in order to have a strong NATO. Credibility of the Western alliance must not be allowed to determine what objectives we pursue and at what cost we pursue them.

There is some risk, per the question, of the influence of non-U.S. participants increasing the tendency toward mission creep. The allies have had their own, sometimes parochial, reasons for championing this intervention. I have addressed this subject elsewhere. But there also are plenty of the same pressures being exerted on the Obama administration from its critics inside the United States.

As the US reportedly prepares not only to shift the command structure away from one with the US in the lead and diminish the tempo of overall US operations, there has been an especially galling failure to fulfill an obligation that relates to one of the most critical aspects of the enforcement of UNSCR 1973 (and a strong official position announced in public by President Obama).

UNSCR 1973 authorizes--practically requires--that combat aircraft operating over Libya under the resolution act to stop pro-regime Libyan forces from threatening the civilian population. Additionally, President Obama declared last Thursday as "non-negotiable" the immediate withdrawal of pro-regime forces from the cities of Zawiya, Misratah & Ajdabiya. So far, aside from one missile strike nearly 3 days ago against one pro-regime target near Misratah (a military school from with pro-regime forces were shelling the city), practically nothing has been done to take under attack regime forces continuing a heavy series of assaults (including shelling) against Misratah and besieging and attacking Ajdabiya.

Technically, the object of UNSCR 1973 is not to assist rebel forces, but the principal thrust of the resolution was to protect civilians. In doing so in and around Misratah & Ajdabiya, allied aircraft could do both. Why this has not been done is a mystery--especially given the pounding those two cities have been taking (along with the badly outmatched opposition fighters in both locations fighting increasingly desperately in an effort to prevent those cities from being overrun).

Neither city--especially Misratah--can hold out much longer, so the need from robust allied action is increasingly urgent. If they fall to regime military assault, as did Zawiya, Qadhafi's security forces surely would begin the process of brutally purging the cities of any and all individuals suspected of even just favoring the opposition. Such massacres must be prevented.

When you don't know where you're going or how you're going to get there, it don't hardly matter who's leading.

The writer and film critic Robert Benchley once wrote a review for a Broadway play. It was one word -- "no." And so I feel about our current approach to Libya -- no.

Why is it that Democrats like to be partners of weak coalitions and Republicans charge like Teddy Roosevelt up San Juan Hill alone. You'd think both sides would learn by now that a careful balance works -- especially if it lead by the Americans.

NATO has not had a real purpose since the end of the Cold War. We pushed it into Afghanistan where it has reluctantly remained., We are now pushing it into the lead against Qadaffi. No. This is an organization that, like its political equivalent the EU, loves to debate and dither. Soon enough France and the UK will split from the rest and soon they will split with each other.

At some point, this Adminstration is going to realize that we are the indispensible man. It is up to us to lead -- period. While we can and should not charge off on our own, we can''t allow NATO to dither. There has been enough of that already.

This decision is a clear one. Qadaffi is a bad actor that no one will miss. All his bellicose rhetoric aside, we can quickly squeeze him into submission if we apply the kind of consistent military pressure that the U.S. can bring to bear when we are in the lead. We have to win this one.

Our promise of support for change made in Cairo a few years back by this Admininstrationis is looking more hollow all the time. And the rest of the Middle East is watching.

As I've discussed this question on Twitter and in person over the past few days, I've been struck by the degree to which people believe that the lack of a recent precedent for the United States playing a supporting or secondary role in a humanitarian intervention means that the United States must invariably play such a role. No, there is no recent precedent but that does not mean that one cannot take shape.

I believe, though, that a humanitarian intervention and stabilization in Libya can only work in the long term if it is designed and led by other Arab states. I believe President Obama's decision to follow the lead of European states in short order is the right move, but within a few weeks or at most months, the Europeans should turn the helm over to Arab states which have the greatest direct stake in the outcome.

If this does not happen, the intervention and stabilization is unlikely to end well.