I spoke about this topic to blog contributor Robert Killebrew the other day, and he made an important point: That Egypt far outweighs Libya -- or any of the Arab countries -- in both sheer population and political & cultural influence, and anything we do in Libya has to keep Egypt in mind. In Colonel Killebrew's words to me: "The real prize here is Egypt, and I worry that precipitate action on our part might tip the balance there."

This discussion is shadowed by our misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is manifest in several respects. One, the country is weary of fruitless, costly and pointless engagements in distant places. It wants them over and done with - as the trauma and aftershocks of 9/11 have faded. Hence, the domestic political dangers for a President who makes a fresh military commitment are compounded. Two, the dishonesty-that has been the hallmark of our 'war on terror' rampages has eroded the respect and deference that Americans naturally have for their Chief Executive cum Commander and Chief. Three, the possible adverse political effects on Muslim opinion of another American military engagement in the Middle East are far greater because of our recent misconduct in the islamic world. Fourth, we have lost all conception of military action that is not protracted, massive and pricey. As a result of the last, we greatly exaggerate the requirements for decisively shifting the military/political balance in Libya in favor of the insurgents. The Pentagon has its own parochial reasons for sharing this viewpoint. Fifth, the obsession with islamic terrorism has warped our thinking and our tolerance for uncertainty.

We inflate the terrorist threat, we inflate the flimsy franchise operation that is now al-Qaeda, we overstate the appeal of fundamentalist Islamist groups generally; and we see the latter as coterminus with violent jihadist groups. We live in dread - victims of free floating anxiety. Sound foreign policy judgments can not be made on this basis under prevailing conditions.

What a great discussion on a critical issue.

Since Richard Hart Sinnreich, one of my intellectual mentors, gently questioned my sanity, I should respond to him first. Yes, I absolutely agree that we should tread lightly before intervening militarily in other countries, especially when we do it in the name of overthrowing dictators and setting up democracy, because our track record is pretty awful. No, I don’t think what I’m proposing for Libya is repeating our mistakes in (deep breath) “Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” Here’s why:

1) NO PRETENSE OF NEUTRALITY. The root of our disaster in Somalia was that we came in as neutral humanitarians, mission-creeped into becoming peacekeepers – still ostensibly neutral – and then got involved in inter-clan rivalries we didn’t understand and ended up backing into all-out urban warfare. For that matter, the early European and UN interventions in the Yugoslav civil wars were hamstrung by their attempt to be neutral peacekeepers when there was no peace to keep and one side was clearly the aggressor. I’ve not heard anyone propose trying to intervene in Libya as a neutral party: We in the pro-intervention camp want to take a side. That simplifies policy immensely.

2) NO GROUND TROOPS. I was bitterly critical of then-President Clinton’s “no ground troops” pledge in the 1999 Kosovo war. But in Libya’s case, an airplanes-and-advisors-only intervention is politically appropriate and militarily sound. Though the Libyan rebels are unclear on exactly what kind of help they do want, they do not want foreign ground troops. Besides, the rebels have their own, admittedly inchoate, ground forces to provide the anvil to the hammer of foreign airpower. Finally, in contrast our painful history of ground interventions, the US actually does airpower and advisors pretty well, often yielding major gains for moderate investment and minimal casualties.

We pulled airpower-and-advisors off with considerable success in the early stages of our intervention in Afghanistan, back when it was a lightning victory over the Taliban state and conventional forces, not a counterinsurgency slog against Taliban shadow government and guerrillas. At a lower level of involvement, we have had good results in Central American countries from El Salvador in the eighties to Columbia today. A little intelligence-sharing, military advice, and air cover goes a long way.

I’ll admit similarities between what I’m proposing and the early intervention in Afghanistan and, for that matter, the 1999 Kosovo war. But I’d argue those were at least qualified successes.

I could also argue that the proposed US intervention in Libya is on a far smaller scale than in Afghanistan or Kosovo (or than what Pat Lang’s anonymous ex-Green Beret is suggesting). Even a no-fly zone can be done in a moderate and manageable way, as Wayne White argues. But that’s a problematic argument because these things have a way of escalating. And, as Steven Metz says, avoiding prolonged entanglements in other nation’s internal messes is a good principle in general and particularly important for the war-weary, deficit-laden United States today.

For those reasons and more, what I’d much prefer to US intervention in this case is Arab intervention. It’s their region, it’s their neighbors, and anything the Arab states do is much less likely to provoke a backlash in Libya or the Arab world at large.

Tunisia and Egypt especially strike me as ideal candidates to lead any intervention. Egypt in particular has a history of leadership in the Arab world since at least the 1950s. As Libya’s neighbors, both Egypt and Tunisia have a stronger interest in events there than anyone else and therefore a greater right to intervene, which should help appease international audiences. (They’re already dealing with refugees). As not only fellow Arab Muslims but fellow North Africans with deep historical ties to Libya, the Tunisians and Egyptians would be less resented than anyone else, even other Arabs from further away, which should help with internal Libyan audiences – unless, that is, there’s some historical bad blood between neighbors I’m not aware of: The blogs’ many Mideast experts should feel free to correct me. Finally, intervening on behalf of pro-democratic rebels in Libya should help cement the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries’ loyalty to their own democratic revolutions at home.

So I’d favor an intense diplomatic effort to bring the Arab nations on board in general and Egypt in particular. But unlike Dr. Metz, I’m not willing to wait on the Arab League to act, or even on Egypt, much as this is their backyard. The League is notoriously slow-moving even by the standards of multi-national bodies and has a particular aversion to intervention against dictatorial governments. The Egyptians have a long tradition of regional leadership, to include (messy, painful) military interventions, but they’re more than a little busy right now.

While the best case is for Libya’s Arab neighbors to take the lead, the worst case is for no one to take the lead at all. The hard part about being the only global superpower is that the United States often has to step up when no one else will.

The merits and drawbacks of a possible Libyan No-Fly Zone (NFZ) have quite a lot of relevance for potential oppositionists in other especially ruthless authoritarian regimes throughout the region (most especially Iran & Syria, but perhaps also Algeria where the military junta showed a tremendous ability to mete out its share of violence during the near civil war of the 1990’s).

I know opinions regarding a Libyan NFZ are quite varied and that even after reading what I have to say below, I could remain very much a minority voice, but in light of my own coverage of the Iraq NFZ’s during their entire duration—and from various angles--while an intelligence official in State/INR, I believe I can comment with some context. Last week, I heard a number of wholly negative opinions expressed by active or retired senior military personnel in the context of hearings or in the media. I believe some of these objections are incorrect, misleading or possibly so. Such questionable objections are as follows:

- The demand on US aerial resources is far too great to support the establishment of a Libyan NFZ. All these arguments appear to address a total Libyan NFZ. Our Iraqi NFZ’s were far from total, with limited ones in the north and south (avoiding the Iraqi regime’s principal concentration of anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles centered on the Baghdad area). The same approach could be taken in Libya, with a geographically limited (and considerably less demanding) NFZ established to shield only the opposition-held east of the country (thus avoiding the need to tackle the concentration of high-altitude surface-to-surface missile sites primarily centered in the greater Tripoli area). That said, some NATO help would likely be required (see below).

- All Libyan surface-to-surface missile capabilities would have to be attacked up front. This would not be true if a limited eastern NFZ were established. As with the Iraqi NFZ's, this would be required only if such missile launchers were moved into the NFZ, fired at aircraft patrolling it from outside it, or their radars "paint" patrolling aircraft. If this were done, one or two destroyed missile systems should suffice to discourage additional challenges.

- All Libyan aircraft would have to be destroyed on the ground up front. This would not be true because the principle governing a NFZ is, essentially, if a combat aircraft of the targeted military remains on the ground or outside the NFZ, it is not subject to attack.

- NATO support—or that of key NATO countries--could not be obtained for a Libyan NFZ. If the US president made the establishment of a limited Libyan NFZ US policy, there would be considerable pressure on states like the UK, France & perhaps Italy and others to shift likewise (or face the ire of millions of Libyans, Tunisians, Egyptians, some domestic constituencies, and the broader international human rights community for standing in the way of such a measure that potentially could save so many lives--and more: see below). Already, in fact, attitudes have changed dramatically since I first wrote a piece to this effect early on Sunday.

- The Arab League would oppose any foreign military intervention in Libya. In fact, Arab official opinion appears to be a bit less certain as time passes regarding a Libyan NFZ. Perhaps we should care a bit less about that in any case. The Arab League is still overwhelmingly dominated by authoritarian status quo powers, some of them probably even hoping the opposition in Libya fails (discouraging opposition at home). Also, in the current situation, the “Arab street” in such countries could be a bit less persuaded by the waving of the “foreign military intervention” warning banner in this particular instance. Qadhafi is rather widely unpopular.

Now, a brief glimpse at both the potential local and regional stakes involved if a Libyan NFZ in eastern Libya is not established:

- Qadhafi & Co. now appear, in large measure because of UN, ICC & Interpol actions, determined to fight on in the face of likely international pursuit if they exit the country. Perhaps more dangerously, it is possible that news through Sunday that Western military action was practically off the table emboldened the regime to launch by far the most forceful and bloody ground assaults against opposition-held bastions of Zawiya and Misrata, as well as in the east . Also, the intensity of fixed wing and helicopter attacks appears to have risen within the past 4 days against opposition targets in the east, quite possibly the result of the same calculation (or to get in some last licks before the potential imposition of a NFZ).

- If, almost entirely by air strikes, Qadhafi succeeds in taking out additional opposition-held munitions dumps in the east, opposition elements even there will be capable of far less offensive—or even defensive—action beyond the near-term. And their capabilities, without the organized military & militia units, far larger munitions dumps, the airlift & airpower capabilities of the regime, already are limited.

- Continued airstrikes also pose a danger to important hydrocarbon extraction, processing & export facilities now in opposition hands in the east. One already has been hit. Substantial damage to such facilities would not only prolong greatly a significant Libyan production shortfall well beyond the end of hostilities affecting global oil prices at least to some extent, but also inflict possibly considerable environmental damage locally.

- Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, if the first truly tyrannical regime with a history of considerable bloodshed largely is left free to wreak devastating havoc domestically to survive this wave of reform, it would send a strong signal to other regimes similar to it that they might well be equally free to do likewise in the event of an especially determined internal challenge. In parallel, oppositionists in those countries would be that much more reluctant to take the risks involved in attempting regime change at home.

- I join with colleagues arguing that our European allies should take the lead on this, but until yesterday that was no-where in the picture. So if the US has to take the lead in order not to allow efforts to overthrow Qadhafi founder, so be it.

Admittedly, an eastern Libyan NFZ would leave oppositionists in Zawiya and Misrata highly vulnerable (but those 2 cities appear to have largely fallen or are in midst of doing so in any case), and would allow Qadhafi to continue flying in more mercenaries from Libya’s Saharan south as well as source countries like Mali and Niger to Tripoli. However, oppositionists in close proximity to the capital seem most threatened by extensive regime ground forces so close at hand, not so much by airpower. Additionally, at this point well over 90% of opposition capabilities (and vulnerable populations that have joined in opposition to the regime and can still be defended) appear centered in the east.

Wow, Sydney -- in the wake of Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, you want to do it again? If Einstein was right that insanity consists in doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result, we all need psychiatirc help.

We have been having an extended discussion of the modalities of "how to do it" at SST. At my request one of our regular authors who carries the pen name "The Twisted Genius" wrote the piece at the link. He is a retired "Greenie," case officer and SMU operator. Nobody thinks this would be easy. As they say in the Green Beret community, "If this was easy, they would not need us to do it." Air support from the fleet would be a big help. Would it make a big difference politically in the end? Who knows? Another saying from that community, "First you sell yourself to the guerrilla leader, and then you are all sold together."

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2011/03/libya-de-opresso-liber.html

On the issue of who might extend a request to the United States for some form of intervention, Sydney and I are at odds, so let me spell out my position a bit better.

If there was some unified Libyan opposition or authoritative spokesman, an invitation from them would be paramount. From what we're hearing now, some want U.S. help, others do not. That means that if we intervene directly, we will be involving ourselves in to politics within the opposition. I'm not sure it is in our interest to play that role.

Such an intervention would also create a long term commitment for the United States. And this is a bad time for that.

To intervene over the protests of the Arab League would also cause further resentment, reinforcing the notion that Arabs cannot manage their own affairs. The whole ethos of the North African revolutions is of the people there assuming responsibility for themselves rather than having imposed solutions.

Arab states have long indicated their disfavor of America's intrusive role in their part of the world. This is a perfect opportunity to back complaints with action and demonstrate that they can manage their own security.

I’m delighted by the quality, quantity, and velocity of comments this morning. Now I’ll allow myself to take off my moderator hat for a moment and put on my commentator hat.

In brief: I think supporting the Libyan rebels is in our national interest, and our assistance to the Croatians during the Yugoslav civil war shows us how to do this with minimum exposure, moderate investment, and maximum effect.

To get you all to that conclusion, I need to start with some basics.

First, the United States needs to be clear about our objective in Libya: We want Qaddafi gone. He’s a threat to his people, to his neighbors, and to us. We could live with him while he was relatively restrained and while there was no alternative, but now there’s an alternative that’s getting stronger every day while he’s getting more brutal and erratic. The man I can’t help thinking of as Qaddaffy Duck, the bad joke of the Middle East, just isn’t funny anymore.

Second, we need to be clear about our wider regional constraints: We don’t want to achieve our goals in Libya at the expense of infuriating Arabs (let alone Muslims) in general; we don’t want to achieve them at the expense of a prolonged civil war destabilizing North Africa or the global oil market.

Third, we want to advance, or at least not overly damage, our general, global goals: promoting democracy; reducing violence; avoiding entanglements; and not offending the Chinese, the Russians, and others whose own internal issues make them terribly touchy about intervention in the affairs of sovereign states, however thin a legal fiction those states’ sovereignties may have become.

Only once we have our priorities clearly in mind can we really assess our options.

1) We do not want an international peacekeeping force. (UN, NATO, Arab League, African Union, doesn’t matter).

Sure, we want peace, but not before the rebels in the east have won and Qaddafi’s gone. It’s been said that “there is no such thing as a good war or a bad peace.: I’m sure many Libyan families now burying their dead would agree. But a peace that leaves Qaddafi in power and Libya indefinitely divided into opposing armed camps is what I’d call a bad peace. Sometimes the only peace worth having is the kind you get once you win.

2) We do not want to intervene without the Libyan rebel leadership asking us to do it first. If things gets even worse and there is no coherent rebel leadership to ask for help even as Qaddafi escalates the killing, we may have to do something without an invitation, but that is a last, worst resort.

A Libyan invitation is much, much more important than international authorization. It’d be great to get both, but we almost certainly won’t, because of concerns about national sovereignty and US hegemony: The Russians and Chinese will veto anything forceful at the UN, and the Arab League said “no” last week -- as Steven Metz points out.

But I’d disagree with Dr. Metz that an Arab League invitation is essential. What’s essential is that the Libyan people themselves see us as helping rather than intruding, which in turn means that an authority most Libyans see as legitimate has asked us to act. It’s the Libyans whose lives, property, and rights are at stake. Morally, what they say outweighs anything an international body decrees. Practically, if we do something that the Arab League disapproves of, they’ll get over it soon enough; but if we do something that the Libyans themselves resent, we will pay the price for a generation or more.

So far, various spokesmen for the rebellion have been wavering back and forth over what kind of foreign intervention they want, if any. Until someone with some legitimacy makes a clear request for something specific, we need to err on the side of caution.

A critical corollary: Making contact with the rebel leadership and figuring out who’s who has to be our highest priority.

3) We can set up a “no-fly zone” without first launching massive airstrikes to destroy Qaddafi’s anti-aircraft weapons. In fact, such a guns-blazing approach would probably backfire. It’s classically penny-wise and pound-foolish: We would reduce the risk of someone firing at our planes but alienate many Libyans even on the rebel side, let alone those who were wavering.

Yes, we have to be prepared to conduct a traditional “suppression of enemy air defenses” (SEAD) campaign if people do start shooting at us, which requires having a lot of aircraft available. But we have to be willing to let the other guy take the first shot.

Why? We’ve already seen defections from Qaddafi’s air force. We don’t know how many of his air-defense troops are wavering. But if we start blowing them up preemptively, we’ve made their minds up for them about which side they’re on, namely, not on ours. On the other hand, if we leave them alone unless they shoot at us – which is the way we handled the “no-fly” zones over Iraq – then we’ve sent a clear signal that defending Qaddafi is bad for your health and that standing by while he’s deposed is the safe option.

Of course, flying around waiting to be shot at is a lot harder than flying around knowing that no one’s left who can shoot at you. (Though I have a lot of confidence in our pilots’ skills and their planes’ self-defense systems, even without stealth). Standing perpetually ready to suppress specific air-defense sites that threaten your planes is a lot harder than just wiping out every air-defense site preemptively. What I’m suggesting makes the no-fly zone option even harder. But, to paraphrase Clausewitz, war is the servant of policy, not its master, and a “woe unto him who casts the first stone” approach will serve our policy objectives much more effectively.

So if a passably legitimate rebel leadership asks for a no-fly zone, we can and should comply. A relatively small force of fighter-bombers can fly defensive patrols over eastern Libyan and stand ready to shoot down incoming pro-Qaddafi aircraft or to bomb any air defense site that tries to lock on to them. (A note to Daniel Gouré: The F-22 is only half the solution because it’s a superb air-to-air fighter but, at least in its early versions, can’t drop bombs). A much larger force needs to be on standby if the pro-Qaddafi forces escalate.

That said, even a well-run no-fly zone only tilts the balance partway in favor of the rebels. Qaddafi’s greatest strength is on the ground. Tilting the balance there is where the Croatian option comes in.

4) In 1995, the Croatian army launched “Operation Storm” and swept Serbian forces off Croatian territory – and ethnically “cleansed” plenty of ethnic Serbian civilians along the way. It was an ugly, excessive, but essential step towards ending the Yugoslav civil wars. And the Croatians could never have taken it without extensive US help. Through the Defense Intelligence Agency, a private military contractor known as MPRI, and other channels, the US provided the Croats with assistance in training, planning, and executing the offensive, including real-time intelligence on Serbian forces.

In Libya, once we have some reasonable clarity on who the rebel leaders are, we need to start providing them intelligence on Qaddafi’s forces, immediately. Their knowledge of the political and human situation is going to be much better than ours, obviously. But we have the satellites, drones, and long-range communications that they lack to figure out what forces are currently where.

A small team from Defense Intelligence or Special Operations, with the right languages skills and communications technology, can provide the rebel leadership a significant edge in directing their forces. Add a few trained staff officers, and the rebels’ capacity to plan effective operations increases too. (Even the Libyan army regulars in the rebellion are terribly undertrained).

More aggressively, a slightly larger effort with U.S. jamming aircraft, apparently in the agenda for NATO, can undermine Qaddafi’s command-and-control of his own forces – quite possibly from outside Libyan airspace, since Tripoli is on the coast and jammers have considerable reach.

We can do all this without a single American pulling a trigger on any Libyan, which reduces the risk of a backlash in the Arab world. We can do all this with very few Americans in harm’s way, which reduces the risk of a backlash at home. We might even be able to pull off the intelligence-sharing and planning assistance without anyone knowing, though in today’s porous world, that’s frankly unlikely. But for all I know, we might well be doing some of this now. If we’re not, we should be, and soon.

For those of use who play poker, we all know at some point we need to ante up to stay in the game. With regards to Libya, Washington needs to ante now.

Since 9/11, America's explicit policy has been to "promote" democracy in the Arab World. Obama went to Cairo to re-inforce that message. Hilary Clinton has pushed forward with a "soft power" support to the message. Bob Gates has been in lock step on this one as well.

So, we asked for and now we got it. And, how have we reacted so far -- timidly would be to put it kindly. I suspect once again we are trying to please the Saudis who are sitting on their own inevitable powder keg. But, the Arab World has a long memory. And they will remember how we came late to the Mubarek "party."

Libya is a chance to make up for this. Nobody likes this guy -- except maybe the British who cut a series of disgraceful deals with Qadafi and his cronies for oil. Supporting anyone who wants to get rid of him should be our main goal.

Arms, training and shoulder launched missiles should do nicely. The latter will take care of a costly no-fly zone that we simply should not implement. He wouldn't be hard to pop. And we will be in the good graces of the new government that will come out of these rebels groups trying to take him out.

We need to show that like Reagan/Bush in Eastern Europe circa 1989, the United States can ante up to the freedom table when called.

Do American interests in Libya warrant military intervention in the current circumstances? No.

First, we ought to be clear-eyed in what military force can and cannot do.

A no-fly zone won’t cause Qaddafi’s grip on Tripoli to collapse nor will it avert the slaughter of innocents. In short, its not an “easy button” solution to the conflict. That said, it might be worth doing, if there is a provisional government established that requests international assistance. It is it not clear, for example, that Libyan opposition forces desire a U.S. intervention. Billboards recently appeared in Benghazi, the leading opposition stronghold, proclaiming: “No foreign intervention. Libyan people can do it alone.” Before Washington intervenes, it should be sure that such actions are desired by suitable partners on the ground, preferably a provisional government that is recognized by the United States and a broad coalition of other countries. Once a provisional government is established and recognized, the U.S. should mobilize international support to help that government liberate Libya from Qaddafi.

A U.N. Security Council resolution is not necessarily required for this. The Clinton Administration’s 1999 air campaign to liberate Kosovo from Serbian domination, which proceeded without the backing of the U.N. Security Council, was much more successful than the disastrous U.N.-backed humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which collapsed in 1993. More important than U.N. support is the support of the Libyan people, who should be empowered to determine their own future.

There are other steps the US could take as well. Washington could provide arms and ammunition, and economic, diplomatic, and intelligence support, but the fighting should be done by Libyans to the maximum degree possible. The U.S. and other countries could provide technical support to help the provisional government utilize the many warplanes that the regime abandoned at air bases in eastern Libya. The U.S. should also assist in efforts to prevent foreign fighters and arms from reinforcing the Qadhafi regime or allowing transnational terrorists to incite further violence.

The real irony here is the assets that are really needed stealth aircraft, amphibious ships, carriers, and marine expeditionary forces are exactly the ones that people want to cut. Its nuts to hear Secretary Gates chide those that complained about shutting down the F-22 line and then turn around and say Libya would be hard because we don’t have a lot of stealth aircraft.

As a virtual civil war overtakes Libya, Colonel Qaddafi has ordered his military and police officers to fire on unarmed civilians – and has executed those who disobey. Given Qaddafi’s desperation to hold power, there is a very real possibility that he will massacre his people to remain their “leader”. Of course, there are brutal leaders throughout the world we do little about – but the immediacy of this brutality, the possibility of stopping a bloodbath before it occurs, and, of course, Libya’s oil supplies to Europe, play a real – and legitimate – role in making intervention more likely. We should think first about how we will succeed.

The risks of failure are significant. A no-fly zone could easily exacerbate Qaddafi’s sense of being surrounded – while doing nothing to stop his troops from killing civilians with machine guns which are difficult to halt from an airplane. Many voices are calling for “taking out” Qaddafi – but without boots on the ground, how will we do that? Thousands in the Libyan elite have built careers out of circling the leaders’ orbit, and want to protect him. Meanwhile, if we succeed, who will lead the country?

Qaddafi has destroyed all vestiges of civil society in Libya; there is not even a Kiwanis Club to give people a sense of how to organize to get things done. Tribal leaders, whom Qaddafi has supported with official cover, will certainly need to play a defining role in remaking the country. Islamist forces are also likely to emerge into the public light. It’s foolhardy to expect a functioning parliamentary democracy in Libya in the next decade.

Despite these dangers, intervention is likely the only moral option. If we do it, however, we need to be aware of the likelihood of a long “occupation” of foreign troops, and a long period of external assistance (remember, we still the EU is still in Bosnia). That means intervening only if done under the mandate of a force with staying power – ideally the United Nations, but joined by the EU, Arab League, and even African Union. We should have up-front commitments from other countries to pay for the costs. And whoever takes the role of last man out should be ready for a long stay in the desert.

Before we discuss whether the interests of the United States warrant military intervention in Libya, I would like to address some of the misconceptions coloring the debate. The first of these is that that such an effort requires initial offensive operations against Libyan air defenses. Secretary of Defense Gates made this claim in testimony before the Appropriations subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee declaring that the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace “begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses." The basis for this statement appears to be that Libyan air defenses could pose such a severe threat that U.S. aircraft could not otherwise operate safely over that country’s airspace.

My response to this argument is two words: the F-22. One of the missions of U.S. fifth-generation fighters, both the F-22 and the F-35, is to operate in denied airspace. But the threat against which the F-22 and F-35 have been designed was so-called triple digit surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of which Libya has exactly none. Indeed, Libya has nothing even remotely capable of defeating the F-22. While the F-35 will not begin deployment for several years, the U.S, has more than enough F-22s in the fleet to deploy a continuous patrol over Libya from airbases in Southern Europe. The U.S. could initiate a no fly zone over eastern Libya without having to attack any Libyan SAM sites.

The discussion of the requirements for creating no-fly zones underscores the case for the F-35. Those who suggest terminating the program need to explain how the U.S. will be able to maintain air superiority in the future with the current crop of fourth generation fighters. If the U.S. fears to enter Libyan airspace in the face of poorly manned and trained double digit SAMs what possibility is there for the U.S. if confronted by countries deploying triple digit SAMs? With a fighter force consisting largely of F-22s and F-35s, the U.S. will be able to maintain its advantage in the air for decades to come.

In addition, the U.S. a great deal of experience with operating no fly zones in the presence of air defenses. For some ten years the U.S. conducted Operations Northern and Southern Watch over Iraq. During that entire period, Iraq maintained a very strong air defense network. Attacks on air defense sites occurred only when U.S. aircraft were deliberately threatened. Most of the time Iraqi SAM systems were present within range of U.S. fighter patrols but did not engage them. And Iraqi aircraft did not fly. Libyan air defenses would pose even less of a threat than their Iraqi counterparts.

Another misconception is that any U.S. intervention would be large-scale and have to involve ground forces. A U.S. intervention would not need to defeat pro-Gaddafi forces. It might be sufficient simply to deny them the advantage of airpower. Without fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships the pro-and anti-Gaddafi forces are much more evenly matched. If a no-fly zone is insufficient to bring down the regime, it might be worthwhile to neutralize the airfields from which the aircraft operate as proposed by Senator John Kerry. Or, the U.S. could even the balance of forces on the battlefield by attacking Gaddafi forces’ artillery positions and tanks. This could be done safely by high-flying B-1 and B-2 bombers using JDAMs. That’s how U.S. airpower helped to bring down the Taliban.

The most important way the U.S. could influence events in Libya is by making it clear to Gaddafi’s mercenaries that they have two choices: leave his service or face American airpower backing up the rebels. These mercenaries understand how to calculate odds; they have no reason to die for Gaddafi no matter how well he pays. If they are given the opportunity to leave the battlefield unscathed, they are very likely to do so. Without its hired guns, Gaddafi’s regime will certainly fall.

Now to the question whether such an intervention is in U.S. interests? My answer is unquestionably yes. Where there is an option for authoritarian regimes to reform themselves, the U.S. should support a negotiated transition to a more democratic political system. But where one side decides that force is the answer to efforts to pursue peaceful change, the U.S. should take sides. And when a dictator with clear signs of delusions chooses to use force against his own people, the U.S. should apply appropriate countervailing force.

While we cannot know at this time who will take power in Libya after Gaddafi, it is hard to believe that a new government will be anywhere near as crazy and anti-American as his has been. In addition, we have to wonder what will be the policies of a Libyan government if Gaddafi successfully retains power. Might he seek to retaliate for the West’s imposition of sanctions? Or would he seek to use his oil revenues to undermine the fledgling democracies arising elsewhere in the Arab world. In other words, in view of what has happened to date can we allow Gaddafi to retain power? I believe the answer is no.

It's now clear that Libya is not going to be another Tunisia or Egypt where the dictator can be pushed away in short order. One of two possible outcomes seem likely at this point.

Gaddafi may regain control of Libya. After blaming outsiders for the revolution and facing global isolation, he undoubtedly would return to his old policy of funding extremists, radicals, and terrorists of all sorts. So even if the U.S. does not use military force against him now, it may have to in the coming years.

Alternatively, the conflict may continue. Potentially this could be a protracted civil war with the revolutionaries holding on to what they now control. It could also devolve into an insurgency with insurgents not in outright control of any part of Libya.

The worst possible outcome for the United States would be a Gaddafi victory. The best, of course, would be quick removal of the dictator and emergence of a stable democracy. U.S. interests, clearly, are preventing Libya from returning to its sponsorship of radicalism and indicating that it is on the side of democracy rather than authoritarian stability.

We should, though, abandon two ideas. One is that a relatively modest application of military force--a no fly zone--is going to lead to Gaddafi's speedy demise. The other is that the U.S. should itself lead or dominate any military intervention.

Should outside military intervention take place, it must be under the imprimatur of the Arab League. Last week, this organization rejected the notion of outside military intervention. If it sticks to that, the United States or NATO should not intervene. Phrased differently, any U.S. or NATO intervention should be in support of an Arab League intervention, not a substitute for it.

If the Arab League decide on such intervention, it could take two forms. If Gaddafi uses chemical weapons or undertakes a genocidal campaign against civilians not involved in protests, a multinational force might be formed to remove him directly. This should be Arab designed, led, and dominated, with the U.S. providing support.

A second form of intervention would be support to anti-government forces, either to help them protect the territory they control and provide humanitarian assistance or, potentially, to assist them in an insurgency campaign. Again, the U.S. role should be support to Arab states which must design and lead the effort.

Ultimately, a U.S. designed and led military intervention would be a bad idea. An Arab intervention which requested U.S. support--while unlikely--would merit serious consideration. Even this would, of course, entail risks and costs. American lives might be lost and new burdens places on an already burdened military. But the question would be whether the political, economic, and military costs of action would exceed those of inaction. The time may be passing when the United States is, in Madeleine Albright's phrase, the "essential nation." But this does not mean it should become the world's first irrelevant superpower. Prudence is wise. Passivity is not.

Sidney poses two questions. First, does the United States have a compelling interest in the removal of Qaddafi? Second, if we do, what are the most appropriate means? I believe that the answer as to interests is ‘yes.’ The public statements of President Obama, repeated daily by Secretary Clinton, that Qaddafi ‘must go’ have staked America’s credibility on the opposition’s success – a credibility made fragile by our letting expedient considerations trump our supposed commitment to democracy in the past. Great powers don’t have the privilege of declaring a situation intolerable and then doing nothing to rectify it when they in fact have the power to do so. In addition, if our failure to act were to lead to a resurgent Qaddafi exacting a heavy toll in blood, it would send a chilling message to peoples across the region who are putting themselves at risk for the sake of dignity and a measure of freedom. Already, the Bahrain opposition has expressed its bitterness about Washington’s siding with the Khalifa monarchy for the sake of its security ties with the Gulf states. By the way, our current position there is a close facsimile to that of the British from 1926 until their departure in the 1960s. They feared an Iranian challenge to their dominant political position, moved in to suppress a shi’ite uprising, and did so due to strategic and economic interests in the Gulf region that it deemed of critical importance. The British installed Lord Belgrave as pro consul who ran the place for 30 years. A similar option does not appear to be open to us. (That judgment may change, of course, were L. Paul Bremer III to make known his availability for the post).

As to the legitimacy of an intervention, it would have to be approved by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. That means dealing with Russia and China who have no enthusiasm for these ventures. A regional collective security body like the African Union may have some derivative authority to sanction an intervention. Unfortunately, its members right now are having a tough enough time holding onto downtown Mogadishu. Egypt is the exception in terms of military capabilities but they are otherwise occupied.

As to the means, I defer to those better versed in these military matters. (Sanctions are but a symbolic gesture that could only harm the innocent). One thought is worth noting. Any intervention that might entail the use of airpower runs into the extreme risk aversion that guides Pentagon thinking. Focused attacks on critical military assets including ground troops might well be both necessary and sufficient. But all recent experience tells us that the U.S. Air Force will not take to the air without prior suppression of all air defenses, communications centers and auxiliary facilities. Secretary Gates made that perfectly clear last week in pouring cold water on the more modest idea of an enforced ‘no fly zone’ over Libya. Let’s bear in mind that Mr. Obama is also an extremely risk averse President. His cautious instincts are especially pronounced now that he is preoccupied with is re-election which overshadows all policy decisions. Military action carrying possible consequences that he could not easily spin are seen as a mortal danger to his reelection hopes. So if he does agree to airstrikes in Libya, they are all the more likely to be of the massive kind that minimize chances of a losing a pilot or two. The should consider, though, the collateral physical and political damage that may ensue before committing himself to that course.