March 2011 Archives

Even as Western forces intervene in Libya, violence is also escalating in Syria and Yemen. Syrian security forces have killed at least 61 people last week. Defecting generals and tribal leaders in Yemen raise a real possibility of civil war in a country long divided between north and south and lately troubled by al-Qaida. Meanwhile, repression on a less dramatic scale continues in Bahrain, with the regime backed by the intervention of Saudi troops. Even Saudi Arabia itself now faces protests, for good or ill. After the largely peaceful overthrow of dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, the pro-democratic tide in the Arab world seems to be crashing up against breakwaters made of stone.

Has the pro-democratic trend peaked in the Arab world? Has it entered a new, more violent phase because protests have now spread to countries with harsher governments? Or is it too early for pessimism? And with the Libyan and Qatari crises in particular drawing in foreign intervention, how will the successes and failures in each country ripple across the region?

8 responses: Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Paul Sullivan, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Wayne White, Michael Brenner, Michael Brenner, James Jay Carafano, Col. Robert Killebrew

In the run-up to Western military intervention in Libya, the Obama administration has ceded leadership on the issue to strong proponents, especially France and Britain and the Arab League. The administration did not push the Arab League to request a no-fly zone, nor did it twist the arms of the Russians and Chinese to approve one.

Now Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said the United States will soon cede command of the military operation to allied countries and take a less preeminent role in its execution. The question of who will take the lead over the operation, however, remains unclear. Gates has suggested France and Britain might do the honors, while others have proposed that the operation be run under the aegis of NATO, despite the public reluctance of key member nations such as Germany and Turkey.

The question we would like National Journal experts to consider is this: What does this uncertainty about leadership and ownership suggest about the likely success or failure of Operation Odyssey Dawn? Is there any historical precedent for the United States playing second banana in such a military coalition of the willing? Do Britain and France have the wherewithal to lead such an operation, militarily and politically, or would they just offer cover for behind-the-scenes U.S. leadership? Can a clearly divided NATO alliance offer effective leadership, especially given the desire not to give the operation a "Western brand"? Does the lack of certain U.S. leadership increase or lessen the risk of "mission creep"? With so much of the credibility of the Western alliance now on the line, will the United States inevitably have to step in and take the reins if the operation stalls? In general, what are the pros and cons of such a fluid leadership situation in an ongoing military operation?

7 responses: Chris Seiple, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Paul R. Pillar, Wayne White, Richard Hart Sinnreich, Ron Marks, Steven Metz

Editor's Note: This week, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is providing the question and joining in the discussion.

Last week, as we debated whether the U.S. should intervene in Libya, contributor Robert Killebrew slipped in a crucial reminder: "The real prize here is Egypt."

We cannot make the right choices in Libya if we lose sight of the wider regional stakes. That's especially true because Libya's eastern neighbor is not only the most populous and influential country in the Arab world, but also a nation in the midst of a delicate transition to democracy.

Though divided by borders, the Arab nations are linked by ancient bonds of language, ethnicity, and faith, all of them tightened by the modern technology of Twitter, Facebook, and Al Jazeera. The pro-democracy protests started in Tunisia and raced east like rows of falling dominos. The question this week centers on whether that interconnection might send the repercussions of a failed Libyan state, prolonged civil war, or triumphant Qaddafi rippling throughout the region as well.

For instance, if Qaddafi is successful in quelling protests and rebellion with extreme violence, might that spell the end of the pro-democracy movements in the region? Might a clumsy Western intervention to contain that civil war tar the pro-democratic movement as a tool of the imperialists, and again, provoke a regional backlash? Or if Western and Arab governments actually manage to work together to help bring some measure of peace and freedom to Libya, might it create a powerful and positive new model for the Middle East?

As you ponder these important questions, please consider what U.S. policy would best serve not only the Libyan people, but also rest of the Arab world and U.S. interests in the region.

15 responses: Steven Metz, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Eric Farnsworth, Wayne White, Michael Brenner, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Wayne White, Michael Brenner, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., James Jay Carafano, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Ron Marks, Michael Brenner, Chris Seiple

Editor's Note: This week, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is providing the question and joining in the discussion.

The unthinkable becomes the inevitable at a staggering clip in the Middle East these days. A month ago, Muammar el-Qaddafi seemed not only secure in his 40-year rule but to have reached a modus vivendi with the West. By March 3, President Obama was saying Qaddafi had to go and instructing the departments of State and Defense to look into "a full range of options" in the event of a humanitarian crisis or a "bloody" stalemate -- including, he said explicitly, a no-fly zone. As the situation continues to escalate, the fact that the president has shown every sign of a deep (and rational) reluctance to use force hardly means he won't feel compelled to in the coming weeks.

What are America's options to intervene in the Libyan civil war? We've already applied targeted sanctions such as seizing bank accounts linked to the regime. What comes next? Can we enforce a no-fly zone without launching airstrikes against anti-aircraft units still loyal to Qaddafi -- assuming we can tell which ones the loyalists are? Given historical precedents in terms of instituting a no-fly in Iraq in the 1990s, and using airpower to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo that same decade, what are the lessons from such experiences? Should we offer weapons and advice to the Libyan rebels -- assuming we can figure out who leads them? Do we need to wait on NATO, the U.N., and/or other Arab governments to come to a firm stance before we act ourselves, and if so, what are the chances that they will support a military intervention?

15 responses: Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Michael Brenner, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Wayne White, Richard Hart Sinnreich, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Steven Metz, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Ron Marks, Eric Farnsworth, James Jay Carafano, Rachel Kleinfeld, Daniel Gouré, Steven Metz, Michael Brenner