http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2010/12/we-wuz-right-afghanistan.html

In addition to what has been said here by my freinds, I would mention my perception that the US view, and to some extent the coalition view, of the struggle for Afghanistan is quite different from that of the local actors, both within and without the country. This was also true in Iraq.

For the Americaan forces and government the war is about the eradication of anti-American and anti-coalition entities and tendencies that could once again provide a base for terrorist attacks abroad. In pursuit of that set of goals, programs are in place to destroy Islamic extremist groups and to make Afghanistan into a model of transformation from oriental traditionalism in all its social and political forms to a hybrid modernism that functions according to the ideals of western liberalism. A part of that vision requires the abandonment of the oriental cultural expectation that the possession of political power naturally leads to acquisition of personal and family wealth. This western aspiration in government is sacred to western self image no matter how much the aspiration may be imperfect in the West itself. A general acceptance of the notion of Afghanistan as a "nation state" on the model of the conceptions of western political science as a disipline is also an expectation of the coalition and the United States. To foster and enforce that idea, massive security forces are in preparation no matter what the costs or the difficulties.

This narrative of events and "facts" differs from that of the inhabitants of the country. In their reality Afghanistan is a place where half a dozen different "nations" live, each with its own language and cultural norms, separated by widely differing terrain and vast distances and aligned loosely by adherence to the many forms of the Islamic faith and law. Unifying physical and governmental infrastructure is minimal and there are places in the eastern regions where the idea of kinship with those who live in the next valley is alien, much less kinship or bonds with a distant and unknown government in Kabul.

To further complicate matters Pakistan and India are fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan. These two successor states are most of what was British India. They divided on the basis of Muslim nationalism and have been enemies ever since. Kashmir is the great prize in this struggle but Pakistan believes that Indian power behind the scenes in Kabul would constitute a threat to its existence. President Karzai's clique is believed in Islamabad to be an instrument of Indian power. To defeat and block the growth of such Indian power Pakistan supports mujahid groups who contest the growth of Karzai's (and Kabul's) "reach" across the country.

These varying narratives are probably mutually exclusive,

Is that enough time to degrade the capabilities of the Taliban sufficiently for Afghan security forces to take control?

This is hard to speculate about at this time. However, it does not seem that the security forces will be up to being a part of the real task at hand: unifying and solidifying Afghanistan as a country and giving the people of Afghanistan as sense of Afghan-ness that could serve them for the long term future. It is still very much a tribal and fractured country. The police might, that is might, be getting better equipped and trained, but the country remains a violent set of puzzle pieces still splattered on the ground. Four years will not put this together, most likely. Some in leadership on this issue are looking at the wrong goals and are looking at things as not being systematic and systems within and across systems.

Has the 2014 deadline relieved some of the anxiety and unhelpful hedging provoked by Obama's July 2011 deadline for "beginning" to withdraw U.S. forces?

Maybe, but the big project of unifying Afghanistan still waits. Anxiety will be there in such a complex situation as will the attempts to put on a good face and spin the situation for personal and other benefits.

Under the current timeframe, can enough progress be made in reducing endemic corruption in the Afghan government, and in making insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan less secure, to give the strategy a chance to succeed?

Anyone who thinks that the corruption in Afghanistan can be significantly mitigated in four years time should look into buying back some of the subprime loans that are parts of the present foreclosure mess.

Bottom line: Does the progress reflected in this week's review represent a potential tipping point in the war, or another tactical advance that will ultimately fail to overcome the immense challenges in Afghanistan?

The immense challenges of Afghanistan are ultimately the responsibility of the Afghans. It is time for them to step up and get the job done. The foreigners will move on to another crisis and the Afghans need to build their capacity and rely mostly on themselves. However, they might also want to think about connecting themselves better internally and externally, and focusing on economic and human development – rather than fighting each other and brining further ruination the in the process. Unless the Afghans are ready to move forward and fight corruption, the drugs economy, the violence, the extremism, the illiteracy, and more then anything outsiders will try to do will be mostly for naught in the medium and long runs.

Counterinsurgency is actually less than the tiny bit of the tip of this massive iceberg of problems.

Nations deserve the heroes they get. A hero usually is one part the actuality of person and performance; three parts need of the observer for confirmation, reassurance, hope. Heroes are made more by the yearnings of others than by their own features and feats. Where the intensity of those needs stunts critical faculties, the powers of illusion and self-delusion grow. That holds for the object of hero worship as well - for the emotional currents flow both ways.

Heroes are enemies of truth. For they evoke powerful feelings that give distorted meanings to inchoate emotions. They provide the personified symbols of legendary dimension that inspire unjustified confidence and offer the comfort of a cult. Thoughtless loyalty follows.

Contemporary America’s craving is exceptional. It is diffuse yet at the same time self centered. Each one of us badly wishes to have the mythology of our collective identity and meaning restored. Abstract yet omnipresent, few can cope without it. The personal resources of our fabled individualism quickly run dry without the steady sustenance provided by the blind belief in our exceptional virtue, competence and claim on the future. Suspicions that we may not be destiny’s child born under a providential star erodes the optimistic self confidence that is our lifeblood.

Those who have emerged as saviors offer no plan to resolve our tangible problems, no exciting doctrine of salvation, no fresh vision. Instead, they are amplifiers of our discontents with a gift for bolstering faith that restoration of the true and authentic America is within our grasp. It’s the eternal American story of self redemption and self-realization that admits of no flaw in our basic character. Whatever is out of kilter just has to be fixed.

There is one celebrity with the makings of a national hero, someone who has the qualities that might carry him right into the White House. It is David Petraeus. He is almost universally credited with the brilliant achievement of saving American honor and gaining an approximation of ‘victory’ in Iraq. President Obama himself is in awe of this warrior intellectual to whom he defers on all matters in the Greater Middle East. Petraeus’ mythic standing is a perfect example of how the compelling demand for a hero creates the illusion that indeed a savior has arrived. The so-called ‘surge’ for which Petraeus takes unabashed credit did not change anything fundamental in Iraq. The record is clear that the decline in violence, sectarian and anti-American, was due to three factors independent of our actions. They were: the emergence among the Sunni militants of the sawa’h movementthat turned on al-Qaeda in Iraq for their own tribal and cultural reasons; the Sunnis defeat by the Shi’ites in the civil war of 2005-2007; Iranian political intervention to persuade Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to stand down so as to strengthen Prime Minister Maliki’s hand in the Iraqi-U.S. negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Iran won its bet as Maliki indeed did turn the tables on Petraeus et al in Washington, severely restricting the American military’s presence in Iraq. All this was in the works well before the surge troops arrived, troops that never got beyond Baghdad. Moreover, Iraq today is an economic and political shambles, without a government for nine months, that teeters on the brink of a three-way civil war while Tehran’s influence mounts steadily.

Petraeus, the most political general America has seen since MacArthur, eagerly accepted the unearned laurels. He plays Presidents and public opinion with the deftness he describes in his counter insurgency writings as required to win the propaganda campaign against the native rebels. The doctrine has been far more effectively executed in Washington than in Afghanistan. In Fall 2004, he penned a series of articles lauding George Bush for his brilliant and bold leadership. In them, he proclaimed success in personally building an Iraqi army ready to take over responsibility for the country’s security. That was a complete fiction. In fact, Petraeus had made a series of blunders in recruiting a nearly 100% Shi’ite army composed mainly of party militia members. One of the very few capable units, the notorious Grey Wolves, took the lead in the bloody ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad and surrounding districts. 6 years later, the Iraqi National Army of which their American general boasted is still a work in progress.

None of this is of interest to our leaders, to our media, to our public. Hero worship is blind – especially when there is a desperate emotional need to make the country feel good – or, at least, less bad – about its tragic, farcical intervention that tarnished every principle our Republic supposedly holds dear.

Petraeus understands all this. He plays his role skillfully. A shy half-smile for a people that prefers the boy next door variety of hero to the grim hard-edged military man we associate with the bad guys. A chest full of ribbons and medals that, to a few jaundiced eyes, makes him look like a caricatured Ruritanian Field Marshal. Army regulations on decorations say wear only 3 or wear them all. It is highly doubtful that Petraeus ever considered the former option. Modesty is not ‘in’ when it comes to American celebrity culture. Oddly, none of Petraeus’ decorations are for actions in combat. He never has seen combat; he never has been under fire. The very model of a modern hero-general. His big battles were won in the corridors of the Pentagon and the antechambers to presidential power. However confected Petraeus’ legendary triumphs are, they serve no less well as credentials that a sorely tried nation may take as signaling that here is the man who can set the country straight.

Audacity is the key to turning celebrity into hero status. Sarah Palin has it. So too does David Petraeus - in abundance. It took audacious nerve to throw himself into the 2004 presidential election while a serving officer, and do so by misrepresenting a key element in the Iraq debate - one for which he was individually responsible. It took audacity to maneuver to undercut two of his former commanding officers, General David McKiernan and Admiral William Fallon, whose careers met an untimely demise as a consequence. It took audacity to sideline Ambassador General Karl Eikenberry from last year's critical Afghanistan strategic review (with the backing of Robert Gates) because his views ran against the grain of Petraeus' own plans for being producer and director of SURGE II. It took audacity to qualify in public the White House's publicly stated commitment to begin a withdrawal of troops by July 1 2011 within days of its being made. It has taken even greater audacity to plant stories via his aides that he has the necessary 'moral authority' in effect to reset the mission's coordinates and resource needs as he deems fit. “Team Kabul,” as Petraeus refers to his Afghanistan staff, says openly that the July 2011 date is “meaningless.” It takes audacity to launch a campaign of village destruction in Kandahar province, cleansing the countryside of its civilian population, so as to chalk up a larger tally of enemy kills in time for the year end review - even if this means turning on its head the core precept of his own counterinsurgency doctrine. It takes audacity to spread word of a breakthrough success in the bringing of “a very high level Taliban leader,” Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, to Kabul for “promising” talks (literally as well as figuratively bringing him); and then when the ‘Taliban no. 2’ is exposed as an imposter, a Quetta shop keeper in fact, for Petraeus brazenly to offer the laconic comment that “I was not surprised.” And, to cap it all, to blame the British for the entire episode. That is the kind of audacity that points a general in the direction of the White House whose incumbent is your Commander-in-Chief.

By the way, the Editors of the TIMES have offered no comment on the ‘Taliban leader’ episode – a humiliation for Petraeus, a humiliation for America. Americans may pay it little attention; others in Kabul, Islamabad and Teheran do.