October 2010 Archives

With the release of its Strategic Defense and Security Review this week, and announcement of an 8 percent reduction in defense spending over the next four years, Britain is clearly retrenching from its role as one of the world's leading military forces able to project power around the globe. The question for expert bloggers this week: What impact will those cuts have on the U.S.-U.K. "special relationship"?

A key aspect of that "special relationship" was Britain's willingness and ability to act as the United States' ally of first resort in times of crisis or conflict. Britain was America's most important partner in the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 Afghan War, and the 2003 Iraq War. Given that the British army had already been cut a third since the end of the Cold War, and will now lose an additional 7,000 troops, some experts estimate that the United Kingdom will only be able to keep a single brigade in the field for sustained periods. The once vaunted Royal Navy will be pared down to a single operational aircraft carrier and fewer than 20 frigates and destroyers. Britain's purchase of the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will be cut from a planned 138 to just 40.

Given the depth of those cuts, will Britain retain the kind of "full spectrum" military capabilities that have made it such a valued ally to the United States? After the domestic controversy surrounding Britain's participation in the Iraq war, are the British people even interested in maintaining the "special relationship"? Is there any other nation the United States can turn to in the absence of a reliable British partner, or do the defense cuts signal that an already overstretched U.S. military is likely to bear a greater share of the burden of policing the global commons?

5 responses: Ron Marks, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Gordon Adams, Wayne White, Michael Brenner

A federal judge has stepped in where Congress, the Pentagon, and the Obama administration were treading carefully, deciding that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy barring gays from serving openly in uniform is a violation of the First Amendment and due-process rights of gay service members. The administration asked for a stay of the ruling pending an appeal, even as the Pentagon announced this week that it will halt investigations and discharges under the policy.

The question this week is whether an abrupt end of "don't ask, don't tell" will have an adverse effect on combat readiness and morale in the uniformed ranks, as some opponents of the repeal have argued.

On one hand, recent polls show 75 percent of Americans think gays should be allowed to serve openly in uniform. Military leaders such as Adm. Mike Mullen, current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Gen. Colin Powell, a former chairman, have argued for ending the ban.

On the other hand, not all of the Joint Chiefs support a repeal. Surveys soliciting the views of current service members and their spouses are only now being compiled by the Pentagon. What if they indicate that a U.S. military that recruits disproportionately from the South and Mountain West has more conservative views on the issue than the public at large?

Is this the kind of social change that is best left to the Congress rather than the courts? If Republicans win a majority of the House or Senate in the upcoming midterm elections, would that make repeal by Congress more or less likely? What should the Obama administration do, considering that the president campaigned on repealing the ban?

Finally, what should take precedence in this case, the views of the rank-and-file military at a moment of great stress on the force, or the rights of gay service members, who in many cases have risked everything to defend the nation in a time of war?

2 responses: Larry Korb, Loren Thompson

President Obama's announcement Friday that national security adviser James Jones would leave his post by the end of the month, to be replaced by senior deputy Thomas Donilon, signaled the end of an important chapter in the Obama presidency. Most importantly, Jones oversaw development of last year's Afghan strategy and troop "surge." He also helped manage a full national security docket that included a tricky withdrawal of forces from Iraq; a looming showdown with Iran; a reset in relations with Russia; tensions with China, North Korea, and Pakistan; a stalled Middle East peace process; and near-constant reports of terrorist plots aimed at the United States.

The question this week is whether Jones's legacy will ultimately be viewed as positive or negative. As a former four-star general, Marine Corps commandant, and supreme commander of NATO, did Jones smoothly manage relations between the White House and the U.S. military in a time of war and crisis? Did he supply the "adult supervision" of Obama's close coterie of political aides that some saw as his most important role? How successful was Jones in coaxing coordinated action out of the many agencies involved in national security? Was he a valued confidant of the president, or marginalized by lower-ranking deputies, as some news reports have claimed?

Finally, how might national security policy and execution change under Tom Donilon, if at all? Can Donilon work closely with Defense Secretary Robert Gates after the two clashed so famously over Afghan policy, especially as a critical period in the Afghan war approaches with Gen. David Petraeus's December review? Will Donilon's close relationship with Vice President Joe Biden, another skeptic of the Afghan surge, create a block within the White House that favors an early exit from Afghanistan next July? In short, what, if anything, is signified by this change in the critical NSA job?

5 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, Paul Sullivan, Michael Brenner, Joseph J. Collins, Ron Marks

Senior U.S. officials and lawmakers have sent Iran a series of tough messages in recent days. Sen. Joseph Lieberman, I/D-Conn., rattled a saber last week by telling the Council on Foreign Relations that a unilateral U.S. military strike against Iran should be considered if Tehran continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons. "It is time for our message... to become clearer: namely, that we will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability -- by peaceful means if we possibly can, but with military force if we absolutely must," Lieberman said. He echoed a recent warning by House Foreign Affairs Chairman Howard Berman, D-Calif., who said the Obama administration has "months, not years," to make sanctions work.

Meanwhile, President Obama signed an executive order imposing sanctions against eight Iranians -- including government officials and members of the Revolutionary Guard -- accused of human rights abuses stemming from last year's disputed presidential election. The State Department also took action against Naftiran Intertrade Co., a Swiss-based subsidiary of Iran's national oil company, and announced commitments by four oil companies to end all business dealings with Iran to escape further sanctions.

How significant are these developments, given the long U.S. campaign to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Will the latest U.S. sanctions, coupled with those approved recently by the U.N. Security Council, have a major impact on Iran's behavior? Will Iran take seriously any American saber rattling while the U.S. military is stretched thin fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Or will a belligerent tone from Washington embolden Israel to strike, thinking it has tacit U.S. approval?

7 responses: Joseph J. Collins, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Steven Metz, David Krieger, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Loren Thompson, Steven Metz