http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2010/09/in-a-sad-sense-none-of-this-maneuvering-actually-matters-all-that-much-regardless-of-who-becomes-prime-minister-or-presid.html

Rather than being tools for averting the mistakes of that conflict, America’s post-Vietnam obsession with timelines and exit strategies only perpetuates the worst way of thinking about wars.

There are several things that should not govern the practice of war. They include emotions, irrational behavior, and calendars. The mere way the National Journal framed its recent question of “Iraq & Afghanistan: Out in ‘11, or Forever War?” reflects the kind of thinking that falls under the shadow of all three.

First, force should only be used in the service of vital national interests. Thus, the right question to ask is “what is the best way to secure those interests”—not whine “how long is this going to take?”

Second, the most tiring and foolish of all assumptions is that America can’t and won’t sustain the will and resources to fight over the long term. The fact that we have already been fighting the Long War for nine years should have dispelled that myth. Long wars happen—the Seven Years, the Thirty Years War, the Hundred Years War. China had a whole Warring States period. Societies a lot less resilient than ours have fought a lot longer with a lot less.

Nor is it rationale to argue that the U.S. can’t afford to defend itself. America has the world’s largest economy and spends today about half of what we spent on average to defend ourselves during the Cold War. Those wanting to cut back on defense today sound like little kids who, when their parents say “we have got to cut back because we have been a little reckless with our spending,” answer, “well you are going to have to quit paying the mortgage, because you can’t expect us to cut back on cable!” Military spending, including war costs, did not create our fiscal mess. Cutting defense won’t grow jobs, but it will put our freedoms, safety, and security at risk.

Third, in war the enemy gets a vote. They vote often and with bombs and bullets. Wars are not predictable exercises. Thinking of defense as a rote exercise is about as mature as Lindsey Lohan or Paris Hilton’s thinking about legal defense.

And so, the two-part answer to the stupid question posed by the National Journal is: neither and it depends.

If Afghanistan and Iran do not go well over the next six months and an anti-war drumbeat starts to build on the Left, we should fully expect the President to adopt some version of a cut and run strategy that will take the steam out anti-war agitation on the Left in time for November 2012.

On the other hand, if our military continues to make progress on both fronts and the White House does not feel pressured to abandon our vital national interests, they will likely stick it out and do the right thing: significant military support for both Iraq and Afghanistan post-2011, not forever, but at least for several years.

It is impossible to predict what the US troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan will be in a year. Where they should be is another matter. Our continued troop presence in Iraq is presumably based on the fact that we broke it (Iraq civil society) and now must continue to try to put it back together. By any measure, we've made things worse in Iraq than they were before we illegally invaded and occupied the country. It is unclear that our troops are serving any meaningful purpose now in the country. They should be withdrawn and we should provide the Iraqis with sufficient funding to rebuild the infrastructure that we destroyed during the war. The number of US troops in Iraq at the end of 2011 should be zero, but I doubt that it will be.

In Afghanistan, the number of US troops at the end of 2011 should also be zero. There is no rational national security interest that the US is achieving there by military means. Nor do we have any chance of “winning” in Afghanistan, whatever that means. We need to stop sacrificing young Americans and foreign nationals in wars that serve no significant purpose.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has shown its soft underbelly. We may have brave men and women and high technology, but we cannot successfully invade and occupy countries against their will. It is time for the US to rejoin the community of nations, abide by international law, and hold to account its own leaders who violate the Nuremburg Principles.

Round # 1

- Freedom from further AQ inpired attacks in the US. Are these wars of nation building insuring that? Why not just kill our enemies where we find them? Dead men don't bite and there are only so many people who want to be "martyred" TODAY.

- A secular missionary's satisfaction in bettering the lot of the Iraqis, various kinds of Afghans, Pakistanis, Somalis (Oh, we did that already), etc., etc.? This is a job for a 21st Century version of "Chinese Gordon." Ah, "Iraqi Petraeus." Oh, I forgot. Hardly any of us know any history. "That's history," a typically dismissive American remark. Try to get your minds around the numbers involved.

- If we do not "sober up," then I think that unending war is the answer to the question, unending war until the collapse.

One of the many aspects of Washington politics I find amusing is when rhetoric and reality run smack into each other. So, the Obama Adminstration is fiddling with its "get out of Dodge" routine in Iraq. We are not getting out anytime soon and nor can we.

Obama's people are caught out. They have tried to please their left as much as possible -- except when Robert Gibbs has a well planned public temper tantrum to quiet them down. However, this election upcoming is likely to throw a total wrench into any further swift Obama initiatives. At best, there will be a split in the Congress with the Republicans and at worst the Dems will lose both houses. In either case, precepitous pullouts due to rhetoric on not likely on anyones agenda.

Of course, a lot depends on what you mean by pulling out. I will be curious to see how many advisors, aid workers and spies we leave behind to support the government. Let's face it. Obama is not going to want to go into the 2012 election with Iraq in an uproar because we pulled out "too early." Boy, would I love to write those campaign ads.

Anyway, the bottom line is the rhetoric and the reality do not match. And reality will win out with a heavy dose of politics on its side.

Long inconclusive wars – pseudo-wars & crypto-wars included – have the effect of draining away just about everything. Manpower, equipment, money, political support, diplomatic capital, ethical standards, patience - all start to run out. The one commodity sparingly used has been critical intelligence. That sad truth goes a long way toward explaining why we’re in such a quandary. Years ago, Charlie Schultz of OMB and Brookings renown cogently remarked that, in his considerable experience of government, most wasteful of time in policy deliberations was a failure to enunciate clearly at the outset what the ‘problem’ was and what was the purpose of actions being reviewed. Afghanistan and Iraq are testaments to that assertion’s accuracy.

Supposedly, the Obama administration has submitted Afghanistan to two systematic reviews. The latter three months long exercise is being promoted by Jonathon Alter as the most perfect text book policy exercise ever conducted. Nice compliment for an author cultivating inside sources but wholly fallacious. Previous posts have demonstrated why in dismaying detail. Certainly, if such heights of governmental competence had been scaled, we – and Washington in general – would not be spending the Labor Day weekend trying, once again, to divine what’s it all about. So let’s begin with aims and ends.

One thing (and only one thing) is plain: we do not want the United States to be exposed to another 9/11 type operation organized, directed or executed by al-Qaeda using Afghanistan as any sort of base. Once we get beyond that commonsensical declaration, a thick fog sets in. President Obama is the main culprit since 1) he is the man in charge; 2) his public statements have obscured more than they have clarified. Above all, he casually mixes together al-Qaeda and the Taliban. That is fatal. For were the objective to eliminate Taliban in its several guises as a force in Afghanistan that controls any sizeable territory or enjoys any substantial measure of freedom of action, then we might as well sign the contract now for some firm to strike the 25th, 50th and 75th commemorative medallions for Operation Forevermore. That is one.

Next is the issue of how much tolerance we have for what measure of risk as may remain. That in essence is a two-fold question: how much of a Taliban residual presence can we live with? and what constitutes acceptable odds that links of any kind with al-Qaeda would be inconsequential? A conception of the future situation that allows for perpetuation of the Taliban in some form or other (the precise terms being itself a valid, important matter) opens possibilities that do not exist in current thinking. A conception that acknowledges the possibility. however slight, of nominal contact between elements of future Taliban and future al-Qaeda (again, the modalities are important) widens the intellectual breakthrough. Then, we can visualize all sorts of political outcomes as tolerable. That is especially true so long as we retain the means to strike directly at any terrorist group’s physical assets if they were to reappear. That is two.

Pakistan is the ‘spanner’ in the works – as General Kayani might say. Do we conflate Afghanistan with Taliban/al-Qaeda infested areas of Pakistan? If so, it becomes harder to sketch an acceptable state of affairs in accordance with the terms outlined above. There we must take into account three additional sets of factors. First is the political jurisdictional demarcation line that does not coincide with the ethnic, tribal, philosophical and political facts on the ground. Two, it is crucial to ascertain whether the agenda of Taliban in Pakistan is identical to that of Taliban in Afghanistan. The latter’s leadership under Mullah Omar is highly unlikely to let the concerns of their Pakistani brethren constrain them insofar as a truce/peace settlement with Kabul/Washington is concerned. But the same cannot be said for Pak-Taliban attitudes toward the residue of al-Qaeda holding on in the Hindu Kush borderlands. Third, what are the intentions and capabilities of the Pakistani authorities? They seem to be at war with some elements and in cahoots with other elements – although I personally am dubious that anyone in the CIA, their off-the-book foreign legion of auxiliaries or Central Command can appraise this with any confidence. After all, Musharaf played them all for fools for six years. From the American perspective, the best we can hope for is that the Pakistanis, through a combination of guile and coercion, contrive to achieve a Taliban/al-Qaeda divorce that sends the latter party packing. At the present, the Pakistani Taliban appear to have raised their sights to target the Pakistani regime itself. Their violent campaign may make use of al-Qaeda assets. A blunting of that campaign, therefore, should result in a commensurate devaluation of their al-Qaeda ties and improve the odds on a divorce.

What can the United States contribute to an evolution of the Pakistani situation along these lines? The best help we can provide is a lowering of the American profile and presence. Whatever practical assist we may provide in hardware and electronic intelligence is more than offset by our serving as recruiting agent for the violent Islamist factions and our compromising the authority of the Pakistani regime. That is tough to swallow. But painful trade-offs are strewn the length of the path to any exit from the trap that is AfPak.

Two further questions of purpose must be addressed. Above all, do we intend to maintain a major military presence in Central Asia – if so, why?

Are there Top Secret documents showing that the ancient Silk Road is destined to become the power corridor of 21st century Eurasia? We are investing billions in state of the art airbases in Afghanistan along with a network of army bases. We construct mammoth embassies of imperial dimensions. (We have done exactly the same in Iraq). So we expect to be there a long time. Some people in the foreign affairs establishment clearly see the United States exercising military dominion across an enormous swath of Islamic Asia for the indefinite future. Yet we have heard not a peep from our elected or appointed leaders as to what this investment is all about. We need to know what’s on their minds so as to debate seriously Afghan/Pakistan options. For myself, I see no tangible interest justifying this ambitious military strategy – other than ‘full spectrum’ military dominance for dominance’s sake.

Finally, there is the key issue of American tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Those traits are not in our national make-up. We like crisp wars with clear outcomes. We are not into ‘managing’ problems or ‘coping’ with complicated, awkward situations. Surely not exercises of the kind that extend over years. Quite the opposite. We are a ‘can do,’ ‘pro-active’ people. Reinventing our collective mindset may not be possible. Yet, unless we are prepared and able to change our ways, we are fated to bleed ourselves dry while failing in pursuit of the impossible dream.

As to Iraq, much of the above applies. We never had a legitimate, compelling mission. We still don’t. Our leaders seem convinced that it is desirable and possible to turn Iraq into a deferential ally who will support us in tangible and intangible ways while we pursue other adventures in the Greater Middle East. This, too, is pie in the sky. Any Iraqi leadership that wants to survive will promote its own interests. Those do not include playing the role of an auxiliary to American might a la Egypt or Jordan. The latter need us for economic reasons and, to their minds anyway, to contain a domestic challenge from salafists. The Iraqis will not need us. They have oil, and will reach their own accommodation with radical Sunni fundamentalists or crush them. Washington insiders talk about ‘partnering’ with the Iraqi military to protect the country from Iran. That, too, is our vision of things – not theirs. All the camaraderie Fort Leavenworth has to offer won’t change that hard reality. Nor will innumerable sorties by Pentagon brass wearing out the red carpet in Baghdad. Time to egress the hall of mirrors.

The sustainability of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, however defined, are negatively correlated to US forces casualties and positively correlated to perceptions of progress. There is nothing inherently predetermined about the timeline or the number of troops that will remain--Korea, Germany, and Japan have hosted thousands of US troops continuously since wars ended there--but the politics change when men and women are being wounded and dying. At the same time, as violence and lack of governance increase, the public begins to wonder whether all the time and effort has been "worth it" and calls increase to wind down the effort. As in Korea, the effort becomes more sustainable when the public can plainly see what would happen if US troops were not present, while at the same time there are no US casualties. The main thing to understand is that, despite Washington's best efforts, the duration of conflicts and the effort required generally does not hew to the US electoral calendar. Decisions should not be made primarily on that basis.

Predicting anything in Iraq and Afghanistan is perilous. Predicting troop levels is just impossible.

That said, we do know some of the relevant parameters.

The President says he wants all the U.S. troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011, and the American public supports that. But we also know that Iraq will not have completed the rebuilding of its air force and navy by then, even if the Iraqi public might like them to. There may also be residual terrorism issues. I find it difficult to imagine that the U.S. would refuse an Iraqi request to keep some troops there in order to complete the training and equipping process. Would we really want the French or the Chinese to step in where we leave a vacuum?

Will the Iraqis ask some Americans to stay? That depends on who is in the next government--and it is too early even to predict that. But if the government includes both current prime minister Nuri al Maliki and former prime minister Iyad Allawi, a request to the Americans for continued assistance is likely.

In Afghanistan, everything depends on what we want to achieve. The President has been vague about that. The only clear indication he gives is that we want to finish off Al Qaeda in Afghanistan--but haven't we already just about done that?

His problem of course is that Al Qaeda will return if we withdraw without a stronger Afghan government in place, one that by some combination of force of arms and negotiation has reestablished control over parts of the country that today are in Taliban hands. When will the President risk saying the Afghans can handle it, as he has already said about the Iraqis?

It is a pretty good bet that the President would prefer to do that well before the November 2012 elections. While it doesn't look today as if conditions will permit that, the renewed effort in Afghanistan has really just begun. General Petraeus deserves time, at least until the December review, when he'll likely ask for more time. But sometime around the end of 2011, the President will have to decide whether to risk turning full control over to the Afghans at some date certain.

He may well decide not to do that: while he might prefer to run for a second term as the President who ended two wars, it is difficult for the Republicans to outflank him on the withdrawal side of the debate. If they attempt it, they risk splitting their own leadership and base.

No predictions here, but I'll be mildly surprised if we don't have a few thousand military in Iraq past the end of 2011 and tens of thousands in Afghanistan. State-building is really not optional in either place--it is vital to U.S. as well as Iraqi and Afghan interests. It takes time, money, troops and civilians to do it.

The cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been colossal, but it would make no sense to abandon either enterprise before being reasonably sure that the investment can be protected after the Americans withdraw.