September 2010 Archives

In recent weeks, a drumbeat of warnings has sounded about the increased risk to the U.S. homeland from "homegrown terrorism." A recent Congressional Research Service report found that since May 2009, arrests were made in 19 plots by U.S. residents, compared to just 21 plots from September 2001 to May 2009. Sixty-three U.S. citizens have either been charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States just since 2009. Last Wednesday, during the latest in a series of hearings he's held on homegrown terrorism, Senate Homeland Security Chairman Joe Lieberman, I/D-Conn., observed that "there has been a dramatic increase in the pace of homegrown and foreign-based incidents" and that "more and more Americans are being recruited and are joining the leadership ranks of al-Qaida and its affiliated groups."

This week we would like National Journal's expert bloggers to consider why the terrorist threat from within has grown so dramatically, and what can realistically be done to counter the threat. Has the conventional wisdom that U.S. Muslims were better assimilated and thus less prone to radicalization proven false? Has President Obama's outreach to the Muslim world failed, and if so, why? Does the evolution make an attack on the homeland, perhaps smaller than 9/11 and using conventional weapons such as car bombs and improvised explosive devices, more likely?

What role do al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen and Somalia play in this evolving threat? Are radical, English-speaking imams and propagandists such as Anwar al-Aulaqi and Adam Gadahn largely to blame, and if so, what can and should be done to blunt their impact? Has the controversy over the proposed Park51 Islamic center near Ground Zero, and the anti-Muslim backlash that has ensued, made further radicalization of Muslims in America more likely? Finally, what steps can the United States take to become more resilient in the event of a terrorist attack, especially given the criticism Obama drew from the right for suggesting that the country would come through another attack even stronger?

7 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, Loren Thompson, Michael Brenner, Brian Michael Jenkins, Wayne White, Ron Marks, Paul R. Pillar

With the last of the Republican primaries just completed, including some odds-defying victories by Tea Party candidates, an electoral tsunami is taking shape that many experts believe will sweep Democrats from the majority in the House and possibly even the Senate come November. Thus this week's question for National Journal's security experts: What impact would a Republican majority in the House, Senate or both have on President Obama's national security and foreign affairs agenda?

On the critical issue of the war in Afghanistan, for instance, might a new Republican majority team with U.S. military leaders in attempting to thwart what they see as a precipitous withdrawal of troops beginning in July 2011? If so, will they bolster Obama by protecting him from the anti-war wing of his own party, or undermine the commander-in-chief by driving a wedge between him and military leadership? On the issue of the New START treaty and Obama's broader nonproliferation agenda, which includes proposed ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, what role would a Republican majority in Congress likely play? Will a Republican majority make it harder or easier for Obama to broker a two-state settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? If the deficit reduction commission's report in December calls for significant cuts in defense spending as part of a debt reduction package, would a Republican majority go along? Would a Republican majority spell the end of meaningful climate change legislation and comprehensive immigration reform, two issues with profound foreign policy and security implications? Finally, how would a Republican majority with a strong Tea Party flavor likely view free trade agreements?

11 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, Paul D. Eaton, Loren Thompson, Larry Korb, Ron Marks, James Jay Carafano, Wayne White, Kori Schake, Eric Farnsworth, Michael Brenner, Steven Metz

On Sept. 16, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry says he will move the "New START" treaty with Russia through his committee. After canceling an earlier vote scheduled for August, Kerry is betting he can muster enough Republican votes this time to avoid a divisive party line vote. But however the committee votes, does Majority Leader Harry Reid dare bring the treaty to the Senate floor in the hyper-partisan atmosphere before the midterm elections? If he doesn't, will the prospects be any better in a lame-duck session after what political handicappers increasingly predict will be a Republican romp? What will the Obama administration have to offer -- say, more money for nuclear weapons infrastructure and missile defense -- to get Republicans on board?

The Russians have already unilaterally declared their right to pull out of the treaty if U.S. missile defenses build up to a level they find threatening. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently wrote Congress a not entirely reassuring promise that even if the Russians do play fast and loose with their New START commitments, it will not amount to "militarily significant cheating." And Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who may be having flashbacks to the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during her husband's administration, lamented publicly that New START has become "a political issue."

In this unpromising atmosphere, what would be the impact on U.S.-Russian relations and President Obama's broader nuclear non-proliferation agenda if the Senate hands New START a stinging defeat on par with its rejection of the CTBT back in 1999? Does progress on Obama's arms control agenda stop with START?

11 responses: Baker Spring, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Michael Vlahos, Paul Sullivan, Rachel Kleinfeld, David Krieger, James Jay Carafano, James Kitfield, Loren Thompson, James Kitfield, Henry D. Sokolski

On Aug. 31, U.S. combat forces officially withdrew from Iraq -- except for the 50,000 "advisers" and support personnel who remain. According to the U.S.-Iraqi status of forces agreement, all U.S. troops will be gone by the end of 2011 -- unless whoever ends up forming the next government in Baghdad asks the Americans to stay. As for Afghanistan, President Obama has promised to begin drawing down U.S. forces in July '11 -- although Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Gen. David Petraeus have both emphasized that drawdown will be cautious, gradual and based on improvements in Afghan security.

So while the total number of troops deployed really has come down, all these caveats make it hard to predict when the last U.S. troops will finally come home, if they ever do. Anti-war activists argue for a swift and complete withdrawal from both theaters; hegemonists prefer a small but permanent advisory presence. What will the U.S. troop levels actually be in Iraq and Afghanistan by the end of 2011? What levels can the American public and politicians sustain? What levels would best serve our national security interests, whatever they are, in these two countries? And is there any overlap between what we probably will do and what we really should?

8 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, James Jay Carafano, David Krieger, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Ron Marks, Michael Brenner, Eric Farnsworth, Daniel Serwer