I am a child of Vietnam. My first memories of the 1960's revolve around rising troop commitments, endless bombing raids and declarations of victory. It was a war that lasted too long without any concrete goals or results. So when I hear of quick, neat solutions for nearly insolvable problems, I cringe and remember.

In many ways, Washington has yet to come to grips with the limited "possible" in Afghanistan. The possible is nearly what we have. The central government in Kabul is there and will likely remain though weak and corrupt. Kabul will control at best the major cities and some portion of the countryside. Aid programs on our part will help a little bit to maintain whatever weak control there is.

Washington will also need to come to grips with the idea that our main realizable goals of keeping the Taliban at bay and Al Queda mostly on the other side of a very porous border are the best we can achieve. On that account, we are going to need to have some form of presence there for some time to come. The aerial shoot and kill philosophy imposed against our enemy is the most effective method like it or not.

The current levels of boots on the ground troops are unsustainable and will be drawn down with declarations of "victory." However, make no mistake, we are not going to "win" this one. At best, we are going to achieve a tie.

The "Anbar Miracle" was a cheap political expedient Petraeus designed to get both parties past the 2008 presidential election without having Iraq on the front pages. And it was only possible because of al-Qaeda's al-Zarqawi and his brutal stupidity. It is even now unraveling before our eyes as al-Qaeda is returning and the Shia-Sunni civil war In Iraq nears.

Petraeus will fail in Afghanistan as he did in Iraq. No al-Zarqawi reddux is coming to that four-star hoax's rescue. The Taleban have won the war. We will withdraw with our tail between our legs. The Muslim world will be galvanized by the defeat of the second superpower.

I probably shouldn't presume to comment on Afghan society, but ts seems that the areas of Afghanistan where the Taliban is most active have some similarities with Iraq's Anbar Province. The Taliban threatens a traditional power structure rooted in local kinship and tribal ties, in much the same way that Al Qaeda in Iraq threatened the traditional power structure of Anbar. It therefore may be possible to make common cause with interests tied to the status quo in resisting the radicalizing influence of the Taliban.

However, the tactical situation in Anbar Province on the eve of the "miracle" was that there were two different groups of insurgents at work -- indigenous Sunnis dissatisfied with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, and Al Qaeda elements from outside Iraq intent on expanding a global jihad against American occuppiers. The Al Qaeda elements were a persistent irritant to the local Sunni power structure, and thus it became possible to quell both insurgencies by in effect hiring the local Sunnis to oppose the foreign Sunnis (Al Qaeda).

The tactical situation in southern and eastern Afghanistan is different, because Taliban members are locals, just like the Afghans populating the traditional power structure. The only foreigners are America and its allies. Now, that doesn't mean we can't buy off many marginal members of the Taliban to help defend the staus quo, but the relationship between the radicals and traditional power brokers seems a good deal murkier than in Anbar. Many locals from both camps may deeply resent the American presence, to a point where they can overlook past differences to make common cause against us.

I'm a big believer in using bribes rather than bullets to resolve difficult situations, and that approach may be very well-suited to the warlord culture of Afghanistan. But with Al Qaeda largely driven out of the country, we are now engaged in a conflict that resembles a civil war, and our very presence may be exacerbating the tensions we are trying to resolve. If there's one thing likely to bring all elements together in Afghanistan, it's the presence of a lot of unwelcome foreigners.

We seem to have come to a dead end in our search for paths to a resolution in Afghanistan. It's time to think out of the box - as they say in D.C. My perusal of Afghan history these past few days reminded me that the one conqueror who was able to establish his sway was Alexander. His method was a series of dynastic marriages with the families of diverse potentates. I propose that President Obama consider a similar approach - taking as wives the kin of Karzai, Mullah Omar, Haqquani and Abdullah Abdullah (counts as one). Of course, now that Islamic custom prevails that would leave some powerful factions unattended to, e.g. Hazaras, Tajiks, Hekmatyar. I'm sure, though, that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would gladly volunteer to fill the breach.

If this marriage surge proves successful, perhaps in could be emulated in Iraq.

Even if we could turn large numbers of rural Pushtuns against the Taliban, the engagement would become more or less permanent. Do we really want that?

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2010/07/clinton-defends-us-strategy-in-afghanistan-bbc.html

I've argued more than once in print the illogic of insisting on grounding success in Afghanistan on NATO's ability to impose effective indigenous central authority on a society with no recent history of it. To the extent that empowering local security efforts represents a shift away from that insistence, I'm all for it. But I'm afraid it may be too little too late. Even Iraq is far from an unambiguous success story at this point, and its starting point was light-years ahead of Afghanistan's. Needless to say, I'd be happy to be proved wrong.

Will the new security initiative in Afghanistan be like the Anbar miracle? Not really. History doesn't repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes, the pundits say. It certainly never repeats itself cross culturally. Islam is the only thing from Arabia that the Afghans appreciate, and even that appreciation is looked down on by Islamists from the Gulf. The situation in Anbar and the many realities of Afghanistan are certainly a strained pairing.

The new community policing issue had a long gestation. It first came up in 2003, and it later reappeared when Ron Neumann was Ambassador. The Afghans have pushed it or kept it from happening. The US camp has been split from the get go. This version of the "militia thing" was two years in the making. If properly tied into the Police system and with good allied mentorship, it has a decent chance of working. The 64 dollar question here is this: if the Afghan National Police are having a hard time supervising and managing their own force, will they have the managerial wherewithal to carry out this new task? Only with the dedicated advice and assistance of their friends, I suppose, is the answer.

The relationship between the community policing issue and the reintegration of Taliban is not clear. My guess is that they are on parallel tracks and not interlocking ones. For those interested in reintegration and reconciliation, keep your eye on the Tajiks. They will be the bellweather nationality to see whether or not Karzai's efforts will easily gain traction. The Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazarras were treated horribly by the Taliban. They won't want Father Karzai to be give away the story to his wayward brethren. Next big issues: how big will the take be from the on-going fund raiser? Next, what fate Parliamentary elections in September?

Having followed the circumstances surrounding the so-called "Anbar Miracle," the "Awakening" phenomenon or what has been characterized by other names from my perch within the Intelligence Community through 2005 and outside since, I doubt very much that Iraq-like results are achievable in Afghanistan.

That said, I commend James Kitfield for focusing attention specifically on this critical aspect of the Afghan and Iraq wars, as opposed to the "surge" in Afghanistan (or Iraq), because the question places front and center the issue that was, by far, most critical in turning around the security situation in Iraq, as it may well prove to be in Afghanistan.

The Sunni Arab "Awakening" (a term I will use since if affected 3 major Iraqi provinces outside al-Anbar, including Baghdad) was much like a ripe fruit ready for the picking when Washington finally turned to that option in Fall 2006. Unlike the situation in Afghanistan today involving the various components of the Taliban, a substantial number of Sunni Arab insurgents began seeking an end to hostilies as early as 2004--in the midst of an era in which they achieved a good measure of success--because they saw the heavy toll their resistance was taking within their home communities in lost lives, material and economic damage, as well as abuses on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) extremists loathed by the vast majority of the insurgents. Yet, the US repeatedly turned down their offers to cease hostilities if US forces joined them in an effort to destroy AQI because the insurgents would not make their peace with the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government in Baghdad which the insurgents believed was not legitimate, could not be trusted, and was dysfunctional and corrupt. Only when driven to desperation by the sectarian bloodletting of 2006 did Washington decide to ignore the Baghdad regime and make a separate peace with the insurgents. Eventually, that narrow agreement would expand to include the Iraqi government, albeit somewhat reluctantly on the part of both the insurgents and the government.

In Afghanistan, there does not appear to be lots of low-hanging fruit ripe for the plucking. There has been no groundswell of war-weary Taliban knocking on our door. The insurgents hold much the same view of the government in Kabul as did Sunni Arab's in Iraq had of theirs in Baghdad. However, the collective military might of NATO forces in that large, rugged country is not nearly as formidable in relation to the Taliban as it was when stacked up against the insurgents in Iraq back in 2006-2008. As a result, the Taliban do not yet appear to view the costs of fighting as too heavy too bear. And despite incoming additional US forces being far more significant relative to the force already deployed in Afghanistan than they were in Iraq, the task of inflicting decisive damage on the Taliban--enough to make them dispair of soldiering on--seems difficult and the timeline terribly constricted.

More than that, as riven as Iraq has been by various internal divides of one type or another, Afghanistan is not only probably much worse, but also is a far less advanced society overall--and perhaps even more hostile to any foreign presence. Moreover, in part because of the more limited nature of the country's development in a variety of areas, the exercise of meaningful governance is far less coherent than was governance in Iraq (even back in 2006-2008). And whereas those in power in Baghdad have at least enjoyed a measure of support (or resigned tolerance) from the majority of the Iraqi population (although still very much sliced down ethno-sectarian lines), the Karzai government cannot even muster that limited amount of backing.

Another important component of Iraq's Sunni Arab "Awakening" missing among the Taliban fighters is a rather generalized loathing of the Islamic militants in their midst. Not only were Sunni Arabs exhausted by sectarian conflict and combat with US forces, they were tired enough of Muslim extremist abuses to view that threat as almost equally significant. In Afghanistan, although there is resentment within the populace toward Taliban extremists, it does not appear to have become generalized among the vast majority of fighting cadres themselves, many of whom do not have the secular mindset prevailing among so many of Iraq's Sunni Arab combatants (then and now).

All in all, with respect to the sheer magnitude of the effort still needed to stabilize the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, the woeful shortfall in producing some form of recognizable governance from Kabul, and the abbreviated time--and limited resources-available to the US with which to accomplish these goals relative to those employed in Iraq, a similar "miracle" in Afghanistan seems like a real stretch by comparison.

Failure and despair are the breeding ground for miracle-workers, prophets and the myths that their legendary feats spawn. Success and hope mute our craving for heroes and heroics. The myth of the Iraqi miraculous acts magically performed by David Petraeus stems from the the country's desperate need to be reassured of its prowess in the face of serial failures in the Greater Middle East. From Iraq through Palestine, Somalia, Lebanon , Iran, Afghanistan II to Pakistan our ill-advised interventions have left a trail of surreal expectations, lost causes, blasted schemes and havoc. Nowhere have we come close to meeting our objectives. We instead have sown doubts about the probity of American strategic judgment and sullied our historical reputation as an agent for good that observes standards of ethical international behavior.

The blows dealt American self-esteem and pride are hard to accept. So we clutch for straws. Recasting the story of our faults and failings under the sway of imagined deeds that never happened and achievements that never occurred is the straw. David Petraeus is the improbable hero who personalizes this fictive tale. Here are a few uncomfortable, perhaps unpalatable facts.

One, Iraq is a bloody mess. The country is in political disarray, economically in worse shape than in 2003 and is prey to growing violence. The outlook is for further deterioration on all three fronts - untilt some strongman takes charge on his own terms. Our only enduring accomplishment is to empower the Shi'ites - therefore ensuring intimate ties with Iran on every front.

Two, the so-called 'Anbar miracle' was the result of hard-headed calculations by Sunni tribal leaders that had nothing to do with Petraeus or the 'surge.' Reversion from the threat posed by al-Qaida in Mesopotamia and their violent fundamentalist allies to tribal authority combined with defeat at the hands of the Shi'ites in the civil war of 2005 -2007 to force them to seek protection from the American occupiers. This policy crystallized at the end of 2006 before the 'surge,' before Petraeus. The promised entente with the Shi'ite Baghdad government is now unravelling.

Three, Petraeus' previous mission to recruit and train an 'Iraqi' national army was perverted by bad planning. He produced a force that was nearly 100% Shi'ite riddled with militia members loyal to various factions. Its political flavor and ineffectualness did not stop Petraeus from writing a series of op-eds in the Fall of 2004 lauding the new 'Iraqi' army as ready to take responsibility for the country's security - op eds that lavished praise on the wisdom and courage of George Bush.

Four, the supposed success against al-Sadr's Mahdi army was equally illusory. The record shows that in Basra the government forces were defeated in phase I before a truce and the intervention of Iran. It was Tehran that forced al-Sadr to stand down in tripartite meetings in Qum. In Baghdad the first phase of fighting produced stalemate. When U.S. forces took over, they pushed the Mahdi army back into Sadr City in heavy combat and Petraeus was considering the need to give Sadr City the Fallujah treatment (hearts & minds?). Then, the Sadrists overnight disappeared from the streets. Again, it was Iranian intervention (as declared publicly by their Ambassador to Iraq, and whose sudden results on the ground was confirmed to me by the Army officer who commaned our helicopter squadrons) that led to this convenient outcome.

Five, Afghanistan - in contrast to Iraq - presents a very different configuration of forces. The Taliban are rooted in the majority Pushtun community rather than being a beleaguered minority. The Pushtun tribes are not reeling from sectarian conflict. President Karzai is a Pushton who has made it clear that he will strike a deal with the Taliban with only the specifics of when and how left unclear. Pakistan has its own agenda that precludes subduing all the Taliban.

Six, President Obama's stated reason for escalating in Afghanistan is to crush both al-Qaidi (no longer in the country) AND the Taliban. The the extent that he makes anything perfectly clear, he has stressed that anything short of that would leave the United States intolerably exposed. Yet achieving that daunting task is an impossibility. Thus the need for miracle-makers.

Mature, confident and competent states do not voluntarily place themselves in the position of choosing between (another) failure and faith in the power of prayer to summon a Saviour. America's inability to admit past mistakes and its vincibility is a sign of its lacking those traits. Leaders, and those who presume to advise them, have no right to play games of make-believe when the country's well-being is at stake. Not to speak of the lives of the natives whose well-being weighs so lightly in the balance.

I can do no better than re-post here a post I did for Huffington on July 6. The arrival of a new military leader will do little to change the realities we face in Afghanistan. For all the sound of trumpets and clash of cymbals, the central government is weak, the tribal forces are the only hope for interim order, and our ability to "remake" the country staggeringly limited:

"Once upon a time, we went into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban government and eliminate a training ground for our friends from Al Qaeda. Mission accomplished.

Then we decided to stay around to "fix" the Afghan regime so it would be more "democratic" and to help stimulate the economy, so that Al Qaeda (and the Taliban) would never come back. Mission incomplete, in part because we took our eye off the ball and went to war in Iraq, instead, pulling Special Forces and civil affairs units out of Afghanistan in the process.

Then Iraq became the "bad" war, for the new administration, and Afghanistan became the "good" war. And, in the meantime, a lot of very enthusiastic military folks spiffed up our military doctrine, turning it into real counterinsurgency money (AKA COIN), and began to implement the doctrine, with equal enthusiasm, in Afghanistan.

Sad things had happened, meanwhile. The Mayor of Kabul, Hamid Karzai, could not make himself into a national president. The $27 billion we spent training Afghani soldiers and police did not produce a force that could bring security to the country. Opium production soared, fueling the Taliban, and filling the coffers of local poo-bahs and warlords.

In other words, we began a new strategy in a country without a central government, rampant corruption, a breakdown of order, and an almost non-existent economy and hoped we could tie it all together, bring governance, order, discipline, and development.

Why were we doing this? Not to remove the Taliban and Al Qaeda; we did that. Not to create a democracy or a healthy economy; we couldn't do that. So why are we there?

The only compelling reason being offered is that there would be a power vacuum if we left, one that would be instantly filled by the Taliban (and, perhaps, a return of Al Qaeda). But we are failing at preventing that power vacuum today. In fact, one might argue, the vacuum exists around us, and we are doing little and can do little to prevent it from emerging. And there is precious little sign of Al Qaeda being present in Afghanistan today.

The bottom line is that the solution to power relations in Afghanistan lies with the Afghanis. And since it is not a democracy, that means it lies with the Taliban, the warlords and their satrapies, and Karzai, to the degree anybody listens to Karzai. And it lies with the surrounding countries, notably Pakistan (who are the only government that can deal with the unruly forces and Al Qaeda in their northwestern regions).

We cannot "fix" Afghanistan. We will spend significant blood and treasure trying, but we are neither competent, nor welcome, to fix it. It is time to step back, look hard at the benefit of staying there, and rethink our presence. And that will mean deal-cutting, with strange bed-fellows, to leave behind some kind of security, based on indigenous militia and security forces, leaving the Afghans to "work it out." It may, now, be the best outcome we can expect; we are not preventing it by staying."

The "Petraeus factor" will do little to change this reality; in fact, signs are that we are increasingly accepting this reality and prepared to form militias that can provide some kind of local and regional security.