Thanks to everyone who has contributed so far in a good discussion.

Brian Jenkins in a message sums up the week pretty well with this addition: "While the opinions of the participants offer different assessments of where we are in the campaign against Al Qaeda, there seems to be a consensus that it ain't over yet, and will not likely end for a long time. As several of the participants, including myself, pointed out, Al Qaeda is a complex foe that must be assessed in several dimensions and on several fronts. Al Qaeda, both as an organization and as an ideology, benefits from its attachment to other insurgencies, including those in Iraq, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. With regard to Afghanistan, the latest U.S. military assessment from Afghanistan, issued in a report to Congress this week, is a sobering reminder of the difficult challenge we face." Here's a headline and links to the report below it...

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon Wednesday issued a downbeat assessment of the situation in Afghanistan , saying that only one in four Afghans in strategically important areas currently back President Hamid Karzai's government even as the Taliban expand their insurgency and install shadow local governments.

Here's the link to the Pentagon's report to Congress www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf. And here's the link to the background briefing by Pentagon officials about the report: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx

Cheers everyone.

The successful attacks against the leadership of Al Qaeda and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past several months are not related. Rather they are a result of several unrelated policies that have been pursued independently. Moreover, these captures and killings will have little impact on what the Bush administration mistakenly called the Global War on Terror and on what the Obama administration currently labels the struggle against violent extremism.

The killing of the two top leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq last week is the result of information provided to the Iraqi Security Forces by Iraqis, who only entered into a marriage of convenience with Al Qaeda as a way to drive out the Americans, whom they viewed as the second coming of the British and/or the supporters of a Shiite government that was hostile to their interests.

Once it became clear that the U.S. was in fact leaving, Al Qaeda in Iraq lost much of that support and the influx of foreigners coming into Iraq to join Al Qaeda slowed to a trickle. Moreover, killing their leaders, as with the killing of Zarqawi in 2006, will have little effect on their operations. This became clear when, within days after the killing of Masri and Baghdadi, Al Qaeda detonated a series of car bombs outside Shiite mosques killing at least 58 people and wounding several hundred.

Similarly, the killing of Al Qaeda leaders with drone strikes, including the operatives who gave orders to three individuals to detonate explosives in the New York subway, resulted from intelligence provided by the Pakistanis. This deepening strategic partnership came about because of the fact that the Taliban overstepped their boundaries, moving out from the frontier areas, trying to exert control in Pakistan proper, and committing unspeakable atrocities against Pakistani civilians and military personnel. Moreover, the Pakistanis captured Mullah Ghani and seven members of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership council in order to give themselves leverage in the negotiations that they want to see take place between the Karzai government and the Taliban. The Pakistanis want the Taliban to have a prominent role in the Afghan government so that their influence on events in Afghanistan will be preserved when the U.S. withdraws.

None of these unrelated incidents necessarily mean that we are getting closer to a knockout blow against Al Qaeda or the killing or capture of Bin Laden and Zawahiri. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists will only be neutralized when countries, like Afghanistan and Iraq (where there was no Al Qaeda presence until we invaded) have a legitimate national government that has the support of its people and is not seen as a tool of the United States.

Strikes against al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan's FATA and in Iraq are said to have damaged severely its leadership ranks. There is talk in Washington of this being a turning-point in the campaign to cripple the organization. Caution about reaching premature conclusions is in order, though. An overall assessment of the state of al-Qaeda in the light of recent events is a low confidence exercise. For a number of reasons. Here’s why.

One, it is unclear exactly who or what we mean by al-Qaeda. It is not a unitary organization with a definite structure, lines of authority and accountability. Using a proper noun, our minds instinctively conjure the image of an entity of well defined contours and dimension – say, Goldman Sachs. The phenomenon we call al-Qaeda is amorphous, diffuse and in a continual state of flux. This is especially true after 9/11 and during its years of duress. The exact links between al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and “headquarters” in AfPak are obscure even to official Washington.

Two, therefore, there is no way to measure the degree of operational degradation for the omnibus movement caused by the loss of certain personnel. The record suggests that we tend to overestimate that effect. In Iraq, over the years, reports of leaders eliminated total several dozen. Yet there seems little correlation with AQM’s ability to wreak havoc.

Three, there are a couple of reasons for these oddities that we prudently should keep in mind. We tend to confuse a terrorist network with an insurgency movement fueled by a nationalist agenda. “Al-Qaeda” is not the counterpart to the numerous nationalist movements we have known. It is not geo-politically focused on a specific plot of ground; its aims are changeable; and it can regenerate itself far better and faster than can nationalist guerrillas. For the latter depend on wide popular support and the motivation provided by one inspirational leader who is alive and active. The momentum factor is relatively less crucial for “al-Qaeda.”

Four, Al-Qaeda in AfPak, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Arabia, al-Qaeda in East Africa are all linked in various ways with other outfits – above all, the Taliban in the first instance. Hence, each al-Qaeda unit’s capability, tactics and orientation are partially a function of those shifting ties and the fortunes of their associates. Those associates, in turn, are even more diffuse than is the local al-Qaeda itself. Moreover, in AfPak, al-Qaeda’s capability/viability is greatly affected by the intra-governmental politics of Pakistan. Given the prominent role of the ISI, and its alumni association, there is no way to disentangle the three intersecting groups. The simple fact that the Pakistani military have nabbed some Taliban leaders does not mean that they are out of the game. They may well be held in reserve by the Pakistanis for the next phase of the game.

Five, the game in AfPak is 5 player chess; not “cowboys & Indians” as we instinctively view it.

What does all this mean?

1. Al-Qaeda is a phenomenon that defies scorecard evaluations.

2. Consequently, you never know how close you are to reaching an objective.

3. Most important, clarity of goal is imperative. Is it complete elimination of “al-Qaeda” in its entirety? Killing Osama and the remnants of the old leadership? Or, lowering the danger (to us? To our friends?) below a certain level?

4. Washington’s evident failure to make a determination of this kind leaves our policy open-ended and spastic. The Holbrooke/Gates line that “We’ll know success when we see it” is a cop-out designed to mask confused thinking as to ends, costs, time-frames, tolerances and, therefore, what is a sensible strategy.

5. We-thus lack benchmarks for judging critical issues such as whether to treat with the Taliban on what basis for what purpose; what constitutes a tolerable state of affairs inside Pakistan; and the linkages between military operations and political operations in a multitude of forms.

In this context, there is reason to fear that self-serving domestic political considerations will be most influential in making these judgments – implicitly rather for explicit reasons. The fog enveloping the “War on Terror” is useful concealment for all kinds of machinations.

Whereas it is militarily interesting to kill Al Qaeda operatives, it is militarily significant to defeat their ideas and their recruiting potential.

There is apparently no shortage of Al Qaeda recruits and certainly no shortage of basing opportunities for training or command and control. As soon as we drive them from Afghanistan, they pop up in Pakistan or Yemen or Somalia - any failed or marginal state either willing to collaborate or unable to deny access. As said in another context of counter-insurgency warfare, we can't kill our way out of this problem.

In traditional military analysis of state on state action, the strategic, operational and tactical framework has served us well. As we work with non-state actors to influence or prevent behaviors, an analytical framework is useful and the strategic, operational and tactical classifications may still be germane.

The tactical level seems pretty straight forward - upon discovering the identity and priority for killing of those Al Qaeda we can kill, the drone attack or small scale military action to kill or capture is at the tactical end of the military spectrum. The most recent killing of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and his colleague Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the capture and interrogation of Mullah Baradar in Pakistan seem to fit in this part of the framework. And we would probably include the drone attacks that have been militarily successful in Pakistan, albeit with some political fallout.

The great shift seems however, at the operational level that informs the tactical. Our intelligence work is apparently producing actionable targeting that has helped push existing Al Qaeda structure to a tipping point. No longer it appears, is their leadership able to produce stunning events like 9/11; rather, we get the Christmas underwear bomber. A mis-guided and poorly trained young man.

So if we assign our terrific intelligence work to the operational level, thankfully producing a prioritized target list bearing real fruit, where is the critical strategic level of this non-state actor vs major state conflict?

If we accept that the militarily significant action is to defeat our opponent on the idea and recruiting battlefield, we would have to look at what Al Qaeda is saying on the internet that informs us about their ideas and their recruiting slogans.

Repeatedly, Al Qaeda leadership uses the Guantanamo prison, former Vice President Cheney's endorsement of waterboarding, other forms of torture or coersive interrogation techniques and other examples of non-core US values behaviors to fight at the strategic level, the war of ideas.

To defeat Al Qaeda at the strategic level, the President must close the Guantanamo prison and refrain from the use of military commissions. We have seen the militarization of our foreign policy; we must not militarize what I consider to be the finest judicial system the planet has. We must try Al Qaeda as the criminals they are, and not for the combattants some would honor them to be. We must assign their criminal cases to our federal courts for adjudication and allow our federal judges the platform to declare American values like Judge William Young in the Reid shoe bomber case.

Certain politicians and movements are selling fear and the backlash fear can provoke.

Courage and the strength of our value system, coupled with great intelligence work and the skill of our fighting men and women will assure Al Qaeda makes it over the tipping point and fails to recruit their next generation.

Colleagues, especially Messrs. Jenkins and White, have aptly summarized the current situation regarding al Qaeda and the extent of the threat from like-minded terrorist groups. I supplement their comments with several notes of caution about favorable concatenations of events such as those cited in the question.

First, don’t be too quick to describe a short-term increase in a particular type of data point as a meaningful pattern. The timing of the capture or killing of bad guys often is more a matter of happenstance and random operational opportunities than of security services doing something that is fundamentally different from what they were doing a month ago or six months ago.

Second, don’t be too quick to attribute larger significance to seemingly beneficial developments. Some touted the capture of that Afghan Taliban number two as a sea change in Pakistani policy. But as subsequent reporting has shown, the Pakistanis do not seem to have changed appreciably the game they are playing, which includes releasing some Afghan Taliban through the back door of their jailhouse while they are bringing others in through the front door.

Third, don’t be too quick to view even significant kills and captures as crippling blows to the organizations involved. The AfPak battlefield is littered with the corpses of men each described at one time or another as “Al Qaeda’s number three.” The plentitude of number threes probably in part reflects puffery on our part about the significance of the latest kill, but it also reflects the group’s regenerative capacity. Similarly, before we get too excited about the deaths of those two leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq we should remember how much the killing four years ago of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—who probably always had more claim than these two to being personally responsible for mayhem in Iraq—was seen at the time as a death knell of the group.

Finally, be aware in listening to public commentary that most of the explanations for strings of apparent successes such as those mentioned in the question will have at least grains of truth but that many also will be simplistic in that there never is a single valid explanation. The simplistic explanations tend to get pushed by those favoring or justifying particular programs or policies. There is no single “key” to success in this business.

Al Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistani context (and beyond) as it was organized pre-9/11, is now a more dispersed phenomenon and more difficult to assess as to its viability and its ability to pose a continuing threat. The chipping away at its more familiar structure certainly has hurt the organization, but over the years it has spawned additional nodes that make other potential sources of terror in some way associated with it or inspired by it still rather difficult to grapple with in any comprehensive manner.

A decline in high-profile attacks worldwide suggests strongly that AQ's overall capabilities have eroded (or been stymied somewhat by security countermeasures). Nonetheless, I doubt anyone has a firm grasp on the potential for rebound among the disparate elements across the globe inspired by its message or energized by similar grievances.

That said, the importance of the existance of the organization's original leadership structure to worldwide terrorist operations in its name remains a bit of a question mark. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al Qaeda in Iraq during much of its heyday, not only did not require assistance from AQ's leadership farther east, he sometimes ignored its wishes (such as by not ending his campaign of attacks on Iraqi Shi'a targets--something his successors largely have continued). In effect, local circumstances such as a desire to trigger widespread sectarian strife caused a group in touch with Bin Laden & Co. to follow its own independent course.

And as long as grievances such as the perception of lopsided US support for Israel, robust US military and other Western involvement in the Muslim world, real & perceived mistreatment of Muslim minorities in Europe & the US, association with the US & the West on the part of a number of largely secular regional autocrats remain, we are likely to endure some measure of AQ-like terrorism. Violence stemming from the region in the 1970's conducted mainly by secular entities came to be rivaled beginning 30 years ago by increased violence on the part of Muslim extremists. Similarly, there could well be further shifts in patterns of violence in the future, but with most all of it linked to much the same longstanding grievances and related perceptions that sustained AQ and its supporters for so long.

Consequently, the US, the West, as well as regional regimes aligned with both probably will have to be prepared for a certain amount of ongoing terrorism--but hopefully violence less harmful and disruptive than that experienced on 9/11 and the worst years that followed.

One of America's major challenges in the next decade will be for us to stop thinking so much like a secular national state and start thinking more like non-nation "zealot states" such as Al Queda.

I can think of few more worthy goals in the world than killing members of Al Queda. They are, for the most part, thugs whose distortion of Islam is a travesty. We have plenty of weapons to keep on killing them. And the killing obviously keeps them tacticly off balance and shows us as strong in a region that appreciates strength.

However, for all of Bin Laden's grand gesturing and murderous ways, Al Queda is a symptom of a larger problem. Islam is in a battle with itself. This is a battle over accepting the modernism exemplified by the West or returning to the more traditional values of Old Islam -- the latter an embellished time of the Caliphate, which spread across the belt of the world from Spain to India. Al Queda is committed to making that mythical return to glory.

If we are to take a part in this battle - an Al Queda certainly drew us in deliberately as the leader of this modernism -- we must have the courage of our convictions. We must back and continue to back moderate voices in the Islamic world. We need to continue to press ahead showing the benefits of modernity, such a freedom of thought and speech.

This is going to be a generational battle against hard line zealots. If we have the courage of our conviction and the willingness to fight the long battle, we will win. In the meantime, killing members of Al Queda is a tactic, not a strategic win on our part.

Although al Qaeda appears to be coming under pressure in some dimensions, I remain wary of calling a tipping point, and I am even more skeptical about the prospect of a knockout punch. We are still too close to the events to discern the long-term trajectory of the campaign against al Qaeda. And almost nine years after 9/11, analysts are still remarkably divided in their assessments of al Qaeda’s current situation, specifically the current role played by al Qaeda’s central command.

Al Qaeda Central’s capability to project power in the form of terrorist attacks has diminished. There have been no successful centrally-directed terrorist attacks in the West since 2005. Authorities have uncovered and foiled numerous terrorist plots, some centrally-connected. These indicate intent but lack of craft. Those attacks that have occurred comprise lone gunmen or inept bombers. Clearly, al Qaeda confronts a quality control problem.

A front-by-front appreciation of the situation shows weaknesses and strengths. Al Qaeda’s top leadership remains at large. Whatever inner doubts they may have are not on display. Instead, their continuing exhortations to violence suggest that their determination to continue the armed struggle is undiminished.

Al Qaeda has assembled a global communications network. When Osama bin Laden talks, many still listen—some even applaud. But that has not translated into an Islamic uprising—a global intifada.

Al Qaeda has spread its ideology. It can radicalize and recruit homegrown terrorists to its cause, although in very small numbers. Al Qaeda’s affiliates in Iraq demonstrate their continuing capacity for large-scale violence and continue terrorist campaigns in Algeria and Yemen. The situation in Afghanistan, where last fall, American and NATO forces were judged to be losing, has not yet turned around. Pakistan has recently begun to make progress. Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan—a difficult but essential partnership has improved the flow of intelligence, but many in Pakistan still see the campaign against the jihadists as a distraction from the real enemy, India.

Al Qaeda’s allies in Somalia rule much of the country while intelligence reports warn of al Qaeda recruiting in Western Africa. And although the situation in the Caucasus is distant from al Qaeda organizationally and has its own dynamic, the conflict there is far from over as recent terrorist attacks indicate.

Al Qaeda appears strongest where it has been able to attach itself to deeper-rooted local conflicts like those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, and Somalia. Some of these resulted from America’s own actions. Al Qaeda’s ideology does not fuel these contests—al Qaeda rides with them.

There are cumulative reasons for al Qaeda’s current difficulties. Its own terrorist attacks provoked crackdowns that ripped apart whatever local networks it had in places like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Indonesia. Intelligence has gradually improved, while unprecedented international cooperation among intelligence services and law enforcement has made al Qaeda’s operating environment more hostile.

Al Qaeda’s bloody excesses have turned off some of its potential constituents, but al Qaeda’s biggest problem is relevance. What will the reestablishment of the caliphate offer those seeking freedom, an education, jobs, or a better future for their families?

Historical experience suggests that terrorist campaigns can survive the loss of their top leaders. The founders of Italy’s Red Brigades and Germany’s Red Army Faction were apprehended early in the contest, which continued in both cases for more than 10 years. Israel has been targeting Palestinian commanders for decades.

The PKK in Turkey and the FARC in Colombia continue their guerrilla campaigns despite loss of their leaders. Although the removal of al Qaeda’s top leaders must remain an objective, it will not end the jihadist campaign.

Removing operational commanders—precious talent, however, demonstrably diminishes the effectiveness of terrorist operations. Terrorists will continue to carry out attacks, but with less training, direction and hands-on assistance, they will kill as fewer people. And the appearance of incompetence and failure tarnishes the allure of the terrorist organization.

But there is still a long way to go.

AQ as an organization is seriously weakened, perhaps shattered. But AQ as an idea remains robust and, in a way, powerful. The United States has done nothing to discredit the organization's mobilizing narrative of American intervention in the Islamic world and support for Israel. States in the Islamic world have done little to address the causes of anger among their people and have not stopped blaming external scapegoats rather than the real causes of their problems. Hence new members will answer AQ's call.

The good news is that while this group may be as angry as its forebears, it will be less skilled, at least for a while. Keeping the pressure on will hinder their acquisition of the skills and resources needed for violence.

At the risk of being proved a fool tomorrow, Al Qaeda appears to have been defeated. Its last major attack on the West was the 2005 tube bombing in London. Every other attempt, from the 2006 trans-Atlantic plane bombings using liquid explosives to last year’s plans by Najibullah Zazi to set off bombs in New York’s subway, have ended in complete failure. The man behind the plane and subway bombings, Rashid Rauf, was killed in a Predator attack in November 2008.

Al Qaeda is safe nowhere. Its supporters in the Taliban have not been able to protect it. (They’ve even been unable to effectively retaliate against government of Pakistan for the invasion of South Waziristan.) What remains of al Qaeda is in hiding. Osama bin Laden hasn’t appeared in a videotape since 2007, and even then the quality was so bad it makes you wonder what happened to the man. If he can’t even arrange to make a half-way decent DVD, what can he arrange? In any honest accounting, we have to conclude we’re winning the ‘war on terror.’ And it has a lot to do with unmanned aerial vehicles, Predators and Hellfire missiles.

I need to confess here that when the Predator attacks first started after 9/11, I accepted the common wisdom (Middle Eastern at least) that they would only end up killing innocents, driving more believers into the arms of Al Qaeda, and would result in more attacks on the United States. So far, this turned out to be largely wrong. Yes, the Predator strikes did lead to some joining Al Qaeda’s ranks, but the new recruits were almost all young and ineffective. And definitely not the makings of an army.

If you add up all Al Qaeda field commanders killed, the argument is good that we’ve broken Al Qaeda’s back. And we aren’t seeing commanders with any stature being replaced.

As for Osama bin Laden, my call is it doesn’t matter whether we capture or kill him. He was never more than a symbol. And his remaining alive, cowering in a cave or wherever he is, can only end in undermining his status.

Last Monday the Iraqi government announced the death of two senior Al Qaeda leaders, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri. But only four days later, apparently unaffected by the loss, “Al Qaeda” retaliated against the Shia, killing 72 people in a series of bombings. Normally this would undercut the argument that Al Qaeda is defeated, however, I think we need to look at Iraq as an isolated case. The civil war there has more to do with a failed ruling class lashing out (the Sunni Muslims) than it has to do with an internationalist ideology like Al Qaeda’s. Al Qaeda is an affiliation the Shia government attaches to the insurgency to draw Western support.

None of this is to say Al Qaeda is dead. We absolutely need to brace ourselves for the eventuality of an attack in this country, or some awful setback in Pakistan. Someone is going to get through – and get lucky. But if things continue the way they are, we should count on Al Qaeda fading away.