[A note from your moderator: From time to time, we invite a guest comment from an expert who is not one of regular roster of contributors but who has particular insight and influence regarding the topic of discussion. This afternoon, I'm very pleased to have a response to this week's question from Colonel Gian Gentile, United States Army, a veteran of Iraq and a leading critic of the current counter-insurgency doctrine. Col. Gentile's words follow below. -- Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.]

It is the theory that underpins population centric counterinsurgency (Coin)—which essentially is the operational method of clear, hold, and build, the winning of hearts and minds, and ultimately nation building—that needs to be looked at critically. According to the theory of Coin when a counterinsurgent kills civilians through imprecise use of firepower or other inadvertent military activities then as a rule those actions create an exponentially higher number of insurgents who will fight the US military and host government. This is at least what the theory states which allows many folks to then assume to be working in practice and therefore drives directives to avoid civilian casualties. In short the theory states that by avoiding civilian deaths combined with establishing trusting, emotional relationships the local population can be won over to the government’s side, the insurgents can be separated from the population and either captured, killed, or co-opted, and nation building programs can be put in place.

Unfortunately the theory of Coin is not supported by history and current practice. For example, in the Vietnam War the rural countryside after the Tet Offensive from early 1968 to 1972 was not pacified by enlightened Counterinsurgency methods under the direction of General Creighton Abrams but instead by the willing or forced relocation of the rural population into government controlled areas. More recently the notion that the Surge of Troops in Iraq starting in February 2007 using the new American Army Counterinsurgency doctrine and under inspired new leadership was the primary causative factor that pacified Baghdad and the rest of the country is a chimera. Instead it was a number of conditions that came together—the Anbar Awakening, the paying off of Sunni Insurgents to stop attacking American forces, Shia militia decisions to stand down attacks, the sectarian cleansing that had segregated Baghdad in 2006, and finally the tactical excellence of Surge Troops in reducing Al Queda in Iraq—the brought about a lowered level of violence.

The point here is that we are basing current operations in Afghanistan and potentially in future troubled spots in the world on a broken counterinsurgency doctrine that is premised on a theory of cause and effect that has not been proven in history or contemporary operational practice.

-- Col. Gian Gentile

The issue is not how long our military can last, or even how long domestic support can be maintained, but how quickly and effectively we can deploy the kind of civilian support and assistance that Afghanistan desperately needs. The Obama Administration has been relatively successful in deploying increased numbers of civilians, but we are still well below the numbers and quality needed to handle the "hold and build" phases that come after the "clear" operations the military is able to conduct.

This war will not be won by military means alone, which is vital to providing security but will have precious little direct impact on delivering what Afghans want next: justice and jobs. It's an old story: the short pole in the tent of civilian/military cooperation is on the civilian side. When will we learn?

The war in Afghanistan-Pakistan could go on for many years more. The more American lives that are lost and the more Americans who come home psychologically and physically maimed, then the less the public will support the war. The more the public hears about the corruption and criminality that is rife in Afghanistan, the less they will support the war. The more the public hears about how the populations of Pakistan and Afghanistan don’t want us there, the less they will support the war. The more the public begins to fear more for their jobs, the growing threat of our debts, deficits and entitlement programs to basic bread and butter issues, the less they will support the war. The more NATO and other troops bail out on us the less the people will support the war.

For most Americans Afghanistan and Pakistan might was well be on mars. For most Americans real war is something that is more out of a Hollywood movie than as part of their lives. If it gets to the point that the people have to start paying for these wars with taxes and with their children being drafted then support for the war will likely vaporize fairly quickly.

The war in Afghanistan-Pakistan is not just a military one. It involves economic, political, diplomatic, cultural, informational and many other aspects. The goals of the overall strategy of the war are well beyond the tactics of a single fire fight. Indeed it is important to keep our troops as safe as possible. But is that done with just having tougher and meaner ROEs or does it also involve a more long term perspective that would include reducing the viral anti-Americanism that has spread across the region.

Saving American lives also means reducing the anger and hatred directed at the US and its citizens. This will take a lot more than just taking out some Taliban and Al-Qeada. It will involve winning over more of the people of the region and of many other parts of the world who are watching the struggles in Afghanistan-Pakistan very closely. Bullets and missiles, and the anonymity of the dreaded drones, seem to be not working to find positive results toward that strategic goal.

None of this is simple.

Short term reactions to long term issues can be counterproductive to even the short term goals.

We also need to consider where all of this is going and whether this is indeed the strategy that we need to solve the much great threats and problems we face that can be found far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

My answer is conditional.

1. A reversion from the open-ended commitment to the current ill-conceived war In Afghanistan that would be based on a mature reassessment of the necessity (as well as the practical possibility) of trying to rid the region of forces that could threaten us (by today's absolute standard), would be the best case scenario,

2. An impulsive reversion based only on fatigue and failure would be the worst case scenarion. For that eventuality would have two deleterious consequences: a) open the way for a fatuous - and dangerous - debate over 'who lost Afghanistan;' and b) leave in place the deeply flawed assumptions that we must and can achieve abroad objectives that make the United States an impregnable fortress.

In other words, the return to reasonableness and proportion, or a spur to the mindless mood of anger, already roiling our public life, that may endanger our democracy.

Actually, provided the money holds out and our NATO allies don’t entirely forsake us, we can probably sustain this fight indefinitely. After all, apart from civilian contractors, and a few gallant AID folks, the only people at risk are those in uniform and their families, and so far recruitment and retention seem unaffected, no doubt thanks in part to the sour economy. How long Congress will put up with it is unclear, but absent stronger public opposition than we’ve seen so far, legislators have more pressing concerns at the moment.

In short, barring a TET-like event or visible political failure in Kabul, McChrystal probably has some time in hand. Whether Obama does is another matter

The consensus of our experts so far is running six to one in favor of maximum caution to prevent civilian casualties, with only one contributor, Ron Marks, arguing that "holding back, sending a political message, and showing the enemy that we are willing to compromise simply shows not mercy, but weakness.....we simply have to grasp that war is hell." The other six argue that, while liberal use of firepower that kills more Afghan civilians may well save some U.S. troops in the short term, it will harden resistance, provoke revenge attacks, and ultimately kil more Americans iin the long term. But how long a long term can the country support? As Col. Joseph Collins wrote, 'Both Afghan and Western public opinion are at stake here." With officially confirmed U.S. deaths in Operating Enduring Freedom at 999 after eight years of fighting, when do we hit the point where public support for the war, long fraying, collapses altogether?

The latest twist on our dubious 'wars on terror' is that we aren't killing enough civilains. This is the conclusion of analyses that find restrictions on military operations hobbling our mission. In this vein, the august New York Times published a solicited piece by 'Anonymous' last week making this case with brutal frankness.

In Vietnam, one tactic for dealing with the dilemma was to declare 'free fire zones.' These were large swaths of territory within which anything living was a presumed enemy. Saturation bombing and random shelling therefore were acceptable. Back in those days, the inhabitants were given fair warning. Leaflet drops informed them that they should alert relatives in neighboring districts to expect guests who would welcome hospitality for an indefinite future.

A more selective, maverick approach to garnering actionable intelligence was to take two Cong captives for a helicopter joy ride. After one of them had been kicked through the hatch at 500 feet, a gentle inquisition of the other began. At times, it was necessary to take up a threesome. Too many Cong didn't value their lives sufficiently.

Today, we up to date post-moderns use more refined tactics. We identify 'the enemy' by means of sophisticated monitoring devices and computer data banks. Instead of clearing whole zones, we pinpoit compounds or small villages. That's progress. We give no advance warning, though. That is not progress. Of course, civilian casualties are inadvertent since we presume that Precision Guided Munitions are highly discriminating. So somebody in Florida sets aside his Diet Coke, 'clicks here' in full confidence that our drone can eliminate the groom at a Pushton wedding ceremony while leaving the bride more-or-less intact. Progress, if the system worked perfectly. Not progress in actuality, since it doesn't.

As for the acquisition of actionable intelligence, this too have become more systematic and sophisticated. We now used refined techniques based on the 'Chicom' torture manuals of Korean War vintage to which we've added a few fresh techniques of our own. A legion of psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, and medical doctors lend their specialized knowledge to the patriotic task. This is not progress. Especially so, since a very large fraction of those tortured were innocents swept up hither, dither any yon.

Under Stanley McChrystal, there supposedly is greater awareness of the practical - if not moral -costs of our stndard modus operandi. Nothing has changed on the ground - one way or the other. There are three reasons why continuation of current practices and policies is inevitable.

Force protection trumps everything else. Commanders will never put at direct risk their soldiers just to reduce the risks of civilian casualties. That is one. Two, Americans believe that we are engaged in a holy war against forces that are evil incarnate. Our cause has been hallowed by 9/11. A country that countenances torture ordered from on high (the Justice Departments legal advisers, after all, "were in a hurry" and moved by concern for 'justice'), just doesn't care about collateral damage in places they knowing nothing of - even if a small fraction can locate it on a map. That is two. Stanley McChrystal, David Petraeus' soul brother, won his stars as commandant of Camp Cropper on the outskirts of Baghdad where torture was institutionalized in May 2010. That's three.

Some of you will be very upset by these remarks. Please don't blame me. They're "the facts, Mame, just the facts."

cheers

I just returned from Marja,where I observed numerous firefights. Many involved extended discussions between the JTAC and the pilots, (to include UAV controllers thousands of miles away.) It is disturbing as a precedent for future wars that the battefield commander under the theater commander did issue a written restriction. Once we've said you can't employ IDF in many circumstances, how does a future commander issue a written directive to the contrary without appearing to be irresponsible?

That issue aside, however, the risk to our troops in the current fight in Afghanistan has not been substantially increased because our commanders and JTACs are so experienced, and our comms so good, that reasonable solutions are reached in the actual fights.

The terrain is so broken by canals and defilade arroyos that 60s and 81s do have a role. However, combat air is the absolutely critical enabler. Yes, grunts complain about IDF restrictions. But the askars press forward in the attack and the enemy ducks and dodges day after day because both hold air in awe. I did not realize the enormity of air’s psychological effect until I talked with interpreter after interpreter across the battlefield. To Afghans, air symbolizes America’s martial prowess. Afghans on both sides attribute to our air capabilities we know exist only in Star Wars.The deterrent effect of our air is extraordinary.

On balance, the restrictions are handled on the ground in a commonsensical manner. We were too quick to release high explosives in years past. There is no evidence that our troops do not receive full support once they are in serious contact. That still leaves the question: if you killed more enemy in the small brush fights by applying bombs, wouldn't that reduce the number of enemy that later could attack in strength? We're not going to win by an attrition strategy, however, and the civilian toll would be too high if we routinely responded to small engagements with bombs.

General McChrystal is following the new COIN doctrine. His focus is on protecting the population, and that is as it should be. Moreover, his new restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) are a reaction to the all too frequent killing of Afghan civilians in 2007 and 2008. Our NATO allies, short some of the US firepower and enablers, were great consumers of US airpower over those two years in particular. According to the UN, McChrystal'a ROE have already made a significant, positive impact on the number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties.

We have to be clear, however, about what this means. First, US troops are at greater risk. Our magnificent artillery and air support have been a key to our kinetic power. Instead of sending a munition to do a task, we now have to send troops farther and farther into harm's way. Second, both Afghan and Western public opinion are at stake here. We are doing better with the Afghans, but it might be for naught if we end up having to face congressional or public pressure on operational judgments over rules of engagement. There is already grumbling and a few cases of reported incidents. If this becomes cast as trading GI lives for the safety of Afghan civilians, this will be a tough nut for our senior commanders and Secretary Gates to crack.

This potential dilemma compounds one that is already on top of us. Two Presidents have determined that success in Afghanistan is a vital national interest. On the other hand, we also remember Marshall's aphorism: A democracy can't fight a seven years war. Our growing deficit and poor economy make future expenditures even more troublesome. We spent as a nation nearly 50 billion dollars in Afghanistan in 2009. Now with the surge, that number has climbed radically. We are already talking about a drawdown. It is almost as if McChrystal et al. are being told to win a protracted conflict but to get it over quickly ... with a very strong hand tied behind our back.

Years ago, in a column reacting to overheated criticism during the first Gulf War of U.S. air strikes on Iraqi troops fleeing Kuwait City on what became known as the "Highway of Death," I commented that trying to apply such domestic law enforcement notions as proportionality and restraint to the battlefield was a prescription for self-defeat.

Of course, that argument reflected an event in a so-called conventional war, in which the identity and legitimacy of the targets weren't in much doubt. There's no question that both are much harder to determine in fights like today's against insurgents who shun uniforms and deliberately shield themselves among noncombatants. Nor is there much question that indiscriminate killing is unlikely to win many Afghan hearts and minds, although it seems to have had considerably less impact on the Taliban's appeal than on ours.

That acknowledged, it remains tragically ironic that U.S. troops today find themselves largely denied the benefit of weapons in which billions of dollars have been invested, and on which American technical inventiveness has labored precisely to assure our battlefield advantage and diminish the risk to our military personnel, in an effort to secure the loyalty of people whose most visible preference is to see us gone.

Following up on my good friend Chris' comments regarding Gen. Sherman, allow me remind everyone that Sherman said in May of 1880 speech that "there is many a boy here today that who looks on war as all glory, but boys, it is all hell." Sherman was but one of a long line of generals and leaders who needed to face the balance of winning against an implacable enemy or holding back and risking delay or loss.

So where do we stand in Afghanistan, a country where hard war is not uncommon and everyone from Alexander the Great through the Russians have tried to conquer or pacify. Sadly, we simply have to grasp that war is hell. And holding back, sending a political message, and showing the enemy that we are willing to compromise simply shows not mercy, but weakness. Sometimes in the dirty business of war, innocent civilians die. And you hope, in the end, to save the lives of many, many others by your action.

The Vietnam War was a tribute to this kind of micro-management of war by politicians in DC trying to send a message to the enemy. 55,000 troops died trying to send a message of limited war for political circumstance. Next month will mark the 35th anniversary of our losing South Vietnam to the communist North. It will also mark the beginning of the brutalization and genocides in the countries of Southeast Asia that killed millions. Thus, the fruits of so-called limited war.

The message that Washington, DC needs to send to the Taliban and Al Queda is a simple one -- we want you dead and we will use all means to kill you. Tying the hands of our troops in the field -- not letting them use their judgment in fighting an implacable enemy -- is ridiculous and dangerous. I am not well to trade one American boy or girl's life for the tone deaf international politics of DC.

Putting Americans at greater risk to save local lives is not an appropriate way to frame this issue. If unrestrained American military power is unleashed in these complex asymmetric scenarios, we risk jeopardizing the entire US military (and civilian) effort. That, in turn, also could place all American, NATO, other foreign and allied Afghan personnel at greater risk.

I personally find cultural limitations on military operations such as night raids jaw-grindingly frustrating. But then again I know full well that we are operating in an alien environment that demands military adjustment and adaptability. The fact is that when we enter into a fight in remote places like Afghanistan, we already have lost one major tactical military advantage: choice of battlefield. In many engagements--or entire wars--that alone can decide the ultimate outcome. In Iraq, we stumbled considerably, both politically and militarily, because of the unique demands of another foreign battlefield--damaging years that diverted critical US attention and resources away from the demanding Afghanistan-Pakistan theater of war.

The bottom line is that we must continue to seek balance between what is required for overarching military success and the bar that must be met to avoid having the parallel--and equally important--political/societal struggle founder. Otherwise, the significance of any tactical military achievements could prove illusory.

First, to get to Hilton Head, you have to fly into Savannah and then drive north...not unlike General Sherman in early 1865 as he repeated in South Carolina his total war effort that he had perfected in Atlanta. Although Clausewitz had not yet been translated into English, Sherman practiced an absolute form of war with no "logical limit" to its application, destroying everything military and civilian in his path. The practice of such a form of war, beginning with the 1864 march on Atlanta, confirmed the re-election of Lincoln, the defeat of a constitutional Christianity that protected slavery, and the preservation of a union that encouraged pluralism (Lincoln, unlike Jefferson Davis, had rejected even the discussion of a constitutional amendment making Christianity central to our government). At the least, Sherman represents a strong case for total war as the means to the most good for the most people in the least amount of time.

In Afghanistan, we are necessarily engaging something Clausewitz did not (fully) consider: limited war and the non-state actor. That said, he did warn us that we should be careful of the "limiting conditions" and "peculiar preconceptions" that each age brings to war. Always we must "appreciate and understand the commanders" according to the "situation of their times," as they, along with their civilian overseers, do not try to turn the war into something "alien to its nature."

In our present times, we have been forced into a counterinsurgency strategy by the lessons of Iraq, the geography of Afghanistan, and the lack of political will to send the troops necessary to impose our will throughout Afghanistan-- all characteristics of the world as it is. In many ways, however, the counterinsurgency strategy is also demanded by the devout religious nature of this region. In other words, our forces are fighting on the side of a more tolerant form of Islam and governance (not without serious critique) against an extremist form of Islam that enslaves conscience and women. If one allows for this awareness, then some different thinking is needed.

In speaking with a senior and well-traveled chaplain this week, he shared with me the increasing overseas phenomenon of engaging local "imams" -- who often wield the most local influence -- only to discover that their knowledge of Islam was rather limited. And that it did no good to offer one's own understanding of Islam, which could result in embarrassing the "imam."

And thus the second reflection regarding a counterinsurgency fought in a very religious region: all religion is local. U.S. personnel can be "armed" with the best analysis of academics and theologians, Muslim and otherwise; but, depending on how it's packaged and delivered, it might soon be irrelevant to the illiterate and rural contexts where our troops find themselves, or hurtful to our own cause. Put differently, Islam is not what the Quran or the hadiths say it is but what the local "imam" says it is. (In my own recent trip to Peshawar, for example, it has become holy writ locally that violent/suicidal jihad is the "sixth pillar" of Islam...which has only five pillars.)

Building a relationship with the local "imam" is critical to a counterinsurgency effort that necessarily must work with the best of faith against the worst of religion in a very devout region. Such relationships represent the opportunity for greater force protection while interdicting/denying insurgent/terrorist recruitment. Such relationships, however, require the capacity to engage "imams" on their own terms; which, in turn, requires patience, an understanding of cross-cultural engagement, conflict transformation, and theology. Such relationships will never occur if our approach to the war is more concerned with enemy body counts than the "collateral damage" of unnecessary civilians deaths.

As the former Vietnamese military commander once told Vietnam War veteran Harry Summers (paraphrased): "Yes, the U.S. won every battle in Vietnam, but that is also irrelevant."

In short, a counterinsurgency effort that is neither bound by our own "peculiar preconceptions" nor "alien" to the local environment -- that is, a counterinsurgency effort that allows for religion and religious freedom as a component of its analysis and approach -- is more likely to accomplish the most good for the most people with the least killed in the least amount of time.