Putin is off to Venezuela this week, in a visit that will focus primarily on arms and energy. Russia is now the top weapons supplier to Latin America, an impressive feat, with Venezuela the primary though not sole arms purchaser. For Russia, the benefits are plain: cash for clunkers, and also the ability to project influence to a traditional US sphere of influence as a counterweight to US engagement with Central Asia. For Venezuela, the benefits are also obvious, including the ability to gain weapons including small arms and munitions it can brandish if not actually use against its neighbors like Colombia, the proliferation of arms that can find their way into the caches of non-state guerrilla actors such as the FARC, and a global patron that gives Venezuela recognition, if not necessarily credibility, in its quest for leadership of a rejectionist, anti-Western group of nations. There is no particular historical connection between the two countries, nor is there a particular affinity between their respective publics. Nonetheless, so long as both sides perceive political and economic gain in pursuing it, expect the relationship to continue to deepen. Does this make Russia a good bear or a bad bear? It probably says little about that either way, but it does show, being diligent but not alarmist, that the Bear may be coming out of hibernation in the Western Hemisphere.

Russia is both ‘good’ bear and ‘bad’ bear – as we might reasonably expect it to be. Moscow is acting according to its self-defined national interests- just as Washington does. The implicit consensus in American circles remains stuck in the ‘end of History’ era. That simplistic idea is showing a staying power well beyond its intellectual worth or worth as a guide to strategic thinking. The discomforting truth is that there are other governments who do not share the explicit assumption underlying official American thinking that we act in the enlightened world interest.

Admittedly, one can make the case that overall we do so more often than some other powers. But that is a relative truth – one that has something to do with our hegemonic position in the world.

Moreover, the respect, deference and benefit of doubt that we had earned over the 20th century has been severely undermined by our behavior since 2001. There are reasonable grounds to question the probity of what we have done in the ‘war on terror’ and to harbor the belief that much of what we are doing is in our unenlightened self interest. In addition, our perceived basic integrity (perhaps the country’s greatest strength in foreign affairs) has been has changed into far more negative images. Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Gauntanamo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza, Somalia, et al have put paid to that notion of the virtuous America in the minds of very many around the world. They include political elites and government leaders. Our feckless irresponsibility in allowing the Wall Street to bring the global economy to the brink of disaster deepens those feelings. The readiness of those people to pursue national policies informed by these new-found ‘truths’ means that Washington will be obliged increasingly to treat with them as instinctive skeptics. That holds for India, Brazil, and of course China as well as smaller powers.

As a consequence, we are required to adjust our standard modus operandi. We need to cultivate statecraft: substituting suasion and dialogue for diktats, taking account more fully of others’ self-defined interests; using skilled diplomacy in lieu of fleeting visits by our perpetually airborne high officials; and following the modified dictum “don’t just do anything; sit there and think.” The Flying Circus of Obama administration dignitaries making serial appearances in Kabul is a case in point. Now the Ringmaster himself has joined the parade – with the obedient White House press corps in tow. Pity the visit can’t be extended to 49 hours so that these bloodhounds of the Fourth Estate could stake their claim to fame writing the definitive study of Afghan politics: Kabul: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow.

As to Russia itself, the specific issues on the Washington-Moscow agenda are too complicated and interlaced to discuss in this narrow compass. Let it be said simply that dealing with Mr Putin and Mr. Medvedev is good training for the long, stressful season that lies ahead.

cheers

During the 1984 election, the Reagan campaign put out a commercial about a bear in the woods. A dangerous bear that only through diligence and strength could be dealt with. And so, among many factors, Reagan was reelected to deal with Moscow. It collapsed of its own foolish weight and lethargy in a few years. It lived -- but stumbled around. We then proceeded to treat the Bear with neglect. That time is well passed. The Bear is dangerous again and we better come to grips with it.

So what kind of dangers does the Bear present. In non-nuclear terms, it is very much a lesser power. The invasion of Georgia was a military misfire. While it did send a message to the "near abroad" that Russia would react militarily, Moscow's troops could barely handle a well trained Georgian military. (Think the US being defeated by Canada.)

The wild cards here are a corrupt society fueled by oil money, an aging military structure chocked full of nuclear weapons and restless minority groups On the first point, the late Russian expert George Kolt noted that after the fall of the communist state, Russia would turn to the "red browns" for leadership. What he meant was the former leadership like the KGB who would assume the mantle of near fascist nationalism to maintain their control. He also anticipated that the very crime and corruption that kept the wheels of the former Soviet state greased would soon blossom. He did not, however, anticipate the level of that corruption or the involvement of the "red browns" in it.

The addition of oil money and the 1998 corrupt Russian bond deal sent the corruption into orbit. We are dealing with a nuclear kleptocracy. It is one with various power struggles within among varying groups. Our focus on the leadership in Moscow remains our major weakness in dealing with the Russians. They are balanced on a teetering tower. But, who else can we really talk to about it?

As for the aging military, well they have enjoyed being pumped primed by cheap oil and nationalism. Putin and his friends like the idea of the blue water Russian navy. They also are quite fond of their old stockpile of nuclear weapons. As with natural gas to Europe, Moscow knows those weapons have a hold on us -- and for good reason. The command and control is good, but is subject to corruption. The Russians are playing on our justified fears of a loose nuke.

The minorities question has and will continue to plague the Bear for some time to come. Chechnya will not go away. As evinced by the latest bombings in the Moscow subway system, this battle is hardly settled -- Moscow's claims to the contrary. The Chechens are not the only restive group in the Caucasus. Not the only restive group in the country. It is a long stretch from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.

On a final note, the continued shrinkage in population also adds to this witches' brew of troubles. Given current trends, the Russian Federation will be down to less than 90 million people by mid-century. Not true of the minorities which continue to have high birthrates.

Bottom line: there is a Bear in the Woods. It is a sick bear. But a sick bear can be a very dangerous thing. We need to proceed with caution and diligence in dealing with Moscow. How much we can really do is likely minimal.

Russia is no longer a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. Now it is a tragedy wrapped in a failed system inside a catastrophe to come. Russia wasted the opportunity presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shedding of its empire to transform its economy and political order and to become a major part of an expanded community of free nations. Now Moscow increasingly must look on from the from the sidelines as it becomes weaker and more irrelevant. Its behavior on the international stage is a pathetic yet dangerous attempt to mask its weakness and postpone the moment at which the Kremlin leaders must admit that they have led their people down a dead-end road.

Ironically, Russia leaders live in a world of illusion in which weakness is strength. The Russian elite’s political narrative stands reality on its head. In their statements on Russia’s world view and foreign policy, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have made three points abundantly clear. First, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not merely a catastrophe for the Russian people but for the world as a whole. Second, that Russia believes that it is back as a major world power and the co-equal of the European Union, the United States, and China. Finally, that Russia will employ all means at its disposal, including military threats, to muscle its way into what it perceives to be the struggle to define the future international political and security order.

Moscow has convinced itself that the time of the West (including the United States) as the dominant force in international affairs is ending. Russia, which its leaders continue to view as outside the West, has an opportunity to influence the new order that is developing and thereby increase its own position relative to the major powers of the world. It is a chance, perhaps the only one, for Russia’s leaders to reacquire the international position once enjoyed by the Soviet Union. If the Russian people cannot have the political freedoms of the West or enjoy the economic success of a China or India, at least Moscow can offer them the illusion of political-strategic equality with the West.

What is ironic about the Russian leadership’s view is that in reality their country’s position is fundamentally one of weakness and that Russia’s position is growing more difficult with each passing year. This only increases the Russian leadership’s sense of their own vulnerability and, perversely, causes them to behave more belligerently on the international stage. Secular demographic, social and economic trends argue that Russia’s sense of its own weakness and hence of vulnerability will only grow. Moscow is determined to take what little time it has and few resources are available to try and leverage itself into a secure position as a co-equal of the world’s great and rising powers.

We should not be confused by Russia’s willingness to pursue strategic arms reductions and to sign a new arms limitation treaty with the United States. This is not a sign of a change in Moscow’s views of international relations or of an acceptance of the need to move beyond relations based on “old style” measures of national power. The new START Treaty was a matter of absolute necessity for Russia. Absent the new agreement, Russia would have been forced to reduce its strategic nuclear forces unilaterally. In an era in which the two former adversaries no longer view each other as principal threats, why should this be a problem? But for the leaders of the Kremlin it was imperative that they bring down U.S. strategic forces equally. Any other outcome would be a clear admission of Russian weakness.

The truth is the Russia desperately needs nuclear weapons. It is a power on the international stage almost solely because it possesses nuclear weapons. The collapse of Russia’s economy following the end of the Cold War, the parlous state of Russian conventional forces and the sense of proliferating threats results is, in the minds of the Kremlin oligarchs, a logical argument for increased reliance on nuclear weapons. It is no wonder that under these conditions, Russian leaders in general, and certainly the military, would view nuclear weapons as being the one capability that guaranteed Russia’s ability to deter aggression. Indeed, it appears as if strategic nuclear weapons are the only factor that contributes to Russia having any relevance in the evolving international system.

Thus, the new START Treaty was relatively easy to achieve. Russia even backed off its desire to re-impose treaty-based constraints on U.S. missile defense. This is a true mark of Russia’s desperation for the new agreement. Russia understood that the missile defense architecture proposed by the United States and supported by NATO based on the Aegis ballistic missile defense system and the Standard Missile 3 posed no threat to its strategic deterrent. However, if it had been able to secure a measure of influence or even control over U.S. efforts to deploy such a capability, Moscow’s power would be enhanced. This increase in Moscow’s power could come only at the expense of Europe’s security, a fact that underscores the reality that Russia has defined its political and security interests as fundamentally in contradiction to those of the West.

But the next steps in the Obama Administrations effort to get to “zero nukes” will directly run into the reality of Russian weakness. Without its only card in the Great Power game, Russia knows it will become irrelevant in international affairs and to the process of creating a new world order. As nuclear weapons become less relevant in international affairs, other measures of power – conventional military power, certainly but also economic, scientific and even cultural - must naturally rise to the fore. Russia’s position with respect to these other measures of national power is weak to dismal and growing more dire with every passing year.

The Russia assault on Georgia was a demonstration of its weakening, not reviving, conventional military strength. It was fortunate that Russia chose to pick on a country with a military even weaker than its own. As the United States, the rest of the West and even China invest in advanced conventional military capabilities including sophisticated ISR, precision strike and enhanced mobility assets, Russia’s military continues to decline. There are no Russian equivalents of the F-22 fighter, Predator and Global Hawk remotely-piloted vehicles, Littoral Combat Ship or the two erstwhile candidates to be the new U.S. aerial refueling aircraft.

Russia has sought to obfuscate its weak military position by a series of what can only be termed stunts. About a year ago, after a nearly twenty year hiatus, a Russian attack submarine conducted a combat patrol off the East Coast of the United States. During the last decades of the Cold War, Soviet submarines routinely prowled our shores trying to detect U.S. ballistic missile submarines entering or leaving port. One would have thought that the least likely time for Moscow to behave in a manner more befitting its erstwhile Communist bosses was in the early months of the Obama Administration and in the aftermath of a new agreement with the United States to pursue strategic arms reductions. This move followed the late 2008 voyage of the Russian missile cruiser Peter the Great to Venezuela for joint “exercises.” Apparently, old habits die hard in the Kremlin.

Russia’s predatory behavior with respect to energy is as clear as is the response by those who need access to the supplies of oil and natural gas Moscow is trying to control. Not even China is willing to trust Russia when it comes to surety of access to energy. The effort to use energy as a weapon has not promoting accommodation to Russian interests. Rather, this heavy-handed attempt at coercion has sparked a resurgent effort to develop access routes to Central Asian oil and gas outside Russian control.

On Iran, it is in Russia’s interest to prolong the crisis. So long as it must be consulted, it has influence. As long as it stands in the way of resolving the situation, it has power. But consider the implications of Russia’s need for a continuing crisis in the Persian Gulf in order to be included in the deliberations of the great powers. It is hard to find a more powerful indicator of Russia’s weakness or a more disturbing sign of the extent to which Moscow must go in order to be a player in international affairs.

Russia is neither a spoiler in the global political order nor a part of the solution. It is a threat.

There are a number of power centers in Russia jockeying for control over foreign policy. The group led by Putin, albeit perhaps the most influential, is just one of them. They all want slightly different things, though what they share in common is that none of them want what the White House wants.

US officials hate to admit this struggle within the power elites is going on or that US and Russian interests are almost totally at odds. It is not the Russia they want. But, rather than face up to the Russia they have, they just pretend hitting the "reset" button is better than slapping themselves in the forehead for being so naïve.

Let's start with the new arms control treaty. The President believes that reducing nuclear arms in concert with Moscow is the first step on the "road to zero." The Russians believe anything but that. Russia believes nuclear weapons are the cornerstone of its defense policy. The last thing Russia plans on doing is deemphasize the central role the threat of nuclear attacks plays in their foreign policy. What they want is to see the US nuclear deterrent diminished and placed on equal footing with Moscow's mediocre might. They also want to link offensive and defensive weapons to arms limitations. They want US conventional strike capabilities and missile defense to be on the table too.

Rather than walk hand in hand with the Russians on the road to zero, the president is likely to make a new arms race more likely. As the US deterrent is seen to shrink, others will step up--not down.

Tossing European missile defense bases under the bus was none to clever either. That gesture garnered zero concessions from Russia in the strategic arms talks and no help at all from Moscow on sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, it emboldened Russian claims that they get to direct the course of what military activities occur within their self proclaimed sphere of strategic concern.

Now, instead of having a missile defense system in Europe in place in 2013 (one that would have sent a clear signal to the Russians that the US did not recognize their right to intimidate Eastern European nations and would have blocked Iran's ability to threaten the US and Europe with long-range missile strikes), the White House has a half-hearted plan to have something in place in 2020...and, by the way, the Russians don't like that plan either.

Energy security is another area where administration officials act like strategic idiots. Russian threats to cut-off natural gas supplies to Europe are just that...threats. Russia cannot afford to cut-off supplying gas to the West, if it did its economy would collapse. But rather just say that, Washington and European capitals use "energy security" as another stupid excuse for their anti-free market, global warming agenda...pushing for energy projects that make no sense and make the US and Europe less competitive.

Russia has cooperated with the US in Afghanistan, providing logistical routes to send in troops and supplies. Privately, they hope the US effort will fail and drag the US even further down the path of decline. Thus, even when the Russians help, they don't believe they are helping.

It is hard to see where all this silliness will stop other than ending badly. Either Russia will over step and the US will snap back or the US will slip further into the abyss. Don't expect Russia to fill the void either. Russia is anything but a resurgent power. It is run by a bunch of selfish oligarchs, delusional in their belief that they can make Russia great again by robbing it blind and promoting a reckless foreign policy that will only make the world less safe for Russians in the long term.