Gordon Adams objects to the framing of the question, arguing that Europe is more important than ever because European governments have chosen to invest in civilians, not men and women at arms. In this context, Europe's military weakness is a feature, not a bug.

Dan Serwer agrees, saying that the "Europeans are on to something," that their civilian capabilities are vast, that they've been deployed in 22 different operations, and are involved in a dozen currently.

But even if they have such capabilities, all the soft power in the world isn't worth much without some military power to back it up. In many of the places where nation building might be called for, various thugs, murderers and warlords use weapons to steal food aid, intimidate local officials, and kidnap wealthy foreigners. Such situations cry out for hard power: people who pry the weapons from the cold dead hands of the warlords, and convince the warlord’s followers to get onboard or else meet a similar fate. The aftermath of this dynamic, played out dozens of times in the past several decades, is what allows the guys in wingtips and the gals in sensible pumps to do development assistance, legal reform, institution building, etc.

In this respect, I agree with Messrs. Killebrew and Carafano. Hard power still matters. Unlike them, however, I would much prefer that locals be responsible for adjudicating these internal disputes, and, failing that, that others beside the U.S. military be capable and willing to deliver that hard power.

Bob Killebrew, the most emphatic defender of NATO as a concept (even if he advocates some reforms at the margins) concludes with three different points:

1. "NATO makes highly unlikely the kinds of European arms races and alliances that led to war so many times in recent history."

In other words, with respect to Gates's contention that Europe's military weakness is a problem (bug), Killebrew still thinks it a good thing (feature).

2. "Without NATO, the Greeks and Turks would have long had their war, and perhaps others as well."

Ummmm, hello? One could argue that NATO prevents small disputes like the 35-plus year Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus from spiraling into a major European war, but that is not what Col. Killebrew wrote (and it would be a very difficult assertion to prove in any case because there are in fact many things to explain the absence of wars between traditional enemies).

3. Killebrew concludes that we are, in fact, subsidizing the defense of other, far more vulnerable allies, and that we should continue to do so. "With NATO, the Poles and others feel less pressure to prepare for their defense. That can, and should, irritate U.S. policymakers, but it's good for the U.S. in the end."

Jim Carafano appears to reject the argument -- he wants Europe to get serious about military power and "join the real world" -- but he is especially dismissive of the claim that greater restraint by the United States will induce the Europeans to do more. "The less we spend," he writes, "the less they spend."

Evidence please.

To reiterate: the current U.S. posture toward Europe is based on precisely the opposite premise: Among the defenders of the NATO status quo, if we were to do less, the Europeans would do more -- and that would be bad.

Our intentions are ultimately irrelevant here. In my previous post, I pointed to the literature showing that even if our policies in Europe were not intended to discourage other NATO members from spending more money on their militaries, they would still be disinclined from doing so simply because it makes sense for each of them to shelter behind the strongest member of the alliance.

One need not sift through dusty economics journals or boring white papers to understand that while we have done more, the Europeans have done less.

• In 1999, NATO defense expenditures (not counting those of the United States) stood at 2.05 percent of GDP. Today, they spend 1.65 percent. (Table 15, IISS, The Military Balance 2010, p. 110).
• Over that same time period, U.S. spending as a share of GDP grew from 3.15 percent to 4.88 percent. (Table 2, IISS, The Military Balance 2010, p. 22).

It is possible that if we do less, the Europeans will do less, on the grounds that they don't see much need for military power of any kind. That is Gordon Adams's contention. But if that is true, then why do Americans pay to discourage Europeans from doing what they are not inclined to do in the first place? If you think that European military weakness is a good thing, you shouldn't much care why they're spending less, only that they are. NATO's defenders have an additional burden, however: they think 1) it a good thing that Europe is militarily weak, and 2) that NATO is instrumental to that state of affairs.

I don't. It would be useful for the strongest power in the world to be able to depend upon regional powers to deal with local problems before they become global problems. It would be useful that other countries have both the capacity and the will to act independent of the United States. We have created a world in which they can't and won't.

I don't fault European governments for preferring not to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on military hardware and personnel. I fault past American leaders and strategists (if they can be called that) for thinking it is a good thing that American taxpayers should pay so that others do not, and that our troops should answer every 911 call in the world. And I fault contemporary thinkers for thinking that this pattern should persist for another 20 years.

Few debates in the National Journal have prompted more "howlers" than this one. Gordon Adams claiming that Europeans have developed a sophisticated understanding of the use of “civilian instruments” for “dealing with the central global security problem of weak states and weak governance” is a particular knee slapper. I guess he missed the German mess at police training in Afghanistan, The British debacle in Basra, The French failures in Angola...Shall I go on? Even the Balkans are not what I would call a ringing endorsement of European soft power.

“European states cannot be ‘guilted’ into greater military investment,” Jim Thomas said, “....the United States can only induce European states to spend more if it demonstrates that it will do less." That's laughable too. The less we spend; the less they spend.

Let’s not considered ourselves, there are only bad things happening on the European security front. Earlier this week, the EU’s Foreign Minister, Baroness Ashton declared she supports the creation of a permanent EU military headquarters to support a European army that will stand separate from NATO. This is truly bad idea given new life. A permanent EU headquarters is yet another step toward an independent EU defense identity to undermine the primacy of NATO in European security structures, and American leadership in transatlantic affairs. It is wasteful and duplicative, largely the brainchild of Franco-German elites who want the EU as a counterbalance to American influence in Europe. All this was do is cut up Europe’s vanishing security into even more tiny pieces.

For once Gates is right. The Europeans are disarming and they will one day regret the decision just like they did in 1940.

Sadly, peoples like the British, Dutch, Czechs, and Poles who have done some hard fighting get lumped in with countries that are just not pulling their weight.
Time for Europe to abandon its disneyland foreign policy and join the real world.

If there is anything for the U.S. to learn from Europe it is that we should leave all the Europeans home when we go to war. Notwithstanding the always expected portion of traditional American Europe-envy seen here -- "Oh, gosh, isn't Europe just so ...", fill in the blank with civilized, sophisticated, thoughtful, modern, and all the other fawning, puke-inducing adjectives -- Europe is a wheezing, expendable, near-corpse.

Europe is dying demographically; culturally sensitive and multicultural to the point of continental suicide; quaking in fear over a domestic Muslim problem they refuse to name; and above all a gang of cowards preening as moral paragons. We need these governments in wartime like we need a second Obama term -- that is not at all, ever. Go to war with the Europeans and you extend the war, don't kill a tenth of the number of enemy and their supporters that merit killing, and come home without winning and with the same war to fight over again.

We should get out of NATO as quickly as possible, surely before the bomb explodes that we madly lit the fuse to by helping the Europeans to rip Kosovo from Orthodox Serbia and make it into an Islamic state. When the Serbs exercise their perfectly legitimate right to reclaim their stolen province -- and they will and should -- we must have acted to make ouselves long gone from the Balkans. Likewise, the phone should be off the hook when the EU finds that it cannot "fix" Greece and calls Washington for help.

It is past time for the Europeans to grow up and fend for themsleves, and it is likewise far past time for American presidents to learn that when we go to war we should depend on our own strong right arm and not cripple that arm by bringing along Europeans who are only good for whining about human rights, staying in their cantonements to avoid being shot at, and paying the enemy to shoot at Americans rather than themselves.

Thanks to all who have contributed to what is proving a wide-ranging and provocative discussion. In posing this question, I may have underestimated the degree to which Europe is something of a Rorschach test for national-security analysts in the U.S. Some of our bloggers see the “more civilized perspective” of European countries on warfare, as David Krieger put it, as a modern object lesson for the U.S. in how to avoid the folly of a rush to battle. In this vein, Gordon Adams suggests the Europeans have developed a sophisticated understanding of the use of “civilian instruments” for “dealing with the central global security problem of weak states and weak governance.” Other bloggers, however, say that Washington needs a new set of tough-love policies to get Europe to do more to defend itself. “European states cannot be ‘guilted’ into greater military investment,” Jim Thomas said. “They will only spend more on their own defense if they assess they must. Thus, the United States can only induce European states to spend more if it demonstrates that it will do less.”

Are there other perspectives on Europe worth considering? I would welcome more commentary on the problem, or not, of the resurgent Russian bear—which is politically reasserting itself in Ukraine and refortifying itself in Abkhazia on the Black Sea. “Moscow may bluster and blow, but they have no real military capabilities. They could hardly manage an incursion into the Republic of Georgia,” Ron Marks said. Do other bloggers agree? Europe is expected to depend on Russia for a significant share of its energy supplies for many years to come. Does Russia really pose no meaningful threat to a ‘demilitarized’ Europe?

Gates is dead wrong, as in the death of many young soldiers and even greater numbers of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reluctance and more civilized perspective of European countries could be a plus for US national security in applying a brake on the aggressive impulses of Gates and others (Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice come readily to mind), if we would actually listen to the Europeans and not spend so much effort twisting their arms to accompany us into needless wars. In the first decade of the 21st century, the US has initiated unnecessary and highly costly wars, which have diminished our security. Most of Europe, with the glaring exception of Tony Blair, seemed to prefer avoiding war in Iraq. It was the US that pressed for this needless war, a war that has cost us dearly in terms of lives, resources and credibility. The Obama administration is now claiming the Afghanistan War for its own, and driving up the costs of this war, with virtually no foreseeable gains for our security.

The US needs to be listening more and to stop being so trigger-happy when it comes to war. We would also benefit from ceasing to supply weapons to conflicting parties, such as India and Pakistan, or Israel and its Arab neighbors. The size of our military budget is also wildly out of control, having become the realization of all that President Eisenhower warned against in his Farewell Address.

Rather than seeking new, more militant allies, the US should be expending far more effort diplomatically to assure that we do not resume a cold war with Russia. But our current security policies, promoted by Secretary Gates among others, of pushing NATO to the Russian border (despite earlier promises not to do so), pursuing missile defenses in Europe and pressing ahead with space weaponization are all increasing the likelihood that a cold war will resume. Europe definitely still matters, and I believe we can count on them to both be honest with us, and to stand with us if and when it truly matters.

There is one element common to the outlook of those who bemoan the unwillingness of the Europeans to do more for American led projects. It is the unstated belief that the United States characteristically acts with probity and prudence.

Below is an excerpt from the Wikipedia entry on Marja(h), Helmand province, Afghanistan.

You will see that it bears no resemblance to the place graphically depicted for us by the Pentagon, State Department and the White House. It conforms in no way with those military maps in all our media featuring arrows better suited to a portrayal of Operation Barbarossa or to the battle accounts that conjured visions of Stalingrad. (As to the media, we now know the true meaning of the term ‘in-bedded').

Perusing my dictionaries, I found no better words to describe the conduct of our leaders than ‘Lying” and “Blatant Dishonesty.” Let’s put ourselves in the boots of other heads of government. Would you place your citizens and well-being at risk by blindly following those so evidently lacking in basic integrity?

I find it extremely painful to say this. But it what we have become due to our mindless 'war on terror.'

cheers

Marja (also spelt Marjah or Marjeh) is an unincorporated agricultural district in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, southwest of Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital. The name Marja is also applied to a location within the district where a number of farmers' markets, shops and a mosque are located. The population of the Marja district is 80,000 - 125,000 according to different estimates, spread across 80 - 125 square miles. During the February 2010 Operation Moshtarak, Marja was repeatedly described in the press as a "town" and even "city", following a 2 February 2010 briefing by US Marines.[4]

Population and economy

Marja is geographically situated in one of Afghanistan's major belts of poppy fields,[5] which are a source of funds for the Taliban.[6] According to one figure, 10% of global illicit opium production in the year 2000 originated from the Marja/Nad-i-Ali area.[7] During the 1950s and 1960s the United States government irrigated the fields around Marja (Lashkar Gah/Helmand was nicknamed "Little America"), with many canals remaining to this day.[1][6]

In conjunction with this American-led development, which included building and staffing a number of local schools, the Afghan government jump-started a program in 1959 to resettle Pashtun nomads to the area, providing them each with "almost 15 acres of land, two oxen and free seeds", with a focus on growing wheat.[8] Besides facing a number of technical problems, the development/resettlement program had the political aim of minimizing spillover of the Pashtun independence movement from across the Durand Line in Pakistan.[8]

Marjaʿ (Arabic/Persian: مرجع) (Plural: maraji), also known as a marja-i taqlid or marja dini (Arabic/Persian: مرجع تقليد / مرجع ديني), literally means "Source to Imitate/Follow" or "Religious Reference". It is the label provided to Shia authority, a Grand Ayatollah with the authority to make legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law for followers and less-credentialed clerics. After the Qur'an and the Prophets and Imams, marjas are the highest authority on religious laws in Usuli Twelver Shia Islam.

I join several others in this forum in believing that NATO will never be healthy again unless and until the U.S. divests itself of an over-reaching and overbearing international security policy. Not even all Americans, or even most, are comfortable with the state of permanent war to which we have largely subordinated U.S. foreign policy since 9-11. It’s scarcely surprising that our allies share that discomfort. Indeed, what’s amazing isn’t how little support they’ve offered, given their concern about America’s strategic prudence, but rather how much.

We might want to recall that, when NATO invoked Article V after 9-11 (for the first and only time in its history), our initial reaction was to reply in effect, “Thanks. Don’t call us -- we’ll call you.” At the time, we just couldn’t be bothered to negotiate the arrangements necessary to build an effective fighting coalition, and our decision within months to divert effort from Afghanistan in favor of an invasion of Iraq to which nearly all our NATO allies objected only made matters worse.

The essential prerequisite of an effective security alliance is agreement about the threats to which it will respond and, to some extent at least, agreement about the modalities that will govern that response. In the nature of an alliance, reaching agreement on both requires surrendering some unilateral freedom of action. That’s a concession we’ve found difficult to accept. While that reluctance persists, so also will our dissatisfaction with our allies.

Gordon Adams is right: the Europeans are on to something. Their civilian capacities are much greater, relative to the Americans, than their military capacities. The European Union has deployed 22 crisis management operations in recent years, drawing on a reserve force of more than 11,000 civilian experts. A dozen missions are ongoing. Europeans also lead civilian UN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the overall civilian efforts in Bosnia and in Kosovo, where the EU maintains an 1800(!)-civilian rule of law contingent. While Europe’s military forces are still mainly national, the bloc’s civilian capacities are substantial.

There is a good deal of ad hoc cooperation between European and American civilians once in the field, but there is relatively little concerted effort at coordinating activities “up stream.” The EU and the US often fail to scan the horizon for emerging conflicts jointly, plan interventions together, train their staff in one place and conduct joined-up civil-military operations. This needs to change. America and Europe should be as good at peacefare as they are at warfare.

Getting help from your allies requires asking of them what they are able to provide. State-building is a European specialty, one they have more or less successfully undertaken with 21 countries in my lifetime. Maybe Washington should depend more on the Euros for what they know how to do, and less on them for something they are reluctant to undertake.

Updated at 3:07 p.m. on March 9.

Churchill said that "there is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies – And that is to fight without them." While true on its face, the performance of the continental members of the Nato alliance in Afghanistan leads one to wonder whether or not this is still true.

Perhaps the greatest mystery is why Nato, in a fit of exuberance in 2006, decided to take over the entire military mission in Afghanistan. Most Nato nations have participated in operations in Afghanistan, but only the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, France (in very small numbers) and a few Central European nations have actively engaged in combat. The great powers of continental Europe have in effect decided to be present in a war zone, but not to fight. The Germans in particular have made a fetish out of refusing combat and even avoiding the use of the "c" word. They will fight in self defense, but their risk aversion has made many wonder why they are bothering to do what they do. The safe part of northern Afghanistan under their watchful eye has gone from "white" to "dark pink." Sadly, the Germans have a highly professional, well trained force that is being kept on the shelf by risk averse politicians who refuse to make the case for the war to their population. In other areas, the European nations have entangled their forces with protective caveats. GEN McChrystal's command of ISAF bears no resemblance to Eisenhower's command of the allied expeditionary force in Europe.

Afghanistan is a telling case. It arose from an attack on a Nato member, the alliance invoked Article 5, and the war in Afghanistan has been authorized by the UN Security Council. On top of all of that, the continentals have another reason to fight hard in Afghanistan. All of the opium-based narcotics in Europe come from Afghanistan. If the continental Europeans won't fight on the ground in Afghanistan, where will they fight? Who will replace the valiant Dutch and Canadian combat units when they depart in the all too near future?

In all, the divergence in post-Cold War national interests inside of Nato, and the luxury of free riding has made a strong partnership with our NATO allies into a very weak link in our effort in Afghanistan. Short of a Soviet attack on Paris, I can't think of a plausible scenario where Nato will fight. If I lived in Poland or Estonia, I would be nervous. The capabilities and demonstrated will of the European allies is not reassuring. Thank you, Mr. Gates, for bringing up the subject as so few others have done.

The question gives rise to the need for serious alternative thinking.

Perhaps the Europeans are on to something. If the new QDR is any indication, the US is prepared to expand military missions and military budgets as far as the eye can see. This will come at perilous cost to our role in the world, the acceptability of US foreign policy, and our federal budget.

Perhaps the Europeans don’t need to do more; and perhaps that does not mean they are “free riders” on the US, but are moving to a different view from that of the US about what international security requires, and the role military force provides in bringing security and stability.

Unlike Jim Thomas, I do not assume that a US strategy of “doing less” should be intended to incentivize the Europeans to “do more.” Perhaps we need to “do less” in our own interests, regardless of what the Europeans think or do. And perhaps they do not need to “do more” to ensure their security, if by “doing more” we mean “spending more on their militaries.”

Our view of international security today is far too dominated by a military vision, and the implementation of that view is far too dominated by military instruments, as Adm. Mullen warned, yet again, just this past week. We do not have a balanced toolkit of statecraft, we have, as the QDR illustrates, one that is moving even more in the direction of using the coherence, mission-orientation, and resources of DOD to do what some see as the job.

There is real risk here for our security. Our military is overburdened, with unending missions still in sight, as seen by the QDR. The missions we expand them into are not “core competence,” but as a “can-do” organization, the military is moving there, anyway. Meanwhile, we put less emphasis on the civilian instruments, where strategic planning and resource focus are only beginning to be a way of thinking about civilian statecraft. And over time our international engagement wears a uniform; Adm. Mullen knows that is not necessarily good for our security.

So the Europeans may, in their own chaotic way, be on to something. Rather than spend time whipping them for not joining in our pursuits, we need to work with them to balance our own toolkit and develop common strategies and instruments for dealing with the central global security problem of weak states and weak governance, using a broader toolkit than we have been using.

I’d like to post a guest comment from an expert source, Jim Thomas, who is Vice President for Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense. He spearheaded the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and was the principal author of the QDR report to Congress.

The erosion of European military capability has been underway for decades. While successive generations of senior American officials have lamented growing capability and interoperability gaps between the US military and its European counterparts, as well as the general lack of European seriousness about collective security, it is ironically the US defense posture itself that has permitted – indeed even encouraged – “free riding” by the European allies.

Why should the allies spend more on their own defense when the direct threats to Europe have receded, or intervene beyond Europe to protect their interests when the United States will almost certainly do so on their behalf? A number of America’s longstanding European allies have decided that they do not need to spend more on defense, nor do they need to project military power beyond the Continent. Their social welfare programs have crowded out greater military spending, and the lack of military capability in turn has dampened their extra-regional ambitions. ISAF fatigue and the looming European financial crisis are likely to accelerate this de-militarization trend, which is less a problem for the United States to solve than a condition that should inform how it thinks about its own global defense strategy.

Despite Europe’s disturbing track record, maintaining the transatlantic link is still in the American national interest. While Europe matters far less than it did during the Cold War, it shares American values and interests more than the so-called BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India and China. It would also be foolish for the United States to write off Europe or walk away from the substantial 60-year investment it has made in European security via NATO. Doing so would only benefit America’s enemies.

What then should the United States do?

The United States should adopt a cost-minimization strategy when it comes to maintaining the transatlantic alliance. European states cannot be “guilted” into greater military investment. They will only spend more on their own defense if they assess they must. Thus, the United States can only induce European states to spend more if it demonstrates that it will do less. Such a strategy might find Washington placing greater emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons deterring aggression against Europe relative to US conventional forces. It might also de-emphasize missile defense coverage for Europe unless resourced by the European states themselves.

The United States should also continue to diversify its portfolio of allies and security partners beyond Europe. While the United States was content with allies that provided little more than political legitimacy in coalition operations in the post-Cold War era, it will need militarily capable allies and partners in the future. Thus, it must look to its other alliances, as well as to promising future security partners like India.

Finally, the United States should avoid painting its European allies with too broad a brush. Europe is not a monolith; significant differences remain across the alliance in terms of both military spending, as well as political will to act militarily beyond Europe. Long-standing allies like Britain, as well as newer Eastern European allies, are making important contributions to the common defense and should be viewed accordingly.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is touring Europe cajoling government leaders to do more for the team. Augmented European contributions are the means to the overriding end of prosecuting the multiform ‘war on terror.’

We know the litany by heart. America is Europe’s savior – three times in the 20th century. Europeans depend on us for securing their well-being. They need and want our leadership. They are rudderless and querulous if left on their own. Their governments never express full gratitude, though, for all that we do for them. Europeans have become free riders who let the United States pay in blood and dollars in undertaking onerous enterprises that serve their interests as much as ours. They refuse to hold up their end – not spending enough on the military and not sending enough troops to fight in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

We bend our ear to hear with satisfaction those farsighted European statesmen who courageously assure us that all this is true and shameful. Thus we welcome the voices of Lord George Robertson, of Jaap de Hoop Sheffer, of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, of Tony Blair, of all those worthy and loyal courtiers who parade in and out of Washington swelling American pride.

If only it were so simple. Certainly, it is convenient to an American administration to have obedient followers. For them to supply auxiliaries (military or diplomatic) for whatever campaign we are embarked on. To feel that we ride in the vanguard of all good and virtuous (and threatened) fellow democracies. Equally certain is the rude truth that we could benefit from being told candidly when we are going astray (Iraq; Palestine); that the Europeans occasionally may have a better notion of how to go about doing things (bring political stability to Afghanistan on reasonable terms); that fanciful schemes buoyed by irrepressible American optimism (the recent Crusade for Democracy) can be counter-productive. Maybe dealing with close allies who yet affirm their independence of mind and judgment is better training for the world ahead than is dealing with nodding dependents whose passive deference feeds an unjustified hubris that America always knows best, does best, and has God’s benediction to superintend the affairs of the planet forevermore.

America continues to denature Europe by its intimidating, looming presence - and by encouraging them to value the waiver from the hard responsibilities of decision and commitment received under the American imperium. Europe and America form a classic dominant/subordinate relationship. The attitudes of the superior and inferior parties reinforce each other. Hence, they have become enablers of each other’s dysfunctional conduct. American impulsive activism, domineering attitude and supreme self-confidence induce Europeans to indulge their penchant for yielding instinctively to American initiative. Their lack of self-assertion and ever-readiness to give Washington the benefit of the doubt, in turn, encourages American leaders to treat them as subordinates. The result is a strengthening of the American rooted sense of superiority and a Europe that unnaturally has played itself out of the game. Solidarity with America, on terms set by Washington, is prized above all else. Candid talk and multilateralism are today’s catchwords, but not where it counts or when it counts. European leaders are most aggressive when elbowing each other to be first in line for photo-ops on the south lawn of the White House.

As for the Alliance, NATO is seen by Washington in strictly instrumental terms. It is a tool kit to be used as and when the United States chooses. The metaphor is that of a Swiss army knife – multi-functional, passive, ever ready and, in the improved model, constantly honing its implements for possible activation. Most European political elites seem quite content with this arrangement even while making polite requests for more consultation. However, for them to continue playing the roles of subaltern, appendix and acolyte to American might and magnetism can only stunt the former while exalting the other. Therein lies an unpromising future for all parties, including the world beyond the Atlantic axis.

Looking ahead, one thing is clear. There will be no initiative from the American side to modify the relationship. Washington enjoys too many advantages from it to want significant changes in the status quo. The practical benefits of having what is potentially the world’s second strongest power center unsure of its identity, deficient in will, and ready to find compensation in being first lieutenant to the United States are manifest. On another plane, Americans’ sense of self, along with their sense of the country’s exceptional place in the grand scheme of things global, is confirmed by two aspects of these Euro-American realities. One, emulation across the Atlantic conforms to what is seen to be the natural order of things. Two, the absence of serious challenge, political or intellectual, spares Americans either critical self-examination of those postulates so basic to the national persona or the exertions required to truly convince a partner cum possible rival. The family ties with Europe strengthen both feelings since the unique virtues of American society are taken to be the ultimate expression of Western civilization’s innate superiority generally.

This logic means that it is up to the Europeans to change – for their own sake and also for the United States. If they are too timid, too fractious, and too habituated to playing off an American lead, then Europe will fail to create its fair share of public goods. An under-supplying Europe runs the risk of being devalued by others as a force to be reckoned with in international political and security affairs.

All this is terrific for the United States if you believe that the 21th century is destined to be another American century and if you believe that we have demonstrated since 2001the aptitudes for running things while producing results that confirm the validity of that prognosis.

On the other hand, if you don’t, then it is a compelling American interest to favor the European nations behaving as responsible, autonomous adults.

These thoughts have been more fully developed in a monograph, Toward A More Independent Europe, published by the Egmont Institute in Brussels. It can be accessed at www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep12.pdf

It would be unwise for Americans to write off Europeans as a lost cause, congenitally dependent upon U.S. military power, and unable to contribute either to their own defense or to policing the global commons. We can’t count on Europe -- right now -- but that doesn’t mean we can never count on Europe in the future.

Americans who complain about Europe’s unwillingness to play a larger role in policing the globe, and who would like them to do more, should start by exploring the many reasons why Europe is so weak militarily.

Consider, for example, Europe’s half-hearted and inconsistent steps to establish a security capacity independent of NATO -- and therefore independent of the United States -- since the end of the Cold War. Such proposals have failed for many reasons, but we shouldn't ignore the extent to which Uncle Sam has actively discouraged Europe from playing a more active role. Most recently, Hillary Clinton expressed the U.S. government’s position that political and economic integration would proceed under the EU, but security would continue to be provided by NATO. This echoes similar comments made by the first Bush and Clinton administrations with respect to European defense. (See, for example, Madeleine Albright’s comments regarding European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) in 1998).

We can dismiss such comments as useful cover for Europeans who were looking for an excuse to cut military spending in the first place. The demographic pressures of an aging population consuming a larger share of public resources are being felt in many advanced economies, but are particularly acute in Europe.

But the problem goes well beyond the fiscal pressures associated with maintaining an adequate defense. Washington has been openly hostile to any resurgence of military power in European, no matter how unlikely that might be, on the basis of what political scientists call hegemonic stability theory. That theory holds that it is better for security to be provided by a single global power than by regional players dealing chiefly with security challenges in their respective neighborhoods. The argument is that such self-sufficiency is dangerous, that it can lead to arms races, regional instability, and even wars. One can think this a smart philosophy or a dumb one, but we can't ignore that it has guided U.S. foreign policy at least since the end of the Cold War.

It could be argued that the costs to the United States of providing such services for the rest of the world are modest, but that is ultimately a judgment call. To be sure, the dollar costs will not bankrupt us as a nation, but Americans spend $2,700 per person on our military, while the average European spends less than $700. The bottom line is that Europeans have little incentive to spend more because they don’t feel particularly threatened, and they aren’t anxious to take on responsibilities that are ably handled by the United States. The advocates of hegemonic stability theory would declare that a feature, not a bug. Mission accomplished.

And that might be true, if the greatest threat to global security were a resurgence of conflict in Europe, and if it is truly in the U.S. interest to forever have allies with few capabilities and many liabilities. But that seems extremely shortsighted. The sweeping political and economic integration in Europe has dramatically reduced the likelihood of another European war. In the meantime, the fact that we have many allies with little to offer by way of military assets, and even less political will to actually use them, is forcing the U.S. military to bear the disproportionate share of the burdens of policing the planet. And in the medium- to long-term, while I doubt that we will be facing “a militarily superior, post-Soviet Russia,” allies with usable military power might ultimately serve a purpose if Moscow proves as aggressive (and capable) as the hawks claim.

In short, Secretary Gates’s comments last month suggest that he has stumbled upon the realization that being the world’s sole superpower has its disadvantages. This by itself would be a significant shift of U.S. policy, and therefore drew favorable comments by others who welcome such a change. (See, for example, Justin Logan, Steve Walt, and Sean Kay.)

Getting Europeans to take a more active role -- even in their own backyard -- will be difficult, but not impossible. It starts with blunt talk about the need to take responsibility and to assume a fair share of the burdens of policing the global commons. But we’ve heard such comments before. What is also needed is greater restraint by Washington, behavior that over time will force the Europeans to play a more active role.

As we all know, Secretary Gates is just the latest in a long line of Secretaries of Defense to ask the Europeans to get serious about their own defense. Even when the Warsaw Pact was at the door, there was considerable angst on this side over NATO defense contributions.

But any longtime observer of the Alliance should be pleasantly surprised that it's held together as well as it has, and that we will shortly have 50,000 NATO troops alongside ours in Afghanistan. Even if many of them operate under instructions that keep them on the combat sidelines, they represent manpower and resources that we or the Afghans would have to replace were they not there. And lest we forget, some of them -- notably but not exclusively the Brits and the Canadians -- have fought hard and have taken heavy losses; that is especially true for Canada and its excellent, if underequipped, forces. The transition of NATO from an exclusively static alliance to an expeditionary one is remarkable, and would have been laughingly dismissed twenty years ago. The new challenges the Alliance faces -- among them, as Secretary Gates said, missile defense, "whole of government" response to security challenges and training and advising allies -- were not even in the paybook within the career spans of NATO officers.

But Gates is probably the first Secretary to call, correctly, for institutional reform. For decades, NATO's redundant and topheavy command structures, and the impedimenta that went along with them, was tolerated as a way to keep the Alliance together and its forces viable, which involved providing command and staff slots for many nations' diplomats and officer corps. Slimming down will not be easy, but redundant headquarters and staffs eat up resources that could better be applied to combat structures and hardware like the helicopters and transports that are so needed in Afghanistan and elsewhere, including naval forces. Perhaps something like the U.S.' BRAC process would be possible, though the political analog is hard to see. But we must not let our dissatisfaction with details obscure how essential NATO is to our own security.

Americans tend to misunderstand the reason why NATO is so important to the U.S. Even the first line of this piece -- that the Europeans need "get serious about their own defense" betrays an American bias that's not quite correct. European defense is our defense as well, and that's as true today as when the Soviets lurked over Eastern Europe and as when Nicholas Spykman wrote, during the Second World War, that America should never forget that the peace and security of the United States is irrevocably linked to that of Central Europe. Generally, the Alliance provides three functions that are essential to our collective security.

The first, of course, is defense of the European and American heartlands. While we have grown accustomed to pacifistic Germans and Frenchmen, the mood in other parts of the Alliance is less so. This is particularly true in those states whose history causes them to look uncomfortably eastward. Russia is still, well, Russia, and while it decides whether it's going to be a friendly or unfriendly bear, the Poles and Czechs and Balts are going to take some reassurance to prevent loose-cannon arms races, and their territory is important not only as buffers, but for missile defense against non-Russian threats and other technical purposes.

Secondly, as Secretary Gates said, NATO's newly-found expeditionary focus is vital for our own defense, from fighting alongside our troops in Afghanistan to naval forces deployed worldwide. We should not underestimate the importance of collective security on this scale, even as we wish there were more troops, and better equipped.

Third, NATO serves a vital function within the Alliance by encouraging dialog and exchanges between members. NATO makes highly unlikely the kinds of European arms races and alliances that led to war so many times in recent history. Without NATO, the Greeks and Turks would have long had their war, and perhaps others as well. With NATO, the Poles and others feel less pressure to prepare for their defense. That can, and should, irritate U.S. policymakers, but it's good for the U.S. in the end.

The last hit song in the Beatles’ extensive music catalog was the "Long and Winding Road." It was a mournful tune about the end of a long relationship. And so we stand with the nations of Western Europe today. As Donald Rumsfeld once said derisively "the Old Europe."

I agree with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The time has come for the United States to seriously look at our arrangement of alliances around the world; and particularly at NATO and the political and militarily flaccid Western European countries within.

Our current military and diplomatic needs must reflect the realities of the 21st century world. The up and comers like Brazil and India matter far more going forward than a prostrate Germany or a bellicose, but ineffective France. Our interests lie in alliances in the politically and economically vibrant areas of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Let the Western Europeans stir in their own lethargic juices and continue to extend help to those in Eastern Europe who see us as their active ally.

There was inevitability to all of this. It has been 65 years since the end of World War II. And let there be no mistake, two World Wars marked the continent of Europe in an indelible fashion. Tens of millions of people were killed in a decade of warring. The Soviet Union/Russia had casualties in multiples of that number. The wars left the western Europeans under the care of the U.S. and the Eastern Europeans under the control of the Soviets. Both sides of Europe were frozen in amber and reminded daily of the costs of militarism. In the West, the tab and majority of the armament of that defense picked up by the U.S.

So the Wall falls and we find Eastern Europe reaching out to us for friendship and protection while our old, coddled NATO allies prove incapable of any military actions. Yugoslavia in 1991 showed the reality. The slaughters and genocides that took place on the European doorstep were an embarrassment to civilization and the impotence of Europe to handle even the meekest military actions. Now they are beginning to desert us in Afghanistan because the work is too bloody and hard – even in the face of rising Muslim hostilities in their own homeland and drug problems that be directly related to the Taliban and Al-Queda.

So, after twenty years of trying to jumpstart them, it is about time to let it go. NATO is an artifact of another time. Let it be what it is – a forum for discussion of military issues and reminder to Russia that we are at least watching them.

As for Eastern Europe, we have already forged and should keep the strong bilateral relations we have built. And we must also grasp the true nature of the Russian threat to Europe -- political more than military. Its threat to the West is minimal. Moscow may bluster and blow, but they have no real military capabilities. They could hardly manage an incursion into the Republic of Georgia.

Bottom line: we are at end of the long and winding road with Western Europe. Time to move on to a new reality and let it be.