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March 2010 Archives
Is Russia a spoiler in the global political order -- or part of the solution? On the one hand, Washington and Moscow are at long last reaching final agreement on a major new pact to make deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Russia is also allowing U.S. supplies for the war in Afghanistan to transit its territory. That suggests, perhaps, a path for cooperation on other fronts. On the other hand, Moscow is balking at tough new United Nations sanctions against Iran, as pushed by Washington, to force the Tehran regime to restrain its nuclear program -- and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is pointedly vowing that Russia will proceed with completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which Russia is helping to build in Iran. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is angling to gain control of Ukraine's gas pipelines, an important source of supply for Europe, and is refortifying its military position in Abkhazia on the Black Sea.
So, what is the best tack for President Obama to take toward Russia on this complex of issues -- should he approach the Kremlin with carrots or sticks, and what might those be? How much do we need Russia? And is Russia more in the good bear or bad bear camp at this moment in history?
5 responses: Eric Farnsworth, Michael Brenner, Ron Marks, Daniel Gouré, James Jay Carafano
In the midst of what some experts are calling the worst crisis in U.S.-Israel relations in decades, a major new player has weighed into the always contentious politics of the Middle East peace process: Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central Command and the most iconic U.S. military leader of his generation.
The crisis began when Vice President Joe Biden was greeted in Israel with the announcement that the government there had green-lighted 1,600 new homes for Jewish settlers in annexed Arab east Jerusalem, a move that Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton quickly labeled "insulting" to the United States and destructive to the peace process. Even before Biden's trip, however, Petraeus had sent a team of senior briefers to the Pentagon to argue that the stalled Middle East peace process was a direct threat to U.S. interests and prestige in the region. According to CENTCOM, the lack of progress in Palestine fomented anti-Americanism, undermined moderate Arab regimes, limited the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships, increased the influence of Iran, projected an image of U.S. weakness, and served as a potent recruiting tool for Al Qaeda.
Do you think Gen. Petraeus' arguments are valid? What effect will they have on the Obama administration's Middle East policy and on the peace process writ large? Is the administration's recent more hard-line approach to Israeli settlements an early result, and is that hard line likely to continue given CENTCOM's strong backing? Given Petraeus' popularity with the American public, and Israel's concerns about Iran's nuclear program, can the Israeli government and pro-Israel lobby afford to criticize him too stridently and possibly alienate the Pentagon? Did Petraeus overstep traditional boundaries by what some are calling an "unprecedented" incursion by the U.S. military into foreign policy?
8 responses: David Krieger, Larry Korb, Michael F. Scheuer, Joseph J. Collins, Michael Brenner, James Jay Carafano, Patrick B. Pexton, Gen. Barry McCaffrey
Should Justice Department attorneys who are working on terrorist detainee cases be forced to disclose any work they did in private practice advocating on those detainees' behalf?
Back in November, Republican senators on the Judiciary Committee asked Attorney General Eric Holder to name the officials now working for the Justice Department who had previously defended accused terrorists, or who had worked for organizations that advocate on their behalf. Among a group of nine officials working on detainee matters, the identity of seven was unknown, and Holder refused to name them. This prompted the activist group Keep America Safe, headed by Liz Cheney, to run a video declaring that "Americans have a right to know" the identity of the "Al Qaeda Seven," and asking, "Whose values do they share?"
Then, in a public letter, several prominent attorneys, former administration officials and national security policy experts decried "a shameful series of attacks on attorneys in the Department of Justice who, in previous legal practice, either represented Guantánamo detainees or advocated for changes to detention policy." The letter called inquiries into the lawyers' past and questions about their patriotism "unjust to the individuals in question and destructive of any attempt to build lasting mechanisms for counterterrorism adjudications."
The lawyers in question have since been identified in the press. But does the public have a right to know their previous views on detainee policy, as Cheney's group and others suggest? Or, as these legal experts say, should we presume that the attorneys will perform their official duties regardless of any positions they took in private life? It is the American tradition, after all, to zealously defend accused criminals regardless of the nature and the victims of their crimes. Is this an argument about seven lawyers, or is it really a proxy for the larger debate over the Obama administration's approach to trying terrorist suspects in criminal courts?
6 responses: Col. W. Patrick Lang, Michael F. Scheuer, Col. W. Patrick Lang, Michael F. Scheuer, Paul R. Pillar, Michael Brenner
"The demilitarization of Europe -- where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it -- has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st," Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared in a Feb. 23 speech to NATO officers and others at the National Defense University in Washington.
Is Gates right? What exactly does "the demilitarization of Europe" mean for U.S. national security interests? Should Americans care if Europe has to live in the shadow of a militarily superior post-Soviet Russia? Is NATO, alas, a lost cause?
Gates' perspective also suggests that, unless the United States is to go it alone in the world, it will need to cultivate partners among rising nation-states, such as India and Brazil, that are more or less U.S.-friendly (at least not enemies) and, unlike Europe, are rebuilding their militaries. In short, should the U.S. be planning for a post-Europe world? Does Europe still matter? Can we count on Europe any more?
15 responses: Christopher Preble, James Jay Carafano, Michael F. Scheuer, Paul Starobin, David Krieger, Michael Brenner, Richard Hart Sinnreich, Daniel Serwer, Joseph J. Collins, Gordon Adams, Paul Starobin, Michael Brenner, Christopher Preble, Col. Robert Killebrew, Ron Marks
The U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has put limits on nighttime raids, airstrikes and artillery as part of his counterinsurgency strategy to kill fewer innocents in the crossfire with the Taliban and to win the hearts and minds of Afghan civilians. Some journalists on the ground with lower-ranking U.S. troops engaged in the offensive in Marja, in Afghanistan's Helmand province, have reported that foot soldiers think they're fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Senior officers say it is necessary to the strategy.
When is it worth putting Americans at greater risk to reduce the danger to foreign civilians? Is this really the way to defeat a hardened enemy that has no such scruples? Where do we draw this line?
13 responses: Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Daniel Serwer, Paul Sullivan, Michael Brenner, Richard Hart Sinnreich, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Michael Brenner, Bing West, Joseph J. Collins, Richard Hart Sinnreich, Ron Marks, Wayne White, Chris Seiple
