A "draft age son? We are reaching the boundaries of the world of fantasy now. If the draft was not reinstated in our present dificulties, how can it be imagined that conscription would be brought back to deal with Iran in the worst of situations. A conflict with Iran worst would surely not involve ground forces, except perhaps those of the CIA.

There is a certain undertone of anti-Israeli feeling in some of these comments. I can understand that. Too often the interests of the United states have been sacrificed for those of "friends" who seem to have no friends themselves.

Nevertheless, to imply that an Iranian nuclear capability will not ultimately diminish the influence and leverage of the United States in the Middle East, seems to me to be simplistic. The Saudis and the rest will shelter behind us like frightened chicks? Perhaps, but if they do, they will be kowtowing in Tehran at the same time.

The military option should be taken off the table in all instances -- save an immediate response to foreign attack -- until we elect a president and congress that will abide by the constitutional requirements and machinery for declaring war that were put in place by the Founders.

In addition, and more practically, the option should be taken off the table vis-à-vis Iran because we have a military that cannot win a war. The common wisdom is that the politicians are to blame for preventing the generals from doing their job; that is, killing the enemy and, as needed, its civilian supporters until each is convinced it is irrefutably defeated. I begin to think, however, that the common wisdom is only partially correct. Our bipartisan political leadership surely is pathetic when it comes to war-making, but the U.S. general officer corps -- save for a few Marine generals -- is today chockfull of bureaucrats, nation-builders, and wanna-be social scientists.

Take that might warrior General McChrystal, for example. In the midst of a supposedly “major offensive” in Helmand Province, the general has spent most of his time apologizing for the deaths of civilian supporters of the Taleban and al-Qaeda, and withdrawing from the battlefield a weapon system that presumably was there because it contributed to victory and helped protect our soldiers and Marines. Sparing civilian casualties might make sense if those civilians were pro-U.S. or even pro-Karzai, but they are not.

The Taleban’s steadily upward trend line across Afghanistan -- not just in the southern provinces -- since 2006 can only be explained by growing popular support from Afghans who are pro-Taleban (some) and/or opposed to the U.S.-NATO occupation (most). To think you are going to win the hearts and minds of these Afghans by limiting civilian casualties is a figment of the social-science minds of counter-insurgency theorists. It is not for nothing that the acerbic but thoroughly brilliant Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld wrote that counter-insurgency doctrine is always written by losers.

For the life of me, and as the father of a newly draft-age son, I cannot imagine why American parents still trust their soldier-children to politicians -- in both parties -- and generals who are unwilling to do anything so old-fashion, anachronistic, and politically incorrect as relentlessly killing the enemy and his supporters until they are defeated. One hopes that American parents will soon wise up and begin to discourage their kids from joining a military whose generals increasingly see U.S. casualties as the necessary cost, not of winning, but of nation-building, fawning over their addled political masters, and pleasing international opinion and the pacifist purveyors of international law.

The wars we are fighting today are the products of the lethal-for-America fantasy that war has changed and no longer requires much killing or an outright victory. This, of course, is nonsense and only our elites and those of Europe believe it; our Islamist enemies know better. America once knew that you never go to war without aiming for victory, and led by men like William Sherman, U.S. Grant, Nathan Bedford Forrest, George Patton, and, until recently, most Marine generals, our military leaders knew that, in Forrest’s words, war means fighting, and fighting means killing. Armed with this fact, and with Sherman’s dictum that the only mercy in war is fast and complete victory, the U.S. military once put fear and sober second thoughts into those who meant America harm. Today, the same military causes some circumspection among our enemies, but it mostly causes mirth in their minds over the specter of a hapless pack of coddled general officers who seek to win un-winnable hearts and minds at the cost of many hundreds of billions dollars and numerous wasted young lives.

I can't see the advantage of giving something for nothing--explicitly taking military strikes off the table in the absence of some sort of concession from the Iranians. History has demonstrated over and over that diplomacy needs both carrots and effective sticks.

I do agree with Mike, though, that the use of force should be based on a congressional declaration of war. I've long felt that the Bush administration made a massive mistake by not asking for a declaration of war on al Qaeda. If a congressional declaration is no longer required for the United States to be "at war," we ought to amend the Constitution.

It seems that a lot of our bloggers think that the less we do about Iran right now, the more likely the regime will take itself down than if we intervene too much on behalf of the opposition Green Movement. I’d like to ask our experts a follow up question, one that arises from Mike Scheuer’s posting. It has been longtime U.S. policy with Iran that “all options are on the table”—meaning of course that military strikes could always be launched if we think Iran’s nuclear program has gone too far.

Scheuer suggests that we be very plain about taking that option OFF the table. In his words “Publicly state that there will be no U.S. surprise attack on Iran, and no U.S. attack at all on Iran unless the president asks for a formal declaration of war and the Congress votes its approval in a constitutional manner.” What do you think of this idea?

It would reverse the Ronald Reagan doctrine, who said it was always better to keep your opponents guessing about your course of action than to telegraph it openly. But Iran, and North Korea, for that matter, have always declared their No. 1 goal in negotiations with the U.S. to be security guarantees that they won’t be attacked. What if we gave Iran that? It might actually help the Green Movement, and undermine the Great Satan shibboleth of the Islamists. Would the Islamic Republic then halt their nuclear program, and enter serious negotiations? Or would this limit Obama’s options too much?

Patrick B. Pexton, deputy editor

On Iran, President Obama should:

1.) Explain to the American people that Iran is no threat to the United States unless we or Israel attack it first, and then it would be a serious threat to U.S. access to energy and would likely stage terrorist operations in the continental United States. [The last thanks to 30-years of federal immigration policies that leave us without knowledge of who is in the country or what they are capable of doing.]

2.) Publicly state that there will be no U.S. surprise attack on Iran, and no U.S. attack at all on Iran unless the president asks for a formal declaration of war and the Congress votes its approval in a constitutional manner.

3.) Call in Israel's ambassador to the United States and tell him that we understand that Israel believes Iran is a threat to its survival, and that we agree that Israel has every right to defend itself. If Israel believes it must go to war with Iran, then so be it. But also tell the ambassador that if Israel attacks Iran, the U.S. administration will declare U.S. neutrality in the war and immediately cut off military and financial support to all combatants in the war.

4.) Speak to the American people and tell them to expect to be brutally propagandized by U.S. citizen Israel-Firsters through AIPAC, their ubiquitous media shills, and the men and women they own in the U.S. Congress and federal bureaucracy. Urge Americans to ignore this effort by U.S. Israel-Firsters to get them to send their soldier-children to fight in a religious war in which the U.S. has no genuine national interest at stake, and in which U.S. participation would further bankrupt the country, require the reintroduction of conscription, and put America at war with all of the Muslim world -- Shia and Sunni -- for the foreseeable future.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2010/02/iran-and-the-end-game.html

We have discussed this issue extensively at "Sic Semper Tyrannins." There are about fifty comments on the initial post.

The options listed above, which are those most frequently discussed, also are, respectively, unlikely to be effective, attainable, genuinely helpful to the so-called Green Movement (if not quite harmful), or without profound, serious risk.

One concept the United States still has not absorbed is that it is no longer the strikingly dominant international player on the world stage it once was. Sanctions that could pass the UNSC are likely to be too limited to change Iranian behavior significantly, and may well be evaded in part by Tehran with the help of other parties. China is not merely an obstacle to the achievement of more effective sanctions, but an increasingly powerful player in its own right internationally, both financially and strategically. The military option, as is so thoroughly explained by two contributors, does not represent a comprehensive or long-term solution to the challenge of Iranian enrichment & potential nuclear weapons development, would likely intensify an Iranian drive for a weapon, and is linked to potentially dire regional consequences. And the more Washington busily works away at what many other governments must surely recognize are rather forlorn choices, the more feckless, not powerful, the US must appear.

I am certainly open to creative "out of the box" thinking. Nonetheless, the bottom line may well be that while finding more ways of expressing international rejection of Iran's increasingly appalling behavior in the area of human rights and registering international dismay over its lack of nuclear cooperation, one must expect Iran essentially to remain on course in both areas for the time being. As a result, given the options currently on the table, the world community probably must prepare itself for the emergence of a nuclear Iran in one form or another through measures such as putting in place firm, clear, countervailing deterrence. A nuclear Iran is highly undesirable, but almost certainly poses much less of an overall threat than military options aimed at delaying or forestalling the emergence of such a reality.

What are our options in dealing with Iran? Well, that is a very complex question. Iran may be in the process of significant political change. Then again, it might just find itself in a much more repressive environment with the same regime in charge that it brutalizing its people. Instead of helping the Iranian people to be free of this regime some actions may prolong their suffering and relative poverty.

Iran has some very complex and fluid relations with many of its neighbors and others from far distances, such as China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. The EU’s relations with Iran have been far less aggressive than the US’s relations with Iran. Many leaders in the EU see Iran differently than the leaders here in the US. The Sunni monarchies and other Sunni states see Iran as a threat, but also an opportunity. Some, such as Qatar and the Emirates, are getting closer to Iran in diplomatic, economic and other relations. Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and Yemen all have significant Shia populations. They also have a significant amount of trade with Iran, either above board or below. Many of these countries also see Iran with some suspicion. (Did I say this was simple? No.)

Egypt and Jordan see Iran as mostly a threat. Syria has an ongoing variable relationship with Iran that includes support for the Shia Hezbollah and other groups. The Alawi also see Qom as a source of legitimacy on many levels. Syria, however, also seems to want to move a bit more to the west at times. Then again, Syria still has to deal with the fallout and reverberations of the Hariri assassination and other things that have happened in Lebanon in the last few decades. Some of these Lebanese problems can be traced right back to Iran.

Hamas seems to be getting closer to Iran. Fatah and the PLO, however, seem to want to distance themselves from Iran. The Israelis are apoplectic about an Iran with a nuclear weapon and are surely going to get more kinetic in some way or other sometime soon, whether it is in diplomatic circles or military ones is yet to be seen.

King Mohammed VI of Morocco sees Iran as a threat mostly. Algeria seems to have more complex relations with Iran than Morocco has. Turkey would like to be something of a broker on the nuclear issues. At the same time it is increasing its investments in Iran and its trade with Iran. We all know about the intense and complex relations Iran has with Iraq. However, as usual, things are not what they seem to be at times.

Iran also has influence in Afghanistan and in some parts of Central Asia, most particularly with Azerbaijan. There are also increasing relations between Iran and India. Iran’s relations with Pakistan could be described as somewhat strained at best, but Pakistan also has a large Shia community. India and Pakistan have been talking with Iran about a possible natural gas pipeline bringing Iranian gas to them both via, of all places, Baluchistan.

Shia can also be found in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Iran seems to be slowly building influence in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Iran is also building relations with some countries in Latin America and not just with Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela. One cannot forget the importance of Brazil in any sort of Latin America-Middle East mix.

There is a lot more to the multi-spectrum diplomatic and economic relations of Iran, including various black and grey markets connections, but to explain of the nuances of these relations would take a book not a short intervention.

It is impossible in this venue to get into all of the nooks and crannies of Iranian international relations. However, it is important to see this issue in the relevant contexts. And the contexts for Iran are quite complex and sometimes unknown or at least uncertain in many different degrees.

Let’s take a look at option #1:

Continued gradual pressure from the U.N. Security Council, combined with other U.S.-led, non-U.N.-approved sanctions targeted narrowly at the Revolutionary Guards and hardliners associated with Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

Unilateral sanctions never work. World trading systems are a sieve that likes to be described as a set of pipelines. Things are not always as the official statistics point out and many parts of the world black and grey markets dominate certain transactions. Iran is also a country with many borders. These borders are also not what one would call tightly monitored and controlled, even by the Iranians. Consider that Iran has long and sometimes mountainous, swampy, deserted and desert, or sometimes just plain lawless borders with parts Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and Iraq and you start to get the picture. Then add in that Iran has a significant shoreline on the Caspian Sea, on the Persian Gulf and on the Gulf of Oman. These three waterways contain some of the smugglers’ paradises of the world. There are ports on all three that are known smuggling zones.

There are also some formal and informal financial centers and locales in the region and beyond that would very happily funnel cash and other financial instruments in multiple directions. Then there are the organized crime gangs, terrorists, and drugs gangs, who are all pretty much connected in many ways, who also act as money launderers and other nefarious designations. Countries that are sanctioned often turn to many shadowy groups for aid in breaking the sanctions.

Most sanctions regimes are somewhat easily busted or at least easily punctured, especially the unilateral ones. In this sort of neighborhood even the multilateral ones could be very difficult to contain.

This is magnified by the fact that many powerful economic and diplomatic players rely on Iranian oil and investments in Iran. These countries will not be exactly positive on tougher economic sanctions, even if they have the mostly false designation of “targeted sanctions”. Targets can move and their finances and trade can change names and places, sometimes at the click of a mouse on a computer.

There is another part to this which many neglect to think about. The US may think it is sanctioning Iranian oil by not purchasing it directly. The US does important a huge amount of Iranian oil indirectly through industrial and other imports from those countries that import Iranian oil, such as Japan, India, China, South Korea, Italy, Spain, France, South Africa, The Netherlands, and Greece. We also indirectly support the Iranian economy by purchasing those imports from these countries. We also have huge investments in these countries. Some of those investments have projects that surely use Iranian oil.

Now let's see how many countries import inputs and other things from the countries listed above and how many of those third level countries we end up importing from. Sanctions are, to be very blunt, a big confidence game on the public here to convince them that the mostly dysfunctional legislative branch is doing something. Tightening sanctions is like filling a few of the holes in a large pasta strainer. Most of the water will still get through. That which does not go through the plugged holes will move over to the unplugged ones. I suppose if you plugged enough in a certain corner some water would be collected, but the question is how much would be collected before the strainer moves.

Some point to the fact that Iran exports only a tiny amount of its huge natural gas reserves, which are the second largest in the world. They point to South Pars. What they neglect to mention is that the internal natural gas markets in Iran have been developing. Also, there are significant investments in South Pars. Total, Shell, Statoil, Lucky GoldStar, Gasprom, CNOOC, CNPC, Qatari, Bahraini, Turkish and Indian companies and many others have been or are investing and working at South Pars. A major Chinese company, PetroChina, just signed a huge investment deal on South Pars. Total was backed out recently. But the Chinese gladly took their place. Investments are happening.

You can read the following to get a sense of how much of a sieve this situation is: http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article179964.ece
http://caspenergy.com/index_en.shtml?id_node=68&id_file=7717&lang=en
http://www.statoil.com/en/About/Worldwide/Iran/Pages/default.aspx
http://www.shell.com/home/content/footer/contact/contact_iran.html
http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidv52n42-3NC10/South%20Pars%206-8%20Gas%20Plant%20Contract%20Awarded%20To%20South%20Korea&rsquo%3Bs%20GS/
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/01/25/India-moves-on-Irans-South-Pars-gas-field/UPI-41561264441345/
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2009/12/01/Russia-sets-its-eyes-on-South-Pars/UPI-46671259684695/
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article149024.ece
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8810100650
http://www.ogj.com/index/article-display/5407138558/articles/oil-gas-journal/exploration-development-2/2010/01/turkey-signs_e_p_agreement.html
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=83194

The issue is whether sanctions are changing behavior. They are not. Are we in a better position now with Iran than we were when the sanctions started decades ago?

Also, whenever the US tries to close the door the Indians, Chinese, Russians and others have been there to pry it open again. When will Washington learn there are new and powerful players in the mix on Iran. Many here still think they are the only game in town. They are not.

What about #2:

2. "Crippling" sanctions, to include a ban or even embargo on refined petroleum imports to Iran, as urged by the U.S. House and Senate and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Iran is in some political turmoil right now. The use of “crippling sanctions” could backfire by pushing more of the Iranian population toward the regime. The best things to happen to the regime right now would be for the outside to be considered an enemy. That would be easy to prove with any attempts at crippling sanctions. These crippling sanctions would cripple the people of Iran more than the regime. They would likely strengthen the regimes hold over the people. They may also sway other people in the region to help break these sanctions and even start to support or otherwise aid the regime. Such hard line policies, especially now, are just plain revenge tactics and not very smart strategies even in the short run. Don’t even consider the long run.

Embargoing gasoline important could be a way to harm the country, but the taxi drivers, bus drivers (who are now turning toward the Green Movement), and others of the poorer classes may be hurt the most from this. Also, please consider all of those border and small smuggling ports. Would we expect our Navy and others to put huge efforts into this embargo when they are already overstretched? Where are the ships and personnel coming from?

Also, Iran imports gasoline, from some surprising sources, including from companies in Switzerland, The Netherlands, Malaysia, Russia, India and France. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/Oil.html

Iran has also been refitting many of its cars with CNG (compressed natural gas). Remember, it has lots of natural gas and it does not take much to refit the typical automobile if the circumstances warrant a change. Even when they are not forced to refit some places can change to CNG quickly, such as the taxi drivers in Cairo, Egypt.

China, India and others have also started very large investments in Iran to upgrade the refineries, reconfigure the refineries’ outputs, and build new refineries. Will they support a move to sanction gasoline imports?

How about the Iraqis who would gladly ship the stuff across the Shatt Al-Arab for a hefty profit?

How will this embargo affect the gasoline markets of the region? It might cause further shortages in Iraq. Now that would not be the best thing to happen. It would also, possibly, be a source of funds for the smugglers and their insurgent partners in Iraq.

Some of the biggest winners from the embargo would be the smugglers, insurgents, mafias and terrorist groups. Why terrorist groups? Where do you think they get their money from? Selling oranges? How much easier would it be to recruit in a further destabilized region? And, for sure, such an embargo would not be stabilizing. Let’s not kid ourselves about that.

What about #3:

3. Full open and clandestine support for the opposition "green movement."

That would be the kiss of death for the movement and many of their supporters. This is best left alone. The US needs to have a quiet hand in all of this, if not no hand at all. The political situation in Iran needs to be worked out by the Iranians. Otherwise, we are back to Operation Ajax and the problems that followed that action over the last many decades.

Also, as many recent operations have shown: we are not good at this. Some of the cloak and dagger guys might see some temporary victories, but let’s look to the long run. Long run stability in Iran means that the new equilibrium needs to be developed by the Iranians.

Change in Iran needs to come from the Iranians.

What about #4:

4. Military strikes against Iran's nuclear complex.

We have left the worst for last. This would be just plain bonkers. If anyone wants to send the region into even more turmoil this is the way to do it. Remember how I listed all of the Shia communities in the region. Remember how the relations with its neighbors and others are described? Now think about the siege mentality that pervades parts of the Muslim world. This military action may prove to many persons in Iran that the GWOT, or whatever it is called now, is a war against Islam. Do we want that? Even if Israel does it the US would be blamed or at least accused of giving Israel the green light.

Some groups in the region and beyond might want Iran attacked for their own reasons, but surely they are thinking about the possible repercussions of such an attack. I don’t hear much pro-attack rhetoric out of Cairo, Amman and Riyadh. They are still reeling from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing problems in Yemen. But for most Sunni Arab states even if they point to Iran as a source of trouble they see the Palestinian-Israeli issue as the biggest one around. Some see the focus on Iran as a strategic distraction from this issue.

Some have mentioned that the Saudis, Jordanians and others might allow air space to the Israelis for such an attack. This should be discounted as not even a remote possibility.

Iran also has many intelligence agents and others in Iraq. If there is an attack on Iran these agents and others would likely go kinetic. There may also be attacks from Iran on various Gulf States and within the Gulf of Hormuz and other areas. Iran may also get violent in other parts of the world. They have threatened all of these. Whether they will or can is another question.

What would such an attack do to world oil markets? How does $150-250 a barrel of oil sound in some of the moderate reactive circumstances? One cannot tell exactly what might happen, but you can be sure it will not be cheaper oil and less risk in the oil markets and other markets? Iran may also attack facilities in other oil states just to make a point.

What would an attack on Iran do to the Green Movement and other reform movements in Iran? It might just stop them, literally, dead in their tracks. Such an attack would also play into the hands of this repressive and brutal regime and we may have them with us for much longer. This is not exactly a positive outcome. Attacking Iran may also postpone the nuclear program, but would it stop it?

Also, who thinks that this would stop at an air attack? Iran and maybe others, such as Hezbollah, might respond in many ways. I doubt very much that the response would be to come to the table to have tea and discuss peaceful options.

Also, like Dan Byman states so clearly, do we really know the full extent of their nuclear program? What if we miss the really important ones? Also, do we know even the partial extent of what the Iranian response might be to such an attack?

This is Catch-44. The President needs to tread very carefully and craftily on the Iranian challenges both here, meaning in Congress and in public opinion, and abroad.

A question I often wonder about: what if major issues in the region and beyond were to be solved or at least managed better? Could this undercut Iran in some quarters and start to peel off some of its supporters? Maybe the answer is not inside Iran, but outside of Iran.

There is a dropped paragraph in the earlier post - apologies

The Iran dilemma(s) are perplexing for their multidimensionality: The ‘Iran’ item on the foreign policy agenda encompasses, inter alia the nuclear/nuclear weapons programs: regional security in the Gulf; Iran’s current and prospective roles in Iraq and Afghanistan; a terrorism(s) connection; and strategic energy interests. Their delineation is complicated by the opacity of the regime’s decision-making, and now the acute domestic crisis. Making sense of all this demands discrimination and discipline – in intellectual as well as policy terms. Unhappily, if predictably, they have been those elements have been distinguished by their absence.

Policy advocacy is beyond my capacities as someone who neither has direct experience of the country nor studied it nor knows Farsi. So I shall restrict myself to a few cautionary points. Policy wisdom, after all, is the product of discriminatingly identified unwise policy inclinations.

1. The United States’ ability to influence internal politics in a positive direction is close to nil. Too close and public an embrace of the opposition is the kiss of death. Too, they do not need us to inspire them. And they surely know that we wish them well and would be forthcoming were they to succeed. As to the regime factions, we know next to nothing as to who’s who and what’s going on; so ignore those who claim that they do.

2. We, therefore, should prepare ourselves for dealing with the leaders in Tehran even under these fluid conditions. It is all too easy to conclude, on the basic of developments over the past eight months, that any form of engagement is a lost cause. That is an excuse for a blunt ,more confrontational stance that holds out little promise of success and forecloses future demarches.

3. The only avenue that holds out any hope of reaching a modus vivendi with the current regime (and perhaps a successor – if there is one) is a comprehensive approach. That is to say, for the West to put on the table the elements of a grand bargain that may entail: lifting the economic and diplomatic embargo; and fashioning a place for Iran in a Gulf security arrangement. The Iranians, in turn, would have to put in play everything that concerns us. Anything short of that is shadow play, and a waste of energy.

II.

One possibility is that the comment was meant to prod other governments into seeing the gravity of the situation, thereby bolstering the campaign for more stringent sanctions. It is less than obvious, though, that a “military dictatorship” rings any more ominously than has the “mullahs’ fanatical regime” and the “irrational” Ahmedinejad. On the surface, it might even be read as a welcome development. And who needs prodding? The Europeans are such obedient followers that the motto of the new EU foreign policy head could be “whither thou goest, I go.” As for the Gulf states, they are about as worried as can be and are not an obstacle to further economic measures. Russia? Mr. Putin et al are clearly unmoved by whatever Washington officials say about Iran’s internal situation. China? Don’t even ask.

A second possibility is that the remark was directed at American public opinion – a reinforcement of the fear factor that ensures sympathetic support for whatever the administration may decide to do now and in the future. There is downside, too, that seemingly was ignored. Were the administration ever to think seriously about a serious diplomatic engagement with whomever is calling the shots in Tehran, it may be handicapped by the very fears it is so assiduously stoking. Prudent diplomacy cautions that one should avoid saying/doing anything that forecloses options that could become desirable on the farther horizon.

Clinton’s remark is apiece with what is now the standard practice of Washington officials to speak impulsively as if there were some intrinsic cost to prolonged silence. They are especially prone to act so when visiting foreign capitals. That in itself is odd since the supposed main reason for such visits is confidential talks with one’s counterparts. After all, an old rule of diplomacy is that ‘silence is golden.’

A statesman’s effectiveness depends on keeping his/her mouth closed unless the words serve a dedicated policy objective beyond that of playing the jejune, distracting game of domestic image politics. Ad hominum pronouncements that merely affirm what is passing through one’s mind are either pointless or costly – hence to be avoided.

Given the direction the larger public debate on this subject has taken, by far the most important contribution that could be made to that debate is to point out that a military attack on Iran in the name of nuclear nonproliferation would be utter folly. Recognizing that is more important than any discussion of the finer points of how a particular type of sanction or diplomatic initiative might or might not work.

That initiation of a war with Iran (and that’s exactly what it would be; the notion of a precisely limited surgical strike is incompatible with our operational requirements and even more so with how the Iranians would perceive the action and react to it) is on lists of policy options, alongside Security Council resolutions and other such standard fare, is scary. It also is a measure of how defective the debate on Iran has become, or how much it has become hijacked by those who may not be focused completely on the best interests of the United States. The prime defect of the debate is not only that it has focused myopically on Iran’s nuclear program and even more narrowly on the issue of uranium enrichment (despite a modest amount of broadening since the stolen Iranian presidential election), but also that it presumes prevention of an Iranian capability to produce a nuclear weapon to be a sine qua non. We hear otherwise serious people saying that if diplomacy failed to prevent such a capability, then we would have no choice but to resort to military force. Nonsense. We would have just as much choice as at previous junctures in the history of nuclear proliferation, when the proliferators included Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, and the producer of the first “Islamic bomb,” Pakistan. To contend that something is fundamentally different in the case of Iran is to say that the principles of deterrence somehow do not apply in the Persian Gulf or that the leaders of the Islamic Republic are uniquely suicidal in a way that none of those other regimes—or any other regimes in modern times, for that matter—have been.

The consequences of a military strike against Iran would be widespread, very costly, and highly damaging to U.S. interests. A sample of what to expect can be gleaned from a recent simulation organized by the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, which began with an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Before long there were Iranian missiles fired against Saudi Arabia as well as Israel, a skyrocketing of oil prices after closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and a worldwide Iranian terrorist campaign against the United States, amid other chaos and mayhem. The mess was still escalating as the simulation ended, despite the professed desires of the Iranian, Israeli, and U.S. teams not to escalate. This did not even get into other serious consequences of a real strike (either Israeli or U.S.), which would include an immediate political boost to Iranian hardliners, long-term poisoning of U.S. relations with all Iranians (rather like the 1953 coup, only probably worse), and more widespread animosity against the United States. And yet I have heard influential participants in the current discourse claim that the Iranian reaction to a strike against nuclear facilities would be to lie low and do nothing.

Last but not least, a strike would not prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. The act of war would provide the most dramatic argument and incentive for the Islamic Republic to press full steam ahead toward that objective. (In that regard the reaction would be similar to that of Iraq after Israel struck its nuclear reactor at Osirak.) Whatever delay or setback to the Iranian efforts one might hope a military strike to achieve would be minimized by the inevitable intelligence gaps regarding existing nuclear facilities, and by the fact that the most important ingredients of the nuclear program are in the heads of Iranian scientists and engineers and not facilities that can be bombed.

The most intense discussion about U.S. policy toward Iran concerns preemptive military action. I strongly oppose this option. Those advocating this use the same flawed logic that preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq: they focus on minimally plausible future scenarios--Iran launching a "bolt out of the blue" nuclear strike, a nuclear Iran launching a conventional invasion of its neighbors--with total disregard for the costs and risks of preemptive action. This is the equivalent of buying a very expensive insurance policy against an asteroid strike. We must take a deep breath and think rationally.

Preemptive military action against Iran would almost certainly fuel al Qaeda's narrative that America hates Muslims, greatly strengthen Iran's current dictators (Bay of Pigs anyone?), have a major disruption on the already fragile global economy, and cause Teheran to increase its currently modest support for anti-American terrorism. On the plus side, it would set Iran's nuclear program back perhaps a few years.

Advocates of preemptive military action choose to ignore the fact that North Korea acquired nuclear weapons without destabilizing its region or causing South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea is deterred. Since the fulcrum of the case for preemptive military strikes against Iran is that that nation is not deterrable, the onus on is on those favoring attacks to make a case for this. So far they have not. To contend that the other side "might" act irrationally--as the Bush administration did when making its case for the invasion of Iraq--is inadequate.

Unfortunately, the least bad option is continuation of the sanctions (with the full realization that they are unlikely to stop Iran's nuclear program in the absence of a comprehensive plan to address Teheran's insecurity), a clear policy of extended deterrence in the Gulf region, renewed investment in missile defense, and, possibly, support to armed resistance within Iran itself.

Neda was not alone. It seems like ancient history now, but many joined her in the street protests following the disputed Iranian presidential elections last June. When Neda took to the streets on June 20 she had lots of company. Thousands flooded the streets of Tehran, stranding her cramped Peugeot 206 in a snarl of traffic. Sweltering heat and an inoperative air-conditioner prompted her and two friends to abandon the car. They walked a short way to get a closer look.

Neda Agha-Soltan was shot square in the chest. She bled out on the street. She did not die in obscurity.

At least two bystanders captured the shooting on cell phone cameras. The video was uploaded to the Internet--and became the social networking shot heard round the world. Before the end of the day, exchanges on Twitter using the hashmark--#neda--became one of the top trending topics by the end of the day. By June 22, an Associated Press report based exclusively on Internet sources took the story global.

Tehran in 2009 is not Tiananmen Square in 1989. It is unlikely that the powerful voice of opposition, for which Neda became a universal symbol, will ever be silenced. The Internet will make sure of that.

The government's response to the Green movement has only made it turn more oppressive and odious in the eyes of both Iranians and the outside world. Further, Iranian President Ahmadinejad has killed any prospects of accommodation with the West.

In short, this is a government that cannot stand. While the opposition still lacks the unity to take down Ahmadinejad and company from within, it is only a matter of time. The regime in Iran is primed to be history's first victim to the Twitter Revolution.

Obama can help speed the process. First, the United States needs to adopt tough unilateral sanctions that hit the regime in the gut. Second, Obama needs to spare no effort to shame Iran for its horrific human rights record. Third, put the "third site"—the deployment of missile defense to Poland and the Czech Republic--back on the table. Take out every avenue Tehran has to threaten the West.

Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and the rest of the regime thrive on a hostile world. In fact, you have to wonder if Ahmadinejad is deliberately trying to bring on an Israeli strike. His thinking would be that the regime’s opposition would not dare raise its head in the streets of Tehran in its wake. Anyone who did would be labeled a traitor and would disappear in Evin prison forever. Military dictatorships--let’s make no mistake about it, Iran now is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rather than the mullahs--need conflict to survive.

Keep the sanctions, talk the Russians and Chinese out of helping Ahmadinejad, even if it means conceding disputes in places like Georgia and Taiwan. At the end of the day, the regime in Tehran, properly ignored, will fall under its own weight.

Economic threats and political isolation neither dissuaded Iran from going forward nor denied the regime the capacity to do so. Sanctions on the Revolutionary Guard and other limited steps may marginally increase the pressure, but it won't be even close to forcing Tehran to reconsider the program.

Okay, option two. This is the one I'm for, as it is plausible from a policy point of view and, in my view, would hurt Tehran politically and set back the program. Even though I am a proponent, I am still skeptical that the United States can muster support for this option -- this option is plausible but still very difficult. In recent years, Tehran has not only flouted the international community on the nuclear issue, it has also rigged an election and brutally suppressed dissent. And the world has done little. China and Russia in particular appear unlikely to sign on to much tougher restrictions, and unless this option is truly comprehensive it's really just a variant of option one.

Option three, in my view, is unrealistic. The Green Movement may succeed (let's hope) or may fail, but the dynamics are largely outside U.S. control. The United States should try to focus attention on the regime's abuses and otherwise keep the spotlight on the country, but too close an embrace will stiffen the spines of wavering hardliners and could discredit the reformers.

Option four is risky and likely to fail, or perhaps even backfire. I do not know the intelligence picture for Iran's nuclear program, but given intelligence limits and Tehran's skill at deception, I'd be surprised if the United States knew the full scope of Iran's programs. Without this intelligence, military strikes would have a limited effect and would, at best, kick the can down the road. (Good intelligence on Iran's nuclear program, in contrast, would make me more favorable towards this option.) In any event, Tehran would retaliate, particularly in Iraq but also in Afghanistan. This would set back two administration priorities, perhaps fatally in Iraq. The regime would also exploit military strikes politically, forcing Green Movement leaders to swear allegiance to the current hard-line leadership or else be cast as traitors.

In the end, I believe we should try for option two but also start thinking hard about how to convince Iran not to take the final steps towards weaponization -- the "Japan option" as some have called it. I don't like this choice, but we're in the land of bad policy options and must choose accordingly.