If the United States had never invaded Iraq, we could have finished the job in Afghanistan at a relatively small cost in blood and treasure. Therefore, we would not now be in a position where we are seen as occupiers by many in that country and where it will cost us hundreds of billions of dollars more and thousands of additional lives to ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a haven for Al Qaeda or a threat to the region. In addition, had we finished the job in Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan would not be teetering on the brink of becoming a failed state while trying to hedge its bets between supporting the Taliban and us.

Had we not invaded, Saddam Hussein might still be in power, but as General Zinni pointed out in 2002, before we undertook this mindless, needless, senseless war, Saddam was contained and growing weaker. Thus, he would be less of a threat to his neighbors and the region. No doubt some Iraqis would have suffered under a continuation of Saddam’s regime had he lasted these past seven years, but far fewer would have suffered and died or been forced to flee their country as a result of the unjustified invasion, followed by a ham handed occupation.

Moreover, Baghdad would still be an integrated city, with Sunnis and Shiites living side by side in relative peace, rather than having been ethnically cleansed. The Kurds would most likely be in the same place as they are now, a quasi-independent entity making their own rules and regulations. Finally, Iran would have much less influence in Iraq and would have continued to be helpful to us in Afghanistan, as they were until we invaded Iraq.

Our economic position in the world would also be on much firmer ground. Not only would we not have had to borrow the trillions of dollars we squandered in Iraq, thus making it more difficult to deal with the economic crisis in this country, but we would have spent far less on oil over these past several years that it has taken for Iraq to return to its pre-war level of output.

Finally our armed forces, particularly the ground forces, would be in much better shape. The Army would not have had to lower its recruiting standards, nor would it have lost so many qualified officers and NCOs, who were driven out by the back to back deployments with little dwell time. Nor would the Pentagon and the nation have to care for the hundreds of thousands of servicemen and women who suffered physical and mental wounds.

In 2005, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-conservative analyst, noted that if President Bush had told the American people in 2003 that the U.S. would spend trillions of dollars and suffer tens of thousands of casualties so Iraq could have an election, he would have been laughed out of the ballpark. Well Iraq had an election in 2005 and violence flared, and it is about to have another one. And we shall see how that turns out.

In reflecting on the Iraq War, the concept of "aggressive war" comes foremost to my mind. The war was neither a war of self-defense, nor one authorized by the United Nations Security Council. As such, its perpetrators committed what the US chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, US Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, considered the most serious of all international crimes, that of aggression. Jackson said in his opening remarks to the tribunal, "Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however objectionable it finds the status quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those conditions." A tragic and, I believe, shameful consequence of the Iraq War is that our country has proven indifferent to the standards that we so strongly supported at Nuremberg, when these standards have been violated by our own leaders.

Many Iraqi lives were lost, many Iraqis lost loved ones, many were displaced from their homes and from their country. The war cannot in any sense be judged worthwhile to these Iraqis. The dead cannot be restored to life, nor can America's honor be restored for going to war on the basis of lies. So, had the war never been initiated and were Saddam Hussein still in power, both Iraq and the United States would be far better off. The lives of many Iraqis would have been spared, and the United States might still be viewed as a defender of international law. As a side benefit, Iraq would still provide some needed balance to the growing power of Iran in the region.

Let me propose an intervening variable: say the United States actually pushed toward a second United Nations Security Council Resolution, and Saddam came clean to the U.N. inspectors. We would have discovered that he did not have nukes, as the inspectors knew already but were unable to convince President George W. Bush. Today Saddam would likely still be in power, still bloodthirsty, but the international sanctions would most likely be relieved. In that scenario the Iraqi people are (marginally) better off, and the region is somewhat more stable than it is today.

"...For any expert bloggers who still want to engage on the subject, I would like to pose a last question on Iraq that tends to haunt me. What if the United States had never launched the Iraq war? "

Well, for starters, we might be out of Afghanistan by now...

On this subject: Yesterday, Tom Ricks broke the news that Gen. Ray Odierno, the US commander in Iraq, is requesting an additional brigade of combat troops -- probably to be relabeled an "advise and assist brigade" -- to stay in Iraq past the August withdrawal deadline, specifically to keep a lid on Kurdish-Arab-Turkmen-etc. conflict in Kirkuk. Ricks updated with Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell's response today.

P.S. If the hyperlinks above don't work on your machine, you can copy and paste the following into your browser:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/25/odierno_requests_more_combat_forces_in_iraq_beyond_the_obama_deadline

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/26/general_odierno_s_troop_request_vs_the_pentagon_spokesman_s_quibbles

A Blood Red Rorschach Test

This week’s blog discussion convinces me that the Iraq war is destined to serve as Rorschach test for the post-9/11 period, a blood red inkblot whose shape shifts depending on the viewer’s intellectual and emotional reactions to one of the most controversial periods in modern American history. In my own reporting on Iraq I felt that shape shifting constantly, as I tried to assemble a picture of reality from so many fluctuating and often contradictory perceptions.

Saddam Hussein was a bloody dictator who hated America and had a past predilection for weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, he also lacked the ties to Al Qaeda or stockpiles of WMD that would have made him the imminent threat that the Bush administration described in order to justify the invasion. U.S. forces would be greeted as “liberators” by ebullient (Shiite) Iraqis waving American flags. We also saw stone-faced (Sunni, Baathist) Iraqis make the sign of the knife across the throat as we drove towards Baghdad.

In toppling Saddam and his regime from power in just three weeks with historically low allied casualties, a military campaign of “shock and awe” saw U.S. forces travel further and faster, and fight more decisively, than any army in history. That same U.S. military force was unable to stop the looting that tipped Baghdad into anarchy, and it failed to stabilize a fractious country or adequately counter the insurgency that was gathering about it as early as the summer of 2003.

The Iraq-Iran War had shown that the sectarian divisions between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds were not as strong as the nationalistic ties that bound them together as Iraqis. Until the invasion opened the door to the outside agitators of Al Qaeda and Iran’s Quds Force.

The election in 2005 was to be the freest held in an Arab country in modern times, ushering in a new democracy in the heart of the Middle East. By so clearly demarcating the line between majority Shiites and disenfranchised Sunnis, they also hastened the cycle towards civil war.

This week’s blog discussion confirms Iraq as a Rorschach test for our times. Depending on our experts various prisms, Iraq’s “New Dawn” will either vindicate the neoconservative view that Iraqi democracy will transform the Middle East, or foreshadow a “Cold Twilight” and more “strutting on a field of twisted dreams in Islamic Asia.”

For any expert bloggers who still want to engage on the subject, I would like to pose a last question on Iraq that tends to haunt me. What if the United States had never launched the Iraq war? Would Saddam still be in power, and if so, would he be more or less of a threat to U.S. interests? Would the Iraqi people be better, or worse off? Would America?

PLAYING GOD Who measures the value in the equation of the dead, the maimed, the orphaned, the distressed, the uprooted? Who measures the value of being free of Saddam's police? Who distributes the values among Shia, Sunnis, Kurds, Christains and Turkomen? Who decides on the relevant time frame? Who determines what constitutes sufficient evidence to support any of these judgments/ Who has the right, the authority, the legitimacy to do this? To do so before the event? To do so after the event in a post hoc justification of the actions that produced these effects? Who is prepared to reach a definitive judgment? Is it God? Or is it those who instigated and supported those actions? I place myself in neither category. What Follows Is A Perspective On The Election Per Se Waxing anxiety over the upcoming elections is understandable. Irregularites in the process exacerbate concerns that the outome may produce either paralysis or a more authoritarian sectarian government. Neither augers well for democracy - now the universal post hoc justification for the invasion and occupation. Hand wringing, of course, is most compulsive in Washington. The world community as a whole (as embodied in the United Nations, its various component organizations, and a legion of NGOs) shares in the angst. For actions taken after March 2010 legitimizing it and the so-called 'reconstruction' have made Iraq custodianship a general issue, not merely an American one. This diffusion of moral and practical responsibiltiy carries with it a vicarious experience of what is happening in Iraqi politics. All of this follows logically from past deeds. Still, some perspective is in order to get a better fix on stakes, consequences and responsibilities. The following points are meant to frame an alternative viewpoint to that prevailing in most capitals. 1. Iraq's political future is in the hand of Iraqis. To the extent that there are external influences - American or Iranian, they exist at the sufferance of Iraqi leaders and parties. The current government had made it blazingly clear that it recognizes no outside party's right to grade its performance or to assert what is in the interests of its populace. That is what they see as self-determination. 2. Admonitions from abroad will affect these attitudes, and corresponding behavior, only at the margins. Even that will narrow progressively over time. 3. It is pointless to act as if Iraq's fate is a matter for the United States or anyone else to determine. To make this unjustified assumption is to prepare the ground for a debate on "who lost Iraq?' that will be as fatuous as the occupation itself was feckless. 4. Whatever the outcome, it is unlikely to have dire consequences for anyone but Iraq's population. The powers that might be will sell their oil, concentrate on their own affairs, follow a foreign policy of reassurance in all directions, and generally keep a low profile. The only danger of serious international repercussions will be due to the interference of outside parties frightened by a 'Shi'ite surge' or a stubborn reluctance to let loose because the admission of lost credibility - and lost investment of blood, treasure and moral standing - is too painful. If you will excuse one vulgarism, when somebody is showing you the finger, it makes no difference what color it is.

Anytime you start looking in the crystal ball about any country --even our own stable little island of peace -- you are at best guessing and at worst reflecting your own prejudices. So let me introduce my prejudices up front before my guessing -- I think we should have gone into Iraq, I think the way we did it stunk. And I think it is going to be a simmering and sometimes boiling mess for some time to come no matter how long we stay.

Let's face it, we are not dealing with a country. We are dealing with a set of borders around an area occupied by three groups who dislike each other at best and hate each others guts most of the time. It is in many ways the Yugoslavia of the Middle East. Held together by a brutal dictator, the glue of that nasty piece of work Saddam Hussein is now gone. And no one is going to put this egg back together the way it was.

So what do we consider a success future out of this boiling cauldron. First, let's lower the expectations. The government in Baghdad will likely hang together by a thread. The balance of power to maintain a semblance of democracy will stumble forward through crisis after crisis -- large and small. It is likely after we leave that some form of strong man government will come back into place.

Second, the Iranians (though they have their own internal problems) will see to it that a powerful Ira never rises again. They are already mucking around internally in Iraq and they will continue to do so Tehran is not about to forget a generation of men lost on the battlefields to Iraq in the 1980's. What is left of that generation is now in charge in Tehran.

Third, and this is the crucial one, anyone who thinks the oil monies are going to salve any of these wounds has another thing coming. That oil money will provide the incentive for each of these groups to seek dominant power.

Bottom line: we have a long term bubbling mess and need to lower our expectation of success. Success is if Iraq does not blow up into a full scale civil war.

Brenner is wrong again. And again not about the details: I could cite many more negative statistics about Iraq since Saddam's statue fell.

But I have also visited Iraq, four times last year. I know something about Iraqis' interest in living freely and well. Sure they complain, and some wish we had never invaded. But none I know (and that includes quite a few who would associate themselves with what they term "resistance") want the US to leave without fixing as much as possible. And even while insisting on shedule for our drawndown, the Iraqi government has made it clear that it wants a close, long-term partnership with the US.

Yes, humanity should be the ultimate measure. What does Brenner think would happen to real human beings if the US pulled the plug on the soldiers who have been preventing Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi Army forces from going at it? And what does he think would happen if we rejected the idea of a long-term partnership with Iraq?

Iraq has been a long, hard slog, one that now appears capable of getting us somewhere worth going. Railing against the well-documented mistakes does nothing to help us figure out how to make decisions at the margin that will serve the interests of the United States. Nor does it help Iraq. If you are not helping the US or Iraq, what are you doing?

Reflections prompted by the upcoming Iraqi elections favor the drawing of balance sheets. Contributions to this blog as well as commentary elsewhere incline in that direction. It is a quite reasonable approach. There is, though, something missing – something of paramount importance. That is the effects on Iraqis themselves. Not Iraqis in the abstract, not as figures in a numerical category of sects. Rather, as flesh and blood and feeling persons. Frankly, most of the discourse about Iraq from day one has had a disengaged quality to it. That is the norm for dominant powers on the world stage; for the seminar strategist. That was not always the norm by which Americans referenced war and violence abroad in the 20th century when we truly believed in our proclaimed ideals.

To illuminate the point, here are some readily slighted facts.100,000 Iraqis are dead as the consequence of our invasion and occupation. Iraqis of all ages and status. That is the conservative estimate. Untold thousands are maimed and orphaned. 2 million are refugees in neighboring lands. Another 2 million are displaced persons internally. The availability of potable water and electricity is less than it was in February 2003. We did not do all the killing and maiming; we did most of the destruction of infrastructure. To all these tragedies we are accessories.

Digits make less of an impact on us than observed reality. That is always the case. And very few have been in a position to see the human effects of what our actions first hand. So let me suggest a way to approximate that experience. Go to your nearest cemetery; read and count the tombstones up to ten. Do that ten times, then multiply by a thousand. Try visualizing only half that number since it is in the nature of all of us to diminish drastically the affect and identity for those who are not part of our community. Step two: go downtown and watch the homeless. Multiply that number by 100,000 and cut it in half. Imagine.

Step three: go back to the office and reconstruct the Iraq balance sheet.

Does this imply that pacifism is the only ethically acceptable conduct? No – but it does give us a more honest fix on the meaning of what we have done.

“Let humanity be your ultimate measure” is a Confucian admonition meant to guide the behavior of officials. America today pays it scant regard.

Quite a lot has been achieved in Iraq. A hostile government armed with nuclear weapons -- which is what the Bush administration believed it was preventing in 2003 -- is no longer a threat in Iraq. Domestically, what struck me most when I was in Iraq last fall was how much Iraqi politics have returned to normal -- they have the same concerns about 3rd grade reading proficiency and sewer systems that the mayor of Des Moines has. Thier politicians are engaged in envidiously gaming the rules to exclude competition, but they are doing so by political means. Internationally, give the neo-cons their due: they said that changing Iraq would change the middle east, and they may yet be proven right. It's not implausible that Iranian opposition to their government corrupting last summer's election would not have occurred without the sting to their pride of Iraqis running fair and competent elections that produce representative governments.

Whether the gains can be sustained depends principally on Iraqis at this point. In part, because with the return to sovereignty and the restrictions on U.S. military operations agreed to by the Bush Administration, but added to in important ways by President Obama's choices. The two most damaging of these are the self-imposed end to combat operations by September 2010 and ineffectual engagement in shaping political developments in Iraq.

The end to combat operations is a transparently political deadline the President established to allow Democrats opposed to the war to claim before the mid-term elections that the President is ending the war in Iraq. No treaty with Iraqs requires this; in fact, while Iraqi security forces have taken over nearly all combat operations, their military leaders want continuing U.S. military help. But the President is committed to that deadline irrespective of developments in Iraq -- we will be cascading troops out of the country very fast during the politically fragile and likely extended negotiations on government formation.

An even bigger mistake than the politically-driven end to combat operations is the failure of the Administration to shape political developments in Iraq in ways that capitalize on the gains achieved. They aren't interested in Iraq, except that it not be news, good or bad. Did the Administration really not notice until the election commission disqualified 500 candidates that Ahmad Chalabi would not be a force for good in such a role? That was evident eight months ago. Because they aren't engaged, and put an Embassy team in place without any expertise on Iraq, they're continually surprised by developments that Iraq hands would be able to anticipate and affect. Chris Hill is no Ryan Crocker, and it shows. Moreover, the Embassy is not postured, staffed, or funded for taking over responsibilities that are migrating to it as our military forces draw down.

So our military having won the Iraq war, our politicians and diplomats may yet lose it. But Bismarck's law may yet apply, and Iraqis might get strong enough fast enough to prevent our mistakes from impairing their success.

Brenner is wrong. Not about the details: for sure the Iraqi government has sometimes abused power, for sure Chalabi exploited the de-Ba'athification committee, and for sure the Iranians were behind the effort. But none of that means that we have definitively failed to build a freer Iraq, or that the Iranians have unequivocally won. Of course the "new dawn" is wishful thinking, but Brenner is guilty of even more hyperbole when he suggests that we are "strutting on a field of twisted dreams in Islamic Asia fixated on the chimera of eliminating the last wouild-be terrorist from the face of the earth."

Fact is, the jury is still out on results in Iraq. Today's news is not encouraging: tit for tat sectarian murders in Baghdad risk reigniting sectarian war. The elimination of key Sunni candidates from the election lists does not bode well. The challenge of forming a government after the elections next month will be enormous.

But there is still the possibility of a credible election March 7. In how many other Arab countries are issues debated as openly, is the electoral system as reliable or the Parliament as powerful? Nor in this period of Iranian development of nuclear weapons are there many other Middle Eastern countries as important as Iraq is to the United States, regardless of whether it harbors terrorists.

The Obama Administration has not done as much as it should to ensure a reasonably good outcome. Clearly it has not done enough to channel Iranian (and other neighborly) influence in more positive directions. It seems to have no explicit plan for resolving Kurdish/Arab disputes. And it has been ineffectual in blocking the immortal Chalabi and his like from making a hash of things. But at the same time it has witnessed a substantial reduction in levels of violence as well as successful provincial elections in January 2009, has successfully withdrawn U.S. troops from Iraqi cities in accordance with the President's plans and his predecessor's commitments, and has helped Iraq to begin the long process of increasing its oil production. Getting U.S. troop strength down to 50,000 or so by this summer, as the President plans, would be a big achievement.

There is still a real possibility that Iraq will turn out better than many feared: a relatively open and somewhat tolerant society governed through more or less representative institutions and aligned if not allied with the U.S. Not a new dawn, but not the end of civilization either.

Quite frankly, in macro terms, a great amount of precious US blood has been shed and treasure spent since 2003 to purchase little more than quite a bit of grief--for both Americans and Iraqis.

Yes, the Saddam Hussein regime was overturned. However, that regime's worst crimes--ranging from genocide at home and wars beyond Iraq's borders--were committed between 1980 (the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War) and 1994 (roughly, the completion of Saddam's campaign to drain the bulk of Iraq's southern marshes to destroy an ancient Shi'a culture there). Since US intervention, even fairly low estimates concede that at least 125,000 to 150,000 Iraqis have died one way or another in the carnage, probably tens of thousands of others, and an even greater number probably have been seriously wounded or maimed. Additionally, Iraq's basic infrustructure, weakened by years of UN sanctions, was devastated by the Anglo-US invasion, post-war neglect, and insurgent sabotage. All manner of public services, also hammered by sanctions, suffered far more cruelly since 2003, and governance at all levels has been plagued by more corruption than has been seen since Iraqi independence. Also, as reflected in all manner of developments since 2003, Iraq's simmering ethno-sectarian divides have been inflamed still further. Finally, a country with an authoritarian, but largely secular, government that despised Islamic militants associated with al-Qaeda prior to 2003 became, for a time, al-Qaeda's most important regional combat zone, a situation still not completely rectified. Consequently, anyone describing our achievements to date in Iraq as an overall success, either in American or Iraqi terms, is not taking in the entire picture or is engaging in considerable denial.

As for the impending elections in Iraq, there is an old saying that trouble comes in threes. We have had shamelessly rigged elections in Iran and Afghanistan. With the arbitrary and highly questionable exclusion of so many leading Sunni Arab, secular, and independent Shi'a candidates, it would appear that we are on the way to witnessing another.

The Administration seems intent upon preserving as long as possible in Iraq as sizeable a military presence as possible for reasons related to stability. However, although I can easily envision a spike in political instability and ethno-sectarian strife, I do not anticipate a return to the dreadful security situation of 2003-2007. And Baghdad has made clear it is loathe to again use US forces for security heavy lifting, and their presence certainly is buying us little in the way of political influence. Essentially, for better or worse, dominant political forces in Iraq have signalled that they will determine the course of events there. And the post-election sorting out of the new Iraqi political order could well take a number of months, more time than we have prior to our withdrawal deadline in any case.

At this point, it probably would make the most sense to accelerate, not prolong, the balance of our withdrawal. US combat troops in Iraq are needed elsewhere, even if that is back in their bases in the United States where a much-needed restoration of overall readiness can be effected.

Operation New Dawn! How disarming it would be were this a sign that a bit of dry wit had penetrated the mental fastness that is the American defense establishment. Alas, the truth is that the Pentagon's public relations machine is still grinding away. This administration's dedication to continuing the tradition of dishonest public communication bequeathed it by the Bush bunch is of cardinal importance. For its implications for how we conduct the nation's affairs are deeper and more enduring than this ridiculous try at casting the mantle of success over our gory, corrupt and inept escapade in Iraq. First a few thoughts on the dimensions of our failure there.

The primary features of what Iraq is becoming are marked out by recent developments. Three stand out. The Maliki government used the military police to force the demission of elected officials in Ninevah province who were political opponents of the current regime. That is one. The shadowy Accountability and Justice Commission that vets candidates for the upcoming elections has succeeded in removing from the lists leading Sunni figures along with a pot pouri of secularists and dissident Shi'a. That is two. The mastermind of this operation has been Ahmed Chalabi, erstwhile paladin of the neo-conservative schemers who instigated the entire tragic affair. That is three. Chalabi has had intimate ties with Iranian leaders, especially in the powerful security services, from the outset. He always was Tehran's man insofar as he placed his largest bets for gaining personal power on his Iranian co-conspirators. His key role in passing to them information that compromised American secret codes back in 2005 led to his being blacklisted by American officers in Baghdad -- for awhile. Nonetheless, he has remained a powerful behind the scenes figure. Now, General Odierno pronounces himself shocked by the discovery that Chalabi and his protégé, Mr. Lami, are the sharp edge of mounting Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. The good general acts as one who had just made the stunning discovery that people in Las Vegas play roulette. Or, perhaps, it's the losing part that leaves him shocked.

The unpalatable truths for the promoters of the "New Dawn" over the Tigris are that Iranian influence has eclipsed that of the United States, a fact of life regardless of whether we have 130,000 troops on the ground or 13; that Iraq is slipping perceptibly into an autocracy in the mode of other states in the region; that simmering sectarian rivalries will bedevil Iraqi politics for the foreseeable future. We have dared the impossible in Iraq and we have failed abjectly -- that is the long and short of it. Moreover, we have been obtuse in ignoring the writing on the wall even though it has been there in bright neon for years. After all, when Maliki is repeatedly pictured walking hand-in-hand with Mr. Ahmedinejad in Baghdad as well as Tehran they are doing more than observing courtesies.

Yet, too many have too much at stake to let the truth speak for itself; much less to learn its lessons. The authors of our Mesopotamian misadventure have their reputations and current influence at stake. David Petraeus and his cohort have their personal stake in the myth of a modern day Lawrence on a white Arabian stead with a counter insurgency manual in one hand and a sword in the other. The Obama people have their own interests in downplaying the Iraq debacle. For the White House has embarked on its own quixotic adventure in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ambitions there are as grand, the obstacles as formidable, success as improbable, and the justification only somewhat less fanciful. The key assumptions are the same. Hence, the refusal to highlight the outcome in Iraq that contradicts them. They are: the United States can produce the transformation of an entire culture out of the barrel of a gun; the natives eventually will put their trust in well-intentioned Americans no matter what; it is imperative to dominate militarily the region forevermore; the nation's essential well-being is directly affected by what is going on in these alien places; and, finally, that the audacious goal of reducing to zero the terrorist and pseudo-terrorist threats is realistic.

To face honestly the Iraq fiasco is to undermine support for the escalated commitment in AfPak, since the earlier experience largely invalidates those assumptions. Therefore, their disproval was ignored or studiously misrepresented. That made it easier for the basic questions of "why" and "how" in Afpak to be sloughed over. If not put on the table, there is no need to give answers. Accordingly, General Eikenberry the skeptical nay-sayer who did raise them was kept on the sidelines of the endless, meandering discussions whose outcome was predetermined.

This is not the way for a great nation to engage matters of high consequence. Bandying around slogans like "Operation New Dawn" is symptomatic of a process that is dishonest and irresponsible at its core. There are limits to how much dishonestly even a resilient country like ours can take, a limit to the costs that it can bear. Instead, our political class should be leading us in a soul searching as to what we as a people want and what is achievable. The lives of Americans and the integrity of their public institutions are factors in the equation whether our masters admit it or not. In the present depressed economic circumstances, ones likely to remain with us indefinitely, the trade-offs are momentous. Inescapably, we risk the well-being and health of our citizens by strutting on a field of twisted dreams in Islamic Asia fixated on the chimera of eliminating the last would-be terrorist from the face of the earth. What we have to look forward to is a Cold Dawn -- if not a cold twilight.