Dishonesty in Washington at high levels has become like poverty in India. Just when you think you’ve seen the very bottom, you discover yet a lower level of degradation. After the Bush years of outright lies and systematic deception, we now have Obama plumbing new depths as he tortures the very language itself. 1984 here we are. Escalation is withdrawal; establishing a protectorate wherein the United States runs the government behind a nominal Afghan façade is “not nation-building;” a facsimile of a British style native state under the Raj is transmuted into self-determination.

Then there is the troubling choice of the West Point Military Academy as venue for this historic address. There is only one place for the President of the United States to speak to the citizenry on a matter of war and peace – it is the White House. It is- along with the Congress - the cynosure of our collective political identity, the repository of our democratic compact. We, as citizens, are all there – equal members of the republic. Choosing a military venue adds nothing in terms of legitimacy, of dedication to the country, of the supposed conviction of the words being spoken. The trappings of physical might, as opposed to the symbols of authority, are more suitable to tin pot tyrants and megalomaniac emperors.

“As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service.” Obama owes that to the American people as their President – before whatever he owes the troops.

Our soldiers are to be honored – as we do in every war we fight. We should always remember, though, that they are citizen-soldiers. Every one of them – cadet, NCO, four star general or volunteer GI – is above all a citizen. That is their one overriding and enduring identity in the tragic drama that is war. There is no greater glory; there is no greater status. An American army is of the people, by the people, for the people. Nothing less, nothing more. True, these days the ‘by’ must be qualified. What these volunteers are called upon to do is exceptional since it is not shared by all of their fellow Americans. That unfortunate truth, though, does not reduce the primacy of what being a citizen soldier is and what that means. Sad to say, this core principle of our country has eluded Mr. Obama.

As for the speech itself, there is no point is dissecting further this exercise in sophistry. If Americans are so disengaged from reality and so credulous that they’re ready to believe that 2 + 2 = 5, that war is peace, that the very essence of America is at stake in the Hindu Kush, then no commentary can change things. Still, for the sake of the record – even if purely historical - allow me to make a few points that perhaps have wider relevance.

1. The belief that we calibrate a war in an intricate, multi-layered situation such as that in Afghanistan and Pakistan is pure self-delusion. Unhappily, this hubris is widespread in Washington policy circles. Faith says that we can fine-tune interventions. Send in ‘X’ number of troops for ‘X’ number of months, re-jigger the military/civilian teams, manipulate the native politicians, then do a reassessment and adjust the modalities.

The real world simply doesn’t permit experimental occupations. There are dynamics that deny us those luxuries. Dynamics at home, dynamics in the military, dynamics in country ‘A,’ dynamics in the region, etc. As one cynical commentator sourly remarked: “I sometimes think that when adolescents addicted to computer games grow up they become counter-insurgency experts.” That caricature is unfair to a corps of able and dedicated persons who have taken on onerous responsibilities. Still, it is no more inaccurate than postulating an ability to calibrate – and recalibrate - strategy/tactics for controlling the affairs of places like Afghanistan and Pakistan (not to speak of Iraq where we are being tossed out by a government on intimate terms with Teheran).

The above paragraph was originally posted on September 9

2. Obama is high on the intoxicating conceit that he can talk himself into anything and out of anything. His one strong conviction is that he is smarter, and superior all around, to us lesser mortals. At West Point, he sought not only to delude the American people but also to delude friends and foes alike that they should listen only to that part of the message directed at them. They are not so stupid.

Any course on foreign policy and diplomacy in a respectable university highlights the dangers of addressing multiple audiences at once. The messages interfere with each other. Yet, The New York Times of November 26 ran a long story on how the White House was planning to try and do exactly that. Leaking their clever scheme in advance seemed based on the idea that only Americans with high security clearances have access to the NYT duringThanksgiving week. Time for the White House to get off the Marrakech Express.

How does a great nation with hallowed democratic institutions reach this nadir of public discourse? A meaningful answer requires plumbing the depths of an increasingly atomized society and frivolous political culture. There, we will find the underlying causes. The more proximate, necessary cause clearly is 9/11. We never have recovered our bearings from that trauma. To illuminate the point, let’s consider two historical ‘might have beens.’

One, if the FBI had been minimally competent, the plot would have been nipped in the bud. Reports from senior agents in two states that non-citizens from the Middle East were taking flying lessons and uninterested in take-off or landing were ignored by the numbskulls at headquarters in Washington. Had they had their heads screwed on, no dramatic attacks, no horror, no American craving for vengeance. Let’s be honest with ourselves. It is that thirst for retribution that is crucial to understanding Afghanistan (I & II) as well as Iraq, Somalia, etc. I find it inconceivable that we otherwise would have mustered the audacious will or so numbed our brains so as to launch those adventures. I believe that logic would have held even though al-Qaeda would have had considerably greater coherence and capability than do the scattered bands in the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands today.

Two, if General Franks had nabbed Osama bin-Laden at Tora-Bora instead of contemplating his early retirement and fat book contract, our hunger for justice would have been appeased. Obama’s corpse would have sufficed. Again, the remnants of his organization likely would have retained greater capacity than they have now, but our lust for vengeance and desire for absolute security would have been dulled.

Those are the vagaries of history. Our responsibility is to resist being made hostage to them.

December 1, 2009

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Pardon me for being cynical, but I think that the Obama Administration will put an unrealistic timeframe on military operations in Afghanistan that will set a goal of pulling the bulk of combat forces out of Afghanistan before the 2012 presidential elections, while arbitrarily redefining any remaining forces as “non-combat” forces, despite their continued involvement in combat. By committing to a “McChrystal light” option that embraces McChrystal’s proposed strategy without giving him the necessary resources and troops to carry it out successfully, the Administration essentially will be adopting an exit strategy not a victory strategy. I would define victory as salvaging an Afghan government that is an ally against Islamist terrorism and capable of defending Afghan cities and strategic areas against an insurgent takeover, with continued U.S. training, advisers, logistical, air, and special forces support. This would probably take at least ten years to attain, although U.S. ground forces might be gradually reduced after five or six years. (But time is an extremely elastic concept in Afghanistan.)

Updated at 10:54 a.m. on Dec. 1.

If the increase in troops to Afghanistan is to try to duplicate the surge policy in Iraq then those thinking about this are missing some important points. There were many other things happening in Iraq at the same time the surge happened. One of them was the increase in the price of gasoline as requested by the IMF and others. This reduced the incentives for smuggling, which dried up some of the smugglers' funds that went into the insurgency. There was also the program of paying off some of the tribal leaders and others to "play ball" with the Americans. This form of pacifying bribery worked for a while. Well, enough to give people a sense that the surge was working. Then there was the increase in electricity production by both hours per day and reliability to a great extent. Then we had the burgeoning oil revenues pouring into Iraq as the world price of oil went up. Iraq spent some of that on padding its government payrolls and this kept some of the youth and others off the street. If you look at DOD, State, and Brookings data on attacks on US troops, Iraqi troops, Iraqi civilians and inter-sectarian attacks then all went down from 2006.

There were, of course, many reasons for the changes that occurred in Iraq, including the strategic creativity of General David Patreaus that went way beyond just increasing the number of troops. The troops were sent on different missions and there was a lot more effort to win hearts and minds. There were also information programs and strategic communications projects that seemed to hit the mark to make things quieter. Also, the Iraqi police forces and military were getting better over time. There were also some "quiet things" that made this all work a lot better than it might have.

What is the big difference here? One could point to the difference between the economics of oil in Iraq and the economics of the main part of the GDP in Afghanistan, poppies and opium. It is not like the IMF and the US could ask the drug lords/ warlords/ terrorists to increase the price of opium to cut down on its smuggling. Just the opposite would happen. Also, it just does not work that way. The demand for illegal and, let's get serious here, murderous drugs, in the "west" is just too high and growing for any real focus on the price of opium to make much of a difference. Actually some people were mentioning after the invasion of Afghanistan that the people who would celebrate this the most would be the Columbian cocaine dealers, given that a large supply of a competitor drug was to be temporarily taken off the market.

Like gasoline, illegal drugs runners find their profits from the differences in the price of their product from one country to the other. Unlike in Iraq, the drugs of Afghanistan are moved in a shadow world developed by organized-crime pushed demand worldwide. Iraqi gasoline was not smuggled onto the streets of Paris and London. That would make no sense. But do the drug dealers and junkies of Paris and London know that they are supporting those who kill US troops and others in Afghanistan and Pakistan? The answer is obvious: no. And there are enough criminals and addicts to keep the demand high. The cancer of illegal drugs has ruined the peace and tranquility of many places throughout the world, not just in the countries where you find the raw material inputs.

Frankly, the terrorists are not the biggest threats we have. Organized crime and illegal drugs are far bigger and more effective threats to our country, the EU and many more places. Organized crime and illegal drugs are also one of the biggest sources of funds for insurgents and terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and many other places. The profits of the drugs business in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not seem to be going down. If anything the profits are going up.

So where does this lead us? Increasing troops might seem like the cure all given that most people equated the increase of troops in Iraq with the fall in the violence in Iraq. Afghanistan is not Iraq. Iraq does not have a neighbor like Pakistan that fuels the flames and is a source of a seemingly unlimited supply of extremists ready to cross the border to get into the "jihad", which is not a Jihad in any Islamic sense that would be understood by any legitimate and well-educated sheikh. ( One only needs to be reminded of the Muslim prophet Mohammed's famous statement to his followers after one of the first battles with the Meccans that "We go from the small jihad to the Big Jihad". The Big Jihad, of course, is the efforts (that is what jihad means in Arabic) to be a good person and to take care of one's family. The violent extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan have lost the meaning of that saying of the prophet a long time ago. ) Nevertheless, Afghanistan has neighboring sources of extremists that dwarf those around Iraq. We can send more troops in, but will the extremists then send in more from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and more. Waziristan and the FATA in Pakistan have no equal in the Gulf region.

Afghanistan is not Iraq given the sources of the money for the extremists. Afghanistan is not Iraq given the relative lack of sophistication in Afghanistan in the development of an even somewhat working bureaucracy. Afghanistan is not Iraq due to its topography. Afghanistan is mountainous. Iraq is mostly flat where most of the battles were fought. Iraq is a country that has most of its population along a river basin and is one used to powerful central government control. Afghanistan has a population that has been mostly defiant of central government for decades. The government in Kabul does not have much control over what happens in the far countryside of the country. Baghdad is increasing its hold over many parts of the country, the KRG regions aside. Even Muqtadr Al Sadr has backed down on many issues.

So what is my point here to wrap this up? Focusing on one factor, increasing the troops, is an oversimplification. Many other things combined to reduce violence in Iraq --- for now. Many other things are needed to reduce violence in Afghanistan in the short run and even more things will be needed to reduce it in the long run. I am sure the President knows this and I hope he will mention some of these other things in his talk at West Point. The bright young people there who will likely be fighting in this war and many of our future wars will surely understand, as General Petraeus has, and as the President does, that is takes more than more boots on the ground to make things go in a better way. Wars are complex, fluid and changeable. Policies need to be the same in order to react to the usual in war, aka, the unexpected.

Can we win in Afghanistan? If someone could define for me clearly what winning means I might be able to think up an answer, but so far "winning" seems to be like waiting for Godot. He never shows up and those who are waiting for him barely understand who he is.

The war in Afghanistan will remain complex, fluid and changeable. I salute the brave people who put their lives on the line there an in Iraq. However, I also salute the strategic thinkers who may create better policies and other options that may keep us out of the next Afghanistan. That way those soldiers will not have to be in harms way in the dusty valleys of yet another far away land as their children grow up 12,000 miles away. There are better ways. Those better ways are what we need to seek out. Until then, I fear, we will be in war after war for decades and more. The solutions to our strategic dilemmas and conundrums are not found in more boots on the ground and more sophisticated weaponry, but more in the creative and profound strategic thinking that will be needed for future generations to have more peace and prosperity. Are these not the real goals of national security?

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The President inherited a difficult situation and an unenviable set of options. He rejected the least good of them: immediate withdrawal. Having decided that, he really has to increase the number of troops, who are clearly insufficient at current levels to create the conditions for eventual withdrawal. It is anyone's guess whether 30k+ will be sufficient, but I find it hard to quarrel with Pentagon estimates of what the Pentagon knows best.

I imagine the President will want to repeat what was arguably a successful US strategy in Iraq: train and mentor the army and police, but make it clear that the locals need to stand up on an accelerated timetable, in order to be capable of handling things before the US is out the door. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki got the message and has gone at least some distance in the right direction. It is still unclear whether President Karzai will get it, or whether Afghans will think Karzai worth the price they will have to pay.

That said, there is no prospect for a withdrawal as rapid as the one planned for Iraq (which is arguably faster than the situation there will eventually allow). The decision to stay is clearly a decision to stay for a long time, whatever promises may be made about exit strategy. We can certainly hope to see much lower troop levels, but Afghanistan is years from being able to sustain and defend itself.

It is a mistake though to focus on Afghanistan. The real challenge is in Pakistan. The Administration seems to be coming to terms with that reality, but the instruments at its disposal to respond seem far from adequate.

Even if everything goes swimmingly well in Afghanistan, the game could still be lost in Pakistan. By the same token, if Islamabad takes on the fight as its own--something it has appeared to begin doing in recent weeks--the situation in Afghanistan could become markedly more manageable.

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The answer to the National Journal’s question is counter intuitive. To the extent President Obama tries to have it both ways on Afghanistan, deploying just enough troops to demonstrate a commitment and to create the possibility of success without enough to provide a significant probability of the same, the longer we will be in Afghanistan. Without a sufficient force – and the additional resources to support economic development, equipping the Afghan security forces and supporting basic government structures – there will be no way to seize the initiative from the Taliban, provide adequate security for the Afghan people or train enough Afghan security forces. All that will be left is a war of attrition that cannot be won.

If Afghanistan is the main theater in the war on terror then it is worth fighting correctly. This means giving General McChrystal everything he asked for and more. If not, then it is time to bring the troops home and line them up along the border. We know from captured materials that Al Qaeda was energized into attacking the United States by their success in forcing the U.S. to withdraw from Somalia. The consequences of withdrawal from Afghanistan will be several orders of magnitude greater.

Given the decision the president is likely to take, I believe we will be in Afghanistan until spring/summer 2012 at which time the Administration will declare the Karzai government to be an unworthy ally. As a consequence of this “discovery” I suspect we will begin a withdrawal from Afghanistan that, surprisingly, will coincide with the run up to the 2012 elections.

How long should we be in Afghanistan? The minimum time is five years (through 2015); the more likely time is ten years. We are only just beginning to deploy much of the necessary capabilities to prosecute the conflict. The M-ATVs are just arriving, as are the Stryker units. The advanced ISR systems (such as Gorgon Stare-equipped Predators) are only now collecting the kind of information that will permit Coalition forces to take the offensive effectively. We have only just begun to seriously equip the Afghan security forces. For example, the Afghan Air Force soon will be receiving Italian-built transport aircraft. The question of what kind of combat aircraft to provide (propeller versus jet0 has not even been addressed yet. It will take years to train and equip a credible, functional Afghan security force.

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QUESTION 1: President Obama is likely prove tomorrow that he matches both Bushes and Clinton as a feckless, self-serving, and fundamentally America-destroying politician, and that like them he has not the remotest clue about the threat the Islamists pose to the United States. If he sends an Islamist-delighting c. 30,000 troops, we will know he has no intention of winning -- that is annihilating al-Qaeda, for the myriad professors, pundits, and intellectuals who can’t define or understand the term “victory” -- but has concluded that he must suppress the Pacifists in his party until after the 2010 mid-term elections. He therefore will allow our soldier-children to bleed, be fitted for false limbs, and die so the Democrats have a shot at maintaining their majority. He will dress this up by hanging the we-won't- fight-unless-you-decorrupt sword over Karzai's head -- preparing the endlessly corrupt Karzai as the scapegoat for Obama's and his predecessors’ willful defeat. He also will join his caterwauling fellow adolescent, UK PM Gordon Brown, in pathetically demanding that Pakistan do more to eradicate bin Laden and al-Qaeda, thereby fingering another scapegoat for our eventual failure. (NB: This must be the first time in Islamic history that a Muslim country -- Pakistan -- has been willing to start and wage a stability-destroying civil war on its own turf on behalf of its Christian/Pagan allies only to be told it is not doing enough.)

QUESTION 2: We should have never gone to Afghanistan at all if our goal was not the military one of annihilating al-Qaeda. Since 9/11, that has been America's only achievable Afghan mission, although the chances of achieving it have gone from good in '01 to nearly nil today. The installation of the other things bruited in Obama's dither-fest -- a stable Afghan polity, a strong central government, women's rights, parliamentary democracy, effective security/military services, curbing corruption, economic development, ethnic/religious reconciliation -- might eventually be done by Afghans, but none will be achieved as along as there is foreign occupying army present. Until the occupiers are gone, there will only be a steadily failing U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. When it is over and America loses, Obama will have completed the work begun by his three predecessors and proven to both our nation-state and non-nation-state enemies that America can no longer even identify achievable war aims, let alone fight and win a war.

P.S. The questions posed this morning strike me as encapsulating why America always loses wars, and why its government leaders and generals are the laughing stock of those in the world who still know how to wage war. Implicit in the questions, I think, is the belief that our Islamist enemies will not have a vote in how long we can stay in Afghanistan. I think that will prove to be one of those basic assumptions that move us quite far along the road toward hell.

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http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4266860/

As a 30-year Afghanistan watcher, I would like to say that our exit strategy from Afghanistan is the same one we had in World War I, which was immortalized in song: "We won't come back 'till its over, over there." As a realist, however, I also remember that George Marshall reminded us in World War II, no less, that a democracy can't fight a Seven Years war. There are resource and domestic political constraints on our ability to help another nation even under the most dire circumstances.

Our mission in Afghanistan then is to square the circle, to win a protracted conflict with a time-limited strategy. This is difficult, but not impossible. The key to victory is developing and expanding Afghan capacity to secure its population, to improve governance, to eliminate corruption, to secure more cooperation from Pakistan, and to fight the narcotics problem.

In any case, as I have argued elsewhere, the war is a vital interest, and we have no reason to quit. Attached above is a link to my Armed Forces Journal article to that end. More to follow, after I have heard the President's speech on the subject. JJC, 11/30/09

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As to how long the US should stay, for the US at least (as opposed to what might be the best for Afghanistan, something that might not necessarily be in line with our interests across the board), my response would be the shorter, the better.

Successfully replicating the multi-dimensional phenomenon known popularly as the "surge" in Iraq seems only a remote possibility in Afghanistan, despite much chatter about doing so among so many observers, senior military officers and politicians. The modest troop increase associated with the US "surge" in Iraq was the least significant part of a varied package that produced significant security successes on the ground (although not the sought-after political reconciliation that remains glaringly incomplete). But not only effecting a ceasfire involving around 80-90% of the armed opposition, but turning much of that former opposition against the most militant jihadists seems even more remote in the context of Afghanistan.

One other major question mark concerns plans to rapidly expand the Afghan army and police. Too rapidly increasing the size of these forces in Iraq--especially the more iffy police--proved unwise early in the Iraq experiment. With the police in Afghanistan already questionable in some cases, further rapid expansion of the police in particular could compromise that force rather than turn it into an effective force multiplier.

Bearing in mind the doubts surrounding the eventual effectiveness of US military reinforcement, pushing up dramatically the numbers of government-affiliated armed Afghans, not to mention the shaky notion of rendering the Afghan government considerably less corrupt and more effective, perhaps the US should establish a deadline for truly meaningful and visible progress. If that benchmark were not met, withdrawal would follow. I would think 2 years might be a useful marker.

In offering the above suggestion, I realize an enemy would quickly become aware of such a deadline even in the unlikely event that an attempt were made to keep it hidden, possibly attempting to wait it out. Nonetheless, with little confidence that the fundamental goals sought by the US can be achieved across the board, it would seem rash and costly to commit to a long-term presence in the hopes that success can be bought with something along the lines of a 10-year effort. Indeed, as some maintain, our presence there for that length of time could generate other, counterproductive reactions that might well offset many potential gains.

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The Obama Adminstration is not going to have the tag of "they lost Afghanistan" hanging around its neck. They will stay in well past the 2012 election to deflect any criticism from the Republicans. They will also do their level best to set goals that are easily achivable and look like progress is being made -- amount of aid to villages, number of missile strikes and the inevitable body count.

The wild card in this mess is Pakistan. Let's face facts. The western frontier of Pakistan is where this mess really lies. We have not been able to push the Pakistan "string." As that is the case, I am deeply afraid we are going to be in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, well beyond the next election and deep into Obama's second term, should he have one.

The short answers: (1) Forevermore; (2) as soon as possible (see below).

The sham Afghanistan strategic review is now revealed for the empty exercise it always was. Escalation was inescapable. For Obama’s staunch promotion of a ‘necessary war’ precluded a serious reappraisal of stakes and risks. Reversing himself would have demanded the kind of courage that is wholly foreign to him. So we are left with an open ended commitment to an unwinable war. That outcome speaks volumes about the failings of Obama as a leader as much as his impaired judgment.

The entire process reeks with dishonesty – a double dishonesty. The White House deceived the country in advertising a root and branch critical analysis of the reasons for our engagement in Afghanistan that never took place. Too, the White House deceived itself in making believe that endless discussions over variations of the same strategy addressed core issues. All of the participants shared the same key assumptions that never have been questioned. Petraeus, Gates, Hillary, Jones, Biden, Holbrooke – and Obama – take as received wisdom four basic postulates: (1) the very existence of al-Qaeda’s remnants constitutes a grave threat to American security; (2) the Taliban’s agenda is fundamentally no different from al-Qaeda’s, so they must be eliminated as a force in Afghan politics as well; (3) both groups can be suppressed by generous applications of military power; (4) the huge risks and costs of trying to do so are eclipsed by a dire threat to the United States. All of these highly dubious postulates are held in common by our senior foreign policy makers.

What then did they spend two months and untold hundreds of hours debating – including forty hours of Obama’s direct participation? After all, the big questions of purpose and objective had been settled in the March review. One is hard pressed to give an answer. Probably these pow-wows entailed little more than repeated advocacies for 10,000 troops (Biden), 20,000 (Jones), or 40,000 (Petraeus, Hillary). The old Bud Lite beer commercials: chants of “Less Filling” alternating with chants of “Tastes Great” comes to mind. Finally, Obama picked 30,000 + as a nice consensual number. All the evidence available suggests that this fateful decision for America’s future indeed was taken in this feckless manner.

So what to make of all the talk about Obama’s demanding fresh options, of ‘off-ramps,’ of an ‘exit strategy? They will be featured in his West Point address, but are no more than window dressing for an apprehensive public. It looks to be nothing more than White House spin provoked by the embarrassing leak of Ambassador General Eikenberry’s memo casting doubt on the strategic framework sketched above.' It is now obvious that Obama’s sudden 'rejecting' of the four options on the table, in light of Eikenberry's intervention, was just standard White House theatre. It is inconceivable that Obama was not already aware of Eikenberry’s heretical views since the memo was written at the end of October; and, in any event, he surely knew his ambaasador's thinking. My reading is that he chose to ignore those contentious ideas because they lay outside of the collective mindset fashioned by Petraeus/McChrystal and which Obama had signed onto. That explains the White House’s fury at the leak of a skeptical viewpoint while tolerant of McChrystal’s calculated leak of his escalation plan followed by public campaigning for it. This is vintage Obama, an exact copy of what he's done with Paul Volcker who was cast into the outer reaches of the financial policy universe because he was out of tune with Obama’s chosen team of Rubin/Summers/Geithner et al. It was the leak of Eikenberry’s memo that threw a wrench into the gears. No surprise then that we wind up with the original escalation plan only dressed out in fancy new packaging. The 9,000 troops ready for deployment in days did not await Obama’s return from China to get their gear together..

The country is ill served by a President who fails to meet his responsibility for the rigorous, open debate on matters of great consequence that he pledged and that is imperative for avoiding more dismal failure. What is the value of an 150 I.Q. when bereft of wisdom or conviction to guide it? Obama’s audacity in pursuing his ambition is one thing ; political and intellectual courage is quite another.

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I agree that if we were to seriously attempt a classic COIN "makeover" for Afghanistan our reach would exceed our grasp. Nevertheless, that may be what the presidnt will announce Tuesday evening. Such a program, even if it is largely limited to the eastern and southern regions would still exceed our grasp. If we attempt that, the American people will call a halt within two years, appalled by the open-ended nature of the drain on our human and financial resources. On the other hand, Afghanistan remains a dangerous place in which much mischief can be made for the region. A small scale presence could be maintained in the country for a long time, a presence focused on mobilization of the non-Taliban Pushtun villagers against those among the Taliban who wish to interfer with the traditional way of life. Participation in training of Afghan government personnel both civil and military would be compatible with such an effort as would a limited infrastructure development program run by an international consortium. Such an effort could be scaled in such a way as to be sustainable for a long time.

It is certainly possible that we could remain in Afghanistan a long, long time--but only if Afghans permit us to do so. And that is the core question: will the Afghans permit us to stay? Their history argues against it. However much Afghans have fought among themselves, they have always united to throw out foreign invaders and occupiers.

In 2001 Afghans saw us neither as invaders nor as occupiers. The situation today is clearly different, however. As much as we might wish to transform Afghanistan, a project that not only is beyond our reach, but also smacks of Western hubris, we also, and urgently, need to transform ourselves.

Even as we continue to fight the Taliban, and the remant of al-Qaida that is still operating in Afghanistan, we must convince the Afghan people that we are there to not to change them but to help them. And we cannot be of assistance if all the Afghans see are people in American or allied uniforms. The continuing and ever-increasing injections of CERP funding are testimony to the military's ability to carry out development projects in addition to kinetic requirements of war. Yet the fact that it is the military that is the recipient of such funds highlights in starkest terms our civilian officials' abdication of their own responsibilities to support the Afghan people, and, in so doing, bolster our security.

Despite all the talk of new waves of civilians that will descend upon Afghanistan to rescue the agricultural, banking, and business sectors, and to provide support for good governance, very little continues to happen on the ground. Previous promises of increasing our civilian presence have come to naught, and Afghans have noticed. As long as the face we show the Afghan people is one in military uniform, we will be increasingly seen as occupiers, not saviors, and our days will be numbered, no matter how many troops we throw into that long-suffering country.

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