Let us look at the logic of even asking such a question. Would it be appropriate to ask whether Mexican Americans were dangerous because a very small percentage of them are members of street gangs and even fewer are connected with violent Mexican drugs gangs? Would it be appropriate to ask whether Russian Americans were dangerous because a very small percentage of them are members of the Russian Mafia here in the US? Would it be appropriate to ask whether Irish Americans are dangerous because a very small percentage of them are members of organized crime gangs like the Winter Hill Gang near Boston? Would it be appropriate to ask whether Italian Americans are dangerous because a very small percentage of them are members of the Mafia families in Chicago and New York? Would it be appropriate to ask whether Japanese Americans are dangerous because a very small percentage of them are members of the Yakuza here in the US? Would it be appropriate to ask whether Chinese Americans are dangerous because a very small percentage of them are members of the Chinese Triads here in the US?

Of course, it is without a doubt that it would be completely inappropriate to ask such questions. The main reason is that the questions are logically absurd and highly prejudicial.

This country has been built on the hard work, smart thinking, investment, skills and education of all of our ethnic, religious, and racial groups. We should consider them all as great gifts to this county. We should be thankful during this Thanksgiving period for the efforts of all who have contributed to this great country. We are a melting pot of many kinds of people. Let us all remember during this Thanksgiving time the plaque of the famous poem by Emma Lazarus on the Statue of Liberty:

"Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand

A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame

Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name

Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand

Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command

The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.

"Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she

With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,

Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,

The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.

Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,

I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"

Indeed, many Muslims come to this country for similar reasons that many others have come to this country: for freedom and the chances for a better life. The fact that a very small percentage here could be problematic and dangerous, given much the same could be said about any other ethnic, religious and racial group in this country, should not be used to tarnish the hard working decent people who make up the vast majority of the rest of Muslims in this country. Many are doctors, dentists, professors, lawyers, business people, teachers, soldiers, sailors, intelligence officers, FBI agents, police officers, engineers and more. They contribute to this society in a significant way. The average education and the average income of the average Arab American is higher than the average for all people in this country. So shall we tarnish the well-educated and the hard working Muslim Americans with the taint of shame of the tiny minority amongst them who embarrass, disgust and frighten them? It is logically wrong and it is morally wrong to apply the behavior of the very few to the many of any group. Indeed, is that not almost the textbook definition of prejudice?

For those who are dangerous in our society be they potential terrorists, drug dealers, members of organized crime, dangerous biker gangs, psychotics, members of street gangs, and the like then the FBI, local police authorities and others need to get to it and mitigate these risks and help prevent dangers to the public and to the country in general.

What are the greatest dangers facing this country? Is it the Muslim American community? Let's get real and let's get our risk measurements straight. The greatest dangers we face are the same dangers we have faced for many decades and beyond: organized crime, corruption (which kills in its own way), street gangs, drug gangs and the murderous drugs they purvey, and those who can be found in any group who have violent intent and destructive behaviors be they from mental illness or whatever. Many more have died from illegal drugs, violent murder related to street gangs and organized crime, and other "home grown" criminal diseases that have been around forever than have died from terrorism in this country.

People like Zazi and the others like him need to be investigated and punished under the laws of the US. Those who have shown that they could be threats to the safety and well being of this country should be followed, investigated, contained and, if needed and under the rule of law, imprisoned, deported or whatever else might be proven sufficient, necessary and appropriate to alleviate the threats.

But those who have done nothing should not be punished for having similar names or similar national and religious backgrounds.

I am all for punishing the terrorists to the fullest extent of the law.

However, I am also for making sure we as a nation don't help breed potential extremists in the youth of the Muslim community in this country by making them feel like they are the enemy. They are not.

We all face the same enemies: violent extremists, criminal gangs, the criminally insane, corruption, and more. We are not lacking in common threats and enemies. Let's fight these together.

A war is better won with allies and with the view to the long term peace and prosperity to follow.

I had Muslim soldiers in several units that I commanded. They were all immigrants of one origin or another, Albanians, Turks, Palestinians, Somalis, Moroccans were some of the places of orogon that come to mind. They were not noticably different from the rest of the soldiers in the command except that they gave me the opportunity to learn from their conversation.

Major Nidal Hasan MC is a lost soul. He apppears to suffer from what Durkheim called "anomie," that is, an inability to feel rooted in his surroundings whether of people or place. Someone remarked recently that mental health care professionals often seek that kind of work because of some problem in their own lives or those of family. He may be one such. It is hard to see a cause in his own life for his decision to make war on other US soldiers. The US military paid for this man's education; undergraduate, medical school, a psychiatric residency, a post graduate fellowship in his chosen field. "Ingrate" is a nice old word that should be revived to describe this man.

Hasan's "anomie" found a resolution satisfactory to his ingratitude in a "conversion" to takfiri jihadism. Islam is perhaps somewhat more susceptible than the more structured sects of "mainline" Christianity to interpretations of qur'an and hadith that have dangerously idiosyncratic visions of the world. Hasan fell into that trap. At the same time it must be said that there are sects of Christianity and Judaism that can lead to similarly dangerous emotional states.

In the end all the commissions and boards and panels of "shrinks" will probably decide that we are going to have to look at people one at a time.

Hmm! I thought that was what we were aupposed to be doing already.

Of course we should be training new Lawrences. But their aim should not only to be to understand our Islamist enemies, but to understand them in a way that helps us gain access to kill as many of them as possible.

Realistically, though, hundreds of new Lawrences would not be able to make a dent in growing Islamist numbers. That would require a host of changes in U.S. foreign policy -- re oil, Arab tyrants, Israel, etc. -- which would, with time, begin to slow Islamist growth. Once such changes are in place and begin to undermine the Islamists' center-of-gravity and major motivation -- status quo U.S. foreign policy -- the new Lawrences could begin eliminating Islamist leaders wherever they are found.

One caveat, however, is that nearly 14 years after bin Laden declared war on America it may well be too late for any new program to help much. The Israeli-Muslim war is coming to our shores, notwithstanding all the Pollyanish nonsense about "99.9-percent of American Muslims are peaceful" and "U.S. supporters of Israel are all loyal Americans." Perhaps this domestic disaster is what we should be planning for at the moment.

Lawrences of Arabia/Somalia/Afghanistan/Pakistan/Iran(?) That senior American policy-makers are actually pursuing such fanciful ideas is revealing of how disconnected from reality and good sense the whole Islamic Terrorism mania has become. A bit of history (the British sold out the locals whom Lawrence seduced - see the film), a bit of empathetic capacity to understand the minds of other peoples as other than objects for anthropolgical exploitation, and a bit of self awareness should dissolve these chimeras before the dawn of a new day.

Indeed, all it would take to restore sanity is some slight reflection on our dismal performance everywhere we have tried our hand at manipulation in the Greater Middle East since 9/11. We have been consistently arrogant, incompetent, corrupt - in all senses, callous to the pain inflicted on the natives and ourselves alike, and abject failures. That is the bitter truth. Now we conjure Jack Armstrong All-American Boys who happen to be Muslims attune to the sensibilities of their co-religionists who are to be the clay for the American Master Potter.

We long since have left Saturday Live territory; we're deep into Monty Python territory.

Sorry folks. But as the kids say, it's time to get real.

In response to your question:

What is the alternative to having people who understand the country and people of where they are serving? "Ugly" and "quiet" Americans don't work out so well.

My summary of the discussion so far follows below. First, however, I would like to pose a related question to the group in hopes of spurring further debate. The U.S. military and Special Operations Command have launched a “Project Lawrence” initiative that attempts to recruit the next “Lawrence of Arabia,” someone steeped in the cultures of places where U.S. forces now operate like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. These recruits will almost necessarily be Muslims, and they will likely be given great authority. Knowing what you do about the Hasan case, should it dampen the military’s enthusiasm in any way for Project Lawrence, or suggests safeguards?

This Week’s Summary

The group wisely rejected generalizations that would impugn the vast majority of American Muslims by the actions of this tiny minority. To tarnish the reputation of 99.999 percent of American Muslim’s with this group of Jihadists, Ron Marks wrote, would be insulting to them and all that they bring to this country. The Muslims who serve in our military, and who have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, noted Dov Zakheim, are certainly neither terrorists nor a threat. The average American Muslim is probably no more dangerous than the average Buddist, Sikh, Christian or Jew, echoed Joe Collins.

In terms of what is known about Maj. Hasan, Brian Jenkins points out that his profile has elements both of the radicalized Islamic terrorist and the deranged and reclusive civilian who “goes postal” in a homicidal rage. They are not mutually exclusive. In fact, terrorism by its very nature, notes Jenkins, does not attract the well-adjusted. Workplace violence is a sad fact of American life, notes James Carafano, but if complacency and “political correctness” did stop officials from connecting the dots before the tragedy at Ft. Hood, then they should dedicate themselves to finding out what went wrong so as to avoid a repeat.

Joe Collins finds great fault with the U.S. Army Medical Corps that apparently identified Hasan as a problem, and then shipped him off to another unit rather than deal with it themselves. The future face of terrorism within the United States, Paul Pillar wrote, may well be just such random shooting rampages as exemplified by Hasan and the D.C. sniper. Dan Byman agrees that this kind of individual attack launched by Hasan is the most difficult to prevent and thus likely, but also in some ways the least worrisome from a strategic standpoint.

When it comes to the Somali Americans who have joined Al Shabbab the group seemed more concerned. As opposed to the relatively well-educated and prosperous Arab-American Muslim community, Byman notes, Somali Americans are poorly integrated and a majority live in poverty. That makes them similar to the Pakistani community in Britain and the North African community in France: poorly integrated, bitter, and prone to radicalization by terrorists and their ilk. The trigger may well have been the U.S. backed intervention in Muslim Somalia by the largely Christian Ethiopian Army. Time to wake up to the fact that such American actions since 9/11, Michael Brenner warned, are seen across the Islamic world as anti-Muslim.

Because of the apparent links to the Al Qaeda core, the terrorist bombing plot allegedly hatched by American Muslim Najibullah Zazi worried some of our group the most. Individuals who are familiar with this country and linked to the Al Qaeda core, notes Byman, are capable of acting strategically and inflicting great harm. Their Al Qaeda training may encourage them to maximize the psychological impact of a terrorist attack, for instance, by linking it to major celebrations, elections or other symbolic events. In order to root out such threats, Carafano argues that U.S. officials cannot let individuals hide behind the Bill of Rights, and should not be afraid to go into mosques, churches, libraries or inside immigrant communities to find them.

In the end, many in the group agreed with Brian Jenkins that these cases collectively tell us little about the radicalization of Muslims in America. Radicalization and recruitment to violence is occurring in the United States, it is a legitimate concern, but it also has yielded very few actual recruits. Michael Scheuer would keep an eye on two groups driven by their religious beliefs – fundamentalist Salafi Muslims who see the separation of church and state at the foundation of the American system as an affront to God, and “Israel-First Jewish Americans” and “Christian Zionists” who put Israel 's interest above those of the United States in all things.

Timothy McVay wasn't a Muslim, and he was a terrorist. The Muslims who serve in our military, who have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, are neither terorists nor a threat of any kind. We cannot generalize.

What we can say is that we have not integrated recent Muslim immigrant well. Many recent arrivals live in poor conditions, similar to their co-religionists in Europe. That situation breeds crime--and, when stoked by the Internet and other influences, terrorism. Our governments--Federal, State, local--need to do whatever possible to integrate recent arrivals so as to avoid their alientation, or worse.

And there are some things only the Muslim community can do. Such as establishing theological seminaries for homegrown Imams, who will have imbibed American culture and values from birth. The vast majority of foreign born Imams are law abiding. But American Islam needs far more native born leaders, for they can have a special influence on youngsters in particular that foreign born Imams simply cannothave, because their formative experiences have been so different.

We are a nation of immigrants. We have welcomed all, and that has included, and must include, Muslims. Certainly, we need to do all we can to prevent terror of any kind--I am a strong supporter of the Patriot Act. But we owe it to Muslim immigrants, and their American-born children, to integrate them into our society as rapidly as possible, so that they, like so many immigrants before them, can contribute mightily to the American dream.

There are some members of every ethnic and religious group in the United States who are in someway a threat to U.S. national security. This has always been true, and we as society have coped adequately with the problem over our history. Still, I believe that there at least three groups in U.S. society that will be of growing concern in the coming decades primarily because they are either opposed to U.S. political life and foreign policy on religious grounds, or believe they should dictate and control U.S. foreign policy on religious grounds.

On the Muslim side of the coin, there is no objective rationale for believing that Salafi Muslims can ever become full and enthusiastic members of U.S. society -- especially as the paganization of our society merrily advances. These folks not only do not see a need for a separation of church and state, but they tend to view such a separation, man-made rather than God-made law, and, indeed the nation-state itself as affronts to God. In addition, Salafists tend to see U.S. foreign policy as an attack on their Muslim brethren and Islam as a whole. Now, it may well be that these beliefs remain simply beliefs and never prompt Salafis to undertake anything more than political action. Then again, they may at some point lead to violence in God's name. We'll have to wait and see, but Major Hassan may well have come to a point where he could no longer could reconcile his Islamic faith with his duties as a U.S. citizen serving in the U.S. military and came down on God's side. If this turns out to be the case, our society and domestic security face a rough path ahead.

On the other side of the coin are Israel-First Jewish Americans and Christian Zionists. Based on their religious beliefs both of these groups put Israel's interests above those of the United States, and seek to involve all Americans in the endless Israel-Islam conflict in which America has no genuine national interest at stake. These two groups are the true, vigorous war-mongers of U.S. society; they want the United States to wage war against any and all of Israel's enemies, from Iraq, to Iran, to Hamas, to the pathetic Syria and Fatah. Both groups use their extensive financial resources and media access to bribe, intimidate and smear any person, politician, or writer who opposes U.S. wars against entities that pose no threat to the United States, but do threaten their country/idol of first allegiance -- Israel.

These two groups are, at least in my view, fundamental threats to U.S. national security because, on the Salfi Muslim side, our secular society is anathema to the Salafis and our foreign policy is perceived by the majority of U.S. Muslims as a threat to their brethren worldwide. On the Israel-First Jewish American and Christian Zionist side, on the other hand, the threat results from these folks having an interest in America's survival only to the extent that it can be reliably exploited to protect Israel, its God-given right to territorial aggrandizement, and also hasten the arrival of the Judgment Day. Both sides inherently contain the potential for domestic violence; on the former side, if U.S. foreign policy does not change, and on the latter, if the status quo U.S. foreign policy does change.

In all of this the fundamental tragedy is that the beliefs of these two opposing camps pertain to an issue -- the Muslim-Israeli war in the Middle East -- that is not a life-and-death concern for the United States. Our only vital interest in the Middle East is oil, and that is only a concern because the Congress has wasted nearly forty years since the first oil embargo and left us in the thrall of OPEC and its Arab tyrant kingpins. Without our need for oil, there is nothing in the Middle East worth the life of one U.S. soldier or Marine. Indeed, without oil worries we could be a truly even-handed partner for the Middle East by selling weapons to both sides -- so long as they could pay cash and carry the weapons they purchase in their own ships.

One of the recent overused buzz "phrases" in the field of organizational analysis is "wicked problem." It is used to describe a problem that is nearly impossible to solve because of its complex interdependencies and contradictory requirements. Or, as we laymen call it, a real mess. The question of Americans becoming "radical" Islamists certainly falls in this category. And, how we try to "solve" the problem is even more complex, if not nearly impossible.

First, some throat clearing on Muslims in America. To tarnish the reputation of 99.9999 percent of America's Muslims with this group of Jihadists is thoroughly insulting to them and all they bring to this country. It would be like calling guys like myself, slightly pudgy, middle aged professionals all potential white collar criminals. Though the tendency lately...

Still, when is comes to radicalization among some Americans, well we have been whistling through the graveyard on this matter for some time. We like to see ourselves as a melting pot where everyone is treated equally and fairly. We certainly aren't a society that openly attacks or dismisses its minorities with a thousand and one cuts like the Western Europeans. Some scholars have noted that our immigration policies focused on allowing middle and upper middle class people from Muslim nations to enter the US -- certainly not the "working classes" like Europe. In my opinion, all of this may have ameliorated the potential troubles, but did not "solve" them.

The radicalization of Jihadist Muslims lies is a system of deep belief. It is a belief that the direction of the world under a form of Western Modernism is wrong. It is a belief that the United States and Western Europe are at the forefront of that movement and they must be brought to heel and submit. This is a belief that transcends any efforts of America to be the "good guys" and any effort that "explains" ourselves.

Dealing with this issue is the definition of a wicked problem. You may get a solution, but it is going to be "subminimal" versus optimal at best. We are going to need to move beyond our political correctness and recognize that people in the US can and will be radicalized. We need to understand that a higher vigilance will be required and sometimes we will arrest the wrong people. And we also need to understand that there is no time or border limit on this one -- this is a generational struggle fought within and outside the US. Our message must be clear and consistent about the good we are bringing to the world. And that we will not tolerate violence as a means to an end.

Updated at 4:36 p.m. on Nov. 16.

The average American Muslim is probably no more dangerous than the average Buddhist, Sikh, Christian, or Jew. There some Muslims in American, however, who are caught up in the jihadist ideology; those Muslims may well pose a threat to national security. While respecting the rights of law abiding citizens, we must also safeguard our society, our communities, and yes, even our Army at home and abroad. This means that we must support intelligence fusion, good police work, sensible security precautions, and effective small unit leadership in the Armed Forces.

Georgetown's Dan Byman said that the jury is still out on Major Hasan, and that is fair. In all probability, if what we know today is found to be accurate, he will in the future be typed as a lone wolf terrorist, an exemplar of sunni jihadist ideology in action. The fact that Hasan had personal problems and "went postal," does not disqualify him from being a terrorist. Indeed, it would be hard to believe that all of our suicide bombers or garden variety terrorists are well adjusted, happy, normal individuals. My guess is that Hasan, in terms of serious psychoses, is relatively well adjusted as the average terrorist or suicide bombers go.

As we contemplate how the Hasan massacre happened, we should remember the case of the 9/11 attack. Just as 9/11 could have been prevented by better police work, tighter immigration policies, and better airport screening, the Hasan massacre could have been prevented by more attentive unit commanders and supervisors, as well as more resolute action by the US Army Medical Corps.

Two of the three biggest black eyes on the Army in the war on terrorism (Abu Gharib, the Wounded Warrior Scandal, and the Hasan massacre) can be laid directly at the feet of the US Army Medical Corps. While the USA Medical Corps (USA MC) excells at combat medicine, it has had long-standing problems with leadership and administration, especially in its major hospitals.

Take the case of Major Hasan. Here is a poor performer who received bad marks throughout his residency. The USA MC's response was to promote him with his peers and send him on a prestigious fellowship. Throughout his residency and fellowship, Hasan showed clearly that he was a security risk and had attitudes incompatible with service as an officer in the United States Army. It was clear beyond any doubt that his attitudes disqualified him from counselling soldiers, before or after combat. One wonders how he was able to maintain a SECRET clearance, a requriement for all officers.

Instead of being flagged and dealt with administratively, Hasan was transferred to Fort Hood and told that he was going to deploy to Afghanistan. Some of his colleagues opined that Hood was a good place for him because there Hasan could get a lot of help due to its large contingent of psycho-therapists! In all, this was the oldest bad-leadership behavior in the book: transfer your problem soldiers to another unit rather than dealing with them.

Issues of racial/ethnic sensitivity and "political correctness" have been around for a long time in the Army and the US Government. Leaders in uniform are expected to have the courage to carry out their duties in the face of obstacles, whether those obstacles be enemy bullets or challenges to your moral courage. Every unit commander in my service age cohort (1970-98) faced pressures from lawyers, higher level commanders, or the media. In the Army, you get paid to do the right thing to protect the country and then, to protect your soldiers. Hasan's leaders did not do this even though he gave them dozens of opportunities to exercise good leadership.

There should be wide investigations of the chains of command that supervised Hasan over the years. It is already clear that he was a radical soldier, and a poor performer, broadcasting near constant warnings of his severe personal and ideological problems. All of these stimuli were ignored. Unless there is a wide seam of exculpatory information that has yet to be discovered, Hasan's trial for murder should be accompanied by trials or administrative punishments within the Medical Corps for dereliction of duty, derelictions which resulted in the deaths of 13 people, and another black eye for the Army Medical Corps.

The excellent comment by Brian Jenkins says most of what needs to be said about the specter of an upsurge of domestic terrorism emanating from the Muslim American (or any other) community within the United States.

The extent to which the public notices, is alarmed by, and reacts to an incident (and isn’t this much of what terrorism is about?) is not directly correlated to the number of perpetrators, the extent of the organization to which they may be affiliated, or the sophistication of their methods. A singleton or small cell can get our attention in a big way. Whether or not it does depends on circumstances. The Fort Hood incident made a large impact not only because of the number of casualties but because of the shock of perpetrator being a U.S. Army officer (and a psychiatrist, no less) and of occurring within the seemingly secure confines of a military base in the United States. Political context also does much to determine the impact. The wave of terrorism in the United States in the mid-1970s—well beyond anything we have seen since, in terms of numbers of incidents—did not lead to a “war on terror” or increased priority to counterterrorism because one of the tenets of the political zeitgeist of that time was the perceived need to rein in, not to empower, security-related agencies such as the FBI and CIA.

Enhanced domestic security measures since 9/11 have made it harder to stage another terrorist spectacular (especially involving that ever-attractive terrorist target, civil aviation) of the sort to which the resources or experience of an established foreign terrorist group such as al-Qa’ida are most apt to be relevant. What remains are the many unavoidable, more mundane vulnerabilities in our open society. Just about anyone can stage a shoot-’em-up in any of countless public places (and even some that are not so public, like a military base). The future face of terrorism within the United States, certainly as far as methods of attack are concerned, is exemplified by the exploits of Nidal Hasan and the D.C. sniper, whom Virginia executed last week.

This is one reason the likes of al-Qa’ida are not the main worry regarding further terrorism emanating from Muslim Americans. Another reason is, as Brian notes, that al-Qa’ida’s operational capabilities have been reduced to the point that its leadership can exhort, cheer, or claim credit for other people’s violent initiatives much more than it can instigate them.

In this regard, it would be useful to get away from the widespread tendency to gauge the seriousness of any incident in terms of whether or not we can establish “links” to al-Qa’ida. Links can, and do, mean anything from command and control to the most innocuous or feckless contacts. Links per se also do not tell us where the initiative came from. In the case of Zasi (while adding the caveat that there is still much not publicly known about the case), it appears that he became radicalized during his days selling coffee and pastries from a cart in lower Manhattan, before he reportedly went off to a training camp in Pakistan. And whatever he was taught in camp evidently did not remove the need for him later to try, between trips to the drug store to fill his shopping cart with hair products, to do research on the Internet to teach himself how to make explosives.

All of this has implications for U.S. policies overseas, including military operations in parts of the Muslim world such as Afghanistan. Whatever effect such operations have on the extent of Islamist terrorism within the United States will be less a matter of further degrading al-Qa’ida’s capabilities than of angering additional Hasans and Zasis and stimulating them to resort to violence.

Major Nidal Malik Hasan is a disputable terrorist in the twilight between political extremist and everyday mass murderer. At a glance, his homicidal rampage looks a lot like what used to be called “going postal”—a deepening sense of personal grievance culminating in a homicidal rampage directed against co-workers, in this case, fellow soldiers. For Hasan, “going jihad,” reflects the channeling of obvious personality problems into a deadly fanaticism.

Hasan’s profile looks familiar. Descriptions of his inability to connect with others, absence of close relationships, passive rigidity, personal disillusion, frustration at not being able to alter his life’s course indicate a man in crisis—a susceptible terrorist recruit.

It is a parallel path that takes Hasan to the Fort Hood slayings. It includes many of the signposts identified in the radicalization process: Hasan’s search for meaning and spiritual guidance, his engagement via the Internet with jihadist ideology, his adoption of the jihadist view that the West and Islam are irreconcilably opposed, the broadening of his sense of grievance from the personal to the defense of a besieged Muslim community, his reported encounter with an enabler—a jihadist imam whose writings would morally validate and reinforce Hasan’s own feelings of anger and aggression, his expression of extremist views, and at some point, as yet unclear when, his decision to kill. If some of the markers of radicalization and recruitment are missing, it is because, except for his reported on-line correspondence with Anwar al-Awliki, Hasan’s journey is entirely an interior one.

We do not know how much to credit personal distress or political intent. The underlying motives may have been personal, but they were acted out in a political realm. Within the ranks of proper terrorists, we also find those who became terrorists in response to profound personal crises, as opposed to deep political convictions, muddled individuals who were swept along by others they happened to meet, or who radicalized themselves, sociopaths attracted by the practice of violence. Terrorism, by its very nature, does not attract the well-adjusted.

Some analysts say that al Qaeda is currently following a strategy of “leaderless resistance.” Leaderless resistance envisions an army of autonomous terrorist operatives, united in common cause, but unconnected organizationally. Although this makes it difficult for authorities to destroy the enterprise, leaderless resistance is a strategy of weakness. Eight years of unrelenting pressure worldwide have greatly reduced al Qaeda’s operational capabilities. Outside of Pakistan and Afghanistan, al Qaeda’s leaders can do little other than exhort others to violence. Leaderless resistance does enable terrorist leaders to assert ownership of just about every homicidal maniac on the planet, thus projecting an illusion of strength. Major Hasan’s Internet imam was quick to praise the Fort Hood murders as another jihad victory.

What does the Hasan case tell us about the radicalization of Muslims in America? Not a lot. Since 9/11, authorities have uncovered a score of terrorist plots involving “homegrown terrorists” including Muslim immigrants, native-born Muslims, and Muslim converts, in all, fewer than seventy individuals. Almost all were U.S. citizens. A few, like Nidal Hasan were veterans of military service, and Hasan is better educated than most.

Some of the terrorist clusters uncovered in the United States began to radicalize before 9/11 while others, like Hasan are more recent converts to jihadist world views. Almost all were local recruits—we have no evidence of terrorist sleeper cells being established here.

The plots show that radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence is occurring in the United States, and is a legitimate security concern. It has, however, yielded very few recruits. With roughly 1.4 million Muslims in America, although some estimates run higher, 70 terrorists represent a mere 0.00005 percent of the Muslim population--one out of 20,000.

This is not a new phenomenon. Al Qaeda and its jihadist followers did not bring terrorism to the United States. Along with its immigrant communities, the United States has imported numerous terrorist campaigns. Cuban, Puerto Rican, Croatian, Serb, Palestinian, Armenian, Taiwanese, and Jewish extremists have all carried out attacks on U.S. soil, in addition to the homegrown terrorist campaigns of the far left and far right. In fact, the level of terrorist violence was greater in the United States in the 1970s than it is today.

The lack of significant terrorist attacks on the United States since 9/11 suggests not only intelligence and investigative success, but an American Muslim community that remains overwhelmingly unsympathetic to jihadist appeals. Modern communications, especially the Internet, offer access to violence-exalting narratives, but there is absolutely no evidence that attempts to exploit the dismay of some Muslims at policies that can be portrayed as an assault on faith or community have interrupted the integration of immigrant communities. What authorities confront are tiny conspiracies or the actions of individuals, which in a free society, will always be hard to predict and prevent.

Even a sketchy attempt to address these issues would lead to a short disquisition. So here are a few stray thoughts.

1) American Muslim immigrants are far better integrated into American society than their British and French counterparts are over there. There simply is no comparison with Bradford or St. Denis.

2) It is easy to exaggerate the significance of the Somalis from Minnesota who went back to fight with Shabbab. Their targets were groups and peoples who were seen by these recent immigrants as threats to the homeland they ledt under duress. There were grounds for joining up with the Shabbab. After all, the interim government I that we backed for years was kept in place by the Christian Ethiopians we unleashed and who, by all accounts, were brutal occupiers who killed many thousands of civilians. Interim government II now in place is simply one of the Islamist factions we treated as an enemy for years. They have tribal roots as do their more fundamentalist rivals. Here is how a leader of the Somali community in Minneapolic explained the situation earlier this year:

"one reason they may have returned to Somalia is that they were caught up in the outpouring of nationalistic fervor following Ethiopia's invasion of the country in 2006. It was kind of popular within the Somalis that many people were calling to liberate the country from the illegal occupation," Hurre went on. "Some of the factions who were fighting over there came even over here to the Minneapolis-St. Paul area and held some conferences, some rallies, and sometimes openly calling people to fight in Somalia."

So how different in kind is this from Jewish Americans volunteering to fight for Israel in 1948 and from a few joining the terrorist Stern Gang (and later American-born Rabbi Meir Kahane’s fascist movement)? Some, but not that much.

3) There is a latent possibility of other Dr. Major Hassans. That is inescapable. Identifying them is a police matter (in his case an FBI/Army matter). Their numbers are unpredictable but in all likelihood will be in the single digits.

4) The greatest danger, therefore, does not stem from these conjectured dissidents but an anti-Muslim wave that could increase their numbers and radicalization. We can only hope that the 9/11 civil trial will bank the fires of vengeance rather than inflame them.

5) Time to wake up to the fact that American actions since 9/11 are seen across the Islamic world as anti-Muslim. All of our hand-wringing that we are misunderstood will not change that. Nor will Obama's honeyed words contradicted by his deeds. Put yourself in their shoes and that becomes obvious.

We should start with what we know.

Do we have a domestic threat? Sure we do. That is beyond debate. At least 27 terrorist attacks aimed at America have been foiled since 9/11. Most of these attacks were domestic in origin. Some of them were hatched by American citizens. Some of these individuals were "radicalized" overseas. Some became extremists here. All we know for sure is that there is a terror threat on the homeland. (There is a reason why when the Bush administration updated the national homeland security strategy before it left office that it included a section on "domestic" radicalization. They could read the numbers just like the rest of us.)

Do we know the nature of the domestic terrorist threat? Sure we do. We know it is anything but uniform. The only thing all these plots have had in common is that they have very little in common. So far, there is no discernable pattern.

Do we know why are they trying to kill us? You bet. They have different reasons. We shouldn't be too surprised, for example, that we might see occasions where killings look a bit like both an act of terror and a senseless premeditated murder. We know that "workplace" violence in America is a fact of life. We have seen innocents gunned at the office, the post office, schools, the front gate of CIA headquarters, the door steps of museums, and the foot of a pulpit...just to name few. At the same time, we also should not be too surprised when some of them turn out to be an al Qaeda "look-alike," "wannabe," or Bin Laden surrogate. There is a domestic Islamist extremist threat...that is also an undeniable fact.

Do we know who they are? You bet. We know that domestic terrorists are a tiny cluster in any data set...except a data set of other terrorists. They are a miniscule portion of any ethnic, geographic or economic group. Looking for terrorists by profiling any group is like looking for a needle in a needle stack.

These are the things we know for sure...and our counterterrorism programs ought to be based on the facts we know.

The only way to get bad guys like these is to go look for them.

We know, for example, that some extremist groups love to hide behind the Bill of Rights...using the guarantees of free speech and freedom of religion to plot and plan activities that are not protected by Constitutional liberties. Intelligence and law enforcement can't be afraid to go look for them. We can't be afraid to go into mosques, or churches, or libraries, or behind the scenes at non-profit groups, or inside universities or immigrant communities...or inside the ranks of the armed forces.

Since 9/11 we have filled the toolbox with instruments that can be used to look for bad guys and adequately protect individual liberties. These tools, like the Patriot Act, allow for lawful investigations, searches, and surveillance. They foster information and intelligence sharing. We have created fusion centers and task forces. The reason why 27 attacks have been thwarted is because many of these capabilities were put to good use. The lesson learned is that we have to use them.

The real issue before us is not about whether we should be looking over our shoulder at one religion or one group or another...but what to do when the system fails, like it did at Ft. Hood, to stop an attack when many of the classic signs of extremism were blinking red.

Our government should first start by stop making excuses. Complacency and "political correctness" could well have been at the root of what went wrong at Ft. Hood. Officials ought to start by admitting that they failed us....and dedicate themselves to rooting out what went wrong and making sure it does not happen again.

Although the verdict on Major Hasan’s motivations and foreign ties is still out, the attack he allegedly conducted appear particularly ominous when paired with the alleged plot of Najibullah Zazi and the reports of Somali-Americans heading back to Somalia to fight for the Shebab there. These attacks suggest three distinct domestic terrorism dangers related to the salafi-jihadist movement, each one difficult to combat.

Initial reports seem to indicate that Hasan was a scared and angry individual who snapped – he acted along, not part of a larger group.

This sort of individual attack is the most difficult to prevent, but in some ways the least worrisome. Angry individuals regularly do horrible things -- think Virginia Tech or Columbine. They can kill significant numbers of people, but they are not tied to a broader group, and we rarely need to fear a broader spree of killings and follow on attacks.

A second danger is posed by the potential radicalization of the Somali-American community. In contrast to the Arab-American Muslim community, which in general is educated and relatively wealthy, Somali Americans are poorly integrated, and the majority live in poverty.

Moreover, the strife in their home country (and the apparent U.S. siding with Ethiopia when it invaded the country in 2006 to topple the Shebab government), has radicalized some Somali-Americans. So far, these individuals (like Ahmed) have focused on the conflict in Somalia, but it is plausible that they could return to the United States bitter at the U.S. intervention and eager for bloodshed. The FBI is justly concerned about this potential radicalization. In my judgment, the Somali-American community is like the Pakistani community in the United Kingdom or the North African community in France: poorly integrated and often bitter about its experience in the new countries. The younger generation, which often grew up here, is often particularly prone to radicalization.

Al-Qa'ida exploited this resentment in finding recruits in Europe, and I worry that the Somali community might be similarly vulnerable.

The third and perhaps gravest concern is attackers like Zazi:

individuals who know this country well and, at the same time, are linked to the al-Qa'ida core. They are capable of both inflicting great harm and in acting strategically (in contrast to individuals like Hasan).

They could plan and time attacks not only to inflict mass casualties, but also to maximize the psychological and political effects, linking it to major celebrations, elections, or other symbolic events. From the press reporting I have seen, the Zazi arrest not only involved considerable skill on the part of the FBI and particularly the NYPD, but also a fair amount of luck -- something that can always fail the next time around.

Yet even with these three dangers in mind, I think it is premature to compare the situation in the United States to that in Europe. The numbers are much smaller, and the vast majority of the Muslim community is well integrated. Recent events, however, suggest more danger than we think, and the Somali-American and Zazi-type dangers deserve particular attention.