Are those fears well-founded? Given a level of popular opposition to the theocratic regime that surprised many outside observers, especially on the part of the country's urban youth, is there a viable prospect that the regime can be swept from power by a people's revolution? Given the sensitivity and danger of any domestic group being associated with the "Great Satan," are there proactive and helpful steps -- secret or otherwise -- that the United States should take to improve the chances of a "velvet revolution"? What aspects of the velvet revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia might apply to Iran? Finally, is there likely any truth to Iranian charges that the United States or other outside players were behind the unrest surrounding the elections?

Whether such behavior change affects the other regime’s domestic strength and longevity (and what direction the effect will be) depends on what kind of behavior is involved. In any case, it is up to us to decide what behavior we want to change. In the case of Iran, it is hard to see how behavioral change in the directions of most interest to us (such as less confrontational Iranian policies in the region, establishing limits to the nuclear program, etc.) would bolster the domestic standing of hardliners in the current regime. If anything, the effect would more likely be the opposite, given the dependence of the hardliners on confrontation as a rationale for their postures and policies.

The other reason the notion is mistaken is that revolutions—velvet or otherwise—have always depended not on whether diplomats are chatting over a conference table in a foreign capital but instead on the political and economic situation much closer to the homes of those who would make the revolution. The recent shudders in Iranian politics—which have given rise to the question whether a new revolution could be in the making—stemmed from wholly domestic factors: an incumbent regime overplaying its hand with a fraudulent election, and failed economic policies. No effort by the United States to undermine the regime had anything to do with it. The most conspicuous Iran-related development in U.S. policy in the months preceding the shudders was the inauguration of a president who had already made clear his intention to engage.                       

We’re at mid-week on the question of whether the Iranian regime’s fears of a “Velvet Revolution” are well-founded. To further the discussion, I wanted to summarize some of the common themes running through the responses to date, and dig a little deeper into what actions the United States should, and should not, take to improve the chances of internal regime change.

As was pointed out by our experts, revolutions are historically rare and inherently difficult to predict. Who can know what spark might start a wild fire? Still, there are obviously hopeful signs in the current conflagration. We’ve witnessed widespread disaffection with the regime on the Iranian street, especially among Iran’s disaffected youth. The crisis has also revealed surprisingly deep fissures among the ruling elite, with influential clerics lining up against hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards. Those unusual divisions in the regime forced Supreme (or maybe only “very important”) leader Ali Khamenei into the uncomfortable position of having to take sides, possibly affecting his own perceived legitimacy. Fears provoked by those divisions almost certainly stayed the hand of those hardliners who wanted to crack down on protesters and opposition figures with even more fury.

On the other hand, there remains a hard core in the Revolutionary Guards and among the clerics who clearly recognize that not only their privileged positions, but also their very survival and the survival of the regime, are at stake. They can be expected to act accordingly even more ruthlessly if the crisis worsens. The opposition leaders are also weak and hardly revolutionary in their views of how to reform Iranian society. And outside nations wield relatively little influence over events inside Iran, even if they were united behind the goal of regime change. They are not.

Given all that, I would like to ask whether other experts agree with the contention by both Daniel Serwer and James Jay Carafano that the Obama administration’s “engagement” with Iran over its nuclear program was counter-productive, strengthening a discredited regime that will only use the talks to reassert its authority and advance its suspected nuclear weapons program? What about recent signs that the talks with Iran are making progress? If the talks eventually hit another dead end and the Obama administration is looking for options, what steps could it take to strengthen domestic opponents of the regime?

Iran is not my bailiwick, but as I am generally credited with having contributed to the program that helped the Serbs bring down Milosevic I dare to offer a few points:

1.       The fears are well founded: no regime is immune to popular protest, and the more unreasonable they get the harder they fall.

2.       The Green movement looks like a serious one, but it is impossible to predict when or if it might succeed. 

3.       Any autocratic regime will demonize the U.S. and the protesters even if the protesters don’t get assistance from Washington.

4.       U.S. engagement with the regime will strengthen it; it is difficult, maybe impossible, to engage and actively seek a regime’s downfall at the same time. Why should the regime play that game? 

5.       There must be a genuine and indigenous protest movement to have any serious impact; only it should decide whether to accept assistance.

6.       If support is given, it should be open to a broad coalition of opposition forces, not to particular individuals or parties. 

7.       Anti-U.S. rhetoric by protesters should be expected and tolerated, whether or not they are getting support from the U.S.

8.       Even after success, it cannot be assumed that a successor regime will necessarily align itself with U.S. interests.

In my experience, truly clandestine assistance, which always seems to go to particular individuals or parties, is ineffectual. Better to sit back and watch it happen than to put our thumbs on the scale in ways that are insensitive to local conditions. 

First, let's get some clarity on what happened after the elections -- obviously rigged.  There is no way the current government in Tehran is considered legitimate by the elites of the country or the middle class.  They know they have been pushed aside and they are plenty unhappy about it.  However, let's not forget that many of the protesters wanted regime modification -- not a complete overthrow.  The lower classes, however, who are more religious and conservative than their elite brethren are not unhappy at all.  In fact, they would be satisfied by a slightly more prosperous status quo.

Second, the power base in the Iranian governing group is not of one mind.  The leading religious leaders and many at the highest levels of government do not like Ahmadinejad.  They think he is too reckless and would dearly love to get rid of him.  While they do not like the West, and like that Ahmadinejad tweaks the West constantly, they also know he antagonizes them and could well bring on further sanctions.  And the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp want tight control so they can make money and increase their power in Iran.

Third, and this is another sticking point, the West is not organized in terms of a response to the current situation. We grumble about sanctions lead by the U.S. and the UK.  However, Russia and Germany seem to be ignoring these efforts and doing their own bilateral business -- nuclear weapons or not.

Bottom line -- there will be no Velvet Revolution in Iran any time soon. 

There is little question that powers in Tehran feel under siege and need the boogeyman of American power more than ever to justify repression.

That said, the US has little to hope by engaging Iran’s extremist government…and everything to lose. By kowtowing to Iran and offering talks without preconditions, the US makes the regime look stronger and gains nothing. On the other hand, the government uses every opportunity to “demonize” America. It blamed the US for post-election violence. Then it was quick to claim that the bombing this weekend was a Western plot as well. Most troubling of all was a public statement by Iranian diplomats last week that they had every intention of using talks with the US to “play out the clock” and buy more time for the regime. Reuters quoted an anonymous senior Iranian official as saying “Time is on our side” and declaring that Iran plans to slow-walk the diplomatic negotiations that will resume this week by sending junior officials who do not have the authority to make firm commitments.

The irony is no country has done to more to make the world safe for Iran than the United States. We got rid of all their implacable enemies—the Soviet Union, Saddam, the Taliban. Tehran should be building statues to America’s leaders not burning them in effigy.

If Iran’s rulers feel under the gun—great. They should. They have taken a prosperous country with a young, energetic, and freedom-loving population and run the nation into the ground.

Why the White House would give this government any respect is beyond me. Not only will the Obama’s charm offensive fail to charm Iran, it will lead Israel to question US resolve in the region. Israel will take events into its own hands and attack Iran’s nuclear facilities…and then we’ll all wait for the morning after.

I have no first-hand knowledge of Iran. I do not read Farsi. I do read a fair amount about current developments and occasionally speak with true experts. In this I am like the vast majority of those inside government and out who pronounce on Iranian affairs. With this avowal of relative ignorance, here are a few thoughts about attempts to interpret how internal Iranian politics may evolve.

All predictions have wide confidence margins. That is one. This is due not only to fluid conditions, but also to the high importance of individual judgments and actions among political elites. Individuals count most at times of uncertainty when structures are eroded, established practices and ideas challenged, and power up for grabs. Twenty years from now, many will explain outcomes in terms of the interplay of determining forces. Right now, the truth is that decisions made by individuals are the compelling reality.

External parties who have a bearing on internal developments are few. That is two. They are the governments of the United States and Israel primarily, of China and Russian secondarily. Regional states only come into play in the event of a serious effort at negotiating a comprehensive set of arrangements for the Gulf. The NGOs which played a noteworthy role in the Ukraine and Georgia are not in this game. Less organized attempts by groups outside Iran, whether exiled Persians or others, to influence attitudes and conduct internally are marginal.

Regime leaders are experiencing acute anxiety about the regime’s survival. Internal and external insecurities reinforce each other. That is three. Consequently, it is unlikely that assertive external policies will be seen as a way to relieve domestic pressure. Fuite en avant strategies are improbable. Any externally oriented action likely will be motivated by defensive considerations. It follows that sny American led initiative should be calibrated to take due account of the politico-psychological realities of today’s Tehran.

Compounding all of this is Iranian leaders’ ignorance of the West, above all the United States. They are confused as to our purposes and strategies. They cannot make us out. That incomprehension extends to our policies toward Afghanistan. Iraq and Palestine. The consequence is an inclination to perceive diabolical cunning behind Washington’s mixed signals rather than disarray.

In this last respect, they have a lot of company outside of Iran.

Cheers,

For a revolution to have any chance of succeeding, there must not only be a popular movement, but also cracks within the elite. To me, this is the most surprising thing about the recent unrest. We all knew that much of the Iranian population scorned the clerical regime. More intersting is the open defiance of the Supreme Leader by several leading Iranians who are usually viewed as establishment types. In addition, the Supreme Leader's open siding with Ahmedinejad also is a departure from his traditional approach of (publicly, at least) staying above the fray. Finally, to make things even more complex, many conservatives also appear to scorn Ahmadinejad as well as would-be reformists. The Iranian elite usually strives for consensus, so these open divisions may be even more serious than it appears from the outside.

The odds of a popular revolution still seem low. Hardliners have a solid base within the Revolutionary Guards and judiciary -- perhaps the two key institutions with regard to suppressing popular unrest. Still, I would have rated the chances of a velvet revolution at near zero six months ago, but the continuing domestic outrage and leadership strife makes this more plausible today and in the months to come.