Mrs. Clinton's pathetic performance in Pakistan today underscores that neither she, the State Department, nor President Obama is what America needs in wartime. Clinton and almost all of our governing elite are worthless caricatures of a leaders so long as they fail to make the protection of the United States the single basis from which all policy flows. Like a hectoring school marm, Mrs. Clinton today told the Pakistanis that she could not believe they did not know the location of Osama bin Laden. Whether or not the Pakistanis know, the reality is that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are America's problem not Pakistan's. Indeed, Pakistan under Musharraf and Zidari have contributed more to the U.S. war in Afghanistan than any of our other allies. Zidari and his Army are now on the verge of seeing their country consumed in a civil war because of what they have done to assist the Bush and Obama administrations. What we need to hear from Mrs. Clinton, Obama, McCain, and the rest is:

"Thanks, Pakistan, for all you have done. We American leaders have behaved as abject, child-like creatures since 9/11 and have looked to use bribery as a tool for enticing other people to do America’s dirty work. That was and is a stupid and cowardly policy. From here on out, we recognize that 9/11 was an act of war against the United States -- not an attack against Western civilization, per Colin Powell’s fatuous claim -- and that we alone are responsible for eradicating those who attacked America. We are capable of doing so, and we intend to do so and end this problem as quickly as possible. "

This is what America needs to hear from Mrs. Clinton. Alas, we will not hear it from her or any other member of the Obama team. We will keep looking for other countries we can bribe to do America's dirty work. Geography may become a problem shortly, however. After Pakistan is gone as a viable state, who will Washington turn to get bin Laden or any other foe who appears? The mighty legions of Turkmenistan, perhaps?

It is the best of times and it is the worst of times, to paraphrase Charles Dickens’s famous opening line from A Tale of Two Cities. The choice of Hillary Rodham Clinton to be the country’s top diplomat was a choice of great consequence for the United States and a significant decision of the nascent Obama administration.Without a doubt, her leadership, vision and energy have invigorated the Department of State. She is a secretary who cannot be ignored, shunted aside or marginalized; her leadership at the helm of the Department of State was desperately needed at this juncture. She is also the first secretary who truly understands development, from the role women and community groups must play in any social change to the central role of well-crafted development policies in any 21st century U.S. foreign policy. When Secretary Clinton accepted the offer, she and her team began the arduous task of rebuilding and recalibrating the diplomatic and development institutions of the U.S. government, while at the same time deftly handling the day-to-day diplomatic work, including Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea and Burma, as well as H1N1 pandemic fears, climate change and food security and working with the Departments of Defense and Agriculture and others. She is a masterful juggler of competing priorities and has been adept at the job – so far. She has also assembled a solid, experienced high-caliber team of professionals to help her manage these challenges. There is, however, one glaring hole.

Without high-level political leadership at USAID, Secretary Clinton is bereft of the very counsel necessary to address some of the thorniest challenges to this administration. She has a competent and talented acting administrator at the helm of USAID, but the agency is desiccated and without any real political clout. It is a shadow of its former self. The agency has had to bring back retired USAID foreign service and civil service officers in droves to fill key leadership positions. Mentors for the newly hired are themselves lacking in experience, and without political leadership, critical elements of the administration’s foreign assistance strategy is being parceled out within the State Department and to other agencies. Without political leadership at USAID, Secretary Clinton is missing a key ally in pushing for a redrawing of lines of the military’s engagement in development work overseas. Without political leadership at USAID, the secretary does not have the professional development managers in place for her development policy work. Without political leadership at USAID, the secretary is confronted with the continued proliferation of development programs at other staffed, functioning U.S. government agencies. Without political leadership at USAID, the secretary’s overall “three Ds” foreign policy approach and the use of soft power has been hampered by the lack of a strong, independent and knowledgeable development voice.

Bloggers:

Permit me a bit of shortchanging shorthand to summarize an excellent discussion on Hillary Clinton, a person and personality who always provokes strong feelings. It seems that we have a rough division here: On the one hand, we have the grassroots structuralists who see a fundamental need for Hillary to remake the Foggy Bottom bureaucracy, and policy and planning process, or else State will never be able to accomplish anything asked of it, no matter who is in charge.

On the other, we have the policy-above-process crowd, who desperately want Hillary to bust outside the conventional U.S. foreign policy box, push the White House to make hard choices, and run a bulldozer over anyone who gets in her way—in other words the Hillary who at the end of her presidential campaign last year seemed tougher than Barack Obama.

I imagine both sides are right, that State as an institution needs to be reformed—bureaucracies are important to policy--but I confess there is a part of me that wants Hillary—without undermining the president—to get in there and force some hard choices. With a nod to Mike Scheuer (how can you not appreciate lickspittle?), I thought Hillary would be the one to tell the Israelis, for example, that if one more nail or brick goes into a West Bank settlement, we’ll put a temporary stop payment on the Treasury checks to their government and maybe recall our ambassador for a few days. In fact, she wouldn’t even have had to do that, just hinting at it would probably make Netanyahu lose his lunch. Or maybe tell the president that a speech to Muslims is a good idea, but not in Hosni Mubarak’s police-state.

And that leads me to my follow up question. Hillary has a tough, I’ll-fight- for-you public persona, but she was a quiet, hard-working, coalition-building senator who did a lot of behind the scenes work. Which one is in charge of Foggy Bottom, and which one does State, and Barack Obama, really need?

I thought I had a unique angle, answering the question by comparing Secretary Clinton to previous holders of the office, but I see that others have beat me to the punch. Rookie mistake.

On balance, I think that Jim Carafano gets it right: the president sets policy, and his appointees carry it out. This is particularly true in the case of foreign policy. The exceptions to this rule are notable, but rare. A few Secretaries of State are remembered for opposing the president's policies and resigning from office (think Wiliam Jennings Bryan or Cyrus Vance). Far more common are the cases where secretaries supported policies publicly even as they harbored doubts in private (e.g. Colin Powell or Dean Rusk). A few have grabbed ahold of a particularly high-profile initiative, and turned it into an enduring legacy (George Marshall), but that can only work when the policy enjoys the full support of the president, and when the president can deploy his influence to coax, cajole, or intimidate, other players in the administration and on Capitol Hill into going along.

Which of her predecessors will Clinton most resemble? Joe Collins accurately responds with "only time will tell." My friend Gordon Adams agrees, but goes on to identify a way in which Hillary Clinton might institute a large-scale reform, with backing from President Obama, and put a mark on U.S. foreign policy that persists long after she has departed Foggy Bottom. Gordon discerns in a few small steps that the secretary has taken a path that could "dramatically reorient how the State Department operations, how it plans, and the role it plays in overall US international engagement." Specifically, he hopes that she puts development at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy, and matches that goal with the resources -- both personnel and money -- to make it a reality.

Gordon and I agree that there is a serious capabilities gap between our stated foreign policy objective and the resources available to accomplish them. We disagree on how to fill it, or even if it needs filling. We could, for example, change our goals.

If we don't, how we fill the goals-ends gap is particularly important. Gordon lays out a series of ideas for staffing the Foreign Service.

Of course, such a staffing surge won't be worth a darn if, when the president orders them to a place, they refuse. (And the Matthew Hoh incident reminds us that Foreign Service Officers, unlike their military counterparts, can still vote with their feet).

We have relied on the military to do what civilians should do for largely one reason: when the president says "go" a soldier/sailor/airman/Marine has two choices: 1) salute smartly and go, or 2) be thrown into jail. I am extremely skeptical that you are going to get the numbers of people you need in non-military capacities in the places you need them in a timely fashion if they can simply refuse an order and not be punished for it.

Which is why, if Secretary Clinton intends a truly revolutionary change to the way we conduct our foreign policy, I expect that she will fail. The different regulations governing military and civilian personnel reflect deep-seated cultural preferences, and they shouldn't be overturned lightly. Americans want a State Department that relates to foreign countries, not a Colonial Office that runs them.

Comments on this question seem focused on process and style -- the sainted Mrs. Clinton designing a "new diplomacy" as did the lamentable Woodrow Wilson, or Team Obama behaving as did the FDR administration, although how that's possible is a question given that FDR had more skill, guile, intelligence, and political savvy then the whole gang of aging, 1960's adolescents now ensconced in the White House.

The truth, I think, is that Mrs. Clinton is more of the same: an interventionist and a bully when it comes to weak countries; a hypocrite when it comes to tyranny; a surrenderist when it comes to America's national interests; and a lickspittle when it comes to Israel. And in this there is nothing new: it is standard operating procedure whether the Democrats or Republicans in power. As Osama bin Laden recently said, the foreign policies of the American governing elite can never substantively change because they are driving the U.S. train on a single track built decades ago. But then, again, softer rhetoric with no policy change does win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Mrs. Clinton has been Secretary of State for a year. What has she done -- by herself or with her cabinet colleagues -- on the major national security issues and threats to the United States:

--Debt control: Are you kidding? Team Obama has taken the frantic debt-making of the Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations to a whole new level, and it has put ever more of our economic future in the hands of our enemies -- China, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf tyrannies.

--Energy self-sufficiency: Since the end of the presidential campaign this issue has dropped of a cliff. Team Obama has snuggled up to the Gulf's Arab tyrants -- not to mention our new best friend, the oil-rich butcher Qadhafi -- just as did the Bush administration. Why? Because we must keep the Gulfies and other energy-owning dictators sweet so they keep buying our debt.

--Spillover violence from Mexico: Mrs. Clinton blamed the violence on Americans, implicitly signaling the Obama administration's plans to undermine the 2nd Amendment, especially for those Americans who own guns for the purposes envisioned by the Founders: to defend themselves against an oppressive federal government or to overthrow an incompetent federal government that fails to protect their country, homes, and families.

--Sovereignty and territorial integrity: Mrs. Clinton and Team Obama said they may take up the border and immigration issues in a year or two -- if, presumably, ACORN gives them permission to issue a blanket amnesty for current and future illegal aliens.

--Afghanistan and Iraq: The surge's success is unraveling in Iraq and Obama has marooned a growing U.S. field army in Afghanistan, an army that is now told to do less fighting of America's Islamist enemies and more Westernizing of Afghans. But hey, the American kids dying in those two countries aren’t Harvard or Yale bound anyway and many probably vote Republican.

--Israel: Where has the Secret Service been when Mr. Netanyahu has repeatedly smashed President Obama in the face with brash knuckles over the issues of settlements, Gaza, and the peace process. Suffice to say, that, because of their AIPAC-intimidated and truckling leaders in both parties, 300 million Americans can be taken to war with Iran -- which is no threat to America -- by a Muslim-hating Israeli leader and his fifth-column of U.S. citizen supporters.

--Human rights, women's rights, all kinds of rights for all: Mrs. Clinton has befriended Russia and China; Mr. Obama has bowed to King Abdullah and enjoyed Hosni Mubarak's hospitality; and they have both cooperated to make sure that communism -- or at least tyranny of some kind -- has a chance to play a future roll in Honduras. Mrs. Clinton has, however, bullyingly lectured the mighty powers in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia on their rights-installing responsibilities. Hypocrisy, they name is Clinton, Obama, Bush, McCain, Powell, Albright, etc.

At day’s end, then, Mrs. Clinton has done what she was sent to the State Department to do; that is, maintain the foreign policy status quo in terms of interventionism, unnecessary and losing wars, tyrant-coddling, democracy-spreading, and failing to protect genuine national interests. Well done, Mrs. Clinton -- all this and it is only costing America its treasure, the lives of its soldier-children, and its future security.

The Ghost of FDR

Maybe, it’s a little to close to Halloween, but you have to wonder if Secretary Clinton is channeling Cordell Hull and Sumner Wells.

As we learn more and more about the emergent leadership style of the Obama White House, it more and more appears to resemble that of Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt once famously declared “I never let my left hand know what my right hand is doing.” You could not tell who was taking the lead in administration decisions by looking at the organization chart. Roosevelt had confidence in one individual…Roosevelt…and he distributed divided, competed, and segmented authority to impose his will on Washington. Marginalizing and ignoring the State Department and sending Harry Hopkins off to do the real work was one of his favorite tactics. He once assigned Treasury Secretary Morgenthau responsibility for drafting a plan for post-war Germany knowing it would infuriate the Joint Chiefs and make them more amenable to accepting a plan closer to FDR’s liking.

The rules under FDR were simple. There was only one person in charge of US foreign policy and it was the president. This was not a “power down presidency.” He doled out and pulled back authority to make things happen as he saw fit.

From outsiders perspective this more like the Obama White House everyday. One day the military is running the war in Afghanistan. The next day is seems Joe Biden is running the war. Now, apparently John Kerry is making policy. My guess is the president is really making policy…and everyone else is just players on the stage…and that includes the Secretary of State.

This observation is meant to be neither a criticism nor a compliment. It is just an observation. To outsiders, the FDR White House seemed chaotic, but it worked and won World War II.

The point is that under this system the decision-making powers and intuitive judgment of the strategic leader is the key essential variable.

If the president can’t be a strategist on par with FDR he needs to pick a different model for exercising strategic leadership…or we are all in trouble.

I am dubious about the assertion that there is a correlation between an organizational rearrangement of the State Department and either the quality of its advice or the amount of influence it has. Consider Iraq. Colin Powell oversaw the preparation of a comprehensive, detailed set of plans for the occupation of the country. By all available accounts, it was a superior piece of work. Nonetheless, it wound up in trash cans - literally in the case of the Pentagon where Donald Rumsfeld issued a fatwa against anyone in the building even reading it.

What would make a difference today is a Secretary who could forcefully argue to the President that the nation's security does not depend on what's going on in the poppy fields of Helmand province nor is the future well-being of the West hostage to counter insurgency in the high valleys of the Hindu Kush. That, to my mind, is far more compelling than a bureaucratic restructuring at Foggy Bottom intended to make the department better able to undertake nation-building in places we designate as failed states - especially places like of Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and now perhaps Pakistan where we ourselves are a major cause of the failure.

There will be a tendency to answer this question by focusing on policy and personal relationships. Will she have an impact on policy, and, if so, which policies? And will she get along with the "team of rivals," which journalists love to write about.

Between big policy issues and the personal politics at the apex of the executive branch, commentators risk missing the one big opportunity she has to bring about long-term change in US foreign relations: reforming the State Department and strengthening its ability to exercise leadership in US foreign relations.

As proud as the State Department is, it is also, in a number of ways, a less-than-functional institution. Once the clearly dominant leader in establishing and implementing US foreign policy, its role has increasingly been eclipsed the the Defense Department, with more funds, more discipline, more people, a focused mission, and planning and budgeting processes, which, for all their warts, are in many ways "best practice" in the federal government.

State lost this leadership role in the 1970s and has seen its impact continue to decline, especially in the past twenty years. Given her visibility, ability, and commitment, Secretary Clinton has an opportunity to set in motion reforms and changes that should have been undertaken years ago. These changes will demand commitment and long-term attention from the very top of the Department, in order to ensure change.

It is too early to judge the outcome of her leadership on State Department and USAID reform, but the first steps have been, for the most part, good ones. She has made it clear that long-term development is an integral part of her view of the Department's mission, and it is an issue with which she has had some experience, unlike almost all past Secretaries of State. She has put in place the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, linking America's diplomacy to its assistance programs. She has filled the long-empty position of Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources with a quality appointment, and given Deputy Secretary Jack Lew responsibilities which cover the full range of foreign assistance, management, and administration. And she has made it clear that she wants State to assume full responsibility for civilian US overseas engagement, ending the trend of handing that responsibility over to DOD.

Together, these initial steps have the potential to dramatically reorient how the State Department operations, how it plans, and the role it plays in overall US international engagement.

So why is the jury still out? What needs to be done?

First, she needs to ensure that these changes are institutionalized. If she were to leave, for example, and there were no statutory requirement for a QDDR, the current exercise could be the first and last of its kind. State should be discussing this issue with its authorizers in the Congress.

Second, she will need to ensure that the QDDR planning process has a directly link to, and impact on, budget decisions, providing a more complete and detailed analytical basis for the Department's budget requests. The Department has not been well-served by budget requests that lack such a detailed analytical basis. The QDDR office says its work will be connected to the FY 2012 budget process, so the true test of this linkage is yet to be seen.

Third, this means developing a strong, permanent staff for planning and budgeting, building on the Foreign Assistance office (F). Such an office needs to combine responsibilities for planning and budgeting for operations, both at State and USAID, and program planning for US foreign assistance. It is not yet clear that such a planning and budgeting capability is being built at State/USAID.

Fourth, she will need to tackle the human resources issue: how do State and USAID strengthen their professional work force for the wide agenda of US global engagement. At USAID, this means restoring the strength of the in-house development capability and reducing the dependency on outside contractors for US assistance. At State, this means a fundamental look at the Foreign Service, with attention to who is recruited, how they are trained and for what skills, how to create full-career training, the importance of cross-cone, and cross-agency experience, and, as a result, the incentives for promotion. The QDDR terms-of-reference include this issue, but it is too early to tell the outcome. This issue, above all, will demand a long-term investment and leadership from the top, if real change is to happen.

Fifth, she will need to grapple with the dilemma of how the civilian side of US government handles US engagement in governance, failed states, and post-conflict situations. While this is sometimes discussed as the civilian counterpart to US force deployments, the real task is to shape US civilian institutions, personnel, and policies to deal with a much broader range of engagement - in strengthening governance in critical areas of the world. This may have much less to do with building up the S/CRS office and a great deal more to do with defining USAID's role in governance programs more generally, including crisis situations. The QDDR is grappling with this issue, but it needs to be framed in the broad, not the narrow sense.

Sixth, she will need to focus major attention on building State's analytical and planning capabilities for US security assistance programs. This will be critical, if she intends to make the case to the Congress, and to DOD, that State is a reliable, flexible, adequately-funded steward of US security assistance. Not believing this to be the case today, Defense has created its own authorities and the Congress has been willing to authorize and fund them. The QDDR is also dealing with this issue, but it is a major inter-agency dilemma, and an area where Congress lacks confidence in State's abilities.

These are the key issues that lead to a "jury's out" conclusion about the Secretary's leadership on management and organization. She, and her team, have made a very good start; one of the best in decades. But the road is long and difficult, and will require persistence and consistent scrutiny from the very top of the Department for the needed changes to occur.

I have always thought they were two Hillary Clintons. The bad Hillary was unnecessarily confrontational and could cause more problems for herself than any of her enemies. The other, the good Hillary, was a damn good senator who dug into her work, was extraordinarily knowledgeable about her subject matter, and very moderate politically. It is the latter person that has shown up at the State Department.

First, Secretary Clinton is proving a willingness to be a team player in an administration that is still sorting out its foreign policy priorities. Had Clinton been anything else, it could be quite destructive and she knows it.

Clinton has even been willing to put up with an insane system of special envoys appointed out of her control dealing on the hot button issues of the day. Fortunately for her -- not necessarily the nation -- they are beginning to show signs of wear or little advancement, except the ever vainglorious Dick Holbrooke who needs a large stage like Afghanistan to be successful. Perhaps they will be folded back under State once they have run their course.

Second, Clinton has been willing to co-opt and accept the participation of the unjustly maligned State Department rank and file. Never has a sharper group of people been more abused by their leadership -- Kissinger and Rice among the worst offenders. Clinton's approach has been inclusive, supportive financially and willing to take on ideas from the experts. No one will ever be loved at State -- not the nature of the best. But, Clinton is widely respected and that is a good thing for all.

Third, and not the least important, Clinton has a grasp of the new realities of diplomacy. She established and is maintaining a good relationship with Sec Def Gates. Under the Bush Administration, the DOD was into areas of messaging and statecraft that made local commanders like viceroys. It was not smart, but necessary given the Rice State Department's narrow view of their role. Clinton knows from her own political background that "the message" is crucial and State should be the chief coordinator.

Bottom line: I would give her a solid B plus for her effort. As an old professor, I find it hard to give A's. But, given how early we are in the game, I like to leave room for a little improvement

Treating National security policy-making as a just another sphere of celebrity culture is itself indicative of how deformed public discourse on serious matters has become. Hillary Clinton has contributed two things to analyze of critical issues abroad: (1) her advocacy of 'smart power' (evidently in apposition to the advocacy of stupid power); and (2) now, her dedication to "rethinking the nature of diplomacy and translating that vision into a revitalized State Department, one that approaches U.S. allies and rivals in ways that challenge long-held traditions. "Grand Project" - as the French say. So grand that it strains credulity how it can be accomplished while taking 11 day African safaris - her prolonged absence, I'm told, rousing anxiety in the administration who thought it might be neceesary to enlist both Stanley and Livingstone for a search mission.

Seriously, individuals do count in decisions at the highest level of government. And the question of relative influence one or another issue is pertinent. That assumes, however, that the individuals represent different angles of vision that lead to contrasted judgments on important questions. There is no evidence that Hillary Clinton has pronounced or original views on anything of consequence. It would be strange for reality to be otherwise in the light of her limited experience and interest in foreign affairs. I submit that what we should be concentrating on is how to break away from the group think in the Obama administration that is preventing consequential change in how we conceptualize Afghanistan, Palestine, Pakistan, Iran and the implications of our financial collapse on our foreign policies.

The recent story in the Washington Post recounting the Obama administration's modus operandi in Super Afghanistan Review I (March) evinces a worrying lack of intellectual and procedural discipline. From what we hear of Super Afghanistan Review II, little is improved. The question on my mind is what Hillary Clinton - or any of her other worthy colleagues - will contribute to remedying this situation.

On Secy Hillary Clinton's stewardship to date, here is the exsum: on the one hand, on the other hand, only time will tell.

On the black-to-gray hand, she has not yet been Secy long enough to have any substantive triumphs. Moreover, she has appointed senior envoys --- Mitchell and Holbrooke --- who have become neo-Czars in their regions. Her voice on Middle East and AfPak issues is strong inside the White House, but muted on the public stage. She has masterminded a re-engagement policy with enemies and adversaries, which is great, but carries with it no guarantees of glory. Russia, China, and North Korea have pretty much dissed the United States in the last 10 months, but that likely would have happened in any case. There is a glimmer of hope in the case of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, but it is too early for parades, or even leaked stories of secretarial mini-triumphs. There are lots of new problems with old allies. Some, as in East Europe, were the result of American mistakes, others, as in Japan, were the result of new and inexperienced friends coming into power.

One final gray issue: the failure to nominate after 10 months a director for USAID. One boo for State here, but five boos for the White House personnel operation. How is it that we are up to our ears in nation building and the White House can't find the wherewithal to hire the engineer/master builder? How is it that there are newspapers in this country who can explain what a huge error this is?

On the other hand, pointing toward the good, Secy Clinton has a strong team and has instilled discipline in Foggy Bottom, no mean feat. Her public diplomacy and public affairs operations have generally been good. She does not make mistakes or serious misstatements. State has received masterful help here from Pres. Obama. Grizzled generals and senior diplomats are for now basking in the glow of a new pro-American feeling in many places. There is clear but managed tension between the centrist-realist line of Foggy Bottom and the more liberal, activist-internationalist (we used to say, neo-con) line that occasionally comes out of our UN mission in New York.

Secy Clinton is talking the right game about improving State Dept performance in planning and programming, and generating civilian surges for Afghanistan. On the latter issue, her department remains many bricks short of a half load, simply because it has learned how to "woof" expeditionary, but it has not (yet?) been resourced for or even pointed in that direction. Efforts to make State the lead horse in nation building continue at 2.5 miles per hour, about the speed attained during the last years of Bush 43 administration.

In all, Secy Clinton has shown herself to be a team player and a very effective manager. We have every reason to be hopeful. Gates and Clinton are the major stars in Obama's constellation, but only time will tell. :-)

A surprise nomination, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton has embraced her role as Secretary of State and skillfully navigated both the array of pressing foreign policy issues that confronted the new Administration as well as the Washington bureaucracy. Her tenure has been marked by keen interest in strengthening the role of the State Department in the foreign policy process and creating new civilian tools for the President’s use in carrying out 21st century national security missions. Having an abiding interest in development, she has been adept at recognizing the need to reassess how we provide foreign assistance. And, coming from her experience on the Senate Armed Services Committee, she was quick to note the value in subjecting diplomacy and development to a longer term planning process that relates objectives to resources. The resulting QDDR is a promising vehicle for building civilian capabilities in a strategic fashion and empowering American diplomacy to be more proactive in its orientation. Further, she has staffed the second Deputy Secretary of State position for management, created by statute in 2001 and left vacant until now, with Jack Lew, former director of OMB. Eminently qualified for the job, Lew is charged with the vital tasks of leading and pulling together strategy, planning, and budget processes within the Department.

While dedicated to strengthening the State Department, she has demonstrated comfort in working with others throughout the government. Her relationship with Secretary of Defense Bob Gates is unparalleled in recent years and harkens back to the level of collaboration enjoyed by Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall under President Truman. The leaders of these historically competitive bureaucracies exhibit a shared vision of integrated ‘soft power’ that trickles down throughout their respective organizations and sets the tone for interagency conduct. Her ease in working in partnership with Congress, as seen in Senator Kerry’s prominent role in brokering an election re-run in Afghanistan, and her willingness to experiment with a system of ‘super envoys’ to deal with foreign policy challenges that span countries and regions, as well as the prerogatives of any one Department, are born only of confidence and a commitment to trying everything necessary to tackle the issues of the day.

The super envoy system, however, highlights some of the challenges she will face going forward in institutionalizing change. While a decentralized approach is perhaps necessary for issues that span so many jurisdictions, at some point the Secretary, together with the President and Congress, will need to gather the lessons and give more form to this system. Currently, there is no established way to coordinate foreign policy interests across these envoys and their teams. Foreign leaders complain that they are visited by numerous envoys and do not know who to speak to or listen to. She should not wait until a foreign policy disaster of Administration-threatening proportions highlights the difficulty of exercising accountability among these envoys. In part, Senator Kerry’s input on the Afghan elections appeared to have been necessary because the envoy system failed. What happened? What can we learn? What is being done about it? The QDDR holds promise, but cannot deliver on that promise while people remain unsure about its ultimate status. The existence of a Presidential Study Directive that appears to be on the same topic sows a certain degree of confusion at best. Unless the QDDR is properly staffed, embedded in core processes that drive the establishment of departmental objectives and the allocation of its resources, and works with Congress and the President to advance US interests, it risks becoming another experiment or slogan. Similarly, the increased resourcing for State Department personnel that began under the previous Administration will only continue if the department can demonstrate ability to productively employ these resources in recruiting, developing, and fielding new, needed capabilities and capacities. So too, progress in growing the Office of the Secretary’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to include a civilian reserve and an interagency civilian planning function marks significant progress. However, these functions cannot forever be tacked on to a larger organization who’s DNA may perennially reject this new organ. Her great difficulty in staffing the Administrator position at USAID is a testament to the level of frustration people have with existing arrangements and concern that they do not effectively serve our interests in a globalized multipolar post-9/11 world.

All of these things will require substantial political commitment and deep organizational reform. Created in 1789, the Department of State has not appreciably changed since the founding of the Republic in its organizational and cultural orientation towards reactive responses to bilateral diplomatic issues. Secretary Clinton is reaching the end of her first year. While much has been accomplished under her direction, her ultimate record will be a function of what legacy she leaves behind in the department itself. Unless change is instantiated in bureaucracy, it quickly dissipates without key proponents constantly pressing its cause or is easily reversed by subsequent administrations. Secretary Clinton’s vision for diplomacy and development requires a next generation organization, capable of truly transforming the way the U.S. interacts with the world across Secretaries, Administrations, and Congresses. The end of the first year of the administration is a good time to give that goal some consideration.