The normal run of Americans have been "trained" not to care about "Peace in the Middle East," trained by unending fruitless talk of the search for that peace.  The media have been trained to think that the Israeli/Palestinian issue is the "Middle East."  Amusing.  We all really know that there will be no peace in the "Middle East."  We know that that all this talk is just ethnic politics, a politics that strangles the possibility of an actual settlement on anything but a very one sided basis.  It is a waste of time to talk about it, but the ethnic obsessions of some condemn the rest of us to have to listen to the endless talkathon on Sunday News Shows about this non-issue.  Eight years, Paul?  How about eighty years?

Paul's question is a tricky one since we are dealing with the intangibles of perceptions and their translation into behavior.  Also, the effects are differentiated from country to country.  I have limited first-hand knowledge of the Middle East.  Mine is restricted to North Africa.

A few thoughts.  The Palestinian issue cuts much deeper there than do any of the other American actions in the Middle East.  This despite geographical distance.  That's one.  The political class on the whole is waiting to see whether Obama’s actions are a clear break from the past. That's two.  His rhetorical flourishes in Cairo was pleasing to hear but judgment on the man remains suspended.  No one mentioned his protests of the French ban on headscarves in schools (which modernists, especially women, resent) as tantamount to a lifting of the ban on the delivery of necessities to the people of Gaza – those with or those without headscarves.  People are no less savvy than their Washington counterparts - about us and their own governments.  That's three. 

Despie these sentiments, we know from the experience of Egypt, and elsewhere, that authoritarian governments will make their own realpolitik calculations as to whether and how to respond to events in and about Palestine. Mubarak et al notwithstanding, it would be a cardinal error to downplay the significance of Obama's unseemly failure to face up to Netanyahu.   The one thing he had going for him in the region was his personal credibility.  That is being badly eroded, they are immune to the predictable White House spin. The effects on all other issues of consequence in the islamic world will be substantial  - and we are already hanging on the ropes everywhere. 

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Thanks to all who have contributed. If there is one word that encapsulates the exchanges so far, that word is “pessimism.” Nine months into the action-promising Obama Administration—nine months after the exit of a President who was widely criticized for giving insufficient attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—no one senses that a breakthrough is on the horizon. “Barack Obama will not solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Dov Zakheim bluntly asserts. “Despite the hopes and efforts of the Obama Administration, this may, in fact, be the most inopportune timeframe during which to hope for a breakthrough since the Israeli-Palestinian peace process first got off the ground in the early 1990's,” Wayne White writes.

Does anyone disagree with this assessment? If not, it seems worth asking, in retrospect, why there appeared to be so much optimism for the peace negotiating track at the outset of the Obama presidency. Perhaps the reason, as Michael Brenner suggests, is that “Obama at first seemed prepared to invest considerable political capital and personal prestige in the effort” but has since “backed away from doing that.” Maybe things have stalled because, as Pat Lang writes, “Netanyahu has taken the measure of the Obama Administration”—namely on the White House demand for a freeze on settlements—“and decided that he has no reason to fear retribution from this or perhaps any American president.” Christian Caryl, also faulting Obama for not bringing pressure to bear on Netanyahu, suggests that, “on settlements,” Obama “could start right now by sending one stark signal: he should sic the U.S. Treasury on organizations in the United States that promote settlement in the occupied territories.”

Then again, as Kori Schake suggests, the problem may be foot dragging by “the one political actor that has the greatest ability to advance peace: the Abbas government in Palestine. Also absent are the other governments in the region that could be supporting Abbas in building a de facto Palestinian state that would draw the allegiance of its citizens and build confidence among Israelis they won’t be trading something for nothing.”

Meanwhile, global diplomatic attention to the Middle East seems to be shifting away from the conflict to the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, with the fresh disclosure of an Iranian uranium enrichment plant under construction inside of a mountain near Qum. Perhaps the lesson is that peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians—at the top of the diplomatic to-do list at the start of just about every new U.S. Presidency over the last few decades—inevitably becomes a casualty of less predictable if no more tractable priorities.

A final prod of a question: Does anyone think it much matters that the conflict may stand unresolved for another four or eight years? Why should Americans, in particular, care if the stalemate continues?

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I share the largely pessimistic line of thinking of those having already left responses.  Despite the hopes and efforts of the Obama Administration, this may, in fact, be the most inopportune timeframe during which to hope for a breakthrough since the Israeli-Palestinian peace process first got off the ground in the early 1990's.

The first major problem is Bibi Netanyahu.  Let us recall that Netanyahu did all he could to put a potentially promising peace process in the deep freeze during his first tenure as prime minister in the late 1990's, perhaps having the most to do with the buildup of frustration, mistrust and ill-will leading to the late 2000 explosion of violence causing what was left of the process to go completely off the rails.  Signing on--albeit with great difficulty--to understandings that might have advanced the process during the Clinton years, Netanyahu then, effectively, exploited every possible violation on the Palestinian side to abort serious Israeli participation.  His interest in the process at the time was so suspect that at least one US negotiator involved in the process in those days has since openly called Netanyahu dishonest.  Now, with a coalition government containing far more hardline elements than was the case at that time, how could any thoughtful observer not conclude that merely with respect to the Israeli slice of the equation, the chance for meaningful progress toward a peace acceptable to reasonable Palestinians this time around is rather remote.

Then there is the mess prevailing in the Palestinian camp.  I advocated engaging seriously with Hamas in an op/ed back in August.  Yet, even if that could be accomplished successfully, it would be but one ingredient in this highly problematic and complex overall equation.  In fact, if Hamas were to remain excluded from the process, it would be that much more likely that Hamas violence would derail whatever process could be salvaged in any case (especially in view of Netanyahu's reaction to such issues the last time he was prime minister).  And then there is the plight of the Palestinian Authority and Fatah:  far weaker than a decade ago and the notion of of negotiations leading to an acceptable peace all-round more subject than ever to skepticism among Palestinians who have seen massive additional settlement expansion, not to mention the construction of the infamous wall, render their daily lives steadily more miserable.

Quite frankly, the situation on the ground for the Palestinians has become so grim as a result of the accumulation of a vast settler population and related infrustructure, not to mention the critical location of much of this activity, that some observers believe the moment has passed regarding any manner of equitable peace as viewed from the Palestinian side because of the situation on the ground alone.  It is possible that this one factor already may represent an insurmountable--and near irreversible--obstacle to a stable final settlement.  And the situation on the ground in this respect is changing steadily in ways ever more damaging to the process. 

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The White Houses’ approach to the combustible Palestinian issue was predicated on five assumptions. Each is fallacious. The key assumption is belief in the President’s ability to wrest from the Israeli leadership concessions of sufficient importance and scope as to lay the foundations for a durable settlement - that is one. Obama at first seemed prepared to invest considerable political capital and personal prestige in the effort. In fact, as we now know, he backed away from doing that – preferring the course of least resistance. Success, as he saw it, would require making his demands on the Israelis credible – that was two. Credibility, in turn, meant neutralizing the powerful Israeli lobby and its supporters in Congress – that was three. Ross’ involvement, along with that of Rahm Emanuel, became a crucial political shock absorber for the White House. Another critical assumption concerned the Palestinians. It was the conviction that the commitments extracted from Netanyahu et al would prove adequate to win their acceptance by Abbas and Fatah – that is four.

All these suppositions are illusory. The first already has proven false. The current Israeli government is even more resistant to proposals for a viable two state solution than its recalcitrant predecessors. It will bend but not break unless Obama threatens a rupture of
Washington’s all purpose commitment to the Jewish state. There is nothing in his performance to date that suggests he has either the necessary conviction or courage to do that. On issue after issue, he has shown a strong reluctance to challenge established thinking and to confront powerful interests. Just the opposite. Retreat from positions boldly declared has become the hallmark of his administration. At times, the retreat follows brief skirmishes. At other times, it is preemptive – prompted by skirmishes in the President’s own mind. This is the singular Obama style evident on major domestic issues. The process begins with a firm statement of the problem, a clarion call for action, and a pledge to force change. Then, there is the period of eerie calm – no plan is unveiled, no strategy executed beyond entreaties that the protagonists act in the reasonable manner the President has outlined. Obama makes brief public appearances punctuated by further proclamations of the imperative to act, still without any specifics or sustained effort. Whatever comes out of this muddle is declared historic and promising. In this case, so blunt and public was Netanyahu’s rejection of the American proposal to do something on the key settlement issue that such a declaration is impossible. In the same vein, though, Obama rushed to say that the settlement matter is not so important after all, just a piece of a complex problem. Just as the 'public option' was redined as "just a sliver" of the overall package.

There is no virtue in this approach. It is classic avoidance behavior. Vintage Obama, as we have come to recognize it. He is a man of personal audacity, but little courage; one of that rare breed who say everything with strong conviction, but whose conviction is only genuine at the moment he speaks.

What does this mean for a possible initiative on Palestine? Several consequences jump to mind. First, the goal will be stated in general terms so as not to set a clear marker of success. Second, Obama is likely to overestimate his personal powers of persuasion as reinforced by the might and authority of the United States. That is to say, he will expect to bring the parties into line with only slight resort to coercion. Accordingly, his instinctive avoidance of head-on confrontations will leave him unprepared, psychologically and politically, for the requisite arm twisting with its inescapable political reaction from the Israeli lobby at home. Third, the expectation that the Ross/Emanuel tandem can protect his flank will prove ill-founded – even if the two of them do genuinely share his commitment and interest in a settlement. Fourth, he is likely to underestimate what terms and conditions will be acceptable to the Palestinians. There is no sign that he or his advisors appreciate how constrained Abbas is by the reality of Hamas’ popularity eclipsing that of Fatah. They may well be under the further illusion that the Hamas issue can be finessed by extracting from the Israelis such generous concessions that Hamas will have no choice but to go along with an outlined accord that meets with an overwhelmingly favorable response on the part of all Palestinians.

The ultimate outcome looks to be failure. There is a real possibility of it ending in a further tragedy for all parties embroiled in the conflict. In either eventuality, the ripple effects will spread widely across the region to the detriment of America’s other parlous engagements. The one thing that we can say with some certainty is that the White House will declare any result, short of a return to widespread violence, to be a breakthrough and will call on all parties to keep a positive attitude – going forward. A part of Obama’s make-up is that of a fantasist – sorry to say.

cheers

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Barack Obama will not solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has too many other concerns: the health care crisis, the war in Afghanistan, the latest revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. A failure to overcome the challenges posed by any one of these three issues, much less more than one, threatens his prospects for re-election, in a way that failure in the “Peace Process does not.” The President is a consummate politician; he knows his priorities.

In any event, the emergence of a fact that the President was aware of for some time, namely, the existence of a secret Iranian nuclear facility near Qom, underscores the reality that the Israel-Arab conflict is not the most pressing crisis in the Middle East, nor would solving that crisis bring stability to the region. The Lebanese civil war of the “seventies; the Iran-Iraq War of the ‘eighties; the attack on Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War of the ‘nineties; and 9/11 all had absolutely nothing to do with Israel. Nothing. Only those who wish away the existence of the State could argue otherwise. A two-state solution would not have solved any of these conflicts.

Does all this mean that Obama should abandon the search for peace? Absolutely not. Abba Eban famously said that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” The same could be said about Israel in recent years. One such opportunity was bolstering Mahmoud Abbas in the wake of Arafat’s death by releasing thousands of Palestinian prisoners. Instead, Israel did so in a piecemeal fashion, negating any long term benefit to Abbas, and therefore, to itself.

Both sides appear once again on the verge of missing an opportunity. The Iranian threat has united Sunni Arabs and Israelis as no other has in the past century. Indeed, if Ahmadinejad fired a nuclear weapon against Israel, he would single handedly resolve the “peace process” because the overwhelming majority of Israelis and Palestinians would perish in the attack. Over time, thousands more Egyptians, Jordanians and Lebanese would also suffer the aftereffects of any such nuclear detonation. Recall that nuclear rain from the Chernobyl disaster spread as far as Ireland.

But both sides must recognize than any agreement—and its outlines are well known by now—requires them both to do things they don’t like. That, of course, is what compromise is all about.

Palestinians do not want to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, but want Israel to recognize Palestine as an Arab state. The Palestinians understand that such recognition closes the book on Arab refugee desires to return to what is now Israel. But Israel is indeed a Jewish state with religious and ethnic minorities. In that regard it is no different from most nation states around the world—China, India, most of Europe, and North Africa, to give but a few obvious examples.

Palestinians also don’t want to commit to a demilitarized state. But Israel will not subject itself to the risk of missile attacks from the West Bank, something that was a commonplace until 1967. Nor would Israel even consider dividing Jerusalem in any way if the Arab portion of that city becomes a safe haven for snipers, as was also the case before the Six Day War.

Palestinians seem unable to bring themselves to granting these concessions. They have to.

As for Israelis, they too must understand that compromise means concessions. They cannot wish away Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem. They cannot ignore the reality that these neighborhoods tend to be out of bounds for Jewish Israelis. If Palestine will be demilitarized, there will be no snipers. Some part of Jerusalem needs to be ceded.

Nor can Israel expect that by ceding to the Palestinians a collection of separated islands of humanity they are coming to terms with the creation of a sovereign state. The assertion by Jimmy Carter and others that Israel practices apartheid is an outrage; no South Africa black ever sat in Parliament, held ministerial positions, could sit, eat or play wherever he or she wanted, as is the case in Israel. But the non-contiguous zones of Palestinian authority on the West Bank look exactly like Bantustans. A contiguous state is a sine qua non for peace, even if the Israelis are not happy about it. That will mean moving thousands of settlers out of the West Bank, even if the Israelis are reluctant to do so.

The Israelis don’t want to make these concessions. But they have to.

There is no way that the two sides can be forced to reach agreement; yet there is no way that they will ever reach agreement without active prodding by the United States. Talking to Hamas is a side show; Hamas is simply unwilling to accept past agreements, so no agreement with Hamas can ever be trusted. But there is no excuse for not working closely with the PA, and pushing both sides to come to grips with reality.

The “Peace Process,” such as it is, may not be as crucial either to Obama’s political fortunes or to Middle East stability as some claim it is. But without peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Obama’s efforts to deal with Iran, Iraq and other potential crises, such as a future Egyptian transition, will be that much more difficult, while the prospects for a united Middle Eastern front against will be that much more remote.

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Personally, I doubt very much that President Obama will undertake anything drastic before the midterm elections. Given the extent to which he’s decided to ease up on the Israelis already, I don’t think we should be expecting any sort of drastic action on the Middle East from the White House for some months to come. For that reason, I believe we'll see a steady erosion of his image among the Islamic countries (who aren’t really that impressed to begin with) - and, even more importantly, the Israelis will feel even less like they have to take Washington’s feelings into account.

Which is a pity, because the extent to which he’s already buckled under on the settlement issue has already reinforced the broader impression that the new president is a foreign policy wimp – someone who talks a good game but doesn’t seem to have much in his arsenal besides speeches. On settlements, he could start right now by sending one stark signal: he should sic the U.S. Treasury on organizations in the United States that promote settlement in the occupied territories.

Right now a number of these private groups get tax exemptions for supporting a policy that runs directly counter to stated U.S. policy in the region. Of course they have a right to their opinion – but there’s absolutely no reason why U.S. taxpayers should be subsidizing it. It’s a scandal that no White House has had the cojones to do this earlier. If pro-settlement groups try to make an issue out of this in the future, the President should send Rahm Emmanuel around to each of their offices with some friendly advice and a dead fish wrapped in newspaper.

If this doesn’t send the necessary message, then other, tougher actions should follow: like cutting back on foreign aid to Israel and dialing back on loan guarantees. Israel is a flourishing, democratic country with a diverse and vibrant market economy – why, for goodness’s sake, should we be throwing money at it on this scale to begin with? Cutting back on mil-mil cooperation should come much farther down on the escalation ladder – don’t want to help the pro-settlement lobbyists too much early in the game.

As for the Netanyahu government, I wouldn’t go to the effort of undercutting it; I’m sure Bibi can manage that by himself. And as far as talking to Hamas is concerned – aren’t we already, through back channels and intermediaries? That’s probably enough as it is; I don’t see any reason to boost them vis-à-vis Abbas for the moment. Plus it’s a good thing to hold in reserve. Never know when you might need it focus minds.

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I think the place to start is to ask ourselves why we don’t already have a peace agreement. Is it really – as suggested in the questions – because settlements aren’t frozen, the Netanyahu government is in power or we’re not talking to Hamas? Perhaps, but that suggests a tractability to the problem its history belies. And absent from that list is the one political actor that has the greatest ability to advance peace: the Abbas government in Palestine. Also absent are the other governments in the region that could be supporting Abbas in building a de facto Palestinian state that would draw the allegiance of its citizens and build confidence among Israelis they won’t be trading something for nothing.

The Palestinians missed an enormous opportunity when Israel withdrew from the West Bank and Gaza. If they’d made those communities into models of self-governance that Israel didn’t feel threatened by, the peace process would have had a much better prospect for advancement. The everyday work of building competent government services in Palestine would be a better focus for efforts to advance peace than draconian measures to penalize Israel for settlements or delegitimize the Netanyahu government. The Obama Administration has been right to engage in the peace process from the start of its term in office, but they are mistaken if they believe the parties to the conflict will be swayed by the frustration of those of us who don’t have to live with the consequences.

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President Obama has lost his psychological struggle for dominance in US/Israeli relations. Netanyahu has taken the measure of the Obama Administration and decided that he has no reason to fear retribution from this or perhaps any American president. The altogether impressive influence of AIPAC in marshalling unconditional support for Israeli policy is triumphant.

The Netanyahu view of things?

Settlements? You Americans don’t like that? So what? Who are you? You could cut off US government financial support for Israel to pressure us? Try it!

Your miserable intelligence agencies do not understand the existential threat posed by Iran? How typical! You don’t even understand the data that you collected and gave us…

Above all, do not think of trying to bring down my government. That may have worked in bringing Ehud Barak to power as prime minster once upon a time, but such a thing is beyond your ability now.