It may be twenty years or two hundred before we can judge with any confidence whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were successful even by subjective criteria, and even then some may question whether they were really "worth fighting," since no one ever will know how history would have evolved had we chosen not to fight them.

But we need not wait twenty years, or even two, to conclude that the way we have fought them has done little or nothing to make them more defensible. The record of our political and military missteps in both contests, and their consequences in terms of opportunities squandered, effort gratuitously wasted, and lives unnecessarily lost, could scarcely be more apparent. Those who doubt it need only consult one of the many depressing "inside" accounts of what has passed for strategic decision-making during the last decade or so. 

In the end, fighting wisely can't guarantee that a war will turn out to have been worth fighting -- even history's verdict may prove unclear. But fighting the way we have until recently certainly doesn't help.

Colleagues,

Permit me to add a few words about the Vietnam-Iraq comparison - if it's not too late or against the rules.  I'm writing from Paris where there is active interest in the comparison and some insight into the revealing differences - and one dismaying similarity.  As to differences: Vietnam had no strategic significance whatsoever.   Whatever was done there, or might have been done, changed nothing of global geopolitical/idological importance.  That was clear by 1985, not 1991.  Iraq has had, and will continue to have, very serious negative implications for the region and for the United States' standing in the world. As to the similarity, the innoculation administered against making similar mistakes wears off.  The No More Viuetnam syndrome was overcome in the Gulf War I.  The Iraq innoculation never really took.  Even as we still endure that tribulation, we have escalated  our commitment to cleansing Afghanistan of enemies and made Pakistan part of the field of operations.  Remember the post-Korea admonition: no more conventional wars on the Asian mainland? Last I looked, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan were part of Asia.  Our systems seem to reject the counsel of self-restraint and prudence as an unnatural transplant.

Michael Brenner

Collapse

 Do we really want to see war’s meaning? Do we really want to know what makes a good war? Can we accept the answer?

American religious nationalism enshrines war as a celebration of identity. But war for us has also been deeply instrumental: For much of our history war advanced the sacred narrative. America’s wars were the vessels of our national passage: Revolution was our war of creation, Civil War our war of self-redemption, and World War II to be our apocalyptic redemption of humankind.

Our sacred wars not only advanced the national narrative, but their message of sacrifice and transcendence was also shaped into a liturgy: a collection of rituals that together define the national-sacred. These include our equivalent of Saints’ Days: Veteran’s Day, Memorial Day, Flag Day, the 4th of July and the 7th of December.

This is what makes sacred wars world fighting for: Our nation’s transcendence in history through collective sacrifice. Smaller wars, pursued for reasons of state and more venal domestic agendas, all sought to appropriate holy rhetoric and ritual symbols. But as these lesser conflicts fell short of success their banner-use of sacred war liturgy betrayed them.

Thus 1812 was all about a grab for Canada, the Mexican War was about Southern empire the extension of slavery, 1898 promised liberation but brought de facto American colonialism to Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. “Police action” in Korea overreached at terrible cost, and Vietnam divided the nation and toppled the very assembly hall of the American tabernacle itself.

Henceforth American wars would be prosecuted by a group of military and defense societies essentially separate from the rest of the nation. This Defense Tribal Confederacy engages 8-10% of the nation. Gone is the sacred oath of every citizen to collective commitment and sacrifice — that was enshrined in American war liturgy.

Thus America’s wars can have meaning only if they fulfill this sacred charge to collective national commitment and sacrifice. So how in this new century did we respond to our next big national challenge — on 9-11? It was curious and dispiriting.

The president urged Americans again and again to “go shopping” — as though this was the highest level of civic virtue to which they might aspire.

To the Tribal Confederacy went the great mission of commitment and sacrifice. The president however passionately invoked every single trope of sacred rhetoric from the American canon, and again, like Lincoln and Wilson and Roosevelt declared a world mission of redemption: This time couched as a “transformation” of the Muslim world. But American sacred war must be the people’s war — it cannot be the wholly-owned franchise of a tiny minority. That would be self-destructive lie. 

Within 18 months the lie of faux sacred war was rising into view as it did in 1812 and 1846 and 1898 and 1950 and 1964. But even these former disappointments and failures were fought at some level by militia regiments. These wars failed the sacred war test but they at least played-out within the framework of sacred war civic virtue.

But the 9-11 War is de novo-different: It is America’s first post-sacred war, or rather it is America’s first war sacred only to Government and its Tribal Confederacy. In the fighting at Ramadi and Fallujah and Tora Bora, and close-combat fights literally by the hundreds, the Tribal Confederacy serves and sacrifices almost as a new, intercessor American nation that fights to keep “Shopping America” safe.

Consider: the millions of citizens of the Confederacy, and their elite “300” — who give the last full measure of devotion daily — are now the ones fighting America’s sacred wars. Or as Sara Palin declared toward the close of the 2008 campaign, these are “the true Americans.”

War now has meaning only to a part of America — the military and their families, and the millions who serve by supporting them, and their families: the Defense Tribal Confederacy. Increasingly, Shopping America has little connection to and even less commitment to this new era. They grow restive and fearful only if failure in war seems imminent, as it did in 2006. New sacred war can thus be fought as long as the Government and Tribal Confederacy wish to engage, because the rest of America is passive and acquiescent — and after all, what right to they have to have a military opinion? Did you serve in the military? Have you been to Iraq? 

Even now the temple cities built to celebrate the wars of the whole American nation fade into untouchable myth like our soldiers of World War — or their remains moulder in front of us. This week my family, vacationing in Charleston, visited a museum of World War II fighting ships: an aircraft carrier, a destroyer, a Coast Guard ocean cutter, and a submarine. They are once-proud temples of modernity slowly crumbling to rust and ruin. Young tourists of Shopping America gawk at the shadows of forgotten ancestors, while old men with medaled and embroidered caps live in a faraway gaze.

Meanwhile different temples are rising: high places of worship where the liturgy of new sacred war may be celebrated — like the new Air Force Memorial over looking the Pentagon, or the soaring cathedral that is the new Marine Corps “Museum” in Quantico. These grand shrines are on consecrated ground: the dense weave of posts and bases that is the territory — and which now protects the tabernacles — of a new American nation.

This theme is central to my new book, Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change, which develops these ideas and metaphors at length.

Collapse

Colleagues,

A number of commentqtors view Iraq through a glass darkly; fewer so view Afghanistan.  Both episodes, seen through an even darker lens, mark out a broader national tragedy.  Since 9/11 the US has embarked on a global campaign not only to eliminate all those elemnets who threaten us but also all those who are hostile to us.  Barack Obama has reiterated that. The implication, and the ulterior motive for the Bush people, is thtat national interests require the establising a world order according to American specifications and overseen by us, i.e;an American hegemonyy.  To date, it has produced only failure for us and disorder for the world.  The escalation in Afghanistan and Pakistan will exacerbate our failures and generate more dangerous risks for our viability and influence in the world..  Yet, there is very little discussion of the underlying premises about national interests and capabilities that underlie this conceit.  That is the ultimate failure for us as a society.

We have met the enemy - it is us.

cheers,

Michael Brenner 

Larry Korb's hysterical assessment of the Iraq campaign ("the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history") typifies the lack of historical perspective on recent conflicts that I described in my posting below.  After six years of fighting, we have lost fewer soldiers than in the Battle of Gettysburg;  we have spent less money than will be expended by the Obama Administration's wasteful stimulus package; and a brutal dicatator named Saddam no longer controls one of the world's largest oil reserves (or threatens the reserves of his neighbors). 

Was the Iraq war an intelligence failure?  Yes.  Was it a strategic mistake?  Possibly.  But failing to stop Germany from remilitarizing the Rhineland was a bigger mistake.  Allowing the communists to seize control of China's mainland was a colossal mistake.  And letting countries like North Korea continue to pursue nuclear weapons may soon have far worse consequences than any fallout from Iraq.

Bloggers:  There’s still time to post on our question about which U.S. wars have been worth fighting and why, or why not, and my thanks to all who have done so already. Speaking parenthetically, we at National Journal, in asking this question, in no way meant any disrespect to the brave men and women who have fought and died in America’s wars and who are fighting in two conflicts as we speak. They did their duty and often sacrificed all. But it is the decision makers in this town who sent them there, and it is these politicians and senior government officials whose actions should always be questioned, especially before war begins, but certainly after the firing has begun, and even long after the guns have fallen silent.

The current Iraq war comes in for its share of criticism among our bloggers. Larry Korb says “it will be viewed as the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history no matter how it turns out.” Others hold out hope that even the worst wars might not look so bad over time. “I suspect that with the passage of time, historians will be more charitable about both” Vietnam and Iraq, said Loren Thompson. Ron Marks says that both Afghanistan and Iraq could turn out fine, “in the long run view of the war for international stability, I think they will be seen as good wars. Joe Collins, too, holds out some hope for the current conflicts but cautions that it isn’t guaranteed: “Of course, if our current conflicts bankrupt our nation, then none of these great putative developments will amount to a bucket of warm spit when compared to the passing of American hegemony.”

New blogger Steve Metz, (welcome Steve) says that properly considering costs of wars should include the value of American being the leading power in the world, and keeping it that way: “ If the United States prefers to sustain the role it has performed since 1942--and we might as well call it by its name: imperialistic--then regular uses of military force will be necessary and have value beyond the immediate outcome a given conflict.”

Wayne White has some biting words about the Spanish-American War, World War I, and Iraq, and says wars can be judged “on the merits of whether they were worth the sacrifice in terms of gains and losses related as exclusively as possible to the interests of the United States itself.” Dick Kohn is down that road too and writes that “The surest way to judge a war is to compare the outcome with the goals and purposes of the contending sides at the time. That there will be unforeseen and unintended consequences--good, bad, and ugly depending on one's point of view--is virtually a given.”

“At the end of the day, we will have to judge both [Iraq and Afghanistan] wars by their results; and, as in so many previous wars, those results might mean different things to different groups of people, leading some to judge one or both of these wars as "bad," and others to conclude that they were "good,” concludes Dov Zakheim. And finally, James Jay Carafano puts a forward spin on the discussion: “We should, however, pay less attention to handicapping past wars and more time practicing hard thinking about future wars.”

Thanks to all.

Patrick B. Pexton

NJ Deputy Editor

Collapse

Before taking this nation to war, American decision makers must give satisfactory answers to the following questions:

-Are the objectives clear?

-Is military force the only way to achieve these objectives?

-Are we willing to use all the force necessary to achieve these objectives?

-Do the potential benefits outweigh the potential costs?

In analyzing these questions, it is clear that, among the 12 major wars this country has waged, only the American Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, Korea, the First Persian Gulf War, and Afghanistan met these criteria. While some of the other wars may have had some beneficial aspects in the long run, these benefits do not justify waging the war in the first place.

Given what the war in Iraq has already cost the U.S. in lives, treasure, credibility, image, and military readiness, as well as what it has done to Middle East stability, it will be viewed as the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history no matter how it turns out. Moreover, it is clear that before going into Iraq, our decisions makers did not answer any of the four questions satisfactorily, let alone honestly.

Afghanistan was a winnable war, but the Bush administration declared victory too early (right after Bush declared Mission Accomplished in Iraq, Rumsfeld went to Kabul and said the same thing about Afghanistan). The judgment on this war will turn on whether it is too late for the Obama/McChrystal/Holbrooke strategy to succeed.

Collapse

There's a saying in psychotherapy that when all other treatments fail, the mere passage of time can work wonders.  So it is with the way we treat our national experience.  After a few generations, even the worst wars and leaders take on a patina of respectability.  So by the time my 12-year-old kids reach the age I am today (57), they'll probably be talking about the presidency of George W. Bush the same way that we talk about Truman today.  The point being that most of the wars (and leaders) we really hate are the ones we can actually remember.  The wars that are more remote in time somehow seem more sensible -- even ridiculous undertakings like the Spanish-American War, which is now said to have 'heralded America's arrival on the world stage as a major player.'

With that in mind, I'd like to step a couple of generations into the future and look back at two of our recent misadventures, the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  I suspect that with the passage of time, historians will be more charitable about both conflicts.  They will adopt an approach similar to the jus ad bellum / jus in bello distinction in the laws of war, and say the decision to go to war in both cases was justified by the available evidence, but the actual conduct of the conflicts by our policymakers left much to be desired.  Vietnam was about containing the spread of communism and defending democracy, Iraq was about stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and protecting access to Persian Gulf oil.  Historians will see that more clearly 50 years from now, and give both Johnson and Bush more credit than they currently receive. 

Collapse

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. In hindsight we might lament the Mexican War, for example, though I doubt many of the residents of Arizona and New Mexico would agree. The Spanish-American War brought on many headaches, notably in the Philippines; again, however, Puerto Ricans might disagree that the war was a bad thing. The Korean War ended in a stalemate, but saved South Korea. Korewan-Americans no doubt see it as a "good war."

On the other hand, many Southerners might, in the privacy of their homes and clubs, still question whether the Civil War (or as they might call it, "the War Between the States") was a "good war." Most northerners, westerners, and probably all African-Americans would all argue that, to the contrary, that the war was more than "good."

And what of the many Indian Wars? Most Americans might say the politically correct thing that these wars were "bad." Yet which Americans are prepared to cede their homesteads to the descendantsof those tribes that were defeated, exiled, and crmaped onto reservations in remote and unfertile parts of our country?

On what wars might all Americans agree? Surely the Revolutionary War (British sympathizers found their way ot Canbada and elsewhere). The conflict with the Barbary Pirates, which resmembles in certain aspect our current engagements in the Middle East. The War of 1812, which helped to shatter European illusions about encroaching on the fledgling United States. World Wars I and II, and Operation Desert Storm, which all sought to combat aggression.   Most American now agree that Vietnam was a misguided war; I wonder, however, if that would have been the verdict had we defeated North Vietnam.

What of Iraq and Afghanistan? It is too soon to judge either. Instant journalism and punditry argued for along time that Iraq was "bad", Afgfhanistan "good." As our combat losses have delcined in Iraq, that war seems to be less troublesome to many Americans. On the other hand, Afghanistan is losing its populairty. At the end of the day, we will have to judge both wars by their results; and, as in so many previous wars, those results might meandifferent things to different groups of people, leading some to judge one or both of these wars as "bad," and others to conclude that they were "good."

Collapse

 There are many things about the British academic system not to like -- including a class structure and learning style meant more for the Middle Ages than the 21st Century.  That being said, the British do believe that history is best viewed after fifty years when the fullness of time and insight allows a better view of the action.  And, of course, the Chinese stretch it further with Cho En Lai's quote that we have yet to understand the implications of the French Revolution.

As for Americas, we are hyper-critical engineers at heart.  We like to fix things and have clear cut solutions.  It is one of the reasons we are so fond of World War II -- a clear cut victory against several countries who simply went stark raving mad. Other recent wars, not so much.

Vietnam is a war that still is seen in the eyes of most Americans as a loss.  I would suggest that in the longer sweep of history that is not the case.  It was certainly a tactical loss.  However, strategically, we stayed for nearly twenty years and provided a bulwark and boost for the rest of southeast Asia, with extraordinarily positive results. Moreover, we did show our enemies, the Soviets, that we were willing to pay a high price for our beliefs.  It came at considerable cost at home and abroad.  But not all victories are clean.

As for Afghanistan and Iraq, much will be made about the length of our presence and the immediate results.  It has been messy and mistakes (as we say in Washington) were made.  However, in the long run view of the war for international stability, I think they will be seen as good wars.  The intent to stabilize and provide some form of self choice to the people of the Middle East is a good one; but an expensive one in purse and people.  The results will likely not be clean, but will be a necessary strategic win if we are to have a relatively stabile world.

Collapse

Wars to End All Wars

Democracies argue about when, where, and how to fight wars before, during, and for generations after. That is how we fight. Mostly, this debate makes for full employment for historians like me—so we like that. The answer to the question is often rooted in Western just war theory, which holds to the concept of proportionality that engaging in and fighting the wars themselves the use of force should be proportional to the task and the good to be gained from the conflict exceed the inevitable evils caused by engaging in a violent struggle. This question is meant to be asked before the war—by the people, not afterwards by pundits, historians, and rabble rousers. That’s because “after” is always changing, depending on how far removed you are from the decision made, the “costs” and “benefits” of war can look very different; as time lengthens, conditions change, perspectives alter—the assessment will change as well. For democracies, the right and the wrong of war are a neverending story.  Don’t get me wrong; this debate is healthy. Democracies hate war and rightly so—the discourse of second guessing is healthy.

We should, however, pay less attention to handicapping past wars and more time practicing hard thinking about future wars. And here history does have something to tell us.  Any discussion defining the future of force should be rooted in the past and reflect the principles that define the U.S. military’s purpose and responsibilities. The purpose of government is to provide for the common defense as prescribed by the Constitution, and the armed forces play an important role in achieving that end. Their primary task is to protect the nation's vital national interests. These interests have proven remarkably consistent and enduring over time -- despite the changing threat environment from gener­ation to generation. The justice of defining these interests and putting our men and women in uniform in harm’s way is measured much more by the decisions we make before the crack of battle than in the Monday morning quarterbacking that occurs after. 

Collapse

Which wars were/are worth fighting?  The question depends not only on acknowledged outcomes but on when you ask it.  For example, the Korean War in 1953 was considered by many as the first war (sic) that we ever lost. By the mid 1970s, even with all the mistakes we made there, Harry Summers was holding the conduct of the Korean war up as a model for what we should have done in Vietnam.  Today, preserving the independence of South Korea looks like a brilliant strategic masterstroke, but who in 1950 could have predicted the incredible wealth and Western orientation of Northeast Asia?  Indeed, when Acheson declared the tiny peninsula of Korea to be outside our defense perimeter, even Douglas MacArthur was quick to agree with the wisdom of that faulty judgment (and dangerous pronouncement).

Academically, the value of wars is judged by the value of the objective, "blood and treasure" expended, and the consequences of the war.  All three of these factors are partially or wholly hidden from statesmen by the great fog of uncertainty that surrounds war.  Churchill had a valid warning for all who are forced to contemplate war as a course of action:

The Statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations—all take their seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think that he also had a chance.

How will historians look upon our efforts in OIF and OEF, as well as the war on terrorism writ large?  Right now, the returns are modest (at best) compared to the blood and treasure expended.  That might not always be the case, however. Friedman may be right that a democratic Iraq may have a revolutionary effect on that region.  We may yet terminate Al Qaeda as a formal organization.  Usama bin Ladin may live to wear GTMO orange.  Afghanistan and Pakistan may again be able to handle their own internal problems.  Of course, if our current conflicts bankrupt our nation, then none of these great putative developments will amount to a bucket of warm spit when compared to the passing of American hegemony.

Joe Collins, 6/15/09

Collapse

Burt Solomon's article poses an interesting and complex question. As he points out, all wars look justified, even necessary, at their inception. Only later, when the passions of the moment fade and the outcomes and costs are clear, can we begin a more realistic assessment. But even then it striking how easily every American war could have had a different outcome, and thus been seen differently today.

It is not too hard to imagine the American Revolution taking a very different turn had France not intervened. George Washington and his colleagues might been seen as criminals playing a bit part in American history. Had Robert E. Lee followed Longstreet's suggestion at Gettysburg and slid around the Union left, the course of history might be different. Americans might see their involvement in World War II as a morally justified but failed crusade had the Germans developed an effective nuclear weapon in time to stave off defeat. Had the United States responded vigorously to North Vietnam's 1975 invasion of South Vietnam, the conflict there might be seen as a costly but "good" war. 

Even Iraq could have played out differently. Had the United States not expelled Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, America today might be well on its way to energy independence and al Qaeda not a deadly enemy. If the Bush administration had stuck to its original idea of cobbling together an Iraqi government in the spring of 2003 and then quickly withdrawing, Iraq might be in chaos today, but the American economy, military, and global position would be quite different.

Ultimately, though, such counterfactual and post hoc thinking makes interesting novels but offers little guidance for future uses of military power. Then the key question is: What global role do we want to play? If the United States prefers to sustain the role it has performed since 1942--and we might as well call it by its name: imperialistic--then regular uses of military force will be necessary and have value beyond the immediate outcome a given conflict. Like all imperial powers throughout history, we must deter challengers by demonstrating our prowess and our willingness to use force. But if the United States gradually moves away from its imperial role, not toward isolationism in the historic sense, but at least toward selective engagement, then the standard for a "good" or justified war gets higher. For such an America, only direct threats qualify, not challenges to "world order" along the lines of Iraq, Vietnam, or Korea. 

That is a frightening thought. We have benefited from our imperialistic world role and grown comfortable with it. But as the costs of intervention mount and the United States grapples with a host of economic and social problems, it may merit consideration.

Collapse

Judging wars in hindsight, as Burt Solomon's story demonstrates, no matter what the standard (necessity, morality, "good," benefit, or other) will usually produce a muddle of confusion and controversy.  One problem is that judgments often hinge on implicit or explicit counterfaction assumptions:   what would have or might have happened had events not taken place as they did.  Anaother problem is that interpretations change over time because of new research or subsequent events.

The surest way to judge a war is to compare the outcome with the goals and purposes of the contending sides at the time.  That there will be unforeseen and unintended consequences--good, bad, and ugly depending on one's point of view--is virtually a given. 

Rather than a sweeping review of most all U.S. wars, I will focus on three unfortunate ones relating to the 20th and 21st centuries: the Spanish-American War, World War I, and the Iraq War initiated in 2003. Although the impact on affected populations clearly also is critical in assessing conflicts, in this case I will judge conflicts more narrowly:  on the merits of whether they were worth the sacrifice in terms of gains and losses related as exclusively as possible to the interests of the United States itself.

The Spanish-American War was a relatively brief and inexpensive conflict, so most criticism relates to the false pretext and yellow journalism that led to it. Nonetheless, this 1898 war involved heavy costs extending well into the 20th Century. The retention of the Philippines placed the new U.S. overseas empire in the front yard of the expanding Japanese Empire, making eventual conflict between the two that much more likely. And, worse still, so far from home, the islands were virtually indefensible against any determined Japanese assault. When that attack came, it involved heavy losses of U.S. troops, equipment and infrastructure.

Often neglected is how U.S. retention of the Philippines triggered the Philippine Insurrection or Philippine-American War, fought mainly during 1899-1902. This placed U.S. forces, woefully ill-equipped and otherwise unprepared, amid their first ugly and costly overseas counter-insurgency challenge. Over 4,000 US troops died of wounds or disease, far beyond those lost in the much broader Spanish-American War. Residual fighting in the Philippines continued through 1913.

World War I involved far higher stakes. U.S. losses and the global impact of U.S. intervention must be weighed against relatively minor U.S. losses at sea and other pre-1917 German provocations not posing serious threats to the United States. By contrast, roughly 120,000 American troops were lost in WWI, far larger amounts of shipping than before U.S. entry into the conflict, and the first major war debt incurred since the Civil War. 

The debate over motives rages on, but it appears that Woodrow Wilson did not try nearly hard enough to sustain U.S. neutrality. And, in greatly beefing up the weary Allies, U.S. entry into the war made the defeat of even wearier Germany and Austria-Hungary inevitable and considerably more decisive than it would have been otherwise. As a result, a powerful Germany was left helpless to resist the crushingly one-sided victors’ peace imposed on her. Had the exhausted Europeans been left to finish the war themselves, it is doubtful Germany would have been forced to accept a peace even its post-Imperial civilian leadership found shocking. World War II was directly linked to that bitter peace-—even the European portion of which cost the U.S. far more than even the steep price of the First World War.

The Iraq war’s ultimate consequences are more difficult to assess at present. Suffice it to say that even if all the alleged Iraqi WMD believed to have been present had existed (considerably more limited than what it possessed in 1991), it would have been difficult to justify such a costly military venture. And then there were the delusional notion of exploiting the fall of Saddam Hussein to topple regimes in Iran and Syria. Instead, Iran’s hand in Iraq was strengthened as never before. Also, the anti-American jihadi cause was energized, not weakened, further damaging overall U.S. security. Thus, the cost of more than 10,000 U.S. troops killed or severely wounded, the trillion dollar bill, the diversion of attention from Afghanistan, and the severe degradation in U.S. global readiness has been terribly lopsided, given the current and likely return.

Collapse