The greatest warship of the 18th century was built not in Great Britain or France, but in Cuba. It was the Santissima Trinidad, 136 guns, whose strong island cedar gave her a 36-year career not to be undone by rot and age, but by Nelson’s guns.

From 1700-1800 Havana built 74 navíos for the Spanish Navy: a third of all of this world empire’s battleships.

This is no arcane factoid. It begins to tell us something about Cuban national identity itself. Cuba was the first and last, and always one of the most essential elements of Spain’s world empire. Even after Latin American independence, Spain’s Cuban trade was still bigger than the rest of the America’s combined. Spain needed Cuba.

Cuban identity has always been defined by its significance to a world power — and for centuries it was the Spanish world power. Then increasingly its significance became linked to its relationship with a rising North American world power. We can see Cuba’s rise in US politics as early as the 1850s, in Southern Dreams of a Caribbean Empire (Robert E. May, http://www.amazon.com/Southern-Dream-Caribbean-Empire-1854-1861/dp/0813025125/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1240505406&sr=1-1)

In symbiotic relationships, Cuban significance is framed through its centrality in the politics of the world power. The “hand-off” of the later 19th century is fascinating: Spain becomes more dependent on Cuba, while Cuba moves decisively to embrace the United States. The consummation of a new world relationship is achieved in 1898.

Yet it then goes badly awry. Its relationship with the United States does not elevate Cuban significance, but rather its opposite, so that by the 1950s the symbiosis is one of patron-client, and Cuban insignificance. Castro’s revolution was able to transform Cuba and renew its significance by reframing its relationship with the world power.

Truth is: Significance can be achieved through enmity as much as through comity. Cuba was never more significant as a national identity than it was during its precious, peak confrontations with the United States.

Remember, Cuban significance was still tied to the North. The Soviets were the means, the enabler, and they too elevated Cuban significance. But symbiosis was still with the Norteamericano.

Why? Because the Soviets alone only offered another take on what the United States offered after 1898: dependencia and hence, loss of significance …

… while the United States made Cuba truly great. How to show this? Why not recall one of the banner films of 1984: Red Dawn.

There we see Colonel Ernesto Bella (played by Ron O’Neal) leading elite Cuban paras deep into the Great Plains states. That Cuba would be the spearhead of an invasion of the United States — and that we would believe and accept this suspension of disbelief — reveals the entire symbiosis and thus, how we enhance and ennoble Cuban significance.

How well Castro knew this! In the 1980s there were Cuban military contingents in 16 countries. Many Cuban tank commanders died fighting the Israelis in 1973. The Mengitsu regime in Ethiopia was rescued by Cuban battalions — as was Luanda by an entire Cuban army, that managed to stop both Savimbi and South Africa, and which numbered at its height an astonishing 36,000.

But a Cuban significance rooted in the creative rituals of enmity faded long ago. Today Cuba is not significant, and there are no more buttons to push on the Castro Paradigm. That well-traveled road met its cul-de-sac years ago.

So here is the deal. We have a shot now to renew Cuban national significance. The question is: Do we want to blow this deal the way we did after 1898?

In order not to blow it we need to look for a second at ourselves. Why did we blow it after 1898? Enough history now: Here is that bottom line. We blew it, like we have with a score or more societies over the centuries, because we did not understand the true basis of our relationship with them, and how what we were offering would surely and inevitably compromise and then destroy the very relationship we sought.

With Cuba then and now, we offer submission. Sure there have been many fruits dangled, but they always came at a price. Today we are offering essentially the same Tantalus fruits we teased them with in the past, only dressed-up today with more modern rhetoric.

We are asking Cuba to submit to the US model — which to us is the true and stainless model for all human life. But no matter how wonderful this life might be a la Frank Capra, we are still demanding Cuban acceptance of our identity-framework.

We should not go there. We should just normalize relations and honor Cuban identity — divorced from any ideological-rhetorical context — and embrace their significance.

If we were confident and strong in our own identity, this approach would yield unexpected and bountiful rewards. Instead of bruised and unattainable Tantalus fruits, we might instead together create a new cornucopia.

Just a quick mid-week update on our Cuba discussion, as well as a pointer to news out of Havana that President Obama may have “misinterpreted” some of Raul Castro’s recent statements about talking with the United States. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090422/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/cb_cuba_castro

Here are some nuggets from our experts’ posts:

Kellie Meiman: The issue at this point is one of expectations. I was in Brasil last week, a country that has served as a virtual bridge between the United States and some of the more populist regimes in the region. Public reaction to President Obama’s pre-Summit policy declarations on Cuba varied from frustration that he did not do something more audacious to amazement that he had the political courage to do so much so early in his term. Fortunately, the tendency of the latter group won out in the Summit of the Americas V in Trinidad and Tobago this weekend, and US positioning in the Americas was enhanced overall by the policy shift.

Patrick Lang: A lot of things require patience in life. It is difficult to see why an end to our failed policy in regard to Cuba should be one of them. Raul Castro has said that his government is willing to discuss any and all issues between us. It is true that this statement was embedded in a speech hostile to the United States, but it was still an offer.

Ron Marks: The famous writer and critic of the twenties, Robert Benchley, once gave a one word review to a play -- "No." That is my response to any further negotiations with the criminal brothers Castro.

Robert Killebrew: I'm for gradually easing the embargo, but I think it has to be accompanied by some serious give and take between the two governments. There's no magic wand that says if we just drop everything, Cuba will reform. In fact, the current Cuban government has shown itself to be pretty good at staying in power and repressing its citizens, and they will try to take advantage of loosened barriers to make a profit and reinforce their positions in power.

Richard Hart Sinnreich: Well, considering how successful our policy has been for the past half-century, I'm not sure I see the downside. The Castros aren't my favorite people, but we do business with a lot of governments that fit that description, including the ones on behalf of which we're currently fighting.

And from guest blogger Peter Hakim: Instead of leaving it to all up to the Cubans, the Obama Administration should seek to push some of the burden elsewhere. The U.S. should stop trying to block other countries and multilateral institutions from doing business with Cuba.

Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, has the following guest entry on Cuba:

Washington’s 50-year-old policy of isolating and sanctioning Cuba has never accomplished much. Today, it is an anachronism that serves mainly to isolate the United States from the rest of the hemisphere.

The Obama Administration has wisely started to fashion a new Cuba policy by taking the very modest steps of scrapping all restrictions on family travel and remittances to the island. These are measure that most Cuban Americans support . The Cuban American community, which has zealously blocked any easing of Cuba policy, may be politically weaker and more diverse than it once was, but its views cannot be disregarded.

President Obama has made clear that it is now up to the Cuban authorities in Havana to respond with reciprocal steps of their own and he has suggested a short menu that includes freeing of political prisoners, allowing more Cuban citizens to travel, and cutting Cuba’s heavy tax on remittances. This emphasis on reciprocity could prove troublesome for the Obama Administration, should the Cubans refuse concessions. President Obama’s objective of a “new beginning” in US-Cuban relations could then be cut short at the start. Latin American countries would end up pressing Washington—not Havana—for new concessions. This just what Obama’s critics would welcome.

Instead of leaving it to all up to the Cubans, the Obama Administration should seek to push some of the burden elsewhere. The U.S. should stop trying to block other countries and multilateral institutions from doing business with Cuba. Washington should cease its efforts to keep the OAS and multilateral development banks from engaging Cuba and not intrude into the diplomacy of such nations as Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and Spain that are strengthening their political and economic ties to Cuba. Instead, Washington should encourage such engagement to facilitate Cuba’s successful reintegration into hemispheric affairs, and assist the island’s transition toward an open economy and political system.

President Obama could also transfer some of the burden from the US government to its citizens. He could make it easier for academic, cultural, and athletic exchanges with Cuba by relaxing the bureaucratic obstacles and overdrawn restrictions that now apply. The United States could allow an expansion of its already vigorous agricultural trade with the island.

The purpose of all this is to start a process that will lead to a steady improvement in US- Cuba relations, and assist the island’s transition toward democratic politics and market economics. Ideally, Washington should seek a wide-ranging dialogue with Cuba (as it did with Vietnam nearly 15 years ago). There should be no question, however, about US support for Cuba’s advancing toward free expression and association, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and competitive elections. But a democratic society in Cuba should be the objective of U.S. engagement, not a precondition. And the US should not try to do it alone.

Well, considering how successful our policy has been for the past half-century, I'm not sure I see the downside. The Castros aren't my favorite people, but we do business with a lot of governments that fit that description, including the ones on behalf of which we're currently fighting.

However, if we want to keep things as they are, making "U.S. demands" certainly is good a way to do it.

I'm for gradually easing the embargo, but I think it has to be accompanied by some serious give and take between the two governments. There's no magic wand that says if we just drop everything, Cuba will reform. In fact, the current Cuban government has shown itself to be pretty good at staying in power and repressing its citizens, and they will try to take advantage of loosened barriers to make a profit and reinforce their positions in power. If in the short term all we do is allow the Cuban government to rake profits of remittances or business ventures, then we lose, and they win, by dropping barriers. If, on the other hand, there is ground for mutually beneficial deals, we should go ahead. After all, the Cubans have more to gain from dropping barriers than we do. As a previous administration once said, "trust, but verify."

The famous writer and critic of the twenties, Robert Benchley, once gave a one word review to a play -- "No." That is my response to any further negotiations with the criminal brothers Castro.

Don't get me wrong. I truly appreciate the Obama Administration's attempts to reach out world wide with a new round of bilateral diplomacy. A new Administration should try to start out with a clean slate. The contrast with the Bush Administration is a profound one and may restart discussions in parts of the world where things have gone off the rails. However, in Cuba (as in North Korea), they are wasting their time. These guys are bad actors and will use us for their own purposes anyway they can.

The Cuba of Castro has been a con from the start. It is about one thing -- the personal aggrandizement of Castro and the cult of his power. The "revolutionary, freedom loving" Castro loved his power and his personal control of Cuba from day one. Castro wants to be a kingmaker, a player, on the world stage. He sided early with the US and switched sides when the Russians offered a better deal. While he pays lip service to democracy, anyone who opposed Castro was either killed or forced off the island. He stacked his government with relatives and cronies. And, even at death's door, is still hanging on to power through his brother, Raul, and outreaches to Chavez in Venezuela. And, of course, trying for the limelight one more time.

Just to remind everyone of the track record -- Castro supported revolutions throughout the Western Hemisphere; sent troops to Angola and Mozambique. And, lest we forget, Castro was willing to base Soviet nuclear missiles on his soil pointed at us and he expressed to Moscow a willingness to use them.

Sometimes there is a reason the US must keep sanctions and restrictions in place against a nation. Not every nation is worthy of our natural goodwill. Cuba under Fidel will not change its stripes. It will continue to repress its people and encourage revolution in the Western Hemisphere. No quarter should be given until the Castro government is forced out.

A lot of things require patience in life. It is difficult to see why an end to our failed policy in regard to Cuba should be one of them. Raul Castro has said that his government is willing to discuss any and all issues between us. It is true that this statement was embedded in a speech hostile to the United States, but it was still an offer. Human rights abuses in Cuba must be at the top of any list of issues to be resolved. Freedom of movement and expression are not negotiable. Do the Cubans want to let Americans and American companies own property in Cuba? Is the Cuban government willing to let all Cuban Americans return to take up lives useful to both countries. Let us find out, and soon.

At "Sic Semper Tyrannis" we have been having a light hearted discussion of this set of issues since last week.

President Obama has taken a pragmatic and necessary step toward a Cuba policy designed to effect real change on the island. Over 40 years of a US trade embargo has not moved the Cuban regime any closer to democracy or toward improving human rights. At the same time, the domestic political environment in the United States does not allow for a sweeping and immediate elimination of the embargo.

By focusing first on improving the lot of families divided by years of strained US/Cuba ties, as well as on the provision of enhanced humanitarian offerings and telecommunication services, President Obama is sending a strong signal to all Cubans that the United States is not indifferent to their suffering. In a consistent fashion, President Obama has clearly stated that further policy moves by the United States will come with only “actions not words” by the Cuban regime. Key actions should relate first and foremost to political prisoners and human rights. President Obama has a balancing act before him that should include both dialogue, now that Raul Castro has stated a desire to discuss “everything,” and results that have the best interests of the Cuban people at heart.

The issue at this point is one of expectations. I was in Brasil last week, a country that has served as a virtual bridge between the United States and some of the more populist regimes in the region. Public reaction to President Obama’s pre-Summit policy declarations on Cuba varied from frustration that he did not do something more audacious to amazement that he had the political courage to do so much so early in his term. Fortunately, the tendency of the latter group won out in the Summit of the Americas V in Trinidad and Tobago this weekend, and US positioning in the Americas was enhanced overall by the policy shift. Those supporting détente with Cuba – as indeed I do -- must be patient. It has taken decades of trials and errors in the bilateral relationship to land the US and Cuba where we are today, and a gradual engagement both economically and politically is not only politically feasible but perhaps will be more effective at the end of the day.