If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the principles of deterrence would not be repealed. They were not repealed when other regimes at least as revolutionary, anti-American, risk-acceptant, and/or mercurial as the Islamic Republic of Iran acquired such weapons. Think of China, where the decade-long turmoil of the Cultural Revolution occurred after China had tested nuclear weapons. Or think of the USSR during the last, paranoid years of Stalin, or during subsequent decades when the Soviet Union was doing far more to try to stoke revolutions than anything Iran is doing today. If we must, then yes, we can live with an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, in the way that Larry Korb has mentioned. Those who say that the only thing worse than military conflict with Iran would be a nuclear-armed Iran are sloganeering, not assessing the consequences of either a military attack on Iran or the advent of an Iranian bomb. A military strike would be folly, in terms of the ways in which Iran could strike back, the consequences for other U.S. interests in the region, and the inability of such a strike to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons program anyway. (On that last point, think of the Israeli strike on the Iraqi reactor in 1981, which led the Iraqis to restructure and redouble their nuclear efforts.)

It is still preferable that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons, not least because an Iranian nuclear weapons capability would increase the chance that other states in the region would seek such a capability as well. An Iranian nuclear weapon is not inevitable. To get from where Iran is now to having a bomb would require the Iranians to take a series of decisions they have not yet taken, all the way up to the decision to make the last turn of a screwdriver in assembling a weapon. Why should the Iranians take decisions any sooner than they must, or any sooner than would make the decisions meaningful, in terms of their capability to carry them out? The Iranians, of all people, are bazaaris in spirit who are not going to foreclose prematurely the possibility of reaching deals beneficial to them.

Two realities should guide efforts to reduce the chance that Iran will make decisions that will bring them closer to a nuclear weapon. One is that among the likely incentives for Tehran to seek the bomb, one of the most important is to acquire a deterrent against what Iranians see as their chief threat, the United States. It follows that anything that increases the perception of hostility from the United States will make it more likely that Tehran will seek nuclear weapons, and anything that reduces that perception will make it less likely. Engagement will decrease the chance of an Iranian nuclear weapon not only insofar as it provides a negotiating mechanism for making deals, but also insofar as it provides the “respect” the Iranians crave and dispels the impression that the United States is really just interested in regime change.

The other reality is that any agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is unlikely to involve an end to uranium enrichment. Most Iranians make a clear distinction between a nuclear program and nuclear weapons, in a way that goes beyond any subterfuge by some members of the elite who may profess interest in an energy-generation program mainly to disguise an interest in weapons. There are procedural devices not yet explored that could let the Iranians have their enrichment program while providing sufficient assurances to the United States and other outsiders that it will not become an ingredient in a weapons program. Direct negotiations are the way to explore those devices.             

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“How should President Obama proceed in dealing with Iran?”

The answer is “carefully…very carefully.”

While talking without preconditions is probably appropriate, perhaps even necessary, most likely at the Secretary of State level, it is unlikely that there is very much, short of an invasion, that Americans or anyone else can do to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. At least at this point, an invasion would seem to be a remarkably unattractive option…and it will be even less of an option once Iran does have a few nuclear weapons along with a relatively plausible delivery capability.

So what then? Enlisting our allies in an effort to bring Iran into the club of responsible nations through the use of both carrot and stick—such as trade and trade restrictions—would be worthy of pursuit. Unfortunately, however, such techniques are notoriously ineffectual—but still not to be ignored. Perhaps the greatest hope for the world is that one day the young people of Iran may grow weary of the “self-imposed” isolate being endured by the citizens of Iran and seek to reach out to the rest of the world. Finally, it should be made unmistakably clear to Iran’s leaders that their use of a (yes, “a” as in singular) nuclear weapon against America would have a direct consequence on the continued existence of Iran on this planet.

We would also be wise to invest in a modest ballistic missile defense system to help introduce uncertainty in an aggressor’s plans—as well as giving at least a chance of survival to those who are targeted. Assuming that a hostile Iran possesses nuclear weapons and threatens to use them, most citizens of major U.S. cities would probably pay a considerable sum to increase their survival probability from zero to, say, even 50 percent. But here, too, the news is not good: any such system would have to be buttressed by air and ground defenses—defenses which today have not been able to keep marijuana from coming into the U.S. by the ton.

We could also do a great deal to help many of our citizens survive should the unthinkable happen. In that regard, my own highly unscientific survey has indicated that our government has largely failed in educating its citizenry on the do’s and don’t’s of twenty-first century survival. For example, most people I query do not know whether, in the case of a chemical attack, they should seek cover in their basement or in their attic; whether in a nuclear attack they should seek refuge in their attic or their basement; whether in a smallpox attack they should go to a hospital to be vaccinated or remain in their homes; or even how long they can remain in a sealed room without being asphyxiated.

The sad fact of life in the 21st century is that for the first time in history small groups, or even individuals, acting alone can disrupt the lives of very large groups. We have somehow learned to live with nearly a half-million automobile deaths each decade…heaven forbid that may be our lot when it comes to nuclear and biological terrorism.

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Yes we should be talking to Iran. And we have been in many forums in many past administrations, including the Bush Administration. But we should not discount past history and expect talks to evolve into negotiations that magically resolve bilateral problems. The problem is not in Washington but in Tehran (and in Qum, the capital city of the ayatollahs).

Iranian hardliners do not want genuinely improved relations with the United States because they know that two previous Iranian revolutions were aborted by the defection of Westernized elites and they fear that better relations with the U.S. will pose a growing threat to their hold on power. They demonize the U.S. as the Great Satan not just because they see us as evil, but because they fear we will tempt their followers to abandon the revolutionary path prescribed by Ayatollah Khomeini.

This is why hardliners seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran a few days after the Carter Administration NSC Adviser Brzezinski met in Algeria with the President and foreign minister of Iran’s provisional government in November 1979. It was one reason why Iranian hardliners sabotaged the Reagan Administration’s effort to engage a more moderate faction in the mid-1980s. And it remains a strong ideological reason why the Obama Administration does not represent change that Iran’s revolutionary hardliners can “believe in.”

True, if Iran was merely a “nation-state threat” as Michael Scheuer has suggested, there would be a much greater chance of successful negotiations. But Iran’s radical regime poses a revolutionary Islamist threat and the logic of the revolution continues to clash with the logic of the state. Ideas have consequences. And it would be a big mistake to think that Khomeini’s ideas no longer resonate with President Ahmadinejad or the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Making the hard compromises that would be necessary to open the door to improved relations with the U.S. would undermine the legitimacy of their ideology and weaken their claim to leadership of the Muslim world. Tehran may go through the motions of a diplomatic dialogue, as it often has in the past, to deflect pressure for more international sanctions and temporarily defuse the nuclear standoff. But seeking a Grand Bargain is likely to result in endless talks about talks that will only enable Iran to buy time to run out the clock, as it completes a nuclear weapon.

The Obama Administration has pledged to formulate an Iran strategy “with bigger carrots and bigger sticks”. But for Tehran, attaining a nuclear weapon capability is the biggest carrot. And unless the Obama Administration can convince Iranians that it is serious about actually using “bigger sticks”, then the talks are unlikely to resolve anything.

I think Washington should place preconditions on talks – but the preconditions should be agreed to with our allies. The EU and Japan have economic leverage with Tehran that they have not used to date. Tehran’s Achilles heel is its faltering economy, hamstrung by mismanagement, corruption and falling oil prices. The EU and Japan are an important source of foreign investment, loans and trade that are sorely needed by Iran. The Obama Administration should press our allies to deny foreign investment, trade subsidies, and high-tech exports to Iran to the greatest extent possible before it agrees to sit down with the Iranians. This will give Iran a strong incentive to negotiate an acceptable deal. And it is important to secure greater European cooperation on sanctions before the talks start, because once they begin, the Europeans will use the need to avoid “upsetting” the talks as a convenient excuse to avoid future sanctions.

Will this result in a diplomatic solution that will dissuade Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power? I doubt it, but at least it will raise the costs to Iran of continuing on its present course.

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Yes comprehensively and strategically (as Hillary suggests), but also slowly.  Slowly not just because of the upcoming Iranian elections, but also because it would be good if we could score with Syria first. Iran's assessment of its own strategic situation will be different if Syria moves towards peace with Israel (a prospect whose likelihood we may know more about with Israel's election results tomorrow).

It would also be helpful to us if US troops are successfully withdrawn from Iraqi population centers--where they are vulnerable to Iranian-trained militias--as is planned by the end of June.  While some Americans will remain in military and police training teams, the bulk of American combat brigades should then be not only relatively safe but also capable of taking action should it prove necessary. And the successful Iraqi provincial (not parliamentary) elections have already scored a blow against Iran's favored surrogates in Iraq and in favor of continuing the return to something like stability.  

Continuing softness in the oil market, and the slow turning of sanctions screws, are also favorable factors.  There are very few problems in the world that are not more manageable for the US at $40/barrel oil than at $140/barrel oil.  And who says the sanctions can't be ratcheted up another notch?  

So I would suggest the new Administration take 6 months to plan its approach to negotiations with Iran, trying to shape the strategic environment in the meanwhile by weaning Syria away from its alignment with Iran, getting Americans out of harms' way, continuing the stabilization of Iraq and pressing the Europeans for stronger sanctions.  Continuing recession will likely take care of oil prices.

The disadvantage of delay is the reportedly rapid progress Iran is making in enriching uranium. While there is some reason to be skeptical of the reported pace of progress, the more important point is that Iran does not appear to be near a decision to construct or test a weapon, a decision that will immediately subject the Islamic Republic (and the rest of the region) to serious security risks.  Quite a few countries have made the decision not to build nuclear weapons, even after acquiring adequate enrichment technology with which to do so.  This is the best we can hope for with Iran, within a verifiable regime of continuing strict and irreversible controls.  

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We do talk to the Iranians both directly and indirectly on a variety of issues even though we do not have formal relations.  And as the above discussion has made clear, there are many reasons to try to step up discussions.  Indeed, even if we try a more coercive approach, talks still have value -- successful coercion, as well as conciliation, requires skilled diplomacy.  But for all our sensitivities regarding talks with the Iranians, we should remember that their issues with us are even more profound.  The coup that overthrew Mossadeq in 1953 is politically more alive to most Iranians than the 1979 hostage crisis is to most Americans.   So far, U.S. hostility to Iran and opposition to direct talks has hidden much of the confusion felt on the Iranian side about better relations with Washington, but a credible offer to improve relations will bring this confusion into the light.  

If we do talk to Iran, and if negotiations actually make some progress, we should expect considerable chaos and confusion on the Iranian side.  Iranian leaders are likely to go back on deals, to step up the hostile rhetoric, or otherwise to make negotiations difficult and maddening.  In addition, Iran often sees escalation as a complement to negotiation -- by pressing the U.S. harder, some Iranians believe, Tehran can get a better deal.  So even as talks go on Iran is likely to continue confrontational policies in the region, at the very least.  None of this should stop America  from going forward, but we should do so with our eyes open.

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How should President Obama deal with Iran? In the words of the immortal Sergeant Crapgame (played by Don Rickles) in the movie Kelly’s Heroes, “make them a deal, a deal deal.” The subject to which he was referring was how to end the standoff between the band of freelancing American soldiers of which he was a member who were trying to steal a hoard of gold in a French bank and a German rear guard that stood in their way. With the rest of the American Army descending on the town, it was urgent that the two sides resolve the confrontation. So a deal was struck. Both sides benefited.

The situation facing the United States and Iran is much the same. Both sides are in a confrontation that benefits neither. But the positions of the two sides are not symmetrical. Iran has much more to lose by continuing its present course. It has no unilateral options for improving its situation – certainly not the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Iran’s strategic position is extremely weak. It has aroused fear in and engendered enmity from virtually all its neighbors. Its economy is in bad shape, particularly with oil prices down 70% from their 2008 high and a global recession making it certain that prices will not rise appreciably for some considerable time. Internally, the country is split between a rabidly conservative and aging leadership struggling to hold on to power and a growing population more interested in a better life than the Islamic revolution. The recent parliamentary elections in Iraq hold forth the prospect for that state to resume its position as a counterweight to Iran, but this time with a Shia-dominated government. Militarily, Iran is a lightweight relying largely on obsolescent technologies and a mistaken theory of asymmetric operations. As U.S. forces exit Iraq, Iran will lose its only real leverage against this country: the threat of renewed terrorism against those forces.

Moreover, the United States and its allies have the military power to negate any threat Iran may pose to the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf or to its neighbors. The U.S. Navy maintains a strong position in the Gulf while employing only a fraction of its forces. It is working closely with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council through several combined task forces to improve the latter’s ability to conduct naval operations. Based on its Fleet Response Plan, the Navy could surge a massive force, including several aircraft carriers, missile-firing SSGNs, attack submarines and surface combatants armed with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, into the region on short notice. These forces, along with land-based airpower, could quickly establish control over the Gulf, protect our friends and allies in the region and strike with near impunity at Iranian targets.

It is time to offer Iran a deal. Better yet, a deal deal. Both sides want an end to the confrontation and improved security in the region. This, and not economic incentives, should be the basis for a deal. The new Administration should pursue direct negotiations with Iran on a new security framework  for the Persian Gulf region. The United States should do this together with its allies in the Gulf region. The new framework would offer Iran the ability to shape its security environment but in a cooperative manner. The framework could include limits on foreign military activities in the Gulf, constraints on the importation of advanced military equipment, a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of the participating states and security guarantees. The Gulf region also should be declared a nuclear-free zone. Iran can be allowed to pursue nuclear energy, but under international supervision. Ultimately, the new framework could even include mechanisms for direct consultation in the event of a threat from outside the area against any state in the Persian Gulf region.

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Talk. Don’t Talk. I don’t care. I would, however, remember the words of my friend Czech Ambassador Petr Kolar when he said, “I am a diplomat, but I feel much more comfortable negotiating when I know that I am safe.”  In that regard dealing with Iran without having credible nuclear and non-nuclear deterrents as well as robust missile defenses makes no sense.

Iran just successfully put a commercial satellite into space. If they can do that with a ballistic missile, they can conduct a missile attack (remember Sputnik). They have a nuclear program which no one really believes does not have military application. Missile plus nuclear weapon equals a real threat.

What do we have so far from the folks at the White House? Well, lots of signals they want to talk, but not many that they want keep us safe. Missile defense—well they have made no commitment on deploying interceptors in Europe which could stop an Iranian missile. Nuclear deterrence—all they’ve said is they want to eliminate three quarters of our nuclear stockpile. On conventional deterrence, they are looking at terminating the buy of the F-22, the only plane that can guarantee penetration of Iranian air defenses.

If the White House wants to talk, the least they could do is at least start by leaving the impression that it is serious about defending America and its allies against serious threats. 
 

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When President Obama begins to implement his campaign promise to engage Iran diplomatically on all the issues dividing us, he needs to keep in mind certain events that have shaped Iran’s perception of the United States, as well as the problems that his predecessors faced when undertaking diplomatic initiatives toward “evil” regimes. And, he needs to consider that a big player in getting Iran to modify its behavior is going to be Russia.

For the Iranians, at least, three events shape their attitude toward the U.S. First, the role the CIA (and the United Kingdom’s MI6) played in removing Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran’s first national and democratic government, from power in 1953 and installing the Shah, whose harsh regime lasted more than a quarter of a century.

Second, the Bush administration’s publicly placing Iran on the Axis of Evil in January 2002, with the avowed goal of bringing about regime change. This was done in spite of the fact that Iran was one of the few Muslim countries to condemn the attacks of 9-11, had played a constructive role in Afghanistan aiding our military efforts, and had helped persuade the Northern Alliance to support the Karzai government at the Bonn Conference. In fact, the Bonn Conference would not have succeeded without Iranian involvement.

Third, the Iranian government’s offer in the spring of 2003 to begin direct negotiations with the U.S. on all the issues dividing our two governments. The Bush administration not only did not respond to the overture but criticized the Swiss ambassador, who handles our affairs in Tehran, for transmitting it.

Obama also needs to remember that he will probably be vilified by some political and opinion leaders for engaging in direct negotiations without preconditions with Iran, just as President Nixon was roundly criticized when he went to China in 1971 and Ronald Reagan was for meeting Gorbachev in Reykjavík in 1986.

When Nixon went to China without preconditions, he was criticized by many conservatives for dealing with a tyrant like Mao Tse-Tung, who was still providing some assistance to the North Vietnamese to help them fight Americans in South Vietnam, who had just put his country through the Cultural Revolution, who had been so cavalier about using nuclear weapons that we and the Soviets had actually contemplated launching a preventive strike against his arsenal, who was threatening our Taiwanese ally, and who had sent 1 million soldiers into North Korea in 1950, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of U.S. service personnel.

Similarly, when Reagan sat down with Gorbachev in Iceland in 1986, he was branded by, among others, Newt Gingrich, as Neville Chamberlain, because the Soviet Union still ruled Eastern Europe with an iron hand, had deployed intermediate-range missiles that threatened Western Europe, was still in Afghanistan, was still meddling in Central and South America, and was violating the ABM Treaty by building a second radar site.

But just as history has vindicated Presidents Nixon and Reagan for dealing with “evil regimes,” so will history vindicate Obama if he opens a dialogue with the Iranians. If Nixon and Reagan had listened to their critics, the Cold War certainly would have gone on much longer.

Finally, obtaining Russia’s support for getting Iran to agree not to develop nuclear weapons will depend on how Obama handles the deployment of the ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Bush administration’s plans to deploy a system that does not work, against a threat that does not exist, to protect people who have not asked to be protected, never made much sense. Obama will have to slow walk the deployments in such a way that he does not appear to be giving in to Russian threats. Vice President Biden struck the perfect note in Munich when he said we would deploy “provided the technology is proven to work and is cost effective.”

While there is no guarantee that the Iranians will accept an overture from Obama or that the talks will be successful, the fact that Obama is willing to open a dialogue without preconditions will make it easier to get support from the international community for stiffer economic sanctions, as well as the threat of military action should that be necessary.

Obama should be careful about overreacting publicly to the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons. While it is certainly desirable that Iran not go nuclear, the U.S., along with Israel, France, and Britain, can dissuade or deter a nuclear-armed Iran just as we have lived with (and still do) such nuclear powers as China and the Soviet Union. Not only do all five former Secretaries of State believe that a nuclear armed Iran can be contained, so also do military leaders, like retired General John Abizaid, who headed the Central Command from 2003 to 2007, and who was the Deputy for three years before that.

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 "If they want to wage war against each other, God and Allah bless them -- and let America steer clear of the mayhem until one destroys the other or they destroy each other." Scheuer

Mike:  This creates the impression that you subscribe to the notion that "God" and "Allah" are two distinct beings or at least conceptualizations.  Since I know you, I doubt that you intend this to be a literal rather than a figurative expression.  Nevertheless, such an expression is deeply offensive to Muslims.  How did you intend this?  As I think you know, I am not a Muslim.

I like it that you’ve asked the question as what should the discussion be, not whether there should be a discussion. We should talk to the Iranian government, and the Iranian people, for the simple reason that the course we’re proceeding on hasn’t demonstrated the results we want: the Iranian government continues to move aggressively in violation of their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, despite IAEA, UN Security Council, and increasing international sanctions. Moreover, the Iranian people are apparently supportive of their government’s choices on this (one of the few areas the government seems to have popular support). By refusing to talk to repressive governments, we cede them the argument – we should instead be making our case to Iranians of why their government is making dangerous choices that will increase Iran’s international isolation. It may not change the government’s choices, but it would require them to pay a higher domestic cost for proceeding with their nuclear enrichment and weapons programs.

We’ve likely reached the end of the line on sanctions through the UN Security Council. Russia and China just aren’t as worried about this as we are; nor is Germany, nor are the United Arab Emirates and other GCC states that do Iran’s banking for them. Whether or not they should be, they aren’t, and we haven’t made much progress in changing their views, despite considerable effort. Treasury’s smart guys have done a terrific job identifying areas the US could press further sanctions: the Central Bank of Iran’s ties to the nuclear programs make it a legitimate target for pressure; insurance, shipping, refined petrol products and their machine parts, are sectors susceptible to leverage.

But at the end of the day – and that could come as early as this summer – Iran will acquire enough nuclear material to build weapons. It would be wonderful if we had a broader range of choice, but I don’t see one. Their satellite launch and ballistic missile tests suggest they are unlikely to cross the threshold opaquely. They are more likely to provide a test as proof of their achievement. Neither talks nor smart sanctions remove the unpleasant reality that President Obama will have to choose between damaging the Iranian nuclear program or accepting this Iranian government crossing the nuclear threshold, with all the dangers and political complications that come with it.

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Before President Obama decides on a policy toward Iran, he might try to accurately define the nature of the threat that country poses to genuine U.S. interests.  For those who do not believe that Iran is a nation-state threat to the United States, the president can cite:

--The clouds of Iranian air force planes that mercilessly bombed Israel during the 2006 Israel-Hisballah war. (Oh, wait a minute, there were no such attacks?)

--The multiple times the Iranian navy has closed the Straits of Hormuz and impoverished Western economies. (You say Iran has never done this?)

--The precision Chinese missiles the Iranians have used to repeatedly destroy oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. (What? No record of such attacks?)

--The thousands of Americans killed and the tens of billions of dollars of U.S. property destroyed at home and abroad since 1984 by the attacks of Iran’s terrorist surrogate Hisballah. (Really, there have been no anti-U.S. Hisballah attacks since 1984?)

--The rising tide of lethal, anti-U.S. operations by Iran’s other terrorist surrogate Hamas. (Are you sure there has never been such an attack?)

--The steadily increasing Afghan insurgency that would not exist if Iran was not initiating, managing, and supplying the effort.  (Really, most Afghans loathe the Shia? And you say that the Afghans -- not even the West’s stooge Karzai -- will not take orders from foreigners?)

--The multiple U.S. Navy ships sunk in the Persian Gulf by Iran’s navy and maritime minefields. (You checked closely and there is no record of such events?)

--The three divisions of IRGC infantry that splashed ashore in Gaza under the cover of the Iranian air force and navy to save the day for the Palestinians by annihilating invading IDF forces. (Are you positive this never happened?)

While the foregoing probably are prominent components of the titillating nightmares of the likes of Feith, Wolfowitz, and AIPAC’s board of directors they, of course, never happened. Indeed, since 1984 it would be hard to find a direct Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on U.S. interests, save for Iran’s hand in helping their Shia coreligionists kill U.S. soldiers and Marines sent to die for nothing in the indefensible, jihad-accelerating U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Iran is a threat to the United States. How so? It is an island of Shias surrounded by a massively more numerous Sunni world which would rather kill the heretical Shias than look at them. It is facing a substantial downward trend in its energy-producing sector. And it is now surrounded by U.S. military bases. In other words it is pretty much -- if you’ll forgive the phrase -- “contained.” On the nuclear issue, the Iranians’ will acquire a nuclear weapon; if we really wanted to stop that now-inevitable development we should have stopped our European allies from selling Tehran nuclear-related technology in the 1990s. And, parenthetically, if I was an Iranian leader watching the coming election in Israel of Netanyahu and his merry band of war-wanters, I would accelerate my acquisition and development activities.

So is there a potential threat to the United States from Iran as a nation-state? Yes, but nothing we cannot contain if we maintain a large, effective, and aggressive, Navy, and if Iranian leaders believe we will use it to without qualm or limit if they attack America. Is there a threat from Iran to Israel? Yes, but there probably is a greater threat from Israel against Iran. In either case, a pox on both of their religious-war-loving houses. If they want to wage war against each other, God and Allah bless them -- and let America steer clear of the mayhem until one destroys the other or they destroy each other.

Is there, then , a major concern for the United States vis-à-vis Iran? The answer is “yes, definitely,” and it is a domestic threat that is mostly one of our own making, or at least of our own sloth and moral and political cowardice. This threat lies in the terrorist campaign the Iranians could conduct in the United States if Washington and/or Israel attacks Iran. Our political leaders, the FBI, and other federal security agencies have been negligent for more than 25 years in two areas: (a) fearing charges of racism, profiling, and discrimination, federal security authorities have allowed the proliferation of the presence of Lebanese Hisballah and Iran’s intelligence services in the continental United States; and, (b) ignoring the national government’s absolute duty to control U.S. borders, Washington has allowed the unmonitored inflow of Hisballah and Iranian operatives into the United States from their well-established bases in Canada, Mexico, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Thus, America is well-positioned to smash like an annoying bug any attack on U.S. interests overseas by the second-rate Iranian military, but it is almost completely undefended against a Tehran-managed terrorist campaign inside the United States that would be triggered by an Iraq-like, unprovoked attack on Iran by the United States and/or Israel.

I will leave it to the reader to express admiration for the American statecraft and strategic thinking that has brought us to this pass.

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I am no expert on this issue, but it seems to this amateur that Washington forgets sometimes that Iran is a sovereign nation with over 70 million people occupying some 600,000 square miles of land.  Like it or not, it has an elected, reasonably popular (not loved) government and a history with America that is checkered to say the least.  And, like it or not, we are unlikely to engage in any substantial military action against Tehran.

So, what can you do with a regime that (with some small variations) is an ideological opponent trying to do us harm in any number and varying degrees of ways?  At risk of going back to the Cold War and the Soviet regime, you need to engage it in a form of comprehensive linkage.   And I mean comprehensive.

Washington always seems to be involved in some form of limited actions against Iran-- carrot and stick at different times over different issues. For instance, financial and other economic sanctions are helpful.  But, frankly, "economics" causes chronic problems for a nation -- rarely fatal.  Following up with some form of direct political engagement, regional political engagement and economic engagement at the same time makes more sense to me.

The best we can hope for (as with the old Soviet regime, in its heyday) is to change behavior -- not regime.  If Tehran can be made to understand it is in its best interests to behave, they will. Otherwise, we are in for a continued storm of their tantrums and our never ending list of "new proposals."

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President Obama has neither the time nor the apparent inclination to devote much attention to Iran in 2009. The issue is whether State believes Iranian possession of nuclear weapons would severely and negatively affect US interests in the Middle East. If so, the US probably has hefty financial leverage with Europe this year to apply serious sanctions that would pave the way for negotiations at a later date. On the other hand, if State is unwilling to expend political capital now to box Iran in, it is unlikely that at a later date the Obama administration will kick up much of a fuss, provided Iran follows the Pakistani model and acquires nuclear weapons without publicity.

The structure of the question implies a situation in which the United States has more or less complete freedom of action in which to pick and choose among options. That is not the case. As Paul Krugman has pointed out, America stands on the brink of disaster economically. The shape and condition of our social contract a year from now is debatable if the economic crisis can not be mitigated. In that context it is doubtful if we can afford the two wars we are now fighting much less the costs that would inevitably derive from yet a further war against Iran. This overriding economic restraint makes a mockery of loose talk of an American war with Iran. In purely military terms, are there serious people who can not see how much the position of our forces in Iraq would be damaged by regional reactions to an American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities or the mere perception of American complicity in an analogous Israeli attack? What has happened in the Khyber Pass recently speaks volumes of the kinds of additional dangers that a rash use of military force would bring on.

David Ignatius wrote last week of his belief that elder statesmen of truly global stature should be delegated to negotiate with the Iranians. I heartily concur. Such negotiations should begin very soon and should be conducted without preconditions. The United States should seek an understanding with Iran in which the Iranians insure that the IAEA has such complete access to its nuclear facilities that there can be no credible claims that they are building nuclear weapons. The Iranians should also give up their support for violent groups that are not willing to transform themselves into democratic political parties. In return the Iranians must be accepted as a major power in the Islamic World. This implies a major change in US policy from regime change to engagement in a wide variety of fields. The Obama Administration has already signaled its serious intent with regard to the Palestine issue. There must be a great deal of “follow through” on early promise. The United States must advance a workable plan of its own for solution of the Muslim-Israeli issue.

Changes of this kind would revolutionize the situation in the greater Middle East. Such changes would be beneficial to Iran as well as the United States. The products of the genius of the Iranian peoples could be a great benefit to the United States and to the world if the barrier of hostility and fear between the two countries could be lowered. A failure to reach such an understanding will inevitably lead to a further deterioration of relations tending towards war, a war that the United States would surely win, but, at what cost?

Vice President Biden said during the late campaign that some foreign power or event would test President Obama severely in the first months of his term. I doubt if he expected the test to come from Israel, but, that is likely. Next week’s Israeli election will probably produce a government of the nationalist and religious Right. The Israeli press is full of the expectation that the new government will visit Mr. Obama in Washington to demand quick and decisive action against Iran. Israel fears Iran’s putative nuclear weapons program and dislikes the thought of an Islamic state that would be a serious rival for power in the Middle East. The expectation is strong in Israel that President Obama will be told to “fish or cut bait.” He will be told that if the United States does not deal with Iran to Israel’s satisfaction, then Israel will deal with the problem. Iraq under American occupation is situated geographically between Israel and Iran. The United States is responsible for the integrity of Iraq’s airspace. The entire world knows that. Certainly all the Islamic World knows that.

One wonders what Joe Biden’s advice would be in this situation.

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There is no harm in seeking to talk to the Iranians, and much to be gained. In the first place, "extending a hand" will make for better coordination with the Europeans--and allow us to apply greater pressure on Tehran at the same time. Moreover, in the likely event that the Iranians reject our offers to talk, we will be able to muster more support for military action, should it have to be taken. Finally, if the Iranians do talk, there is some hope that a compromise that allows them to "save face" yet puts their program in the deep freeze is still possible, even if remotely so.

Talking to the Iranians does not mean easing up on economic, especially financial sanctions. If we demand no preconditions, we should offer none either. On the contrary, we should squeeze the Iranians financially as hard as we can, and, as part of our "coordinated" effort with the Europeans, ensure that they too are putting the major financial and economic squeeze on Tehran. We should continue to press for Switzerland to expand the sanctions it recently adopted against Tehran, and ask the French and Germans in particular to ensure that this is so. We know that our sanctions are hurting Iran, especially since the price of oil has tumbled; we should hurt the mullahs even more, if they won't see reason.

We should reach out to both the Russians and the Chinese to work with us to contain Iran. With respect to Moscow, that might mean listening more carefully to what the Russians have to say about missile defense, and our deployment to the so-called Third Site in the Czech Republic and Poland. But engagement with Moscow should also involve having the Kremlin recognize the Iranian missile challenge for what it is. The Iranians pose at least as much of a threat to Russian stability, especially in the North Caucasus as they do to American interests. It is no accident, either, that Russia and Persia are ancient adversaries. Creative American diplomacy with Russia is an essential element of any strategy vis a vis Iran.

As for Beijing, the last thing the Chinese want is instability, or worse, in the Middle East. That is what a nuclear Iran would bring on, and Beijing knows it. Nor does China want to stand alone as Iran's sole protector. If we can reach an understanding with Moscow regarding Iran, and simultaneously continue to engage China on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Chinese will more than likely come around as well.

At the same time, we must also do nothing to slow down our missile defense program. Those in the Administration--and their allies on Capitol Hill-- who are advocating a cut in the missile defense budget continue to view the program as it was when Bill Clinton was still in the Oval Office. In fact, the missile defense program has undergone significant changes since Democrats were last in power. At that time the defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was still in force. There was a clear distinction between "national" and "theater missile defense", one that no longer exists because the US now has a networked ballistic missile defense system. There was virtually no space-based element of missile defense. No land based missiles had been deployed in Alaska. There was no sea based defense. And, of course, no dying satellite had been shot down as it descended toward earth, which is what a Navy SM-3 missile accomplished a year ago this month. The missile defense program is our ultimate deterrent against Iran; it should not be tampered with.

Therefore, while we might engage Russia regarding our missile defense in Europe, we should move ahead with all elements of the program, both land and sea-based, together with space based support, to defend against any Iranian threat to any of our allies, be they the Europeans, the Israelis or the Gulf States. In particular, if should increase our missile defense cooperation with the Israelis beyond the current deployment of an X band radar and upgrades to the Arrow, such as selling them the new high altitude THAAD missile, networking our systems with theirs, and deploying missile defense warships to the Eastern Mediterranean on a full-time basis, we would lower the likelihood of a preemptive Israeli action against Iranian nuclear sites.

Our approach to Iran must therefore be both strategic and comprehensive. We must talk to Tehran--if the mullahs are indeed willing to talk--but with no preconditions. As we sit at the negotiating table we must squeeze them under the table . We must further tighten the economic and financial screws that we know are causing them problems; coordinate those pressures with our allies; engage the Russians; engage the Chinese; and reassure the Israelis and the Gulf Arabs. Only in this way are we to have any hope of putting the Iranian nuclear genie back in the bottle before it is too late.

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Think big; thinking small about U.S.-Iranian relations won’t work and could make things worse. From my own experience as a U.S. official negotiating with Iranian officials over Afghanistan and al-Qaeda for almost two years during 2001-2003, it is clear to me that trying to proceed incrementally with Tehran—by picking one or two issues on which U.S. and Iranian interests seem to overlap, hoping that productive interaction on those issues will build “confidence” enabling the parties to deal with more contentious issues later on—is doomed to fail. Our talks over Afghanistan were productive but structurally flawed. Because there was no comprehensive, strategic framework for dealing with the Iranians, unrelated issues could and did undermine otherwise productive negotiations at any time.

If President Obama is serious about diplomatic engagement with Iran, he needs to establish a comprehensive strategic framework for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy at the outset, rather than waiting in vain for some measure of “trust” to be established. Moreover, that comprehensive strategic framework needs to posit strategic realignment between Washington and Tehran as engagement’s end goal. Without this, the Iranians will never believe that the United States is truly prepared to live with the Islamic Republic as Iran’s legitimate government. Under these conditions, the Iranians will continue to act in ways that they believe are critical to defending their vital interests, but that we see as unacceptably provocative. Unless we break this vicious cycle, already bad U.S.-Iranian relations will continue to deteriorate, and the United States and the Islamic Republic will be drawn ever closer to the point of conflict, even with the Obama Administration’s professed interest in diplomatic engagement.

President Obama should start formulating his Administration’s policy toward the Islamic Republic by recognizing an important set of facts: Iran’s geo-strategic location at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia and in the heart of the Persian Gulf, its enormous hydrocarbon resources, and its influence and standing in key arenas and on important issues for the United States make it a truly critical country.

Given these facts about Iran, President Obama also needs to recognize an important set of facts about the United States: For almost 30 years, U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic has emphasized diplomatic isolation, economic pressure, and thinly veiled support for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, successive U.S. administrations have periodically sought to elicit Iranian cooperation on specific tactical issues. This two-track approach has not worked to advance U.S. interests; indeed, it has damaged the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East and undermined regional stability.

These two sets of facts lead inexorably to my argument about the imperative to “think big”: it is time for the United States to reorient its policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran as fundamentally as President Nixon reoriented American policy toward the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s. I have argued elsewhere that this kind of fundamental reorientation would be most effectively embodied in the negotiation of a U.S.-Iranian “grand bargain”, or at least a “grand agenda”, in which all of the principal bilateral differences between the United States and Iran would be put on the table to be resolved in a “package”.

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