-- Corine Hegland, NationalJournal.com

a) End the supplemental funding circus. “Since we have been at war for more than seven years, there is no longer any excuse for sending up supplementals separately from the regular budget,” writes Larry Korb; Gordon Adams singles out the “constant DOD effort to 'get well' in procurement by funding hardware through supplementals.” Dov Zakheim, on the other hand, says eliminating supplementals is “wishful thinking.”

b) Eliminate non-useful weapons systems including the amphibious warfare vehicle, the Army's Future Combat Systems; the F-22, F-35, C-13OJ, Stryker, DDG-1000 destroyer, and the V-22. (nominations by Joseph Collins, Larry Korb, Rachel Kleinfield, Andy Krepinevich, and Winslow Wheeler; Wheeler describes the systems as “low-hanging fruit with their hyper-cost, almost complete irrelevance to warfare as we know it today, and high probability they are technical failures.”) “Gates now has both the opportunity and challenge to align the defense program with his vision,” writes Krepinevich, noting that the services are struggling to accept “persistent irregular conflict.”

c) Prepare for smaller budgets by asking the Services and an independent panel to identify potential cuts, suggests Joseph Collins, and pulling the FY 2010 budget plan “back from the rumored increases” writes Gordon Adams.

d) Call in—and fund--the civilian cavalry. “The military is a remarkably versatile instrument, but it remains a military instrument and is viewed so by the rest of the world,” writes Richard Hart Sinnreich. DoD got 87% percent of the national security budget in FY 2009, while State got just 5%, notes Larry Korb as he urges Gates to push for a “unified national security budget that allows the next president to make trade-offs” between DoD, DHS, and State. “Military superiority is not merely a question of how the Pentagon spends its own funds,” writes Stewart Verdery.

e) Fight the wars we've got. “The U.S. military is running on fumes,” says Michael Scheuer, who says “the U.S. Congress will have to reintroduce conscription.” Investments in “people programs” like education, training, wounded soldier care, and veterans benefits draw an approving nod from Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, who says Gates’s focus on people over machines represents a “tectonic shift” away from Rumsfeld, whose “idea of transformation postulated that technology alone would solve our problems.” Kori Schake disagrees, saying that “We should be cautious not to be as in thrall as opponents of transformation as its advocates were.” Rachel Kleinfield points out that investments are needed in other militaries, as “America cannot stabilize many parts of the world without creating backlash and anti-American feeling.”

f) Can we afford cuts? “All this talk about 'peace dividends,' and 'smarter defense choices' is just delusional,” writes James Jay Carafano, who, pointing to ships, planes, and bombers, calls talk of eliminating Cold War systems “ridiculous.” ““If we had gotten rid of them after the Communists vacated the Kremlin, we’d be fighting in Afghanistan with sticks and rocks,” says Carafano. Not much can really change in the new budget, writes Dov Zakheim: Personnel costs are virtually untouchable, operations and maintenance cannot be reduced in the midst of two wars, and “what Member of Congress will support procurement cutbacks, with attendant layoffs, at a time when billions are being spent to create new jobs?”

g) Reform intelligence. Loren Thompson writes that if you “look at the reorganization [Gates] has been pushing forward at the National Reconnaissance Office over the past year…you get a good idea of what he would like to do across the entire system.” “Gates, DNI Blair, and DCIA Panetta will have a few discussions over what needs to be done to sharpen that faltering machinery,” writes Ron Marks, pointing to the “mess brought on by the woeful 2004 Intelligence Reform bill.”

My thanks to all who participated!

On top of this current slate of problems, our Israeli allies -- talk about an oxymoron -- have ensured more theaters of military action across the Muslim world for U.S. troops. Their necessary self-defense action in Gaza will lead directly to more dead American civilians and military personnel. Thanks to our unnecessary relationship with Israel, Americans and Israelis are considered as virtually identical by our Islamist enemies -- killing one is as good as killing another. This reality was explained again to the Muslim world on Wednesday by Osama bin Laden, and as he spoke to Muslims worldwide they were simultaneously watching the Israelis use U.S.-provided weaponry to demolish Gaza and a democratically elected government. Secretary Gates will soon find out the high cost to U.S. military personnel of American politicians blithely involving the country up to the hilt in someone else's religious war.

Overall, Secretary Gates is a good and honest man. We are lucky to have him at the Pentagon, because he will have the moral courage to tell the president that because both parties have blundered us into a war with Islam, and because we have spent so much money on non-applicable-to-insurgencies weapon systems, the U.S. Congress will have to reintroduce conscription.

What  can really change in the new budget? Not much, at least with respect to what is called the "baseline" budget. Personnel costs have become virtually untouchable, despite the fact that health care costs in particular have spiralled under control. Indeed, with projected increases in Army and Marine Corps end-strength, pay and benefits will consume even more taxpayer dollars.

Operations and miantenance costs cannot be cut back while we are in the midst of two wars. And what Member of Congress will support procurement cutbacks, with attendant layoffs, at a time when billions are neiong spent to create new jobs?

It may be easier to cut back on research and development projects, many of which are less visible to the public, and which tend to affect fewer people. In general, however, don't look for the Secretary of Defense drastically to cut back the budget he only approved a month or so ago.

There is much talk of eliminating supplementals. This is wishful thinking. As long as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, there will be limits to how much supplemental funding can be reduced. Force levels may decline in Iraq, but they will not be entirely eliminated there, while forces are projected to double in Afghanistan. Personnel and oeprations costs associated with these conflicts will still have to be funded by supplementals.

Some portion of the supplemental budgets certainly will decline; in part because several tens of billions in supplemental funds are expected to migrate to the baseline budget. Those acquisition programs that are buried in the supplementals, and that will not have been transferred to the baseline budget, also may be reduced.  But the supplementals that are likely to be requested from the Congress will still amount to many tens of billions of dollars.

Ultimately, what can be expected of the second Gates era at the Pentagon is a change of tone, one of degree rather than of kind. In fact,  it would be out of character for him to make radical changes to the budget, or, for that matter, apart from high profile changes espoused by the President-elect, such as a more rapid withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq, to other programmatic and policy thrusts that he has espoused since he replaced Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. Gates has already laid the gorundwork for the new Administration's emphasis on Afghanistan, on greater inter-agency cooperation, on "soft power." And it is precisely the steadiness and consistency that he has projected that has made, and will continue to make Gates such an effective Secretary of Defense.

What are the goals we should be working towards?

1) A military designed to win the wars we are likely to fight.

We must maintain our ability to fight a peer competitor--having the ability to fight is the best deterrent to ensure that such a war will never happen. But the reality is, most of our current and recent wars have been manpower intensive, with counterinsurgency elements.

What does that mean for spending? We need to cut big, expensive conventional weapons programs that don't add crucial capabilities. The F-35 program is exhibit A for cuts--as "the most costly single aircraft program in DoD history" in the words of the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, it offers little that is essential for the wars we are likely to fight in the future. Cutting back on the Air Force purchases and ending the Navy variant could save up to $1 billion. (Read the report)

We can spend that money on needed conventional weapons, such as replacing Air Force tankers. We need to look at new challenges: cybersecurity, and purchasing ice breakers that will allow us to compete as militaries jockey for control of polar lands and naval passages that are newly opening. And we need to be able to fight today's wars: that means more spending to increase manpower, improve training, and care for troops returning from the battlefield.

2) A Whole of Government strategy so we can win wars, not just battles.

Secretary Gates understands that our military can create zones of stability--but it can't kick the ball through the posts. To win wars in fragile states requires other capabilities: a stronger State Department. Improved development aid that helps new governments gain legitimacy and deliver. Police training. Better intelligence capabilities, especially improved human intelligence. Other agencies--and a deployable civilian force-- is better suited to these tasks than our nation's military. The DoD needs to lead the way in moving its funds to other agencies so that the rest of our nation can stand shoulder to shoulder with our service members.

3) Other militaries trained to take on some of the global burden. America cannot stabilize many parts of the world without creating backlash and anti-American feeling. Our initial Afghan strategy that let us conquer the ruling Taliban is a case in point: we executed an innovative strategy with local forces, we did not try to master the terrain and relationships from afar. It is better for American security to have other forces we can work with, and other forces that can stabilize parts of the world where we may wish not to intervene at all--such as the EU mission to the Congo. That takes resources and focus--but will initially save American taxpayers, and improve American security in the long run.

First, he could bring some discipline back to the defense budget process. For eight long budget years, now, the Department has relied on supplementals, not only to fund the war, but to fund a lot of "business as usual, as well. It is high time to restrict supplemental funding requests to needs that are truly unanticipated and not likely to be repeated.

This no longer applies for much of our spending in Iraq, where costs are predictable, and coming down. It applies to a lot of our spending for Afghanistan, as well, though policy changes may reshape those requirements. And it applies with special importance to the constant DOD effort to "get well" in procurement by funding hardware through the supplementals - these are not one-offs or unexpected spending.

In addition, his FY 2010 budget plan should scale back from the rumored increases contained in the FYDP plan put in place over the past year.

Second, the Secretary could put "flesh" on his commitment to help rebalance the national security toolkit. The temporary authorities the Department has accumulated over the past eight years to provide security and development under direct DOD authorities should remain temporary. While it will take time to build the capacity and flexibility at State and USAID to provide agile, flexible, contingency-funded security and reconstruction/governance assistance, the responsibility to do so, outside of direct combat zones, belongs on the civilian side of the government.

DOD should not be creating a parallel architecture of permanent authorities for these tasks. Instead, it should withdraw requests to Congress to make Section 1206 and CERP permanent law, and, working with State/USAID, should help persuade Congress that security assistance and support for economic recovery and governance are civilian responsibilities and deserve both flexibility and adequate funding on the civilian side of the government.

The most important thing that Gates can do is to prepare the Department for deep cuts and major changes in how it must do business.  For example, we need to stress --- as we did in the Nixon doctrine --- the role of advisors and trainers over the role of US expeditionary forces.  On the hardware and manpower end, Gates should direct the Services to prepare evaluations of their own modernization efforts and decrement lists at the 5 through 25 %-cut levels over the next 5 years.  He should then create an independent experts panel to evaluate service modernization programs and then to create their own decrement lists.  The "dialog" between these competing evaluations and decrement lists should be the subject of the next Quadrennial Defense Review.  In all of this, the Secretary will have to trim in some places and eliminate in others.  My personal candidates to appear on the cut list would be both the Navy and Marine versions of the JSF, the amphibious warfare vehicle, and at least a third of the Army's FCS.  Plus ups should go to repariing salvageable Army and Marine equipment, Advisory training programs, a new CAS plane or helo for the Army and the Marine Corps, and UAVs.  More money should also go into buying the AF JSF faster while retiring older airframes faster at the same time.  Gates should also consider putting some of the 90,000 increase in the active Army and Marine Corps into the reserves at a point in the future. 

However, in the FY2007, 2008, and 2009 budgets, which were prepared on his watch, he has failed to match words with deeds. For example, while he said the Air Force should not purchase any more F-22s, he did not close down the production line, saying he would leave that to the next administration. Moreover, while the baseline defense budget (exclusive of war costs) grew by nearly 20 percent in real terms over the past three years, the budget for the State Department remained essentially flat. In fact, the increase that Gates requested for the FY2009 defense budget exceeded the total budget for international affairs. And in January 2007 and again in January 2008, Secretary Gates made no trade-offs and actually revised the five year spending plan upward. Finally, in the war supplemental he submitted to Congress on December 31, 2008, he requested funding for four more F-22s!

Now that he has been reappointed by President-elect Obama, Secretary Gates and his new team have the opportunity to put his words into action. To do this he should take the following steps, which my co-authors (Peter Juul, Laura Conley, Major Myles Caggins, and Sean Duggan) and I outline in our December 2008 monograph (Building a Military for the 21st Century).

First, he should get defense spending under control by keeping the regular DOD budget flat, that is, allowing the budget topline to increase only enough to keep pace with inflation. Over the past decade the budget has nearly doubled in real terms. And if one adds in the costs for the global war on terror we are now spending more on defense than at any time since World War II.

Second, he should consolidate or incorporate the supplemental into the baseline budget. Since we have been at war for more than seven years, there is no longer any excuse for sending up supplementals separately from the regular budget. This will give the Congress time to ensure that the supplementals are spent efficiently and effectively. For example, on New Years, Gates sent up a two page supplemental requesting almost $70 billion for the remainder of FY2009!

Third, he needs to eliminate weapons that deal with threats from a bygone era, as we are not meeting their program goals. Not only the F-22, but weapons systems like the V-22, the DDG-1000, and the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) should be eliminated or slowed down. This will not only free up some money from the overall budget, but will allow the Pentagon to spend more on counterinsurgency.

Fourth, Gates should take the lead in helping the Obama administration develop a unified national security budget that allows the next president to make trade-offs between the offensive (DOD), defensive (DHS), and preventive (State) components of the national security budget. In FY2009, DOD received 87% percent of the overall national security budget. Preventive security funding accounted for only 5% percent. This unified national security budget would allow the new administration to carry out Gates’ argument that the country should spend more on diplomacy without increasing the budget deficit any more than it already is.

In addition to matching his own words with action, Gates needs to ensure that the military leaders do not attempt to undermine President Obama’s Iraq policy directly or indirectly. Like Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, who had to contend with opposition from the Chiefs and the Combatant Commanders to President Nixon’s plans to withdraw 10,000 troops from Vietnam each month, Secretary Gates needs to prod his commanders to carry out the new president’s campaign promises to give the Joint Chiefs a new mission on day one, that is, end the war in Iraq.

Finally, the Secretary can help the new administration to ease tensions with Russia by slowing down the deployment of the missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Deploying a system that has not been proven to work, against a threat that does not exist, to protect a region that has not asked to be protected, and that causes diplomatic problems does not make much sense.

Gates has also been a very good crisis manager in DOD, establishing accountability and solving problems when they were brought to light, as in the Walter Reed scandal and the lack of Air Force attention to the nuclear mission.  What he has not done is establish an agenda for the more routine business of establishing mission priorities, aligning the budget and forces to them, and preparing for a much more constrained spending environment (which I believe was likely even before the financial crisis, but surely will be now if the Administration is shoveling money at competing priorities like transportation infrastructure).  That's where I'd recommend he put more effort.

I would disagree with General Scales and others that stamping transformation dead should be atop the list.  While the breathless hand-waving of transformation's more ardent advocates in 2000 has clearly proven unfounded, there is important technology-enabled innovation occurring that our forces' proficiency and the economy of scale of our spending make possible as competitive advantages for US forces over most adversaries.  We should be cautious not to be as in thrall as opponents of transformation as its advocates were: figure out where it's sensible, cost-effective, and enables new operational concepts, throw out -- as General Mattis so admirably did with "effects based operations" -- the intellectually bankrupt parts.

America now spends more on defense than at any time since the end of World War II.  However, our military forces are smaller than they have been since 1946. Our major weapons are – on average – older than at any point in recent history, and we are sending Soldiers, Marines, and Air-men and -women into combat with disgracefully low levels of training.

Despite what most think, the emphasis that we give to technology does not rescue us.  As was the case in Vietnam, the immeasurable technological advantage we hold over our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan means little to nothing in winning the form of conflict we find ourselves in.  For waging conventional war, we are burdened by technological failures that come at extraordinary cost. For example, the Air Force's newest fighter, the F-35, can be regarded as only a technical fiasco – even more so than the preposterously over-priced and -hyped F-22. Nor is the $120 million per copy F-35 “affordable.”  

Given that these problems have been with us for decades – when many now on the Obama team held important and influential Pentagon positions under President Clinton and, in the case of SecDef Gates, President Bush – and given that none of them did anything to reverse the problems when in authority, I am not at all optimistic that they will change anything now.

Despite decades of acquisition reform from these folks and the rest of Washington's best minds in Congress, the Pentagon, and the think tanks, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) tells us that cost overruns in weapon systems are higher today, in inflation adjusted dollars, than any time since they have been measured. 

Worse, the Pentagon cannot tell Congress and the public exactly how it spends the hundreds of billions of dollars appropriated to it each year. The reason is simple; it doesn't know how the money is spent.  Decades of reports from the Department of Defense Inspector General and GAO make this problem painfully clear.

For a solution, some urge to cut, if not terminate, a list of weapons programs that have identified themselves as low hanging fruit with their hyper cost, almost complete irrelevance to warfare as we know it today, and high probability they are technical failures – which we could learn if ever they were to be tested properly, which is not in the Pentagon’s current plans. We clearly would be better off without these millstones on our armed forces' budgets and ability to fight: programs such as the F-22, F-35, C-130J, Future Combat Systems, Stryker, DDG-1000 destroyer, and V-22. 

However, even if these rococo edifices to “next-waritis” were to be dropped over the inevitable howls of protest from the military services and pork-crazed Members of Congress, mere dollar savings are incapable of bringing real reform to the Pentagon. Spending less money, but doing so in the same manner as we do now, will simply mean that the trends shrinking and aging our defenses will accelerate.

What then is to be done? Real reform starts with at least three principles:

1.        No failed system can be fixed if it cannot be accurately measured.  A crash program to make Pentagon spending accountable is essential.  But just that is also insufficient.  DOD must also have an ability to predict with reasonable accuracy the cost, performance, and schedule of its future programs and policies.  The current bias, based on advocacy, is the heart and core of business as usual.

2.        The basis for competence cannot just be intelligence and hard work; it must also be objectivity and independence, ruthlessly enforced.  We currently have a fundamentally corrupt incentive system for senior Pentagon decision-makers.  The iron-clad control of the Pentagon decision process by people (in and out of uniform) who are free to then collect salaries and other emoluments from defense contractors (or other organizations, frequently lobbying firms and think tanks, funded by them) must end - without compromise.  The similar sham of members of Congress and - especially - their staff pretending to perform oversight on Capitol Hill and then accepting jobs from those they "oversee" (including the Pentagon) must also end.  

3.     If ever the above two principles are observed, President Obama can very usefully review all existing hardware programs.  We need a process where well informed, independently minded Pentagon managers can actually identify the unaffordable, the irrelevant, and the impractical hardware programs combined with an atmosphere where people appreciate that the money party in Washington is over. 

The track record of the people now being asked to run the Pentagon – again - on these issues is not a reason for optimism. I hope I am wrong. Time will tell.

Second, this ridiculous discussion about getting rid of “Cold War” systems is just nuts. Barney Frank wants to cut missile defense which according to the Congressman is Cold War relic…even though we didn’t start fielding them until after the Cold War was over and threats we are building to counter didn’t appear till after the Fall of the Wall either. And, did anybody notice all the “Cold War” systems that we use everyday…ships, planes, bombers (like the B-52 which has been around since Stanley Kubrick penned the script for Dr. Strangelove). If we had gotten rid of them after the Communists vacated the Kremlin, we’d be fighting in Afghanistan with sticks and rocks.  We also had sailors, soldiers, airman, marines, and coastguardsmen during the Cold War—should we dump them too. Give me a break!

The worst canard of all is that we will be able to spend less because we will just make “much smarter choices” than the other guy. This was the excuse Carter used to gut the military in the 1970s. Clinton’s Pentagon did the same. Now the question is whether Gates and all Clinton-era defense officials that are back again will try the same tactic again. Likely as not, very smart people will argue that Washington can gut budgets; ignore the need to buy next generation platforms; and short-change training and maintenance because they “know” exactly what to cut. Of course, first they will cut the things they don't want - politically incorrect systems such as missile defense, space-based weapons, and modernized nuclear forces. Then they will wish away the wars they don't want to prepare for - insurgencies and conventional conflicts with regional powers. Finally, they will assume that America's enemies will be blinded by their brilliance and not prepare for exactly the kinds of wars Washington does not fund the military to fight.

The right answer is simple enough and nobody has to be “unleashed” to get it done. They just have to do the right thing: provide robust, sustained funding for the armed services that will pay for current operations; maintain a trained and ready military for a range of missions; and modernize forces for the future.

And it doesn’t take a genius to figure out how to do it. All that is need is a defense program that addresses the most pressing priorities: fielding, preparing, and sustaining America’s military. That includes:

Fielding a Robust Force. The armed forces must prepare for the future without the luxury of focusing their preparations on a single enemy or particular type of conflict. Thus, while the U.S. needs to continue modernizing its conventional military capabilities to deter and, if necessary, fight and win against state-based actors, it also needs to build a force that can deal with a myriad of other challenges. These challenges range from defeating terrorist networks to preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction to preventing failed states. To balance its defense portfolio more effectively, the U.S. must also invest in its strategic forces (the stuff nobody wants to talk about) including (1) The U.S. should build a balanced, layered missile defense system by concentrating on fielding additional interceptors at sea, in the air, and in space; (2) The U.S. should execute Bush’s 2006 Space Policy Directive by achieving space situational awareness, fielding an operationally responsive array of space systems, and developing capabilities to protect U.S. space assets and counter the exploitation of space by hostile forces; and, (3)  The U.S. should remedy the problem of nuclear weapon atrophy by designing, testing, building, and fielding a new generation of nuclear weapons.  Finally, because the requirements of U.S. forces in the future will likely wax and wane, maintaining a healthy and robust Reserve Component is vital. Reserve Component forces should be updated and adapted to better fulfill the tasks of the 21st century: supporting homeland security activities, theater support operations, and post-conflict missions.

Preparing the Force. To field the right force for the future, the Pentagon must change how it man­ages manpower costs and how it acquires goods and services. The success of the all-volunteer military depends on a well-designed compensation package that attracts highly qualified people to military service. Above all, the compensation should be flexible and should favor cash and defined-contribution plans for health care and retirement. With the private sector conducting most scientific research and development, the Defense Department will need to become more adept at leveraging the private sector's capacity to provide the military with cutting-edge technology.

Sustaining the Force. To provide the resources for preparing and fielding the force that the nation needs, Congress must ensure that baseline defense spending is at 4 percent of gross domestic product for the next five to 10 years. This will require adopting fiscally responsible policies in non-defense spending, which must include reforming entitlement spending.

Providing for the common defense is Washington's responsibility and arguing its way out of this responsibility to justify budget cuts is the wrong strategy. It puts our men and women in harm’s way without the equipment, preparation and support they need; it play’s Russian roulette with the future of children and grandchildren and all because somebody in Washington wants to spend money on something else. 

Prescribing what defense secretaries (or even presidents) should do with respect to defense policy is a hazardous undertaking at any time, but especially in today’s economic and security conditions. Between worldwide recession and two continuing wars, America’s options are limited. A good deal of the defense budget already is committed and the prospects for any significant increase are poor.

For my money, two efforts should top Mr. Gates’s agenda: first, he should follow through on his own very sensible calls to expand budgetary and personnel support of the nation’s diplomatic and development agencies. The military is a remarkably versatile instrument, but it remains a military instrument and is viewed so by the rest of the world. It’s time to restore some balance in the face America shows to the world.

Second, as I noted in an earlier post, we lack a defensible strategic framework in which to ground future engagements with friends, enemies, and the uncommitted alike. Preventive war and coerced democratization both have proved strategically defective and politically self-destructive, even had we the military capabilities to continue to pursue them. In the meantime, other critical strategic priorities have suffered, from alliance maintenance to great power management. As with capabilities, its time to rebalance objectives, and that implies a deliberate effort to rethink the basis of America’s engagement with the world. That task certainly doesn’t fall to Mr. Gates alone, but no one in the new administration is better equipped by experience and predisposition to lead it.

On specific matters, first, I think he will move quickly to establish a modus vivendi with SecState Clinton.  Gates has been uncomfortable with the "viceroy" role the US military has played overseas -- diplomacy and nation building added to their already strained resources.  He no doubt will try to get a willing Clinon State Department involved in more of these activities.  How successful Gates will be given the depleted economic and personnel resources of the Department, I do not know

Second, I believe Gates desparately wants to get a handle on the ridiculously large and out of control expenditures of DOD weapons systems.  This will be a formidible battle pitting Gates against a contracting community that has more than a symbiotic relationship with its clients.  I suspect his main battle will be over the F-22, but there are certainly other programs that would prove worthwhile to reinvestigate for their useful in a modern battlefield.

Third, and hardly last, Gates will likely do what he can to continue intelligence reform and cooperation among the military, national security and homeland intelligence communities.  The current situation in the latter two is a mess brought on by the woeful 2004 Intelligence Reform bill.  I have no doubt Gates, DNI Blair and DCIA Panetta will have a few discussions over what needs to be done to sharpen that faltering machinery.

But let's say for the sake of argument that there in no blowup, and Gates stays on. In that case, there are at least three big things that Gates clearly wants to do. First, he wants to integrate the intelligence system so that structural and cultural barriers to sharing vital information are removed. Look at the reorganization he has been pushing forward at the National Reconnaissance Office over the last year, and you get a good idea of what he would like to do across the entire intelligence system.

Second, he wants to fix the Pentagon's sprawling acquisition system. Insiders and outsiders alike say the system is broke, but a more accurate way of putting it is that the acquisition system is baroque. It's way too complicated to produce timely, cost-effective results, so Gates will move to streamline it by reducing the number of players and enforcing accountability.

Third, Mr. Gates feels that the military isn't stepping up to the challenge of irregular warfare and would rather prepare for battle with the Soviet Union (even though it's long gone). So he will seek to bring pressure on the services to reorient their training and investment priorities. The conventional wisdom is that he will go after the Air Force first, but I think it is actually the Army that is resisting transformation the most. There's no justification in the Quadrennial Defense Review scenarios for a big ground force unless it is postured for irregular warfare, and yet the Army wants to invest mainly in the kind of heavy brigades that support armored warfare. I suspect Gates will try to force a change in Army priorities.

This new focus on people over machines represents a tectonic shift away from the Rumsfeld view of the world. His idea of “transformation” postulated that technology alone would solve our problems. His was a firepower intensive theory of war in which big machines would fight big wars. Before Gates we were overwhelmed with a whole culture of “shock and awe,” effects-based operations and net-centric warfare. Gates turned away from those tired canards, and began refocusing on the world as it is, rather than as some in the Pentagon wanted it to be. Part of his frustration comes from a defense establishment that he perceives is still driven by the Cold War emphasis on programs, institutions and structures. From his writings and speeches it’s clear that Gates views the future in terms of irregular wars. The task at hand is to shape the defense establishment in a very practical way to confront these wars. Gates acknowledges the value of technology but he cannot accept the premise that technology has changed the fundamental character of war. War to his mind is just that: war fought by people, and people have not changed for millennia.