A footnote on the Balkans:  Hillary may be correct in calling for a muscular U.S. role in the Middle East, but she is wrong when she says "...the Balkans, where the parties on the ground (especially the Serbs) were by no means worn out but the United States, with other international players, was prepared to assert its own perceived interests in a negotiated settlement." 

The Serbs were not only worn out in the summer of 1995, partly as the result of NATO bombing, they were also retreating as fast as possible in the weeks before the U.S. arranged a ceasefire, thus saving them from losing all of western Bosnia. At Dayton (where Michael Steiner and I negotiated the first agreement reached, between Croats and Bosniaks), the Serbs were suing for peace while the Bosniaks and to some extent the Croats wanted to keep on fighting, because they were winning. What the U.S. did at Dayton was to force the Bosniaks, arguably our closest friends in the room, to accept what their leader (Izetbegovic) said at the time was an unjust end to the war.

This narrative has relevance to the Middle East.  Short of the use of military force, the U.S. has much more leverage over its friends than over its enemies.  If it is going to play a muscular role in the mediation, a lot of the muscle will be exerted to influence Israel, especially on the settlements issue. I don't personally think that would be a bad thing, but we should have no illusions based on a misunderstanding of what happened at Dayton.  There we saved those whom we had regarded as at fault and muscled our friends into an agreement they regard as unjust, for the sake of ending the war.  The result was peace, but one that is still unsteady and difficult to implement.  

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With respect to Ms. Leverett, I think the Balkans are a very dubious analogy for Gaza.  The U.S.-NATO intervention settled nothing in the Balkans -- it merely let Holbrooke strut and preen as a prelude to his coming failure in Souh Asia.  The Balkans intervention simply gave the opponents a chance to catch their breath and rearm; it also left the field wide open for Saudi and other Gulf NGOs to keep bringing Sunni Islamism to Europe.  Unless the U.S.-NATO garrison intends to stay forever, the Balkans' religious war will resume after it leaves.  Indeed, it may start sooner if Serbia decides to exercise its unquestionable right to retake its Kosovo province, which Serbia lost as the result of ignoble Western-justified theft.  Russia will back the Serbs when they are ready to recomplete their country's territory, and that point NATO will expire among much U.S. blustering because the Europeans will update the precise truth that Bismarck spoke long ago -- nothing in the Balkans is worth the bones of one EU grenadier.

I would add to my previous comment that although the two sides are probably not yet ready to make the obvious territorial compromises necessary to have peace for their children, they will require an external formulation of a peace settlement when they ARE ready.

Where will that come from?  It will emerge from a consensus of the interested parties across the Middle Eastern, Islamic and Western regions, a consensus that does not shrink from domestic political pressure, that does not fear to apply the inherent leverage provided by huge annual budgetary contributions to both sides and that values  human life and happiness more than it does momentary advantage.

We might have to wait a while yet for all that.

A brief response to Hillary Leverett. A lot more humility, in general, would do U.S. statecraft a lot of good right now. Humility and caution are not a sign of weakness, but of strength.

President Carter clearly made progress. And Bush I and Clinton both made a contribution, leading to Jordan joining the peace process. But there is the story about how many Californians it takes to screw in a light bulb -- one, but the light bulb has to want to change. In both of those cases, the parties were ready for change and needed help on the path.

Today the parties are clearly not ready, not now, either one of them. No bribery, no force, no seizure of the issues by the White House is going to alter that reality. As Aaron David Miller made clear, yesterday, in a talk at American University, the most the U.S. can do at this point is reposition itself from the Bush stance of support for the Israeli right wing to a middle position, and stay engaged, as a transmission belt.

I am sorry that Hillary Leverett considers this as “hope as a strategy.” We may wish for something more, but hope is better than what exists in the region today. It is up to those in the region to be ready for a more active U.S. (and international) diplomatic role in finding a solution.

If I understand him correctly, Gordon Adams argues against the United States taking ownership of the Middle East peace process, suggesting instead that humble mediation is the best that Washington can do. He supports his argument with a claim that “multiple presidents” have tried to take ownership of the issue and that no president tried harder to do so than Bill Clinton. I read the historical record differently. Indeed, few presidents have tried to take ownership of the peace process; by my definition of taking ownership, only two presidents – Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush—took serious steps in that direction. These are the two presidents who actually made serious substantive progress on the core issues of the conflict. Neither won reelection, so we cannot know what more they might have achieved with additional time in office. President Clinton comes nowhere close to taking ownership of the issue, by my definition. President Clinton certainly wanted to see a settlement and devoted considerable (if strategically ungrounded) energy to that end. However, as Aaron Miller documents in his excellent book, President Clinton was never prepared to move the peace process in directions that would cause any serious discomfort in Israel – and that is the root of his ultimate failure to deliver on either the Palestinian or Syrian tracks. We should hope that President Obama does not repeat the Clinton approach to Arab-Israeli diplomacy.   

I also disagree with Adams’ claim that U.S. mediation efforts in the Middle East founder on the “politics in the region.” That is not so; U.S. diplomacy founders on politics here at home. Finally, I reject the assertion of several bloggers that an Israeli-Palestinian settlement will only come when the two sides are tired and worn out. That may have been part of the dynamic which produced a settlement in Northern Ireland – after literally 80+ years of conflict. But to apply that as an analogy to the Middle East leaves us with nothing more than hope as a strategy. The better analogy, in my judgment, is with the Balkans, where the parties on the ground (especially the Serbs) were by no means worn out but the United States, with other international players, was prepared to assert its own perceived interests in a negotiated settlement. I believe that the interests of the United States in a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are sufficiently compelling to warrant a similarly robust diplomatic approach.    Without asserting those interests, the United States puts its most important strategic goals in the Middle East – shoring up moderate forces in the Muslim world, reducing support for radical movements and terrorist activity, enhancing key strategic partnerships in the region (e.g., with Saudi Arabia) and energy security—at serious risk.

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            This is being written as I return from the United Arab Emirates. Here, as in many other places in this part of the world, it is believed that the keystone to a stable Middle East is Palestine. While the U.S. (and Europe and selected Arab states) can and should help, peace is likely to be elusive until Israel and the Palestinians both conclude that it will be worth the price. What price? Abandoned settlements, assurance of a right to exist, and more.

            Only when both sides determine that the compromises necessary to achieve such a peace are less onerous than the status quo of killing and destruction can there be hope of lasting peace. Even that will require that at least the U.S. and the key neighboring Arab states step in as guarantors of whatever agreement is reached.

            Until the above happens, everyone will continue to be the loser.

The two state solution  has been dead for awhile, perhaps dating back to Hamas “shocking” Washington (but practically nobody else) with its sweeping win in the 2006 parliamentary we pushed so hard for in the first place. The equally feeble scrambling after the slapstick effort by Fatah to topple Hamas in Gaza the next year only compounded American embarrassment.  

After the fanciful and sad performance of the Bush administration over the last eight years, it will be a tall order for Obama to restore America’s credentials as anything approaching an honest broker.  It may still be worth a try, but unless the U.S. can adjust its position on Hamas, these renewed attempts will also fail.  If we continue to insist that Hamas accede to all the major negotiation points with Israel as up-front preconditions to serious talks, it might not be worth the bother. Plenty of thoughtful Israelis think some of these preconditions we insist on could come at the end of the negotiations, particularly the recognition of Israel’s right to exist and agreeing to abide by previous agreements. But it unlikely that we can make the needed adjustments to get real talks going.

Pat Lang is probably right, the sides aren’t yet “fought out”.  

It is expected ritual to say that the Palestinians and Israelis want peace.  What is never specified as part of that incantation is the description of just what sort of peace each group wants.  Here it is...  What they still want (on both sides) is to win in the contest for that sad, beautiful, stony little strip of land and for their own group to live in peace and possession of the country.

There is no external power preventing the sides from making peace.  If the Israelis and Palestinians wanted peace more than they want to win, they would make peace.  They do not make peace because there is not enough good will toward the "other" among them to allow peace to exist.  No.  I no longer really believe that the inhabitants of Israel/Palestine want peace for other than their own side in the bloody mess that has persisted there throughout their lives.

Someone has said on this blog that the United States lacks the ability to "make peace" between these two peoples.  That is profoundly true.   It is part of our national illusion that we Americans think of the rest of the world as though we are the guardians of distant, unruly and childish folk who act in strange, inexplicable and unreasonable ways.  We tend to believe that their quarrels are errors in information or simply bad behavior of the kind seen in school yards.   This mistake on our part is persistent.  The new presidential press secretary said today that President Obama has benign "aspirations" for the peoples of the Islamic World.   I thought he was president of the  United States.  WE are in need of his aspirations. 

George Mitchell tried once before to make peace in histroric Palestine.  He failed because the combatants would not do the sensible things that he recommended to them.  He succeeded in Ireland because the Irish were ready.

We will now see if the Palestinians and Israelis are "ready."  I doubt it.  I do not think that they are "fought out" yet.

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If Hamas had its way, the two-state solution certainly would be dead. But Hamas need not get its way. It is not just a matter of the beating it took; more than that, there is a fresh opportunity for the West, and, more importantly for Israel, to support the PA as a far more viable alternative for ordinary Palestinians. Ratcheting up Israeli assistance to the PA would not make the Authority, or Abu Mazen, any more of a stooge than does our current support for the Maliki government. What it would do is provide the PA with sorely needed credibility.

It is no small thing that the West Bank was quiet during the Gaza operation (for that matter, other than making a lot of noise, Hezbollah did nothing either). Hamas would have loved to have seen riots in the streets of Jenin, Hebron, and Ramallah. There were no major riots.

"Support" means much more than verbal support, however. Israel needs to demonstrate that it is serious about a Palestinian state. While everyone cites Abba Eban'd dictum that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, Israel has not done all that much better in recent years.

In particular, Israel missed an improtant opportunity when it ignored the Saudi-inspired Arab peace intiative, and it missed another  opportunity when it didn't do enough to bolster Abu Mazen after Arafat's death. Now, with Hamas weakened, Israel has yet another chance to move toward some sort of accommodation with its neighbors. And to do so requires more than lip-service. 

Israel should get serious about dismantling hilltop settlements.  It should stop all construction in settlements that it anticipates would be ceded to Palestine in a peace agreement. It should be an enabler for the economic development of both the West Bank and Gaza, and accelerate the process of easing checkpoint restrictions--at least on the West Bank--so as to foster economic growth. In a word, it should help the PA demonstrate that it has created a viable proto-state on the West Bank, and could do so in Gaza, with the help of its many supporters who remain there.

A one state solution is no solution for Israel. And Israel will fight to the last to ensure that it is not the Palestinian solution. George Mitchell, like all his predecessors, faces an uphill battle as he tries to revive the two-state approach. Israel, as the victor in the Hamas war--and it did win that war--can, with the cooperation and support of the West, at a minimum shrink tat hill, so that Mitchell has a reasonable chance at reviving a process that is the only real hope for any sort of accommodation between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East.

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The violence and bloodshed that recently held the world’s attention have caused some to give up hope for lasting peace between Israel and Palestine 

 But when stakeholders in the region are serious about and truly committed to peace, peace can be achieved. 

Just look at the 1979 Camp David Accords which resulted in Israel turning control of the Sinai desert over to Egypt – because both parties at the negotiating table were serious about peace there have been 30 years of peace between Israel and the largest Arab country in the region.

 Unfortunately, Hamas has of yet failed to convince anyone that peace is their ultimate goal. 

Since Israel left Gaza in August of 2005, Hamas has fired 6,300 rockets at Israeli civilians killing and wounding innocent civilians since 2005.

 So where do we go from here – with one side committed to peace and the other seemingly committed to violence?

 First, the United States must remain steadfast in their support for Israel’s right to defend itself against attacks.   

Next, we remain committed to a two-state solution. I think this is still a viable option if the new Obama Administration uses some of their momentum and global goodwill to build international support. A new voice in an old conflict may bring help move us towards a real solution. 

Also, just as important, the United States must utilize Smart Power – or non-military initiatives, to make it possible for Palestinians and Israelis to live side-by-side.  

These initiatives must tackle an array of problems that plague the area – most urgently the poverty that many Palestinians live in. We must create alternatives to extremism – let’s help Palestinians develop skills and create opportunities for them to support their families instead of supporting Hamas-led violence. 

 Humanitarian projects – much less costly then military – can go a long way in winning hearts and minds. One example is the incredible work accomplished at the Holy Family Hospital in Bethlehem in the West Bank, which predominantly serves pregnant Palestinian mothers and babies. With just a small investment from the United States, Holy Family Hospital, which handles the region’s highest-risk pregnancies and sickest babies, is literally saving lives. Holy Family is a shining example of promoting peace through serving the poor. 

These Smart Power initiatives should also include efforts to change the dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. While in Israel a month ago, I had the opportunity to hear from Peace it Together – an organization that teaches teenagers how to shoot films and documentaries. This group harnesses teenagers’ favorite mediums – internet and film – to promote peace dialogue. 

These types of Smart Power efforts are critical components to creating the conditions in Palestinian and Israeli communities that can make peace possible.

 Don’t get me wrong – the road to peace for Israel and Palestine won’t be easy. But giving up hope now on a lasting peace is not an option. 

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I concur with Mr. Sinnreich, let them fight it out until one or the other is utterly defeated or even annihilated. Then, I suppose, there would be peace in the Levant -- or at least mostly peace -- and it would be even more apparent that America has no genuine national interests there.

Such a scenario also would have the salutary impact of showing Americans that, contrary to the "war never settles anything" lunacy they were taught in school, and which their children are now being taught, war can indeed be the precisely correct answer to a problem, and that a war fought to a conclusion can eliminate problems once and for all.

Finally, a stated intention to let the two sides slug it out might well have a positive deflating impact on Israeli arrogance and cockiness. Like the trained boxer who gets caught in a bare-knuckled battle with a street fighter in Hemingway's Islands in the Stream, Israel would receive a wonderful education in how the world really works if it suddenly realized that no one was going to step in and break up the fight resulting from its invasions. Ditto for Hamas, Hizballah, …

I'm not sure I understand why we insist on treating this problem as a one-off. The essential fact of the 60-year war between Israel and one combination or another of its Arab neighbors is that, like other lingering struggles, neither side has been able to win it. In that problem, the outside world has been heavily complicit, supporting one side or the other (and sometimes both) just enough to encourage it to fight but not enough to enable it to win.

There will be a solution, two-state or otherwise, only when at least one of the parties finally acknowledges that it can't survive continued armed struggle. But the odds are that it won't happen unless and until that struggle is permitted to factor itself to a decisive conclusion, unpalatable as the process may be to outsiders.

Is there a two-state solution? The response from the United States ought to be the simple question “Who cares?” Of all the many insane issues our political elite has gotten America into overseas, there is none with less importance to genuine U.S. national security and more potential to bring America disaster at home and abroad than Washington’s unnecessary involvement in the Arab-Israel issue. This issue is not about land-for-peace, a two-state solution, or any other of the feckless slogans that swirl around the problem. This issue is one of historic, eternal, and vicious religious hatred -- Muslims for Jews, and Jews for Muslims -- and the endless war it has engendered. There is no true give on either side, and there never will be any because to compromise for these folks means to turn your back on God. It ought not to take a Harvard education -- nor even a high school one -- to understand that the beginning of wisdom for America is to steer away from this issue as far and as fast as possible and let the two sides do what they best like to do -- kill each other.

And for those Jewish-American and Muslim-American citizens who want America to spend its blood and treasure to support their embattled coreligionists and redeem promises made by Allah or Abraham, let them put their safety and liberty here in America, as well as their supposedly sincere faith where their mouths are. Let these people renounce their U.S. citizenship, depart America with their fortunes and their sons, and go fight and die alongside the IDF or Hamas. Long ago, John Bunyan explained in The Pilgrim’s Progress that faith is insincere and heaven is unattainable as long as words are not matched with deeds. So the time has come for the U.S.-citizen advocates of involving America in other peoples’ religious wars to begin their heaven-earning deeds by going to fight for the people, lands, and Gods they love best. They would thereby leave the rest of us free to say -- at long last and in good earnest -- a pox on both your houses.

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I have to respectfully disagree with Hillary Leverett.  We have spent many decades imaginging that simply by having the U.S. firmly seize possession of an issue, we can solve it.  It is a meritorious wish, but this problem is not one to which the solution can be found by simply having us seize it.   Multiple presidents have tried; the closest was probably Clinton.  But this effort consistently founders on a politics in the region that we do not control, and a hatred and a history that go back many generations now.  We can help; we can even help make a difference, but until both parties are sufficiently tired and ready to play, our mediation, while valuable, pushes the issue to the right; it does not solve it.

We have, in my view, a serious need to rethink our instinct for being the global problem solver, whose mere action will make things better.  Some of that humility that George Bush talked about, but did not practice, may be valuable here.

Sadly, I think the solution will only be found through fatigue and regime change, not through yet another redefinition of the right "map" and the "right number" of states.  The Palestinians need to create a regime that is willing to sit down and talk and can command enough support to do so without leading to fratricide.  The Israelis need to elect a regime that does not default to using force, assuming that will cause the Palestinians to submit., and that regime has to be able to survive another fratricidal assassination.  Neither side can keep doing the same thing, time after time, assuming the outcome will be different; it will always be the same.

The only safe and sane position for the Obama administration is to start walking down the road they have just found in naming George Mitchell the special ambassador: that of honest broker.  For eight years, the U.S. has leaned to one side of the conflict, destroying its credibility as a facilitator of a solution.  Mitchell's task is tough, almost impossible, and it depends on the regime changes, more than on his skill as a negotiator.

I don't see how you get from where we are to peace--two state or other--with a divided Palestinian polity (never mind all the other problems).  

Timing is everything in diplomacy.  Right now is time for peace between Syria and Israel:  both countries seem ripe.  Making that peace would open up options for dealing with Iran (and Hizbollah and Hamas) that do not exist today.  

The first step is clear:  send an American ambassador to Damascus.  Just that would be a powerful signal!

I agree with Loren on this one -- it is a nightmare version of the movie "Groundhog Day."  Both sides reacting to the other in predictable ways; like a longer running version of Bosnia.  Hamas will do its best to hang onto Gaza.  The bloody footage shown to the Arab world -- and shown in ways we do not begin to see if America  -- serves its purpose in inflaming the vaunted Arab street.  You'll notice, however, no Arab governments are stepping in hard to help.  Iran, as always, is helping to stir the pot a bit with funds and encouragement.

While it may be Groundhog Day, let me say that Hamas shoulders a large portion of the blame.  They know what the Israeli reaction will be to their antics, yet they persist.  Why?  Very simple.  It is easier to be a revolutionary than one who governs.  Governing means worrying about health care, roads, water, etc.  Perhaps it will never happen, but Hamas needs to look to the West Bank to see what progress can be made when even a modicum (and it is a modicum) of goverance is applied to an area.

On a final note, but hardly the least important, this will be the first real foreign test of a relatively green Obama Administration.  Sending George Mitchell to the area is an interesting gambit given his work in Northern Ireland.  However, I think both sides in that conflict were closer to knocking it off due to their collective exhaustion.  And no large money was pouring in from the outside to continue fomenting the violence. This is obviously not the case with Hamas.

As for the effectiveness of SecState Clinton and the NSC Advisor Jones, they are about to get a steep ramp up into advanced level foreign policy.  I doubt they can do much for now.

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I don't pay much attention to the continuous friction between Israel and the Palestinians, because it reminds me too much of that movie "Ground Hog Day" -- the same patterns keep repeating over and over again, without much change.  Israel is a valuable ally of America, but its geographic, demographic and economic circumstances are not promising over the long run.

Permit me a flight of fancy.  I have fantasized for years that American would one day give the Jews North Dakota as their homeland.  North Dakota would become the richest zip code in the Americas within two generations, the Palestinians could have a real homeland of their own, and the U.S. would then become the "promised land" for one of the world's most greatest peoples.

But given the hapless history of the Jews, I imagine all those displaced Dakotans would soon start rediscovering their lost roots and launch a crusade for a return to their ancestral lands. 

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never drawn the support of more than a narrow majority of either Israelis or Palestinians-and, much of the time, not even that. Such a solution only meets the minimum needs of each side-and nothing more. As such, a two-state outcome will never win truly broad and deep political support among Israelis or Palestinians.

The proper analogy here is not with Northern Ireland -- now much in vogue, given Senator Mitchell's appointment as President Obama's Middle East envoy. The more appropriate comparison is with the Balkans -- where the international community, led by the United States, defined its own interests in negotiated settlements to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and effectively told the parties that negotiated settlements would be achieved.

In this regard, one of the most frequently heard and utterly misplaced observations about America's mediating role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy is that "We can't want peace more than the parties." In reality, we can -- and almost certainly do.

What does this mean for U.S. policy? Primarily, it means that a U.S. role defined primarily in terms of mediation is doomed to fail -- even if that mediating role is carried out with more vigor and a greater effort to be "even-handed" than was the case during the George W. Bush Administration. If the United States is going to move this issue, it has to take ownership of it -- in other words, to act like the United States has serious interests of its own at stake in there being a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Taking ownership of the peace process means, first of all, getting everyone to the table who needs to be there -- including Hamas, which speaks for many Palestinians, not as an intrusive outsider but as an organic movement with deep roots and broad reach, especially in Gaza. It also means keeping them there, even when, especially in the short-term, Palestinians continue to try to attack Israelis. Inclusion in negotiations cannot work if it is treated as a "reward" that the United States and Israel bestow for "good" behavior. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama appeared to grasp this fundamental point, but now seems unwilling to follow through where Hamas is concerned, preferring to stand by the Bush Administration's thoroughly dysfunctional "conditions" for dealing with Hamas.

This brings us to another critical dimension of taking ownership of the peace process --managing Israel's threat perceptions so that Israeli actions do not eviscerate possibilities for diplomatic progress. Israel frequently overstates the strategic significance of threats to its security - as with home-made rockets landing in Sderot. At the same time, Israel commonly understates or ignores the destructive impact of its own actions, whether in the form of ongoing settlement activity or grossly disproportionate exercises of military force.

Some may say that the United States could and should never manage Israel's definition of the security threats it faces. But, in fact, we have done precisely that when Presidents judged that important American interests were at stake - interests which were incongruent with Israel's self-defined security threats. In 1991, in the midst of the first Gulf War, the first Bush Administration effectively told the Israeli government that a small number of randomly fired Iraqi SCUD missiles did not warrant an Israeli military response against Iraqi targets.

The Obama Administration needs to show similar leadership if it really wants to stabilize the Middle East. In his most detailed comments on the Middle East since taking office, President Obama said last week:

"Let me be clear: America is committed to Israel's security. And we will always support Israel's right to defend itself against LEGITIMATE threats (emphasis added)." The inclusion of the adjective "legitimate" suggests that President Obama may be willing to take a significant, even critical, step beyond President Bush and President Clinton's reflexive and uncritical endorsement of anything Israel does in its self-defined pursuit of "security."

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This question first begs two more: 1) Why is it vital to U.S. national security that a just peace between Israel and Palestine be achieved? 2) What is the essence of a just peace?

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is the primary prism through which the Muslim world views the United States. And that view regards the American role as less than even-handed, providing a recruiting and fund-raising tool for terrorists worldwide. If we remove this prism, then we stand a chance of winning the global war of ideas and preventing the bin Laden-after-next (the next one is already guaranteed). Yes, it is critical to stand with an ally and fellow democracy, and it is important to work for a just solution that serves some 10 million people. But the single greatest thing the U.S. can do for its long-term national security is to have 1.3 billion Muslims see the U.S. play an even-handed, active, and sustained role in creating a peace that is just between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. If not, more and more Muslim youth, especially Palestinians, will likely channel their frusterations into the global insurgency that al-Qaeda is now fighitng against America.

The essence of a just peace is one city accessible that serves both as the state capital of two nations and as a holy home to three religions.

Theoretically, the "Two-State Solution" peace process sought this end-state. Unfortunately, often in the absence of viable partners, the U.S. did not do much these past eight years to enable the process, except to belatedly start the "Annapolis Process" in December 2007. "Annapolis," however, witnessed both an increase in Jewish settlement activity and a decrease of the moderate middle in Palestinian politics and society. This result begs one further question.

Do we have two states, let alone two nations? A "nation" is a group of people with a common identity (usually ethnic). A state is a generally contiguous geographical entity with internationally recognized borders. Israel must become a nation-state if it is to survive as a democracy. If Israel--whose majority population is Jewish--allows for too many Arab-Israelis (Palestinians) within its borders, it is likely that freely elected Palestinians will rule the Jewish nation in less than two generations (given current birth rates).

Sadly, on the other hand, Palestine is barely a nation, and barely a state. Divided within itself--between Gaza's Iran-empowered Hamas and the West Bank's Fatah--the people of Palestine do not speak with one voice about who they are and what they want (even as Hamas and Fatah now try to kill one another). Adding insult to injury, Palestine’s geography is not contiguous: Instead it is a series of intentionally compartmentalized enclaves that are not economically viable. Thus, the Jewish nation cannot allow for the Palestinian nation within the Israeli state or Jewish democracy will soon cease to exist; even as the Palestinian nation is not one until its leadership unites to oversee a ghetto-ized geography that is not viable as a state.

So where does this leave the U.S.?

First we should acknowledge that the formal peace process known as the "two-state solution" is essentially dead.

Second, we should re-affirm our commitment to a just peace that eventually results in two sustainable states, while allowing for the reality on the ground: it will be some time before the Israeli and Palestinian leadership emerges that can consider new ideas and approaches to a just peace. Meanwhile, we should also view this current danger as an opportunity.

Third, since everything else has failed, we should allow for the possibility that religion can be a part of the solution (since it is obviously a part of the problem). In "getting to yes," it is critical to see the interests behind the negotiating positions. In moving from conflict resolution to conflict transformation, however, it is vital to engage the heart behind the interests. When hearts are engaged, there is a chance for truth-telling, mercy, and healing. While such a process is not singularly faith-based, the deeply devout children of Abraham must be involved. These devout folks are necessarily paradoxical partners: they hold irreconcilable theological beliefs but are also commanded by their faith to work for peace, justice, mercy, and compassion. This kind of engagement--we call it "relational diplomacy" at our institute--means being ready to speak to all sides.

Now, perhaps, it is not (yet) the official role of the U.S. to engage in such diplomacy. It is, however, in the national interest to support such endeavors. Devout people are not constrained by previous positions and interests. They can talk to whomever they wish in the name of practical peace. For example, devout people of faith are not be afraid to engage Hamas, Syria, and Iran. These conversations not only provide for real listening and respect across the deepest of differences, this kind of relational diplomacy provides sufficient "plausible deniability" for the various governments to begin to understand the other sides' positions and interests. These kinds of conversations, above all, have the potential to transform hearts and therefore produce a new vision rooted in common values (instead of the usual conflict management that governmental negotiating teams have a difficult time moving past). Call it "track 1.5"--operating at the nexus of "track one" (government) and "track two" (non-government).

Fourth, in similar fashion, the primary role of the U.S. right now should be to establish a new tone and behavior in its interaction with all parties. We must work to ensure that all sides see, hear, and feel respect. Respect-based engagement foremost means an active listening. It is the pre-condition for enabling a new peace process where all sides, especially the Israelis and Palestinians, can begin to figure out a solution for themselves. The process must be about mutual respect if we want the product to reflect the same. As we move forward, it might prove that the new tone and behavior established by the U.S. government would mutually reinforce the "track 1.5" relational diplomacy of devout people.

Fifth, the above points are the foundation for a comprehensive U.S. approach that engages all relevant parties simultaneously. While the U.S. actively listens to Israelis and Palestinians--and as those two parties begin to determine the leadership they need for the post-two-state-solution peace process--the U.S. should also be engaging the surrounding Arab states, being sure that the 2002 Saudi peace initiative is not taken off the table. As it does so, the United States needs to demonstrate respect to the Arab world even as it encourages and engages the emerging dialogue about religious freedom and apostasy in Arab countries. That respect can begin with hiring Muslim-Americans to serve on the U.S. negotiating team for the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Given the current state of affairs, Syria is now the center of gravity to this comprehensive U.S. approach. We should engage Syria with the intent of fostering a peace treaty between Israel and Syria (working with and building upon the good work of Turkey). If an Israel-Syria deal is possible, it weakens Syria's dependence on Iran even as it limits Iran's influence of Hamas. Finally, as much as possible, this comprehensive approach should take place in the context of ongoing international and regional consultation and support. (For more ideas about what a comprehensive approach entails, please see my July 2008 article, "Seizing the Middle East Moment," published in The Review of Faith & International Affairs.)

We are at a moment, and now is the time for U.S. diplomacy and relational diplomacy's "track 1.5" approach to enable a respect-based engagement rooted in common values, hearts, and goals.

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I am writing this from Jerusalem, and my mood is pessimistic. The two state solution has been dying since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007. The recent fighting in Gaza was a further blow, but only one of many. The fighting further discredited Palestinian moderates associated with the Palestinian Authority, as many Palestinians saw them as complicit in Israel's campaign against Hamas. The Palestinian Authority's endemic corruption and poor governance, as well as the declining appeal of secular nationalism, have steadily weakened the moderates even without the fighting with Israel. Hamas, in contrast, offers more efficient governance. In addition, Hamas can credibly claim that its resistance to Israel, not the negotiations led by Palestinian moderates, is what led Israel to quit the Gaza Strip in the first place in 2005. (It is still unclear to me what impact the latest fighting in Gaza has had on Hamas' popularity. Unlike Hizballah in 2006, Hamas did not emerge with a credible claim to victory, but it is plausible that it will successfully sell its message that resistance itself is a form of victory.)

It may not be impossible to revive the moderate cause and with it the two state solution, but it will be difficult. For the Obama administration, any negotiations have to recognize Israel's fear that Hamas will take over the West Bank as it did Gaza. The latest fighting in Gaza shows how seriously Israel took the rocket attacks on Sderot and other areas near Gaza. Even a remote prospect of rocket attacks from the West Bank is unacceptable for Israeli leaders, as much of Israel's population and economic life lives within rocket range of the West Bank. If Israel cannot be sure of both its short-term and its long-term security, it will be loath to make any concessions. This in turn requires a strong U.S. program to build up and professionalize Palestinian Authority security services and otherwise strengthen it at the expense of Hamas. More aid money would help the moderates improve conditions in the West Bank, which they control. (Or, more cynically, it would enable them to buy off more potential opponents and keep their own forces in line.) Even more important is tangible progress on peace negotiations with Israel. If these negotiations do not deliver improvements for Palestinians in the form of fewer checkpoints, more control over local security, and other immediate benefits that affect the daily lives of Palestinians, then the "resistance model" is likely to become even stronger in the long-term. Further complicating all this is that, like it or not, Hamas is going to remain the power in Gaza for years to come. Any deal that is cut must satisfy Hamas at least somewhat, or it can easily disrupt a settlement with violence as they have done repeatedly in the past.

I do not envy George Mitchell.

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