I have a slightly different take on the question.

It is, indeed, a fact that we have not been struck at home by terrorists since 9/11.  And it is indeed a fact that many fine American men and women in many agencies have worked tirelessly, creatively, and unselfishly in making the lives of Americans more secure.  We can all salute them.

But when the usual GOP politics kicked in over the last year or so, the facts and the sacrifices were degraded into just another deception by the Bush administration.  When challenged on any aspect of homeland security, the standard collection of administration acolytes and strategists instantly dredged up the dog-eared list of interdicted attacks against us.  There were the slapstick operations as with the Lackawanna Six and the the Liberty Seven.  There was the strange as with  Lyman Faris and his blowtorch attack on the Brooklyn Bridge.  And there was the just plain weird as with the case of Attorney General Ashcroft’s dark Moscow announcement of the wrap up of Jose Padilla and his dirty bomb plot. All of this was interspersed with the raising and lowering of the color-coded warning flags by the homeland security secretary. It was enough to interrupt Americans from the shopping spree their president had sent them on.

But when pressed for something a little more real there was usually a hasty retreat behind the screen of protecting sources and methods.  It’s secret.  Trust us.

I’ve always been troubled by the hints that there were real and present dangers to the homeland thwarted by the administration, but that they must forever remain cloaked in secrecy.  I never understood how any responsible leaders could steadfastly stick to the protection of sources and methods while that very position accounted for a weakening not only of this nation’s alliances, but potentially strengthened our adversaries.  I cannot imagine a source or a method so sacred that it should be protected at those costs.  And I cannot imagine that had there been any real and present danger interdicted by the administration, that the system would not have leaked the story. In a New York minute, it would have leaked it.

We can all recall that before Ronald Reagan even felt a twinge heat from his retaliatory attack against Tripoli following the Libyan attack on the La Belle Disco in Berlin in 1986, he laid his intelligence on the table.  We had busted the Libyan codes solidly implicating the Libyan Peoples’ Bureau in Berlin in the attack.  It was hard fact.  A Smith & Wesson-beats-a-full-house type of fact.  Reagan sailed through the brief storm, and no damage was done to our standing among our friends and many of our adversaries were silenced. Indeed, we gave up a priceless source -- the fact that we had the Libyan codes.  And indeed, there was some whining in the intelligence community.  It was worth it.

If there had been a similar American intelligence coup in the last few years, and if the administration hadn’t used the intelligence as Reagan did, then a new layer of irresponsibility could be added to the Bush legacy.

It’s time to set aside childish things, as the man just said.

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While commentators this week have disagreed over the expected speed with which President-elect Barack Obama will withdraw troops from Iraq, many of you have cited similar, competing pressures upon that withdrawal.

On the side of speed, we have a) Obama's promise to withdraw major combat forces within 16 months; b) the Status of Forces Agreement, which, subject to a referendum in Iraq next year, requires U.S. troops to withdraw from “cities, villages and localities” by July 2009 and a complete withdrawal by the end of 2011; and c) the desire of many Iraqis and Americans to bring a rapid end to the American troop presence.

On the not-so-fast side, however, we have substantial concerns about how the “facts on the ground” develop, particularly with regard to a) Iraq's political stability; b) the possibility of civil war among Sunnis, Shiias, and Kurds; and c) the capability of the Iraqi security forces.

I wanted, then, to draw attention to a new U.S. Institute of Peace analysis of the competing pressures upon the incoming administration. The report, “Iraq in the Obama Administration,” is based upon the work of the expert working groups that originally supported the 2006 Iraq Study Group, which was co-chaired by Lee Hamilton and James Baker. Although the ISG itself ceased operations after its December 2006 report, USIP's Daniel Serwer, who wrote the first response for this week's blog question, has kept the staff-level experts together to “offer occasional assessments and advice on the situation in Iraq.”

Thirty-two of those experts, including three of this week's commentators, participated in the discussions leading to the group's latest report, which, while acknowledging conflicting opinions about the future role of American troops in Iraq, offers 15 concrete recommendations to the administration and a warning that regardless of how quickly those troops are withdrawn, the “U.S. needs to mobilize more civilian effort immediately.”

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In the words of noted foreign policy analyst John Lennon, “Life is what happens to you while you’re busy making other plans.”  I believe that President-elect Obama’s campaign pledge to withdraw most combat forces from Iraq within 16 months will be overtaken by reality.  While Obama’s pledge made political sense when he was competing with the more hawkish Hillary Clinton for votes in the primaries, I think that as President, Obama will be forced to conclude that such a precipitous withdrawal would pull the rug out from under Iraq’s fragile governing coalition, squander the hard-won security gains of the last two years, and risk reinvigorating the sunni Arab insurgency as well as pro-Iranian Shia militias.  Iraq’s political timetable – provincial elections in January, the referendum on the SOFA in July, and national elections late next year – will put a premium on maintaining adequate U.S. forces to assure Iraq’s security.  On the other hand, the U.S. political timetable will lead Obama to press to withdraw as many troops as possible by the 2010 mid-term elections.  But the most important factor will be the security situation on the ground, which could deteriorate suddenly if the Shia-dominated government fails to broaden its base to attract more Sunni political support, the Mahdi Army returns with a vengeance, or simmering Kurdish-Arab-Turkmen tensions boil over regarding the status of Kirkuk or other issues.  Obama’s advisers, including Secretary of Defense Gates, NSC Adviser Jones, and Secretary of State Clinton, are likely to recommend a more cautious and gradual drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq than candidate Obama promised.  But as President, Obama cannot fall back on glib rhetoric about “ending” the war.  A sudden U.S. pullout would only intensify the fighting as violent Iraqi factions and their foreign backers struggled for supremacy.  The end result would be a humanitarian catastrophe.  And that is not change that we can believe in.             

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Both the incoming and outgoing Administrations share a fundamental misconception regarding the presence of our military forces in Iraq. They believe that the majority of both Iraqis and the governments in the region want U.S. forces out as rapidly as possible. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The invasion of Iraq overturned the admittedly fragile balance of power in that country and in the region as a whole. The only thing providing some stability, order and even focus of anger is the American presence in Iraq. Events will conspire to make it very difficult for the new Administration to successfully extricate itself from Iraq, even by the end of 2011.

The government of Iraq is fragile, at best. The factions that are represented in the government want a U.S. presence so long as it provides support for their continuation in power. So, they will be glad to see U.S. forces withdraw from the cities by June 2009 as called for in the Status of Forces agreement but no further. Residual U.S. forces are a guarantor of the Shia position in Iraq. They also understand that U.S. forces provide vital functions in support of the Iraqi security forces. This dependence will diminish only slightly between the end of 2008 and 2011.

Iraq’s Sunni minority requires the protection of the U.S. Without it, a real civil war is inevitable, one that the Sunni cannot win. The American presence is also the reason Washington has pressured Baghdad to provide a measure of liberty, access to resources and a role in the government and parliament to the Sunnis.

Iran too needs a U.S. military presence in Iraq. Iran’s identity and the legitimacy of the 1979 Revolution are closely tied to its role as opponent of the Great Satan. The American presence on the soil of the Middle East enables the current regime in Teheran to maintain its stranglehold on power. In addition, American forces are a potential target for Iranian retaliation in the event Washington or Tel Aviv decides to take out Iran’s nuclear production capability. Iran needs an enduring American ground force presence in Iraq.

U.S. allies in the region also do not want the U.S. to completely leave Iraq. They have to confidence that the government in Baghdad can maintain control over the country. Turkey sees the U.S. as the only force capable of preventing Kurdish independence. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States believe that absent the U.S. Iran will expand its control over Iraq and threaten their security.

So, one or perhaps all of these groups will act to prevent the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. With luck, we may be able to reduce our presence by about half, to 75,000 or so. After that, all bets are off. Look for things in Iraq to deteriorate in 2010.

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On this topic, from today's Christian Science Monitor :

"....So when US troops withdraw to their bases next June under an agreement with the Iraqi government, there's a good chance they will stay put in Mosul...."

The full story is available online at www.csmonitor.com/2008/1217/p01s01-wome.html

I returned from a two week trip to Iraq and Afghanistan last month. While there I observed the state of conflict in both regions. What I witnessed has convinced me more than ever of two facts each driven by “ground truth.”

First, our mission in Iraq is winding down very quickly and it’s time to get on with handing over the serious business of ground combat to the Iraqis beginning immediately. The Iraqi units I saw in action weren’t exactly the 101st Airborne but they were passably competent in the essential tasks necessary for sustained tactical combat. I’m not convinced that we should continue to lead by example using full brigade combat teams in Iraq. What we need there now are really competent advisor teams willing to train, advise and then accompany their Iraqi charges into combat. The real unknown for the future is whether the Iraqi Army will act as a bonding agent for Iraqi nationalism or fracture into conflicting sectarian armed groups. I don’t think a fractured military is in the cards but a continued U S military presence will not affect the outcome to any degree.  

Second, seeing both theaters of war convinced me that there is an enormous asymmetry in ends and means between Iraq and Afghanistan. The issue for now in Afghanistan doesn’t seem to be brigade combat teams but material resources. One theater is rich, one is poor. Afghanistan lacks the basics for success: helicopters, UAVs, communications, and most of all competent advisors capable of not only training but sustaining the Afghan Army in the field. If the President is serious about Afghanistan he must begin to shift resources there immediately.

We always taught in the war college the importance of balancing ends and means in war. Right now they are out of balance: too much doing too little in Iraq and too little doing trying to do too much in Afghanistan. Let’s accelerate our withdrawal from Iraq consistent with conditions on the ground and demonstrate our commitment to the Afghans with resources and trainers rather than just brigades. Also of course an accelerated withdrawal will offer our terribly overstretched Army and Marine Corps time between deployments to tend to their families and time to study and reflect on their experiences.

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We cannot, and will not, pull all our troops from Iraq in sixteen months, not even all our combat troops. We need  troops to protect Iraq's borders, both from the predations of others as well as to reassure Iraq's neighbors that Baghdad will not once again threaten or actually attack them with its troops or missiles. Middle Easterners have long memories, and those of Iraqi aggressive behavior  in the nearly half century that began in the  'forties (against Israel), and continued into the 'sixties (agianst Kuwait), the 'seventies (again against Israel) 'eighties  (against Iran), and the nineties (Kuwait, Bharain, Saudi Arabia, Israel) remain as fresh as today's news. Note that Saddam was not Iraq's leader during this entire period. That fact too is not lost in Iraq's neighbors.

There is another reason to keep our troops in Iraq: we must ensure, as only we can, that the Kurds do not delcare independence. Any such move to create an independent Kurdistan will guarantee a powerful Turkish and Iranian reaction, as well as unite Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis agianst their northern neighbors. The result will be a conflagration far worse than any of the recent Gulf Wars.

Many observers, myself included, once felt that no less than 70,000 troops had to remain in Iraq for the indefinite future. In light of the successof the surge, and political developments inside Iraq, a tripwire of some 30,000 troops could suffice. Removing all troops is an invitation to chaos, however.

But we need to be under no illusions about Iraq. The Iraqis do not want us there. For that reason, we are asking for toruble by having a huge embassy complex-- a veritable fortress-- in the heart of Baghdad.We seem to have forgotten the lessons of Tehran and Islamabad in the late 1970s

In addition, it is time to stop fooling ourselves about reconstructing, or transforming (pick your buzzword), the Iraqi polity. By now we should recognize that the Iraqis neither attach the same importance to democracy as we do, nor do they define it the same way.  The ordinary Iraqi has other priorities--freedom of religion, food for the famiy, a roof over one's head. For such people, democracy is a luxury, not a necessity.

While  Iran thus far appears to have been the real winner in Iraq, most Iraqis resent the Iranians more than they resent us. The sooner we lower our profile in Iraq, the sooner the Iraqis will turn on Tehran's stooges in Baghdad and elsewhere. But a lower profile does not mean no profile; whatever the rightsof wrongs of our remaining in Iraq for so long, we are there, and we have to ensure that our one real success--terminating Iraq's previous aggressive impulses against a half-dozen neighbors--is not undone by a withdrawal as ill-thought through as our original decision to remain in Iraq in order to transform its unwilling society in our own image.

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I don't see any reason not to take the Obama Administration at its word that they'll be out of Iraq in 16 months.  They've said it's the wrong war, that fighting in Iraq actually increased the risk to the US, they need the troops for Afghanistan, and they need the money for his domestic programs.  Gates and Jones have given him the political cover to claim he's doing it sensibly, the Iraqis look more and more ungrateful, 70% of the country wats this over..what's in it for reversing himself?  They understanably think they have a mandate to do this. 

Obama came to national attention for arguing we shouldn't have invaded Iraq, and he's never had to explain how he would manage a Saddam Hussein that not only had chemical weapons, that not only used them on an enemy, but that used them again his own subjects.  They'll pull out of Iraq as fast as they can without Petraeus resigning. 

The only thing that will restrain the pace is if they fear losing the military as a constituency and by extension that Democrats can't be trusted with national security  -- which gives the military enormous influence over the pace. Because despite all the Bush Administration's bungling, our military figured out how to win this war, and they are winning it.  The only risk to Obama of withdrawal is the military resenting him choosing to give up a war we're winning.

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Whatever the flaws with the recently-signed SOFA, and there are many, one positive was that the Bush Administration, after years of resistance, finally accepted the necessity of a timeline for the redeployment of U.S. troops out of Iraq.  This long overdue acceptance is necessary to relieve the strain on U.S. forces, to free up some of those forces for service in Afghanistan, and to allow the U.S. to maintain ready forces as a strategic hedge in case of unforeseen conflicts.  Having said that, while I am hopeful that the vast majority of troops are out of Iraq within 16 months, I believe there are two reasons that we will not have reduced our troop level to zero by the end of that time.

It pains me to disagree with my good friend Larry Korb, but I do not believe that we can support a move of all U.S. combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months. While Larry is right that we will only have around 14 combat brigades in Iraq by the end of January, we will still have over 30 brigades or brigade equivalents overall in country.  Presumably we would withdraw these other supporting units while we withdrew combat brigades—I think it highly unlikely we would leave support units in a much safer, but still very dangerous Iraq without some combat forces for protection—and we do not have the logistics capacity to do that all in 16 months.  I asked my staff on the House Armed Services Committee to travel to Iraq last year and to, among other things, look at planning for a redeployment from Iraq.  They came up with a back of the envelope estimate of just over two years, given the logistics.  We could speed that up by leaving large amounts of noncombat equipment behind, but that would increase the overall cost of the redeployment and reset and would add to the difficulty of preparing our forces for a future conflict or service in Afghanistan.  As has been mentioned by others, the SOFA also requires us to move combat forces out of Iraqi cities and towns, and it is unclear what impact this will have both on overall planning for a redeployment and on the actual execution—for example, assets involved in moving a combat brigade that will stay in Iraq out of downtown Iraq and into a base in the desert are not available to take another brigade south through Kuwait.

I also agree with Bing West when he talks about follow on forces conducting training.  The units currently partnering with Iraqi Security Forces to further the training of the ISF and carrying out operations with those units are combat forces, and it is likely that such an effort will carry on past the 16 month deadline, no matter what label we use for those units.  In my view, continuing to provide some training and support for the Iraqi Security Forces into the future is a responsible policy.  I think this for several reasons—first, we do owe it to the Iraqi people.  We defeated and then disbanded the Iraqi Army, and we cannot leave Iraq without defenses from external threat.  Secondly, this will reassure our allies in the region that our redeployment, while certain, is not irrational and that we are committed to Iraq’s security and theirs as well.  Third, Bing West is also right when he criticizes the Maliki government.  Training, equipping, supporting, and partnering with Iraqi units will provide us with some leverage over the actions of the Iraqi government.  While the Bush Administration has, to date, never apparently used such leverage, I hope the Obama Administration will not hesitate to do so. 

In short, I do not believe that all combat forces will be out in 16 months, although some of the ones that remain might be relabeled as “trainers”.  I think we will probably have tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for the duration of the SOFA, and it is possible some number in Iraq after that point (although this is up to the Iraqis themselves).  Nonetheless, I am incredibly encouraged that President-elect Obama has recognized, as the Bush Administration never did, that Iraq is not the most important theater in the fight against Al Qaeda and that we must begin to rebuild our overworked and abused military to prepare for future threats.

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The debate over withdrawal of American forces from Iraq has effectively ended:  Troops will begin withdrawing in early 2009.  The withdrawal will be complete somewhere between mid-2010 and the end of 2011, in accord with the expressed determination of the incoming Obama administration and the wishes of the Iraqi government.  The pace of withdrawal will depend on local security conditions.  If the security situation continues to improve, the withdrawal may accelerate.  However, if the security situation sharply deteriorates, the withdrawal is unlikely to be reversed.  There will be no second surge.

What is not yet entirely clear is what type of residual American force may remain in Iraq.  President-elect Obama’s commitment to withdrawal in 16 months refers only to American combat forces, which constitute only about a third of the total force, although presumably some support troops will come home with them.  That still leaves a sizeable American military contingent of as many as 70,000 or 90,000 troops remaining at bases in Iraq.  The Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States is appropriately blurry on this point.

The residual forces could continue to train and support Iraqi forces, in accord with our current long-term strategy, but by their very presence they would bolster democratic institutions.  They also might protect Sunni and Kurd minorities, protect Iraq and its Arab neighbors against possible Iranian aggression, and protect Iraq’s neighbors against any potential future Iraqi aggression.

 Their presence would signal America’s commitment to keep vital sea lanes open.  If Iraq goes nuclear (or ambiguously edges closer and closer to nuclear weapons status without announcing or testing a nuclear bomb), a nearby American presence might help discourage threatened Arab governments from starting their own nuclear programs.

But anything less than full withdrawal (except for a tiny training contingent) may not satisfy Americans who want out of Iraq, or the Iraqis, who may regard any American presence as a limitation to their sovereignty.  Moreover, the violence in Iraq, although it has declined, will almost certainly continue. Americans will remain targets of al Qa’ida-affiliated terrorists. And if antagonisms between the United States and Iran are not reduced, Americans in Iraq could be targets of Iranian-backed terrorists.  It ain’t over yet.

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On this very subject, from this morning's Washington Post, some new poll results:

"Americans are more upbeat about U.S. prospects in Iraq than at any time in the past five years, but nearly two-thirds continue to believe the war is not worth fighting and 70 percent say President-elect Barack Obama should fulfill his campaign promise to withdraw U.S. forces from the country within 16 months, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll....."

The full story is online.

The United States needs to get out of Iraq. America’s approach to the social, political and economic transformation of Iraq through military occupation whether through the use of violence or cash payments for cooperation is illogical and unsupportable. It is altruistic imperialism, or benevolent territorial imperialism, a condition under which Americans in uniform seek to impose American concepts of governance in a cultural setting where these concepts are unworkable, if not completely irrelevant.

Ultimately, for reasons of finance and an acute lack of domestic political support the United States Government must eventually walk away from Iraq allowing it to devolve back to the mean for the Arab World. In Iraq, American withdrawal will witness the permanent installation of “Sharia Democracy” as oxymoronic as that sounds, a dictatorship of the majority where there is a kind of “rule of law,” but not the secular law America sacrificed 800 billion dollars and 36,000 battle casualties to get.

The sad truth is Iran’s Arab allies in Iraq will shape the destiny of Iraq, not American military power. The “winner takes all culture” of Arab politics guarantees that control of Baghdad and Arab Iraq will rest permanently in the hands of Tehran’s Shiite Arab allies, especially the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). Arab political culture also consigns the Sunni Arabs who elect to stay inside the country to second class citizenship inside the new Iraq. Understanding this reality helps to explain the reluctance of 2 million Iraqi Arab refugees living in Syria and Jordan to return to their homes in Iraq.

 Whether the Shiite dictatorship can contain the territorial ambitions of the de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq is, however, open to debate. It seems certain that the Kurdish Peshmurga; a battle hardened force stronger and more capable than Iraq’s Security Forces, will reassert Kurdish control of Kirkuk and the Northern oil fields in the aftermath of U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq’s cities next summer. The possibility that these events will trigger Turkish military intervention to prevent oil revenues from funding Kurdish terrorism against Turkey should not be underestimated. Bottom line: As long as U.S. Forces are in Iraq, the probability of American military confrontation with the forces struggling for power inside Iraq, even the Turks if they intervene, will be high.

 No wonder President-elect Obama is under pressure from those inside the Beltway who fear the inevitable exposure of America’s failed nation building experiment in Iraq will create. In addition, the truth of Iranian strategic dominance in Iraq will become impossible to conceal from the American public.

 Among those most committed to permanently garrisoning Iraq are many, if not most of the Army generals, active and retired. They know the current status quo in Iraq will not survive the withdrawal of U.S. Military and would prefer to maintain the façade as long as possible regardless of the cost to the American people. Moreover, without the requirement to garrison Iraq, there is no justification for an increase in the size of U.S. Ground Forces.

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Regardless of whatever may or may not have been said during the campaign, the US objective should be to leave behind an Iraq intact behind its internationally recognized borders, under the rule of law and in a state of relatively quiescent relations with its neighbors.  To that end a gradual withdrawal of  US forces and ultimately of nearly all non-diplomatic military personnel is appropriate.  Nearly all ground combat units should be out of the country by the 2010 congressional elections.  Some advisory, supply, and security forces will have to stay longer but the end of Obama's first term should correspond with the end of an American presence.

The Middle East is ready for a variety of diplomatic solutions to long standing problems.  Let the diplomacy begin!

It is far more important that President Obama understand why he should lead America out of its occupation of Iraq than what schedule he puts the withdrawal on.  Today, it is unclear whether he has as clear a view of the reasons as he did before he became a United States Senator, and his statements during the presidential campaign bring on added fog.

Recall the basics: the American contractor and military presence in Iraq is an occupation of a culturally, religiously, ethnically alien land with a long history of deep aniimosity to Westerners.  The deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians as a result of the occupation has left no doubt about that in Iraq.  The overall effect has been to strengthen our opponents, such as Iran, and to raise doubts in the minds of those in the world who might otherwise be sympathetic to us.  To suggest that the quite minor "surge" in US troop numbers and some alteration in tactics (deemed "counterinsirgency" by Washington bloviators) is the cause of the reduced violence in Iraq tells us more about Americans' view of (rather blindness toward) the world than it does about events in Iraq.  In fact, pretending that the "surge" has brought us to the brink of "victory" in Iraq reveals the same blindness and self-absorption that made us think that invading was a reasonable idea in the first place - with or without the belief that Saddam Hussein had any weapons of mass destruction.

How fast should the US withdraw from Iraq be?  Given the circumstances and the effects on America's security, fast is hardly fast enough.

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Although a bit off topic, Ms. Kleinfeld's suggestion that we not send more troops to Afghanistan tends to support the quite erroneous idea that anything was ever possible in Afghanistan save the military annihilation of our only two genuine national-security concerns in that country, the Taleban and al-Qaeda.

The glittering horse we have been and are betting on -- the building of strong central government, military, and police institutions -- is precisely the one that causes endless war and civil war in Afghanistan. The goal of centralizing Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai -- who is abhorred by most non-westernized Afghans, and by all of the guys carrying AKs -- has been the death knell of our Hindu Kush adventure from the beginning. Indeed, our efforts to train the Afghan army and police will yield, first, many well-trained men who will return to the mujahedin to fight the U.S.-NATO coalition, and, second, better trained and equipped ethnic warriors for the civil war that will intensify after NATO is defeated. Ethnic, tribal, and clan loyalties in Afghanistan always have and will trump any sort of national feeling, unless of course there is an infidel occupier to generate the latter.

Afghanistan is a war zone.  It is not a laboratory for "improving" Afghan society and spreading secular democracy and, even more ludicrous, women’s' rights. Sadly for the United States, the war is lost. We had a fifteen-month window for effective savagery after 9/11, but we instead chose to nation-build in a manner devoid of even the barest knowledge of Afghan history and traditions, or of the actions and subsequent disasters of Afghanistan's multiple other infidel invaders. In a short time we will withdraw from Afghanistan -- obviously defeated and in an attempt to maintain Pakistan's viability as a nation-state.  One wonders if Washington will ever learn that when a person or nation ignores what history shows has failed repeatedly in the past, the result is a pathetic and well-deserved defeat.

.         

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Withdrawal is a dangerous occupation, and it is likely that Obama's pragmatism will lead him to withdraw troops based on a triangulation of events on the ground, his own campaign promises, and the Status of Forces Agreement which, by Iraqi law, mandates troops leaving by 2011.  It is equally likely that the U.S. works with Iraq to find a method by which some residual force can remain to fight guerilla remnants and extremists.  

However, leaving the timeline solely up to events on the ground as some other commentators here suggest allows Iraqi politicians and extremists to hold U.S. troops hostage through their action, or inaction.  U.S. troops play a role in Iraqi's political calculations.  We should not forget that in Vietnam, the south Vietnamese government went so far as to pretend ammunition shortages and hold back much of its ammo at the end of the war, in an attempt to re-energize U.S. intervention, fiddling and in-fighting while their country burned out of a deep belief that the U.S. would rescue them.  Our troops should not be  a political football for Iraqi politicians.  Nor should they become an excuse for the Iraqi government or military to fail to govern their own country.

One campaign promise I hope the Obama team reconsiders is moving troops out of Iraq in order to move them into Afghanistan.  Focus on the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan is essential.  More troops, however, are very unlikely to be the answer.  The mountainous, cavernous, cave-pocked terrain and deep anti-foreign sentiment and conservativism of many Afghan tribes play against the U.S. military's comparative advantage.  A better strategy is essential in Afghanistan.  The right mix of troops, with the right aims, are crucial.  But equally important is improving the way the state is governed by civilians, so that it can fulfill the basic role of a state: ensuring security, while reducing the hated corruption.  More U.S. troops, and troops that prop up an unpopular government can spark backlash and may endanger U.S. service members while doing more harm than good.  

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 One of the problems of age and health is a long memory.  Mine goes back to 1968/69 when Richard Nixon promised his new Administration would get us quickly out of Vietnam.  Then reality intervened and we left in January 1973.  We also saw North Vietnam breaking through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon in April 1975.

I take this little trip down memory lane to remind us that campaign promises -- no matter how sincerely made -- run up against the harsh realities of life.  While there maybe a SOFA in place and a leader in Malaki, we are one bullet or car bomb away from that not being the case.  What if, beyond the extreme scenario before, the Iraq government gets nervous about its fate in general and wants us to stay beyond 2011.  Are we going to complete a withdrawal under those circumstances?  Likely not. The question of who lost Iraq is not one any current or future president would like to address.

My bottom line:  we will stay in Iraq well past Obama's first term with a substantial number of troops in place.  How many that will be remains anyone's guess.  But, I would venture to say you will be seeing US troops supporting patrols in Baghdad in 2012.  

Dates and pace of any U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will still be dictated by events on the ground and Iraqi sensibilities about US troops.  Once he is sworn in, President Obama will be no more eager to lose the war than George Bush, and he will use the many loopholes in the status of forces agreement to iinsure that Iraq is not lost onn his watch. 

That said, he is very fortunate that conditions in Iraq have so dramatically changed for the better since he took his original, and irresponsible, position on withdrawal early in his campaign.  When he takes office, he'll inherit favorable trends in a war that will probably allow him to keep his promises -- roughly -- and get the "combat brigades" out, while leaving a substrantial advisory effort (that will include some combat troops for security).

It's outside the scope of this question, but his real challenge is going to be Afghanistan-Pakistan.  In his campaign, Afghanistan was the "good" war, usually mentioned in a throwaway line to contrast Iraq as a "bad" war and Bush's blunder.  It won't be long -- in fact we're hearing it already -- before Afghanistan becomes "bad" as well -- unwinnable, a black hole for American  investment, a weak and corrupt government and so forth -- and the Left begins to press for American withdrawal.  My guess is that within a year, and if he acts responsibly, Obama will be vilified by the Michael Moore wing as a turncoat and a warmonger, but doing anything but commiting to a long war in that part of the world will endanger not only liberalization of Afghnistan, but the very existence of Pakistan as a democratic country as well. 

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By whatever name or size that our military forces are called and deployed, they will remain in Iraq for some time to come—certainly longer than 16 months—as it is clearly in the American interest to deftly encourage the fragile stability that now exists in Iraq. Withdrawing military troops, however, is the easy part. The real question is not about the withdrawal of our hard power from Iraq, but the capacity of our soft power to act in an integrated fashion that deepens and expands this fragile stability in a manner perceived as legitimate by the Iraqi government and people. Striking the right hard-soft balance as we encourage a non-authoritarian and stable government in Iraq will take a great deal of nuance. If the stability deepens, however, the American public will continue to give their new president the benefit-of-the-doubt, trusting his judgment.

That said, a military withdrawal timeline—no matter how often it is tweaked/extended per reality—serves both the U.S. and Iraqi governments. On the American side, we do not have the troops, time, or money to continue current Iraqi operations, and ramp up in Afghanistan (per the president-elect’s campaign promises). If we plus up our hard power in Afghanistan (which might be more significant than we thought, should Pakistan re-deploy its troops along the Afghan border to the Indian border), it stands to reason that we will have to be better at our soft power in Iraq.

Finally, on the Iraqi side, nothing concentrates the mind like a deadline. If the Iraqi government is smart, it will take political credit for “sending the Americans home” (most of the visible ones, anyway). With their resulting credibility—something enhanced by the government’s continued use of American soft power dollars—the Iraqi government will gain more time to deal with the very serious issues they still face.

The first test of this overall process will be this summer, when activity traditionally spikes with more heat and less air conditioning. If the Iraqi government can provide more security and more electricity, then a sustainable victory might be in sight.

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When President-elect Obama made his campaign promise to withdraw all combat brigades from Iraq within 16 months, at the rate of one to two brigades a month, there were 20 combat brigades, consisting of about 70,000 troops in Iraq, and he was roundly criticized on two grounds. First, he was called a defeatist for setting a timetable for withdrawal. Second, he was called logistically naïve for thinking that he could remove that many troops in such a short period of time.

The SOFA, which was agreed to by the Bush administration and the Maliki government undermines the first criticism. This agreement mandates that all U.S. troops must leave Iraq by the end of 2011. When the SOFA takes effect there will be the equivalent of 50 brigades (combat and support) in Iraq. Therefore, about one or two brigades per month will have to be withdrawn over the next 36 months to meet the SOFA timetable.

More importantly, the SOFA stipulates that all American troops must withdraw from all Iraqi cities and towns by the end of June 2009. What then will be their mission? What is the purpose of the combat brigades if they can only leave their bases to conduct operations with the permission of the Iraqi government?

Finally, Bush’s SOFA is even more radical than Obama’s plan. After completing the withdrawal of the combat troops, Obama had planned to leave a residual force of about 50,000 troops for an indeterminate time to go after Al-Qaeda and protect American officials. The SOFA does not allow any Americans to remain.

The logistic complaint is also without merit. When Obama takes office there will be only 14 brigades combat consisting of about 50,000 troops remaining in Iraq, down from 20 brigades in 2004. In 2004, the U.S. moved 200,000 troops and their equipment in and out of Iraq within three months. Using that as a baseline, we demonstrated in our recent report, How to Redeploy, that all combat troops and their vital equipment can be safely withdrawn within 8 to 10 months.

There is no doubt that some military and civilian bureaucrats will try to slow down the Obama timetable. General Odierno, the Commander of all our forces in Iraq, has already said that the June 30, 2009 deadline to remove all American troops from the cities and towns may be altered. But Obama needs to keep in mind that if he backs off his campaign promise it can have profound, negative consequences for our overall security interests.

It will reinforce the Al-Qaeda narrative that the U.S. is an occupying power, decrease incentives for the Iraqi political leaders to undertake meaningful political reconciliation, make it less likely that the Iraqi people will vote to approve the SOFA, make it more difficult to send the required number of troops to Afghanistan without putting further stress on our ground troops, and slow down the process of resetting the equipment for the Army and Marines.

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It is hard to imagine why anyone would expect a substantial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq during the Obama or any other administration. Several factors will prevent the promise from becoming a reality.

1.) We destroyed our most important ally against the Sunni jihadists, namely Saddam Hussein. As long as Saddam was in power, the jihadis were stuck in South Asia. Without Saddam, they have moved 2,500 kilometers westward. The lethal and cost-effective effective -- it cost America nothing -- Saddam bulwark is gone. No one can take his place. Mr. Bush never accepted this. Mr. Obama will be forced to accept it and so will leave most U.S. troops there to provide at least an inferior version of the anti-jihadi blockade that Saddam once mounted.

2.) The success of the surge has been vastly overestimated and cynically exploited by both U.S. political parties for partisan electoral advantage. The surge created a lull -- not victory -- which is even now beginning to unravel. As Mr. Maliki and company continue to harshly treat the Awakening lads, the Sunni insurgency will be reactivated and its leaders will welcome the return of al-Qaeda fighters -- they will need and accept help from any and all quarters -- under the leadership of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. Unfortunately, the necessary killing by U.S. forces of al-Qaeda's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi eliminated the only strategic threat to al-Qaeda since 9/11 and was the indispensable first step toward the rehabilitation of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

3.) The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq compromised Israel's security, and the full or near-full withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country will ensure the definitive if long-term cooking of Israel's goose. Indeed, one result of the over-hyped surge has been the movement of non-Iraqi Sunni mujahedin across Iraq's western border to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Gaza, in essence allowing jihadi leaders to draw ever closer to Israeli territory. This tightening Sunni ring around Israel would accelerate if U.S. forces withdraw, and so there will be no major U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.

4.) Any government we leave behind in Iraq will be anti-Israeli; no regime could survive if it did not punch the anti-Israel ticket. U.S. troops will have to remain to try to keep the Iraqi Shia regime from becoming too deeply involved in anti-Israeli activities.

5.) If most U.S. troops are removed from Iraq there will be a Sunni-Shia civil war. Iran would side with Iraq's Shia and Iraq's Sunnis would be aided by Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda, the other Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, and wealthy Muslims from across the ummah. From the U.S. perspective this would be no bad thing as long as oil supplies were not badly disrupted; it is much better for Muslims to be killing Muslims -- indeed, they should be covertly encouraged or tricked into doing so -- than for Muslims to be killing Americans. The U.S. governing elite's fear of such a war, however, ensures that most of the current U.S. garrison in Iraq will remain to referee, and therefore America will continue to bleed lives and treasure.

There are of course circumstances in which a major withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq could occur. A not-altogether-unlikely emergency requirement for large numbers of U.S. combat troops in Afghanistan would be one such circumstance; others might include the disruption of oil production in either Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province or in the Niger Delta, or the clean-up tasks that would arise after a greater-than-9/11 al-Qaeda attack in CONUS. But without these unexpected demands, the U.S. troop total in Iraq will not decrease substantially over Mr. Obama's term because of (a) the vast and deliberate overestimate of the surge's impact; (b) the spreading geographical base of Sunni jihadism thanks to Saddam's removal and the U.S.-led war in Iraq; and (c) the U.S. governing elite's idiot belief that U.S. and Israeli national security interests are identical.

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 Obama’s plan for withdrawal may have placated a restive anti-war movement and solidified political support for his candidacy, but it had nothing to do with crafting a sensible plan for reducing the American military presence in Iraq. But that was then and now is now. Reality has caught-up with rhetoric and a drawdown of US forces is now sensible and desirable—because, thanks to the fact that the administration ignored proposals like those made by the president-elect, Iraqis are increasingly capable of looking after their own future.

That said, it would still be stupid to follow a Lemming-like timeline. Presidents must respond to the global situation they face, even if that means flouting political promises they made in Iowa many, many months before. Events on the ground — not politics in Washington — must drive the new administration’s decisions That is the reality of international affairs. America can’t just impose its wishes on the world. The rest of the world gets a vote in how things turn out.

Rather than a concrete plan with irrevocable promises, what is needed now is strategy flexible enough to keep the positive momentum going regardless of what curveballs an enemy might throw—a strategy that continues to stem the violence, keeps Al Qaeda on its heels, frustrates Iran’s hope to dominate the country, and nurtures hopes for establishing a stable state (where reporters can practice the freedom of throwing shoes at elected leaders without being summarily shot).

So if Obama wants to lead, he needs to start by turning his back on the anti-war movement that helped get him elected. That’s OK—it’s a spent force anyway. Anti-war movements never share any political coherence. All they have in common is opposition to the war. When that cause goes away, the movement will fall apart. This is already happening with the anti-Iraq war movement. 

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President-elect Obama should be pleased with the U.S.-Iraqi status of forces agreement, and should wish it well when it comes before the Iraqi people in a referendum.  The agreement gives him credible cover for making adjustments to the withdrawal timetable he laid out during the campaign, should he and his military and civilian advisers consider such adjustments prudent.  If U.S. combat forces linger beyond the 16-month period of which Mr. Obama spoke, he can say--quite credibly and honestly--that this is an adaptation to circumstances on the ground and that, given the U.S.-Iraqi agreement, no one should mistake such an adjustment for an indefinite kicking of the can down the road.  The United States and Iraq have reached an agreement, and U.S. forces will be leaving Iraq.  The acceptance by the outgoing administration of any withdrawal timetable at all (after long denouncing the very idea of such a timetable) was a huge concession to Mr. Obama's position on the war--much more important than the specific dates on the timetable.  I expect that come 2010 there will be some such adjustments.  The blurry distinction between combat forces and other U.S. forces (which candidate Obama never said should be withdrawn entirely) provides additional room for prudent and justifiable fudging of withdrawal schedules.

In comparing the different withdrawal dates implied by a presidential candidate's position and the newly negotiated agreement, some perspective is in order.  I find it difficult to believe that the difference between U.S. forces fighting in Iraq for 7 years and 2 months (i.e., until May 2010, which is 16 months from the inauguration) and fighting there for 8 years and 9 months (until December 2011, the deadline in the U.S.-Iraqi agreement) is a make-or-break difference.  Of course, one can point to a coming Iraqi election or some other hump to get over.  But there always are more humps, and more horizons.  We have been through all this before with the various humps (elections, transfer of sovereignty, etc.) in the first couple of years of the war.

Another bit of perspective (coming from a U.S. citizen, in a comment that probably would sound harsh to Iraqi ears) is that the decisions of the new administation should be based on U.S. interests, not Iraqi interests.  Talk of what is or is not realistic regarding withdrawal timetables tends to focus on such issues as stability within Iraq and the prospects for escalated civil war. Important stuff, to be sure, but by no means the totality of U.S. interests that have been profoundly affected, and continue to be affected, by the Iraq War.  There are all the broader effects, such as on extremism and on the standing of the United States in the world, and there is the direct expenditure of American blood and treasure, not to mention the more recent concern with having enough troops to accomplish a mission in Afghanistan.  It would be better for U.S. forces to withdraw sooner rather than later from Iraq, for the reasons Bing West mentioned and many others as well.  In doing so, the United States can hold its head at least as high as it could have if during the Vietnam War it had followed George Aiken's advice simply to declare victory and get out.  American forces have freed Iraqis from a horrid dictatorship and already have done far more than what the people of one nation can be expected to owe the people of another nation.  That fact is more important than whether their mission formally concludes in May 2010, December 2011, or somewhere in between.                              

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Assuming the referendum goes through, the United States is not likely to have all its forces out of Iraq (and let's get rid of the term "combat brigades" if we can and just talk about brigades) in the next 16 months.  The demand for training will remain high, as will the heavy demand for SOF and high mobility forces as backup.  Ideally these forces would largely be in the background and most of the visible roles would be played by Iraqi military and police forces.  But effective training takes a long time, and delays and slips are almost inevitable, particularly if violence flares up from one faction or another.

Politically, however, a significant drawdown should take much of the heat out of this issue in both Iraq and the United States.  If the United States is clearly seen to be on its way out, whether there are 15 brigades or 10 will not make a tremendous difference to the publics of both countries.  Leaders in both countries can credibly claim that the occupation is ending and that the Iraqis are now in charge of their own security.

The sooner our combat troops are withdrawn, the better. The military war ended a year ago. Al Qaeda, our mortal enemy, has suffered a sharp defeat in Iraq, earning the enmity of the Sunnis. Many of our troops are bored. Rifle platoons are not organized and trained to rebuild nations whose sovereign leaders resist reforms.

Our troops aren’t engaged in firefights; instead, they act as the buffer between the Sunnis who had been resisting and the Shiite-dominated government brought to power by the US. The freedom extolled by President Bush threatens to create the tyranny of the majority in Iraq. Political compromise is as rare as an honest official. Our forces are sustaining a resentful Maliki government that seems heedless its own fragility. Justifiable distrust of the serpentine Maliki-led central government is slowing the pace of withdrawals. In essence, the interactions of our troops with the Sunni Sons of Iraq, the Iraqi Army, the police and ordinary citizens are preventing the Maliki government from acting on its worst instincts.

The President-elect has selected a conservative, experienced national security team. The person best able to judge the pace of withdrawal and the resultant degree of risk is Gen. Odierno. The Crocker and Odierno teams in-country understand the ironies and risks better than anyone else. We have to get through three elections in Iraq that offer the hope of elections politicians more responsive to the people who elected them. So the pace of withdrawal may seem slow during 2009, and then will pick up steam during 2010.

It’s reasonable that within 18 months, most of our “combat” troops will be out of Iraq. But we should be wary of labels. Our combat brigades can withdraw, while leaving behind units with different names that still quack like a duck. All marines, for instance, are riflemen, and the US Army is adapting a similar philosophy. Rifle platoons may morph into “training teams”, allowing President Obama to meet his campaign pledge while permitting our commanders to take sensible precautions. We will probably go from about 149,000 today to less than 90,000 by the end of 2010. Another 30,000 might depart in 2011..

Certainly, there will be crises along the way. But the impact of a crisis is influenced by the amount of press coverage, or lack thereof. Led by the New York Times, the mainstream media, sympathetic to the new administration, will consign Iraq to a few paragraphs on page 15, below the fold. Front-page coverage will not be given to every setback, allowing the new administration to concentrate upon policy more than perceptions.

Iraq, however, cannot sustain security without the aid and the psychological reassurance of about 50,000 American troops for the next five years. They will provide intelligence, surveillance, airspace control, anti-terrorist forces, training and logistical support. They should not persist with economic development and reconstruction tasks in Iraq. And as we send more combat brigades into Afghanistan, our military should not repeat the Iraq model and again become the nation-building force. Mission creep has gone too far. Our military should focus on security, and the State Department on politics.

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President-elect Obama's campaign promises related to a rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq might well be difficult to effect, but serious consideration probably will have to be given to hewing to a schedule of withdrawal considerably more rapid than that contained in the U.S.-Iraqi agreement concluded earlier this month that allows for a U.S. withdrawal through the end of 2011.

That agreement is not a done deal: it must be submitted to an Iraqi national referendum this July, and there are good reasons to believe that its passage is by no means assured. Should it fail to pass, experts agree that the U.S. suddenly would be confronted with a far more abbreviated period for withdrawal.

Another key deadline in that agreement is the requirement that all U.S. troops withdraw from inhabited areas of Iraq by June 2009. In many of these areas, U.S. troops are still separating hostile parties that were not politically reconciled as was hoped during the period of the surge. As U.S. forces pull out of such areas in the coming months, violence could well rebound.

A major decison must be made: should U.S. troops be withdrawn as rapidly as practicable in order to get as many as possible out of harm's way and so as to be in the best possible position to pull out quickly in the event of a failed referendum, or should substantial combat troops be retained in the country well into 2009--and possibly beyond--to address a potential rebound in violence? An effort to re-enter troubled areas to suppress a resurgence in violence caused by the Iraqi government's political failings would be costly and potentially open-ended. It is this writer's opinion that prudence dictates that the Obama Administration stick to a withdrawal schedule as close to its original intentions as is reasonably possible.

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It is anyone's guess what the President elect will do after inauguration, but here are some things he should keep in mind:

1. Predictable "hot" moments in Iraq over the next year: January 30 provincial elections (10 days after Inauguration!), withdrawal of US troops from population centers by the end of June, scheduled referendum on the SOFA in July, national elections in December.

2. Unpredictable "hot" moments: Kurds and Arabs have their troops facing off one day, signing an oil deal with the Turks the next day--hard to tell whether they are ready to embrace or kill each other.

3. Lots of tensions among Sunni and among Shia that could break out into serious violence, not to mention all those Sunni who want to go back to Shia majority neighborhoods and Shia who want to go back to Sunni majority neighborhoods.

None of this matters if you don't care what happens in Iraq, but a break down (more likely than a neat breakup) there would threaten not only oil supplies but regional stability--and open the door to a lot of bad guys. Do you really want to risk having to send the troops back in?

The president has to weigh that possibility against satisfying people who voted for him that he is doing what he said he would do, the need for more troops in Afghanistan, and the hope that withdrawal from Iraq will help restore US prestige worldwide. No wonder we pay him those big bucks!

PS: The President elect has not said all the troops are coming out. It is the agreement the Bush Administration negotiated with Iraq that says that. But no one believes it. Iraq is going to need a BIG military assistance mission after the combat brigades have come out. The odds on favorite is 30-50,000 for some time to come.

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